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ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST IN THE LOWER WORLD

BY

DANIEL SHEERIN

Ἡ τοῦ Προδρόμου ἔνδοξος ἀποτομὴ οἰκονομία γέγονέ τις θεϊκή,
ἵνα καὶ τοῖς ἐν Ἅιδῃ τοῦ σωτῆρος κηρύξῃ τὴν ἔλευσιν.
Romanus Melodus

The theme of John the Baptist's mission after death as precursor of Christ to the Underworld has been generally neglected or given only partial treatment in the literature concerning both John the Baptist as well as Christ's *descensus ad inferos*.[1] This note will attempt to document the genesis of this theme, to suggest the dimensions of its *fortleben* and use in exegesis.

The position of John the Baptist in the Gospels is an ambiguous one. He was given a pivotal place in salvation history, Ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται μέχρι Ἰωάννου· ἀπὸ τότε ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ εὐαγγελίζεται ... (Luc. 16,16). John is more than a prophet (Mt. 11,9; Luc. 7,26) and the greatest of men (Mt. 11,11; Luc. 7,28), but the fact remains that ὁ δὲ μικρότατος ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ μείζων αὐτοῦ ἐστιν (Mt. 11,11; Luc. 7,28). Hence arises the question, yet to be solved in any precise way, of the nature of John the Baptist's relationship to the Kingdom. An attempt was made in the ancient church to clarify John's place in salvation history by providing a role for him in the extension of salvation to those who died before the completion of redemption, Christ's *descensus ad inferos*.

[1] See J. Monnier, *La Descente aux enfers: Etude de pensée religeuse, d'art et de littérature* (Paris 1905) 117; L. Capéran, *Le problème du salut des infidèles, essai historique* (Paris 1912) I, 66–67; C. Schmidt, *Gespräche Jesu mit seinem Jüngern nach der Auferstehung*, Texte und Untersuchungen, 43 (Leipzig 1919) Exkurs II: "Der *Descensus ad inferos* in der alte Kirche", 507 (+n. 2), 541 (+n. 3), 574 (+n. 2); J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle: Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe* (Leipzig 1932) 89 (+n. 1), 99 (+n. 1), 107 (+n. 1); J. Daniélou, *Jean-Baptiste, Témoin de l'Agneau* (Paris 1964) 183.

I. Background

Following Grillmeier[2] one may divide the complexity of the *descensus* into three soteriological themes or aspects of Christ's activity in the Underworld: 1) Christ's preaching to the dead (the preaching theme, *Predigtmotiv*),[3] the oldest theme; 2) Christ's administration of baptism in the Underworld (the baptism theme, *Taufmotiv*);[4] and 3) Christ's subjugation of Hell and the liberation of the just (the battle theme, *Kampfmotiv*), the most common and enduring theme. The *descensus*, particularly in its preaching and baptism themes, was of central importance in Jewish Christianity in dealing with the matter of the salvation of the just who died before Christ.[5] These themes suggest an extension to the Underworld of an economy of salvation parallel to that which had been elaborated in the world of the living. This approach is to be found particularly in the Alexandrian church, in Clement, in Origen, as late as Ammonius, and elsewhere as well.[6] As controversy arose over the extent of the salvation of the dead, *sc.* whether Christ liberated all, sinner and just alike, whether He converted the sinner and the incredulous in the Underworld or liberated only those whose behaviour in this life warranted salvation, the preaching and baptism themes declined somewhat, generally leaving the field to the battle theme of the "Harrowing of Hell".[7] John

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[2] A. Grillmeier, Der Gottesohn im Totenreich, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 71 (1949) 4–5; *Christ in the Christian Tradition*, tr. J.S. Bowden (New York 1965) 87; Höllenabstieg Christi, Höllenfahrt Christi, *LexThK*, V, 453–454.

[3] U. Holzmeister, *Comm. in Epp. Ss. Petri et Iudae*, I (Paris 1937) 307, conveniently divides the preaching theme into three aspects, 1) preaching for conversion, 2) preaching as announcement of liberation, and 3) preaching of a condemnatory judgement.

[4] For the sources of the preaching and baptism themes see the note of J.B. Cotelier in his *S.S. Patrum ... Opera*, ed. Joannes Clericus (Antwerp 1698) 117–118; Grillmeier, *art. cit.*, nn.11 and 12; R. Cantalamessa, *L'Omelia "In S. Pascha" dello Pseudo-Ippolito di Roma* (Milan 1967) 246, n.176.

[5] See J. Daniélou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity*, tr. J.A. Baker (London 1964) 233 *sqq.*, and Cantalamessa, 245–253.

[6] See Clement, *Stromata* 6,6,48: οὐχὶ καὶ ἐν Ἅιδου ἡ αὐτὴ γέγονεν οἰκονομία; ἵνα κἀκεῖ πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀκούσασαι τοῦ κηρύγματος ἢ τὴν μετάνοιαν ἐνδείξωνται ἢ τὴν κόλασιν δικαίαν εἶναι, δι' ὧν οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν, ὁμολογήσωσιν (ed. L. Früchtel, GCS [Berlin 1960] 456,12–14). On this parallel economy of salvation on earth and in the lower world see Capéran, 63–70; Holzmeister, 327–328; W.J. Dalton, *Christ's Proclamation to the Spirits*, Analecta Biblica, 23 (Rome 1965) 16–18.

[7] On the controversy concerning the extension of salvation in the Lower World see Capéran, 51–132; Holzmeister, 323–337; Dalton, 16–20; J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd ed. (New York 1972) 380–382; J. Galot, La Descente du Christ aux enfers, *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 83 (1961) 481–482. On the character of this salvation see the materials collected by J.H. Waszink, *Tertulliani De anima* (Amsterdam 1947) 553–558.

Chrysostom speaks harshly against those who entertain any notion of conversion unto salvation after death.[8] Those holding the extreme position of universal salvation in the Lower World, called "Adecerditae" (Ἄδη κερδίται?) by the author of *Praedestinatus* (often identified with Julian of Aeclanum, *ob. post* 454),[9] were clearly regarded as heretics in the later 4th century. Filaster of Brescia includes them in his *Diversorum hereseon liber*:

> Alii sunt heretici qui dicunt dominum in infernum descendisse et omnibus post mortem etiam ibidem renuntiasse, ut confitentes ibidem saluarentur, cum hoc sit contrarium dicente propheta Dauid: In infernum autem quis confitebitur tibi? Et apostolus: Quotquot sine lege peccauerunt, sine lege peribunt.[10]

Augustine followed Filaster in his *De haeresibus*, ch. 79.[11] A celebrated letter of Gregory the Great[12] invokes both Filaster and Augustine against the position of the "Adecerditae". Gregory writes to George the priest and Theodore the deacon of Constantinople:

> Praeterea post discessum vestrum dilectissimis filiis meis diaconibus narrantibus agnovi, quod dilectio vestra dixisset omnipotentem dominum salvatorem nostrum Iesum Christum ad inferos descendentem omnes qui illic eum Deum confiterentur salvasse atque a poenis debitis liberasse (p. 458,14–17).

Against this position Gregory maintains: *Descendens quippe ad inferos solos illos per suam gratiam liberavit, qui eum et venturum esse crediderunt et praecepta eius vivendo tenuerunt* (*ibid.* 18–19). This suggests that some official consensus had been reached in the West and that some extreme position on the extension of the salvation wrought by Christ in Hell was still to be found in the East at the end of the sixth century.

II. The genesis of the motif of John's mission to the underworld

Now out of this early notion of a parallel economy of salvation, however imagined, to whomsoever extended, of those who died before

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[8] *Hom.* 36 *in Matthaeum*, PG 57,414–417; for Chrysostom's treatment of John the Baptist in this homily see below; see Capéran, 84–89.

[9] Ch. 79, PL 53,614B.

[10] Ch. 125,1–6, CCL 9,288.

[11] Ed. L. G. Muller, *The De haeresibus of St. Augustine*, Catholic Univ. of America Patristic Studies, 90 (Washington 1956) 114.

[12] *Ep.* 7,15, ed. L. Hartmann, MGH Epp., I,ii (Berlin 1891) 458–459.

Christ could easily be derived a notion of a pre-evangilization, a parallel *praeparatio evangelica* of the Lower World. Such a notion appears in Origen, with John the Baptist playing a leading role. Origen seems to have conceived of a continuous transfer of prophecy, an unfolding of revelation parallel to that taking place in the world of the living. In, for example, what must have been the last stage of this process, Moses and Elijah are described as carrying news of their conversation with Christ at the Transfiguration to their fellow prisoners in Hades.[13] Origen's clearest statement of this prophecy in the Lower World is to be found in his homily on I Kings 28,3–25.[14] In this homily he disputes with those who would question the veracity of the report of the conjuring up of Samuel by the Witch of Endor. He reports that part of their argument was that Samuel was not in Hades, for if he were, so too were Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jeremiah, and Isaiah, and all the prophets.[15] Origen replies to this with the question of who is greater, Samuel or Jesus Christ, the prophets or Jesus Christ. That Christ is greater cannot be disputed, and Origen proceeds to a second question of whether Christ had been in Hell or not (p. 288,11). It is stated that Christ descended into Hades as lord and liberator, and Origen poses yet another question:

> οὐκοῦν ὁ σωτὴρ κατελήλυθεν σώσων· κατελήλυθεν ἐκεῖ προκηρυχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν προφητῶν ἢ οὔ; ἀλλ' ἐνθάδε μὲν προεκηρύχθη ὑπὸ τῶν προφητῶν, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ κατέρχεται οὐ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν; (p. 289, 10–12).

Moses, with his prophecy of Christ's coming into this life, is cited as an example and Origen concludes with another question: εἰ δὲ Μωσῆς προφητεύει αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε, οὐ θέλεις αὐτὸν κἀκεῖ καταβεβηκέναι, ἵνα προφητεύσῃ Χριστὸν ἐλεύσεσθαι; (*ibid.* 18–20). Origen's answer includes Moses and all the prophets: Ἰησοῦς εἰς ᾅδου γέγονεν, καὶ οἱ προφῆται πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ προκηρύσσουσι τοῦ Χριστοῦ τὴν ἐπιδημίαν (*ibid.* 27–29). Origen proceeds to argue that as every place (πᾶς τόπος) needs Christ, so too every place requires those who prepare for Christ's coming (p. 290,14–17). At this point he introduces John the Baptist: καὶ Ἰωάννης ... μὴ φοβοῦ λέγειν ὅτι εἰς ᾅδου καταβέβηκε προκηρύσσων μου τὸν κύριον, ἵνα προείπῃ αὐτὸν κατελευσόμενον (*ibid.*17–22). Origen concludes his argu-

[13] *Comment. in Matthaeum* 12,43, ed. E. Klostermann, GCS (Leipzig 1935) 168,15–169,4.

[14] Ed. E. Klostermann, GCS (Leipzig 1901) 283–294.

[15] Ch. 3, 285,20–27.

ment about Samuel, applying to all the prophets the epithet usually reserved for John the Baptist: εἰ πάντες εἰς ᾅδου καταβεβήκασι πρὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ πρόδρομοι Χριστοῦ οἱ προφῆται Χριστοῦ, οὕτως καὶ Σαμουὴλ ἐκεῖ καταβέβηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἅγιος (p. 291,28–292,1). Origen suggests that as the world of the living required prophecy and a preparation for Christ's coming, so too did the world of the dead, and that the prophets, including John the Baptist, their earthly course run, continued their ministry in the Lower World. Here John is the last of many πρόδρομοι of Christ.

But what of John's role as *the* πρόδρομος? Elsewhere Origen shows a full awareness of John's peculiar role in the salvation history of the Lower World. As he discusses Luke 1,17 Origen says the following as he compares Elijah and John the Baptist:

> Ἐκεῖνος ἀνελήφθη, οὗτος δὲ πρόδρομος γέγονε τοῦ σωτῆρος. Ἀπέθανε πρὸ τοῦ σωτῆρος, ἵνα καὶ τοῖς ἐν ᾅδῃ πρόδρομος γεγονὼς τοῦ σωτῆρος κηρύξῃ τὴν κατάβασιν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.[16]

In his commentary on John Origen gives a more elaborate description of the Baptist as the two-fold precursor whose birth and life's work and death form a parallel:

> Καὶ τί γὰρ ἢ πανταχοῦ μάρτυς καὶ πρόδρομος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐστιν ὁ Ἰωάννης, προλαμβάνων τὴν γένεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγου τοῦ θανάτου ἀποθνήσκων τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα μὴ μόνον τοῖς ἐν γενέσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς προσδοκῶσι τὴν διὰ Χριστοῦ ἀπὸ θανάτου ἐλευθερίαν πρὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐπιδημῶν, πανταχοῦ ἑτοιμάσῃ κυρίῳ λαὸν κατεσκευασμένον;[17]

Origen was not alone in his concept of John's work after death, for his contemporary, Hippolytus, also sees John as a part of the economy of the *descensus*:

> οὗτος [John] προέφθασε καὶ τοῖς ἐν ᾅδῃ προευαγγελίσασθαι ἀναιρεθεὶς ἀπὸ Ἡρώδου· πρόδρομος γενόμενος ἐκεῖ, σημαίνων μέλλειν κἀκεῖσε κατελεύσεσθαι τὸν σωτῆρα, λυτρούμενον τὰς τῶν ἁγίων ψυχὰς ἐκ χειρὸς τοῦ θανάτου.[18]

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[16] *Hom.* 4 *in Luc.*, ed. M. Rauer, GCS (Berlin 1959) 27,19–28,4.

[17] *Comm. in Ioan.* 2,24, ed. C. Blanc, *Origene, Commentaire sur S. Jean*, I, SC 120 (Paris 1966) 360–362.

[18] *De Christo et Antichristo*, Ch. 45, ed. H. Achelis, GCS (Leipzig 1897) 29,5–8.

III. 'Fortleben' of the motif of John's mission to the underworld

It is in the third century, then, that we find this concept of John the Baptist's ministry after death established. It did not become ubiquitous in panegyrics and descriptions of John the Baptist, but it was sufficiently common in later centuries that it seems safe to say that it was widely known. Cyril of Jerusalem, like Origen, includes John the Baptist among those who "ran before" Christ to the Underworld,[19] and among those awaiting deliverance there.[20] In a sermon among the *spuria* of Epiphanius of Salamis John is listed among those imprisoned in Hell and is described as ὁ δίττος πρόδρομος, καὶ κήρυξ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν· ὁ ἐκ φυλακῆς Ἡρώδου τῇ πανδήμῳ φυλακῇ παραπεμφθεὶς τοῦ ᾅδου ...[21] Gregory Nazianzen, in the course of a panegyric on Basil the Great, provides a succinct, laudatory description of John the Baptist which includes his mission to the Underworld.[22] Ambrose too describes John as *praenuntius natus et praenuntius mortuus*.[23]

John's work as precursor of Christ in Hades is alluded to in homilies on John's martyrdom of later Greek authors. Sophronius of Jerusalem refers to the Beheading as the means δι' ἧς σεαυτὸν διπλοῦν τοῦ Σωτῆρος κατέστησας Πρόδρομον.[24] Theodore Studita emphasizes John's communication to those awaiting Christ: σήμερον Ἰωάννης ὁ Πρόδρομος εἰς ᾅδου κάτεισι, καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ χαρὰν τῆς Χριστοῦ παρουσίας ἀνεκλάλητον ἀκουτίζονται·;[25] the emperor Leo Sapiens,[26] and, much later, Gregory Palamas,[27] speak of John's announcement of Christ's coming to the Lower World as necessary for the fulfillment of the prophecy made in the Canticle of Zachariah (Luc. 1,79). Brief references to John's descent

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[19] *Catachesis* 14,19: Προσέτρεχον οἱ ἅγιοι προφῆται, καὶ Μωϋσῆς ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαάκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ· Δαβίδ τε καὶ Σαμουὴλ, καὶ Ἡσαΐας καὶ ὁ βαπτιστὴς Ἰωάννης, ὁ λέγων καὶ μαρτυρῶν· Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ἢ ἕτερον προσδοκῶμεν; (PG 33,848–849). Of the intimate association of this question sent to Christ by John with John's descent more will be said later.

[20] *Catechesis* 4,11, PG 33,469B: ... πάντες οἱ προφῆται, καὶ αὐτὸς Ἰωάννης ὁ λέγων διὰ τῶν ἀποσταλέντων· Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ...

[21] *In sabbato magno*, PG 43,453B.

[22] PG 36,597A: Τίς Ἰησοῦ πρόδρομος; Ἰωάννης, ὡς φωνὴ Λόγου, καὶ ὡς λύχνος φωτὸς, οὗ καὶ προεσκίρτησεν ἐν γαστρὶ, καὶ προέδραμεν εἰς ᾅδου, διὰ τῆς Ἡρώδου μανίας παραπεμφθεὶς, ἵνα κηρύξῃ κἀκεῖ τὸν ἐρχόμενον.

[23] *Exp. Ev. sec. Luc.*1,38,577–578, CCL14,4, 25.

[24] *Encomium in sanctum Joannem Praecursorem*, PG 87,3325C.

[25] *In decollationem S.Joannis Baptistae*, PG 99,769C; see also *In nativitatem ... Baptistae*, PG 99,757C.

[26] *Oratio in decollationem ...*, PG 107,196B, 197D–200.

[27] *In ... baptistam Joannem*, PG 151,513C.

may be seen in the sermons on him by Maximus of Turin,[28] Peter Damian (following Maximus),[29] Guerric of Igny,[30] and in the *Legenda Aurea* in the reading for the feast of John's nativity.[31] John's descent forms a part of hymns for the feast of his Beheading in Greek[32] and Latin.[33] A beginning of the study of the occurrence of this theme in art has been made by A. Masseron.[34]

IV. The use of the motif of John's mission to the underworld in exegesis

The notion of a mission for John the Baptist after death gained a currency far greater than the Alexandrian concept of the economy of salvation of the Lower World of which John's work was a part. For John's mission was employed, first by Origen, and then in wider circles to explain the question put to Christ by the embassy from the imprisoned John the Baptist: σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ἢ ἕτερον προσδοκῶμεν; (Mt.11,3; Luc. 7,19).[35] The difficulty which exercized the Fathers generally here was that of making sense of such a question from John who earlier in the gospel accounts had observed the divine witness to Christ at His baptism and, more importantly, declared Christ to be the Lamb of God.

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[28] PL 57,655B.

[29] PL 144,637C.

[30] PL 185,72A.

[31] Ed. T. Graesse (Dresden 1846) 362.

[32] See, for example, Romanus Melodus, ed. P. Maas–C. A. Trypanis (Oxford 1963) No. 38, quoted at the beginning of this paper and the extraordinary poetic materials in the *Menaeum* for the feast of John's beheading (Μηναῖα τοῦ ὅλου ἐνιαυτοῦ [Rome 1901] vol. 6, 523–541). For Greek hymns for the feast of John's beheading see H. Follieri, *Initia Hymnorum Ecclesiae Graecae*, vol. 5, Studi e Testi, 215 *bis*, 173–174. The vast majority of the hymns are either unprinted or to be found only in uncritical printed copies of liturgical books.

[33] See Bede, AH 50, #87; Ekkehart of St. Gall, AH 50, #207; the Mozarabic hymnal (*s.* X), AH 27, #138; the hymnal of the abbey of Moissac (*s.* X), AH 2, #122 (same as AH 27, #138); a XIIth-century troper, perhaps from Limoges, AH 7, #149; a Cistercian rhymed office (*s.* XIII), AH 26, #52 (p.152); Albert of Prague (*s.* XIV), AH 3, sect. 2, #1; AH 46, #233 (English, *s.* XIV); AH 15, #188 (English, *s.* XV); AH 44, #172 (Noyon missal, *s.* XIV); AH 39, #197 (printed missal of Fontevroult, 1606). The dates given for the anonymous hymns are, of course, the dates of the documents in which they are first found.

[34] *Saint Jean Baptiste dans l'art* (Paris 1967) 143–146; see also L. Réau, *Iconographie de l'art chrétien*, II,1 (Paris 1956) 460.

[35] For a recent study of this text see S. Sabugal, La embajada mesiánica del Bautista (Mt 11,2–6 = Lc 7,18–23), *Augustinianum* 13 (1973) 216–278; 14 (1974) 5–59. Sabugal provides, in the first segment of his work (13,216–218), a very summary, but well-documented treatment of patristic opinion on these texts; cf. D. Buzy, *Saint Jean-Baptiste* (Paris 1922) 280–306.

Tertullian had addressed the problem in his own idiosyncratic way:

> Ergo non erat caeleste quod caelestia non exhibebat, cum ipsum quod caeleste in Iohanne fuerat, spiritus prophetiae, post totius spiritus in dominum translationem usque adeo defecerit ut quem praedicauerat, quem aduenientem designauerat, postmodum, an ipse esset, miserit sciscitatum.[36]

Origen seems to have been familiar with some such point of view, for he criticizes it,[37] and offers an explanation of his own.

> ἐν φυλακῇ ἦν μεγάλα εἰδὼς περὶ Χριστοῦ, εἶδεν οὐρανοὺς ἀνεῳγότας, εἶδεν πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατερχόμενον ἐπὶ τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ μένον ἐπ' αὐτόν· ἰδὼν τὴν τηλικαύτην δόξαν ἀμφέβαλλεν καὶ τάχα ἠπίστει, εἰ ὁ οὕτως ἔνδοξος καὶ μέχρις ᾅδου καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἀβύσσου κατελεύσεται· διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν· "σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, ἢ ἄλλον προσδοκῶμεν;"[38]

This mode of viewing John's question to Christ as pertaining not to Christ's messianic character but only to the *descensus* is employed as well by the author (called "Adamantinus") of the anti-Origenist dialogue Περὶ τῆς εἰς Θεὸν ὀρθῆς πίστεως. Against his interlocutor's allegation of Mt.11,3 to prove that John had not recognized Christ, "Adamantinus" maintains that John sought to know of Christ's *descensus* because he was His precursor:

> Εἰ περὶ Χριστοῦ ἐπυνθάνετο Ἰωάννης, ἔλεξε· σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς, φάσκει γὰρ· σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἢ ἕτερον προσδοκῶμεν; νῦν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι φρονήσεως τὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐξετάσαι· σὺ εἶ; ὁ λέγων· ἴδε ὁ ἀμνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ αἴρων τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τοῦ κόσμου, οὐκ ἠγνόει ὅτι αὐτὸς ἐστιν· ἀλλ', ἐπεὶ πρόδρομος ἐγίνετο, ⟨εἰ⟩ καὶ ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ ἐπυνθάνετο· ᾔδει γὰρ λέγοντα αὐτὸν· ὑπάγω καὶ πέμψω τὸν παράκλητον, τουτέστι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.[39]

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[36] *De baptismo* 10,5, CCL 2,1,285,26–31; cf. *Adv. Marcionem* 4,18,4–6, *ibid.*, 589,11–590,10; *De praes. haer.* 8,3, *ibid.*, 193,6–8.

[37] Νῦν μὴ νοήσαντες γάρ τινες τὰ εἰρημένα λέγουσιν· Ἰωάννης ὁ τηλικοῦτος οὐκ ᾔδει Χριστὸν, ἀλλ' ἀπέστη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. *Hom. in I Reg.* 28,3–25, *ed. cit.*, 290,30–32.

[38] *Ibid.*, 291,20–26; cf. the catena fragment (#2201) from Origen's commentary on Matthew, ed. E. Klostermann, GCS (Leipzig 1941) 105; Ambrose describes this point of view and says that, according to those who held it, John *non ... fide, sed pietate dubitauit* (*Exp. Ev. sec. Luc.* 5,98, CCL 14,4,167,1044).

[39] Ed. W.H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, GCS (Leipzig 1901) 50,15–21.

Rufinus, the translator of the dialogue of "Adamantinus", seems to assume this interpretation. As he comments on the article of the creed *descendit in inferna* he cites, among other evidence, John's question to Christ: *Sed et Iohannes dicit*: "*Tu es qui uenturus es*" (*in infernum sine dubio*) "*an alium exspectemus?*"[40] Jerome too adopted this interpretation in his commentary on Matthew:

> *Tu es qui venturus es, an alium expectamus?* Non ait: tu es qui venisti: sed, tu es qui venturus es. Et est sensus: Manda mihi, quia ad inferna descensurus sum, utrum te et inferis debeam nuntiare, qui nuntiavi superis? An non convenit Filio Dei, ut gustet mortem, et alium ad haec sacramenta missurus es?[41]

Another explanation of John's embassy was, however, propounded, occasionally with prejudice to the explanation based on John's mission after death, often in company with it. John's question is explained as a matter of ignorance feigned for the sake of his disciples, in order to bring them into contact with Christ and His works, to the end of dispeling their doubts concerning Him or of overcoming their envy of the Messiah who was increasing at the apparent expense of the Baptist's prestige. This interpretation, which came to enjoy wide currency, may have come from Origen as well, if the attribution to him of the following catena fragment is correct:

> Ἡ τοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐρώτησις οὐκ αὐτοῦ μόνου ἦν χάριν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀποσταλέντων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποσταλέντες ἔχρῃζον μαθεῖν, εἰ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ ἐλθών.[42]

Hilary of Poitiers employs this explanation, without mentioning the alternative based on John's *descensus*:

> Ergo ad Evangelia [Jesus] contuenda lex [John] mittit: ut infidelitas fidem dictorum contempletur in factis; et quod intra eam peccatorum fraude sit vinctum, per intelligentiam libertatis evangelicae absolvatur. Tali ergo Joannes exemplo, non suae, sed discipulorum ignorantiae

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[40] *Expositio Symboli*, CCL 20,161,5–6.

[41] PL 26,69–70. Cf. *Ep.*121, *Ad Algasiam* (*Liber quaestionum undecim*), ch.1 (ed. J.Labourt [Paris 1961] vol.7,11,26–12,7) where this question is treated similarly but at greater length.

[42] Ed. Klostermann, *ed. cit.*, #220 II,105. The fragment is found in close association with material derived from Chrysostom. The words οὐκ αὐτοῦ μόνου ἦν χάριν suggest more than one purpose for John's embassy, and, as shall be seen, Chrysostom stoutly maintains that John sent his question to Christ *only* for the sake of his disciples.

consuluit: ipse enim venturum in remissionem peccatorum praedicavit. Sed ut scirent non alium a se praedicatum, ad opera eius intuenda discipulos suos misit ...[43]

Ephraem Syrus, though fully aware of John's mission to the Underworld, takes a similar approach in explaining John's question:

Sed hoc dicamus: Sicut ea quae erant dicta a prophetis, propter hos et eos qui, ut ea audirent, opus habebant, erant dicta, velut et Dominus noster dixit: *Propter turbas istas dico hoc, ut credant*, ita et Iohannes, cum vidisset prope esse ut migraret ex hoc mundo, et praecederet salvatorem inter mortuos, sicut praecesserat (eum) per nativitatem inter vivos, curam gessit, ne (ita) relinqueret discipulos suos ut aberrarent et dispergerentur, sicut et pecus cui non est pastor.[44]

Augustine takes up the puzzle of John's question to Christ in his Sermon 66:

Quid sibi ergo vult obscura quaestio? Luceat sol, unde illa lucerna accensa est. Prorsus ita solutio evidens solutio est. Joannes seorsum habebat discipulos: non separatus, sed testis paratus. Oportebat enim ut talis perhiberet testimonium Christo, qui et ipse discipulos colligebat, qui ei poterat invidere, si non possit videre. Ergo quia pro magno habebant discipuli Joannis magistrum suum Joannem; audiebant a Joanne testimonium de Christo, et mirabantur: moriturus, ab illo eos voluit confirmari. Sine dubio enim illi dicebant apud se ipsos: Iste de illo tanta dicit, ipse de se ista non dicit. *Ite, dicite illi*: non quia ego dubito, sed ut vos instruamini. *Ite, dicite illi*: quod ego soleo dicere, ab ipso audite; audistis praeconem, confirmamini a judice. *Ite, dicite illi*: *Tu es qui venis, an alium exspectamus?* Ierunt, et dixerunt; propter se, non propter Joannem. Et propter illos dixit Christus, *Caeci vident, claudi ambulant, surdi audiunt, leprosi mundantur, mortui resurgunt, pauperes evangelizantur.* Videtis me, agnoscite me: videtis facta, factorem agnoscite. *Et beatus qui in me non fuerit scandalizatus.* Sed de vobis dico, non de Joanne. Nam ut sciremus quia non de Joanne dixit: *Illis abeuntibus coepit dicere ad turbas de Joanne*: dixit laudes ejus veras verax, veritas.[45]

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[43] *Comm. in Matth.* ch.11, PL 9,979B.

[44] L.Leloir, tr., Saint Ephrem, *Commentaire de l'evangile concordant, version armenienne*, CSCO No.145 (Louvain 1954) 85–86 (orig. text ed. Leloir, CSCO No.137).

[45] PL 38,432–433.

Ambrosiaster, hastening to reject the possibility that John had any doubts at all about Christ, also views John's embassy as having been sent on behalf of John's doubting disciples:

> Iohannes enim uolens nutantes discipulos suos corroborare in fide saluatoris, sciens exitum sibi imminere, ea, quae de ipso dicebat, ore eius uoluit confirmari. ideo ut testis uerus sit, testimonium potioris implorat, ut eorum concordia omnis ambiguitas auferretur. hoc commentum Iohannis est, ut dubios suis quasi uerbis mitteret, ut eadem audientes a saluatore, quae audierant a Iohanne, firmarentur scientes idonei procuratoris et domini caelestis testimonium in dubium uocari non posse.[46]

Ambrosiaster, along with Jerome[47] and Augustine (see above), viewed Christ's eulogy of John following the dismissal of the embassy as an effort to exempt John from Christ's rebuke to his envious and doubtful disciples implied in *beatus est qui non fuerit scandalizatus in me*. The author of the *Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum* is a part of the tradition of this understanding of John's embassy to Christ:

> Vis scire quod est super humanam naturam? Missus in carcerem non de suo periculo sollicitus erat, sed de aliorum salute cogitabat, id est, discipulorum suorum ... ipse nunc quasi nesciens interrogat, *Tu es qui venturus es, an alium exspectamus?* Sed Joannes in carcere, sciens se jam in exitu constitutum, volebat discipulos suos Christo adjungere, tamquam si providus pater moriens filios suos consignet fideli tutori. Desiderabat enim vivens plenam fidem videre discipulorum, et sine dubitatione aliqua credentes in Christo ... Ideo interrogabat per discipulos suos, non ut ipse reaccipiens responsum, a Christo audiret, et disceret, sed ut missi discipuli oculis suis viderent opera ejus et crederent: *Tu es, qui venturus es, an alium exspectamus?*[48]

The proposal of this explanation joined to an attack on that based on John's mission to the dead is found in John Chrysostom. The Baptist's mission to the Lower World is swept away in an attack on any notion of salvation as a result of conversion after death. Chrysostom takes up

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[46] *Quaestiones veteris et novi testamenti, Appendix quaestionum N.T.* LV, ed. A. Souter, CSEL 50,449,23–450,2; cf. *App. quaest. N.T.* XLII,441.

[47] *Ep.*121,1, *ed. cit.*, 12,14–29.

[48] PG 56,772.

the question in his thirty-sixth homily on Matthew.[49] He denies any ignorance on the part of John the Baptist (c. 413), and argues that John, fearing that his disciples' envy of Christ would prevent their ultimate association with Him, was making a final effort to join his disciples to Christ:

> Εἰ μὲν οὖν εἶπεν, ὅτι Ἀπέλθετε πρὸς αὐτὸν, αὐτός μου βελτίων ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἂν ἔπεισε δυσαποσπάστως ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνομίσθη μετριάζων ἂν ταῦτα λέγειν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῷ προσηλώθησαν· εἰ δὲ ἐσίγησε, πάλιν οὐδὲν πλέον ἐγίνετο. Τί οὖν ποιεῖ; Ἀναμένει παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι θαύματα ἐργάζεται· καὶ οὐδὲ οὕτως αὐτοῖς παραινεῖ, οὐδὲ πάντας πέμπει, ἀλλὰ δύο τινὰς οὓς ἤδει ἴσως τῶν ἄλλων εὐπειθεστέρους ὄντας, ἵνα ἀνύποπτος ἡ ἐρώτησις γένηται, ἵνα παρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων μάθωσι τὸ μέσον τοῦ Ἰησοῦ κἀκείνου (c. 414).

Now to strengthen his listeners' acceptance of his explanation Chrysostom undertakes to present and then discredit the alternative explanation. He divides it into two parts, taking first the allegation that John did not know if Christ would die and descend into Hell:

> Τί οὖν φασί τινες; Ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία ἡ παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένη, ἀλλ' ἠγνόει ὁ Ἰωάννης, ἠγνόει δὲ οὐ τὸ πᾶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ Χριστὸς, ἤδει, εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν, οὐκ ἤδει· διὰ τοῦτο εἶπε, Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος; τουτέστιν, ὁ εἰς τὸν ᾅδην μέλλων καταβαίνειν (c. 415).

Chrysostom proceeds to argue that in declaring Christ to be the Lamb of God John showed forth a knowledge of the Cross, and that in saying that "He will baptize you in the Spirit" he showed a knowledge of events after the Resurrection, and concludes: Πῶς οὖν ἔμελλεν ἀνίστασθαι ὁ μὴ παθὼν, μηδὲ σταυρωθείς; πῶς δὲ μείζων προφήτου οὗτος, ὁ μηδὲ τὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἐπιστάμενος; (c. 415). Chrysostom cites a series of prophecies of Christ's death, concludes again with the question of how he who was greater than all the prophets could not have known these matters too, and presses his attack on the second aspect of his adversaries' position, John's mission to the Underworld:

> Τίνος δὲ ἕνεκεν οὐκ ἔλεγε, Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος εἰς τὸν ᾅδην; ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς, Ὁ ἐρχόμενος; Καίτοι πολλῷ καταγελαστότερον τούτου ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη· φασὶ γὰρ· Διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα ἔλεγεν, ἵνα κἀκεῖ ἀπελθὼν

[49] PG 57,413–420; see Capéran, I, 84 *sqq.*

κηρύξῃ. Πρὸς οὓς εὔκαιρον εἰπεῖν· Ἀδελφοί, μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε (c. 416).[50]

Chrysostom goes on to argue that any such preaching heard after death was neither necessary to the just nor beneficial to the wicked of the Old Law, for Ὁ μὲν παρὼν βίος πολιτείας ἐστὶ καιρός· μετὰ δὲ τελευτὴν κρίσις καὶ κόλασις (c. 416). He finds the notion of a Hades emptied of just and sinner alike absurd. Of the people of the Old Law he says:

Τί οὖν; ἠδικήθησαν, φησὶν, οἱ πρὸ τῆς παρουσίας αὐτοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς· ἐνῆν γὰρ καὶ μὴ ὁμολογήσαντας τὸν Χριστὸν τότε σωθῆναι. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀπῃτεῖτο παρ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδωλολατρεῖν, καὶ τὸ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν εἰδέναι (c. 416).[51]

Chrysostom clearly states that those who died before Christ are rewarded or punished according to the behaviour required of them then, and that from those who live after Christ more is required commensurate with their greater knowledge. He concludes his discussion of John the Baptist:

Ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔδει προδρόμου ἐκεῖ. Ἄλλως δὲ, εἰ μέλλοιεν μετὰ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οἱ ἄπιστοι πιστεύοντες σώζεσθαι, οὐδεὶς ἀπολεῖταί ποτε (c. 416).

Chrysostom dismisses thus the notion of any conversion unto salvation among the dead, and dismisses as well the whole question of preaching in the Underworld (and of John's mission there) with: Μὴ δὴ τοιαῦτα λοιπὸν εἰσάγωμεν δόγματα γραώδη, καὶ μύθους Ἰουδαϊκούς! (c. 417).

The use of John's mission to the Underworld as a basis for his question to Christ was rejected as well by Cyril of Alexandria, an opponent of Chrysostom, and, in the matter of the extension of salvation in the Underworld, a member of the opposite camp. In his commentary on

[50] Dalton, 28, incorrectly considers ἵνα κἀκεῖ ἀπελθὼν κηρύξῃ to refer to Christ's activity described in I Pet. 3,19, whereas the subject of κηρύξῃ is clearly John the Baptist.

[51] Cf. Augustine, *Ep.*164,12–13 (CSEL 44,532–533). It is good to remark here on the contradiction to Chrysostom's point of view found in John the Baptist's announcement to the souls in Hades in the *Descensus ad inferos* portion of the *Evangelium Nicodemi*: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπέστειλέ με καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἵνα κηρύξω πῶς ἔρχεται ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὧδε, ἵνα ὅστις πιστεύσῃ πρὸς αὐτὸν σωθήσεται, ὅστις δὲ οὐ πιστεύσει εἰς αὐτὸν κατακριθήσεται. διὸ τοῦτο λέγω πρὸς ἅπαντας ὑμᾶς, καθὼς ἴδητε αὐτὸν, ἵνα προσκυνήσητε πάντες, ὅτι νῦν μόνον ἐστὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὁ τῆς μετανοίας καιρὸς ὑπὲρ οὗ προσεκυνήσατε εἰς τὸν ἄνω μάταιον κόσμον τοῖς εἰδώλοις, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμαρτήκατε· ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ καιρῷ τοῦτο γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον (ed. C. Tischendorf, *Evangelia Apocrypha* [Leipzig 1876] 325).

Matthew Cyril offers an explanation curiously reminiscent of Chrysostom's:

> Οὐκ ἀγνοῶν εἶναι αὐτὸν τὸν Χριστὸν, ἐρωτᾷ, ἢ ὅτι ἤμελλεν εἰς ᾅδου κατελθεῖν, ὡς τινές φασιν (ᾔδει γὰρ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἀμνὸν ὠνόμασεν)· ἀλλ' ἵνα ἔτι ζῶν πείσῃ αὐτοὺς, καὶ μὴ μετὰ θάνατον αὐτοῦ προστεθῶσιν ἑτέρῳ διδασκάλῳ.[52]

In his commentary on Luke Cyril gives a very elaborate description of the dispositions of John's disciples and of John's ignorance feigned on their behalf.[53] He describes the earlier explanation, and rejects it, denying John's mission to the Lower World because it lacks a scriptural basis:[54]

> Ἔκβλητος δὲ παντελῶς τοιάδε δόξα· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ εὑρήσομεν τὴν θεόπνευστον Γραφὴν ἀπαγγείλασαν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἐν ᾅδῃ πνεύμασι προκατήγγειλε τοῦ Σωτῆρος τὴν ἄφιξιν ὁ μακάριος Βαπτιστής (c. 613A).

He proceeds to argue that John knew ὅλην ... τῆς μετὰ σαρκὸς οἰκονομίας τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὴν δύναμιν, and especially of Christ's coming into Hell:

> ᾔδει πάντως που περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἐν ᾅδῃ λυτρώσεται, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπιλάμψει χάριτι Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ παντὸς γενόμενος θανάτου ... (c. 613A).

Unlike Chrysostom, however, Cyril seems now to argue for a universal salvation in the Underworld,[55] and now, at least for the salvation of those of the dead who could have been expected to believe had they encountered Christ in the flesh.[56] In one passage from Cyril's writings he seems to take Chrysostom's narrow view of the character and extent of salvation among the dead,[57] but the authenticity of this passage has been questioned.[58]

Theodoret of Cyr rejected the explanation based on John's feigning

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[52] PG 72,397C.

[53] PG 72,612–613.

[54] It is interesting to note that Schmidt, 546, regards all the more dramatic aspects of the preaching theme, Christ's preaching to the disobedient spirits of I Pet., the preaching of Christ and the apostles in the Underworld, and the preaching of the prophets and John the Baptist there as alien to the genuine Christian nucleus of belief in the *descensus*, as "dogmatisch-gelehrtes Beiwerk der Theologen".

[55] See the texts gathered by Holzmeister, 325.

[56] PG 74,1014CD.

[57] *Frag. in I Petr.*, PG 74,1016A.

[58] See Holzmeister, 334, n.10.

doubt for the sake of his disciples and suggested that John really did not know whether Christ was the Messiah or not.[59] In answer to the question of why, if John sought only to persuade his disciples that Jesus was the Messiah, he did not tell them as much but sent them to question Jesus, Theodoret replies that as word of Jesus' miracles was circulated, and some were calling the thaumaturge Elijah, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets:

> ταύτας τὰς φήμας ἀκούων ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐν τῇ εἱρκτῇ, πέμπει τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ μαθεῖν, εἰ ὁ τὰ σημεῖα ποιῶν αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ μαρτυρηθεὶς, ἢ ἕτερός τις, ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν θρυλλούμενος (c. 1284CD).

Both of the mainstreams of interpretation of John's embassy to Christ survived, sometimes, as has been said, with one adopted against the other, often with both together with no suggestion of conflict. The explanation based on John's mission to the Underworld is found in Gregory the Great,[60] in Bede (following Jerome),[61] Paschasius Radbertus,[62] Remigius of Auxerre,[63] Christian of Stavelot,[64] Bruno of Segni,[65] and in the *Glossa Ordinaria*.[66] In the East it is found in a sermon in the collection attributed to "Eusebius of Alexandria",[67] and in a homily among the *spuria* of Chrysostom.[68] A very remarkable manifestation of the influence of this interpretation may be seen in the following introit trope which occurs in tenth-century tropers from Moissac and Limoges:

1. Sacra melodimata recinendo clangite cuncti,
   Nempe quae en angelica de Iohanne pertonat tuba:
   Iohannes autem, cum audisset in vinculis opera Christi,
2. Quem digito populis indicit latice baptizatum,
   Nosse cupit, ipsum debeat inferis nuntiare,
   mittens duo de discipulis suis ait illi: Tu es qui venturus es,

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[59] *Quaestiones et Responsiones ad Orthodoxos* No. 38, PG 6,1284.

[60] *Hom. in Evang.* 6, PL 76,1095C–1096A; *Hom. in Hiez.* 1,5, CCL 142,7,92–104.

[61] *In Matth. Ev. Exp.* 2,11, PL 92,56CD; *In Luc.* 2,7, CCL 120,2, 160,2355–2359.

[62] *Exp. in Matth.* 6,11, PL 120,436C.

[63] *Hom.* 2, PL 131,873BC (following Gregory the Great).

[64] *Exp. in Matth.*, PL 106,1354BC; Christian suggests that John came to doubt whether Christ would die at all: *Cum audivit illum tantas virtutes facere, tunc coepit cogitare dicens: Si ipse tantas virtutes facit, quis occidet illum? Modo innotescet mundo: modo nullus audebit eum occidere, sed omnes venerabuntur eum.*

[65] *Comm. in Matth.* 41, PL 165,166–167.

[66] PL 114,120B.

[67] PG 86,379–384.

[68] PG 59,523–524.

3. Homo verus Deusque verax, redemptio mundi
   Et qui cuncta tenens aequo libramine pensas,
   an alium exspectemus?[69]

Chrysostom was followed in his polemic against this interpretation by Theophylact of Ochydra,[70] and the explanation he favored of John's question to Christ was accepted by Basil of Seleucia,[71] and Euthymius Zigabenus.[72] Specimens of the interpretation which assumes John's feigning doubt are found, side by side with the prior explanation in Bede,[73] Paschasius Radbertus,[74] Rabanus Maurus,[75] Remigius of Auxerre,[76] and Christian of Stavelot.[77]

V. John the Baptist in "Eusebius of Alexandria" and the Evangelium Nicodemi

The motif of John's descent into the Lower World to announce Christ's coming there enjoyed, as one may see, a modest popularity, and its exegetical use survived serious criticism to provide, over the years, a possible explanation for a vexed passage. However, it was, along with so many details of the *descensus* complex, a legacy of an imaginatively mythologizing theology and exegesis, and later left its only serious mark on more imaginative but less sophisticated religious writings, as hymns, and the two documents which will close our discussion, the *Evangelium Nicodemi* and the sermons of "Eusebius of Alexandria".

The most influential dramatic account of Christ's *descensus ad inferos* is to be found in the second portion of the *Evangelium Nicodemi*. This document is said to have been composed in the fifth century,[78] though it obviously drew on earlier materials.[79] "Eusebius of Alexandria" is the

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[69] AH49, #262.
[70] *Enarr. in Matth.*11, PG 123,248C.
[71] *Oratio*34, PG 85,372B.
[72] *Comm. in Matth.*20, PG 129,348A.
[73] *In Matth.*2,11, PL 92,56C.
[74] PL 120,436D.
[75] *Comm. in Matth.*4, PL 107,909 (following Hilary and Jerome).
[76] PL 131,873AB.
[77] PL 106,1354CD.
[78] See J. Quasten, *Patrology*, I (Westminster, Md., 1950) 116.
[79] One might point at once to the promise that Christ would baptize Adam in Chapter III of the Greek version, καὶ ἐν ὕδατι καὶ πνεύματι ἁγίῳ πλυνεῖ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ and John's declaration, already quoted (see n. 51), in Chapter II that Christ's coming into Hell was the time for repentence from idolatry.

name under which a remarkable collection of homilies was circulated. The true identity of the author is not known, but the works have been dated to the fifth or sixth centuries.[80] Three of these Eusebian homilies of pronounced dramatic character have been regarded as fragments of a dramatic structure concerned with the *descensus ad inferos*.[81] The first of these three homilies and another not included in the cycle by La Piana composes "Eusebius'" treatment of John's mission to the Underworld. The first sermon which concerns us is Εἰς τὸ, "Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἢ ἕτερον προσδοκῶμεν;".[82] In the opening of the sermon the author makes an intriguing remark on opinions concerning the meaning of this question:

> ... πολλοὶ τῶν ἑρμηνευόντων καὶ πολλὰ εἰδόντων, ἠγνόησαν τὸ μυστήριον· καὶ ἡμῖν ταύτην τὴν ἑρμηνείαν παρεισήνεγκαν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους μαθητὰς πιστοποιήσας ἀπέστειλεν αὐτοὺς αὐταῖς ὄψεσιν παραλαβεῖν τὰ θαύματα, καὶ πιστεύειν ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Ἄλλοι ὡς ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν διαγράφουσιν, ἄλλοι ἕτερά τινα ἐννοοῦνται, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔγνω τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ ῥήματος· δεῦρο οὖν ἡμεῖς τοῦτο σαφῶς καταστήσωμεν ... (c. 380B).

He rejects the possibility of John's ignorance of Christ's identity (cc. 380B–382A) as well as the interpretation that John feigned ignorance to strengthen his disciples' faith, for they had themselves heard John bear witness to the Lamb of God (c. 382A). "Eusebius" proceeds to the true explanation. The question of those detained in Hell is foreseen:

> Καὶ ἔμελλον οἱ ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ ἐγκεκλεισμένοι ἐπερωτᾶν αὐτὸν [*sc.* John] λέγοντες· Τίς ἡμᾶς ἐξάξει ἐντεῦθεν; ἆρα ἄγγελον πέμπει; ἆρα ἀρχάγγελον; Εἰπὲ ἡμῖν τίς ἔρχεται, καὶ ἐκβάλλει ἡμᾶς. Ὁ δὲ Ἰωάννης οὐκ οἶδε τί μέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς (c. 381B).

John, he continues, could not believe that Christ, whose glory he had realized, would truly descend into Hell (c. 381C), and, Ἀπιστήσας οὖν τοῦτο, ἀπέστειλεν πρὸς αὐτὸν λέγων *etc.* "Eusebius" imagines an

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[80] See H. G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (Munich 1959) 400–401, and J. Darrouzes, Eusèbe d'Alexandrie (Pseudo-), in: *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire*, IV (Paris 1961) cc.1686–1687, and the bibliographies collected there; for a suggestion of the authorship and nature of the collection of Eusebian sermons see F. Nau in *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* 13 (1908) 433–434.

[81] See G. La Piana, Le rappresentazioni sacre e la poesia ritmica dramatica nella litteratura bizantina dalle origine al sec. IX, *Roma e l'Oriente* 3 (1911–1912) 39*sqq*.

[82] PG 86,380–384.

address by John to Christ in which the Baptist foresees his own death and its nature as well as its consequences, his descent into another world:

> πορεύομαι πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας μου, ὑπάγω πρὸς τὸν κόσμον τὸν ἐκεῖ ἐγκεκλεισμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ εἰς τὸν ᾅδην. Καὶ ἐὰν ἐπερωτήσωσίν με λέγοντες, Τίς ἔρχεται καὶ ἐκβάλλει ἡμᾶς; τί αὐτοῖς ἐρῶ; Εἰπέ μοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Δέσποτα· Σὺ εἶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἢ ἕτερον προσδοκῶμεν; (c. 381D),

and Christ's reply to John:

> Σὺ πτωχὸς ὢν, σὺ εὐαγγελίζου τοῖς ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ ἐγείρονται (c. 384A).

"Eusebius" concludes the sermon with an account of the need for Christ's descent into Hell:

> ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ οἱ ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ τύχωσιν τῆς παρ' αὐτοῦ σωτηρίας, καὶ αὐτοὶ προσκυνήσωσιν αὐτὸν· καὶ ἵνα πληρωθῇ τοῦ εὐλογημένου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου τὸ ῥητόν· Ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ πᾶν γόνυ κάμψει ἐπουρανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων ... (c. 384B).[83]

The second homily of "Eusebius" concerned with the Baptist is his λόγος περὶ τῆς παρουσίας Ἰωάννου ἐν τῷ ᾅδῃ καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖσε ἐγκεκλεισμένων.[84] In this sermon, after brief prefatory remarks, John's death and coming to Hades are summarily described. In Hades he is at once recognized by the souls there: Καὶ θεασάμενοι αὐτοῦ τὴν αὐγὴν τοῦ λύχνου ἐγνώρισαν αὐτὸν· καὶ ἤρξαντο περὶ τοῦ Ἡλίου τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐρωτᾶν αὐτόν ... (c. 512A). It is related that the souls in Hades knew by John's mere presence of the approach of the Sun of Justice; as the morning star brings knowledge of the approach of the sun,

> οὕτως καὶ Ἰωάννης ὡς πρόεδρος ἔδραμεν εἰς τὸν ᾅδην λύχνος ὑπάρχων· καὶ ἐμήνυσεν τοῖς ἐκεῖσε, ὅτι ἔρχεται ὁ Ἥλιος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐξάξει ὑμᾶς [*vel* αὐτοὺς] ἐκεῖθεν (c. 513A).

John here says nothing, though we may see the remnant of a speech in the alternative reading ὑμᾶς. The souls run to John, and acclaim the sugges-

[83] It is of interest that Chrysostom, in the homily discussed above uses this same verse of Paul (Phil. 2,10–11) to argue against John's descent and the repentence in the Lower World.

[84] PG 86,509–525.

tion of the Lord's approach, for if He come, ἐπληρώθησαν τὰ προφητευθέντα εἰς αὐτόν (c. 513A). Taking his cue from this, John proceeds to ask the prophets τί ἕκαστος ὑμῶν προεφήτευσεν περὶ τοῦ Κυρίου. There follows a *processio prophetarum* including thirteen speakers. While the prophets are speaking περὶ ἑκάστης οἰκονομίας ἧς ἔμελλεν ποιεῖν ὁ Κύριος (c. 518A), there is introduced the dialogue between Hades and Satan which is a prominent part of this and of the other homilies in the cycle. Hades asks Satan the cause of the excitement. Satan describes John the Baptist and his work and how he encompassed John's death through Herodias, and suggests how John's death contributes to his own ultimate deception about Christ:

> Καὶ περὶ οὗ εἶπεν τῇ οἰκουμένῃ λυτροῦσθαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτον [*sc.* John] ἠδυνήθη λυτρώσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἀκούσας περὶ τοῦ θανάτου Ἰωάννου, καὶ φοβηθεὶς μὴ καὶ τοῦτον ἀνέλῃ ὁ Ἡρώδης, ἔφυγεν εἰς τὴν Γαλιλαίαν. Τότε ἔγνων ὅτι ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ... (c. 517B).

In the *descensus ad inferos* portion of the *Evangelium Nicodemi* the narrative, related by Leucius and Karinus, the resurrected sons of Symeon, describes the Harrowing of Hell, beginning in all three versions with the appearance of a great light. This light can only be understood as the light of Christ's approach,[85] and this light seems to be the prerequisite to the recognition by the patriarchs and prophets of one another.[86] In all three versions John arrives (ἦλθεν, *supervenit, apparuit*) after the illumination of Hell by Christ's approach and after speeches by various persons in the different versions, in the guise of a desert-dweller (ἀπὸ τῆς ἐρήμου ἀσκητής, *quasi heremicola*). John is asked to identify himself (τίς εἶ; *Quis es tu? Tu quis es, qui talia gestas in corpore?*), and describes his activity as precursor, his identification of Christ as the Lamb of God, his baptism of Christ and the divine phenomena which attended it. His description of his mission to the Underworld varies in the three versions in interesting matters of detail.

In the Greek version, John declares that he has been sent by Christ to declare His coming to the Underworld, and announces to the souls there

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[85] Ἐν ὥρᾳ μεσονυκτίου εἰς τὰ σκοτεινὰ ἐκεῖνα ἀνέτειλεν ὥσπερ φῶς ἡλίου καὶ ἐλάμψεν (ch. 2,1); Latin A: ... *subito factus est aureus solis calor purpureaque regalis lux illustrans super nos* (2,1); Latin B: *subito illuxit nos lux magna* (2,1).

[86] (Of the light) καί ἐφωτίσθημεν πάντες καὶ εἴδομεν ἀλλήλους (2,1); Latin B: *Audiebant autem sancti dei contentionem Satanae et inferni*; *ipsi tamen adhuc intra se minime recognescentes nihilominus erant in cognitione* (4,1).

that the time of penitence is now at hand (2,2; see this passage quoted in n. 51).

In Latin version A John deals with his mission most summarily: *Et nunc praeivi ante faciem eius et descendi annuntiare vobis quia in proximo est visitare nos ipse oriens filius dei ex alto veniens, sedentibus nobis in tenebris et umbra mortis* (2,3). The Latin B version contains an allusion to John's embassy to Christ and the interpretation of it as pertaining to John's mission to the Underworld: *Ego ab eo responsum accepi quia ipse descensurus est ad inferos* (5,2).

Whatever the precise character of the relationship between the *Evangelium Nicodemi* and the "Eusebian" cycle of dramatic homilies on the *descensus* may be,[87] the differences in the sections describing John the Baptist are striking. The superior chronology of the Eusebian work is obvious, where John makes his announcement in Hell immediately after his death.[88] John's death and announcement is regarded clearly as the first event in a series of events occurring both in the world of the living and of the dead, though viewed from the world of the dead, which comprise the complex of the *descensus*.

VI. "Eusebius of Alexandria" and the Venerable Bede

A final note on an hitherto undetected evidence of the possible influence[89] of the "Eusebian" sermon on John the Baptist seems in order. The Venerable Bede's hymn for the feast of the Beheading of John the Baptist[90] incorporates many elements of the motif of John's *descensus*, elements whose source, unless it be Bede's imagination, must pose intriguing questions. After the report of John's execution in Stanza 7, Bede proceeds to describe John's work after death. It seems best to

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[87] See the note by J.C.W. Augusti reprinted in PG 86,411–414.

[88] In the Old English poem on the Harrowing of Hell in the Exeter Book (No. 24, ed. W.S. Mackie, EETS O.S. No.194, London 1934), where a prominent place is given to John the Baptist, the action takes place after Christ's death. In his announcement (vv. 26–32) John declares that when Christ sent him on his journey to Hell, He told him that he would come in six month's time. This would seem to be an effort to clarify the confused chronology of the *Evangelium Nocodemi*.

[89] On the diffusion through translation and adaptation of the Eusebian cycle on the Harrowing of Hell, see S. de Nersessian, An Armenian Version of the Homilies on the Harrowing of Hell, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 7 (1954) 203 *sqq.*, and A Homily on the Raising of Lazarus and the Harrowing of Hell, in: J.N. Birdsall, R.W. Thompson, edd., *Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of Robert Pierce Casey* (Freiburg 1963) 219–234.

[90] Ed. J. Fraipont, CCL 122,4, 431–432.

provide Fraipont's text of the remaining stanzas here for ease of reference in what follows:

8. Exsultat almi spiritus
Praeconis artus linquere,
Praecursionis ut sacrae
Sic coepta dona compleat.

9. Nam quem manens in corpore
Ostenderat uiuentibus,
Hunc mortuis iam mortuus
Christum uenire praedicat.

10. Nouo stupescunt inferi
Ereptionis nuntio
Gaudent chori fidelium
Vna patrum cum plebibus.

11. Iusti, prophetae et martyres
Et quique Christum a saeculo
Puris amabant cordibus,
Piis colebant actibus,

12. Cuncti Iohannis dulcibus
Laeti fiunt affatibus
Christumque poscunt ocius
Suos uenire ad seruulos.

13. Praecursor alme, dicito,
Quando, putas, adueniet
Aduentus ille, qui prope est?
Descende Iesu, et eripe.

14. Tandem Redemptor paruit
Omnesque in unum congregans
Tulit pios ab inferis
Polique regnis indidit.

15. Sic praedicator optimus
Magnusque Christum praeuius
Postquam retentis corpore,
Postquam canebat mortuis,

16. Ducente Christo in aethera
Omnes fidelium choros
Cum ceteris perennia
Intrauit ipse in gaudia.

John's mission to the lower world is introduced (vv. 29–36) not as something novel or mysterious, but as a part, an essential part of John's course to be run (*Praecursionis ut sacrae ... coepta dona compleat*). Certain features must be pointed out in the account of goings-on in the world below. The content of John's actual message in Hades is not stated, but is implied in the explanation provided in Stanza 9. The considerable reaction described in Stanza 10 is immediate. Now the reader will recall that in the *descensus ad inferos* portion of the *Evangelium Nicodemi*, in all the versions, John is not the first to bring intelligence of the Saviour's coming, being anticipated by the great light of Christ's approach in all versions and by various speakers in the different versions. Within this hymn, John is not required to identify himself as in the *Evangelium Nicodemi*, but a direct address to John (St.13) is provided for the saints. It will be remembered that in the Eusebian sermon on John's

coming to the Lower World no identification is required of John, his message is implied rather than stated explicitly, he appears immediately after his death and brings the first news of Christ's coming. In the "Eusebian" sermon the saints address John after the delivery of his message. Certainly Bede's hymn has more affinity to the "Eusebian" sermon than to the *Evang. Nic.*, or, for that matter, to any Latin document. Certain portions of the Eusebian corpus were available in Latin translation by the time of the Venerable Bede,[91] though how much circulation these documents enjoyed can only be surmized.[92] It is maintained that Bede either did not know or ignored the *Evangelium Nicodemi*;[93] if not, a translation of the "Eusebian" homily would have provided material for this dramatic and uncommon treatment of John's *descensus*.

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[91] O. Hey, E. K. Rand, Eine Predigt über Christi Höllenfahrt, *Archiv für lateinische Lexicographie und Grammatik* 14 (1906) 253–268; G. Morin, *Sermo de dominicae observatione:* Une ancienne adaptation d'un sermon attribué a Eusèbe d'Alexandrie, *Revue bénédictine* 24 (1907) 530–534; A. Siegmund, *Die Überlieferung der griechischen christlichen Literatur* ... (Munich 1949) 73.

[92] Morin, 533: "Cette pièce (the fragment on Sunday observance), dans sa brièveté, suffirait à établir que, dès le VII[e] siècle pour le moins, les homélies de l'énigmatique Eusèbe d'Alexandrie étaient connues et utilisées en Occident."

[93] J. D. A. Ogilvie, *Books Known to the English, 597–1066* (Cambridge Mass., 1967) 71.

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IGNATIUS, POLYCARP, AND I CLEMENT: WALTER BAUER RECONSIDERED

BY

FREDERICK W. NORRIS

Walter Bauer's attack on the classical theory of the development of heresy remains impressive. The claim of some early Christian writers that everywhere heresy was both later in time and smaller in number than orthodoxy appears to be untenable to many scholars.[1] Even H.E.W. Turner contested the report that heresy only flourished in a few places, although he vigorously defended orthodoxy's priority.[2] The historical reconstructions which Bauer offered, however, continue to be debated. His assessment of the evidence resulted in two theses. 1) In most areas of the Mediterranean basin – particularly Edessa, Egypt, Asia Minor, Antioch, Macedonia, and Crete – heresy was either earlier than and/or stronger than orthodoxy. 2) From the beginning of the second century the Roman community was singularly the dominant influence in the formation of orthodoxy.[3] My purpose is to examine Bauer's treatment of

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[1] Walter Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 10, zweite, durchgesehene Auflage mit einem Nachtrag, herausgegeben von Georg Strecker (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1964) 3–4 mentions Origen, *Comm. II in Cantic.* (see Baehrens, GCS 33, 179) and *Sel. in Prov.* (see Lommatzsch 13, 228), Tertullian, *De praescr. haer.* 36, and Hegesippus in Eusebius, *H.E.* 4,22,2–6 as espousing the so-called classical theory of the development of heresy. Reviews of and responses to Bauer are cited in Georg Strecker, Die Aufnahme des Buches, in *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 288–306. The American translation by the Philadelphia Seminar on Christian Origins, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, ed. by Robert A. Kraft and Gerhard Krodel (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1971) – published in England by SCM in 1972 – contains a "completely revised and expanded" version of Strecker's essay by Robert Kraft, 286–316. Helmut Koester, Häretiker im Urchristentum, *RGG*[3] III, 17–21 has an extensive list of works influenced by Bauer.

[2] H.E.W. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth: A Study in the Relations between Orthodoxy and Heresy in the Early Church*, Bampton Lectures 1954 (London, A.R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd., 1954) 7.

[3] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*. These theses are most easily seen in Bauer's own precis of his book, Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum, *Aufsätze und Kleine Schriften*, herausgegeben von Georg Strecker (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck,

selected sources from Antioch, Asia Minor, and Rome in order to reconsider both the method by which he arrived at these theses and the theses themselves.

I. "Orthodoxy": A minority in Antioch and Asia Minor

The way in which Bauer employed the terms "orthodoxy" and "heresy" has been a point of contention even for those who accepted his insights. The legitimacy of that criticism will be discussed below. Here attention is directed to the claim which Bauer makes that the supporters of Ignatius and Polycarp were probably a minority in Antioch and Asia Minor. His claim may be summarized as follows. Ignatius' frantic concern for his allies is best explained against the background of a minority whose very existence is threatened. The argumentation which he put forward for monarchial episcopacy is typical of minority groups. Although it is possible that Ignatius' friends represented a plurality in the various cities to which and about which he wrote, his frenzied activity in behalf of his supporters and his overwrought exhortations to them, suggest that this was not the case. Antiochene "orthodoxy" must have been seriously endangered. Nothing else could have called forth Ignatius' unparalleled request from every congregation known to him for representatives or at least letters to be sent to Antioch. The peril was depicted so clearly that bishop Polycarp wanted to leave troubled Smyrna and himself travel as a delegate to Antioch. On the basis of these texts, Bauer concluded that "orthodoxy" in both Western Syria and Asia Minor was of questionable size and influence.[4]

Bauer himself changed his estimation of the number of those supporting Ignatius. First, he viewed the possibility of their being a majority as unlikely because of Ignatius' frantic arguments and efforts. Then he suggested that they probably comprised smaller or larger majorities in Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, and Philadelphia.[5] The unquestioned concession of probable majorities favoring Ignatius in Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, and Philadelphia has two results. 1) Bauer's claim that Ignatius' views developed from minorities cannot be substantiated on his own reading of the evidence, unless he can prove that these three cities had

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1967) 229–233. Hans-Dietrich Altendorf, Zum Stichwort: Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum, *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (1969) 62–63 gives a similar summary of Bauer.

[4] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 65–78.

[5] Pp. 67, 73, and 81.

"orthodox" minorities prior to Ignatius, or demonstrate that there were no truly monarchial bishops in those communities. Bauer made no attempt to argue that prior to the time of Ignatius, Magnesia, Tralles, and Philadelphia had "orthodox" minorities. He tried to indicate that Ephesus could have been no "center or orthodoxy" before Ignatius. If that could be established – which I doubt[6] – it would still not be definitive evidence that Ignatius' argument arises from a minority situation. Bauer had already conceded that Ephesus probably had a majority agreeing with Ignatius' views when the Syrian wrote. Bauer's assertion that there were nor real bishops in these cities will be handled below. 2) He could still claim that Ignatius' arguments for monepiscopacy come from a threatened minority, if he could establish the minority status of "orthodoxy" in Smyrna and Antioch prior to and during the time of Ignatius.

The texts relating to Smyrna do indicate a struggle. It is possible that both in *Smyrneans* 6,1 and *Polycarp* 1,2 the use of *topos* refers to a significant leader or leaders who were performing cultic acts outside Polycarp's jurisdiction. The opening of Polycarp's letter to the Philippians also may be evidence for counter-leadership.[7] Bauer posited a "gnostic anti-bishop" or someone acting in that way although he did not wish to quarrel about semantics.[8] These details, however, are not enough to warrant the conclusion that in Smyrna, Polycarp and those supporting Ignatius' supporters in Smyrna also comprised a majority. Decisively, as firmly in the way of demonstrating their minority status. *Smyrneans* 10 indicates that the Smyrneans unlike the Philadelphians had received Ignatius' representatives quite well. Both Philo and Rheus wished to express their thankfulness for the way in which they were treated by the Smyrnean congregation. If, as Bauer conceded, the supporters of Ignatius were a probable majority in Philadelphia, and yet did not treat Ignatius' representatives as well as the congregation in Smyrna, it is possible that Ignatius' supporters in Smyrna also comprised a majority. Decisively, as in Philadelphia, Ignatius was so certain of the proper faith and strength of the Smyrneans that he asked them to appoint a delegate to be sent to congratulate the congregation in Antioch. If Ignatius had felt that the

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[6] I argue the weakness of Bauer's case concerning Ephesus in "Asia Minor Before Ignatius: Walter Bauer Reconsidered", to be published in *Studia Evangelica*, papers from the Fifth International Congress on Biblical Studies, Oxford, 3–7 September 1973.

[7] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 73–74. Turner, *The Pattern of Christian Truth*, 64 contests both points.

[8] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 73.

Smyrneans would have had any difficulty in appointing a faithful delegate, he certainly would not have requested them to send one to his beloved Antiochenes.[9] Furthermore, since Bauer insisted that in Smyrna during Polycarp's lifetime there was no "separation between ecclesiastical Christianity and heresy",[10] on his reading of the evidence, there was no "heretical" group outside the community to which Ignatius wrote. Therefore, Bauer has been unable to prove that ecclesiastical Christianity was a minority among the Christians in Smyrna.

The situation in Antioch reflects the same kinds of difficulties seen in Smyrna, although we have little direct evidence about conditions there. In this instance, however, Bauer misinterpreted the information we possess. Ignatius did not seek representatives or letters to be sent to Antioch from every church open to him. In his epistle to Polycarp, he did ask Polycarp to write churches on his route to Rome since the journey from Troas to Neapolis came much sooner than he had anticipated. One purpose of these requested letters was to ask congregations to send representatives or messages to Antioch.[11] The reference to "bishops, presbyters, and deacons" in *Philadelphians* 10, however, states that "the nearest churches have sent bishops, and the others presbyters and deacons". Bauer, in his handbook treating the Ignatian epistles, understood "nearest" to refer not to Philadelphia or Troas, the city from which the letter to Philadelphia was written, but rather to Antioch.[12] If this interpretation is correct, bishops were only sent from churches near Antioch. Presbyters and deacons came from the more distant churches. This interpretation is supported by the fact that nowhere in his letters did Ignatius ask a bishop to go as a messenger. The Philadelphian letter specifically requests that a deacon be appointed.[13] Ignatius sought a delegate from Smyrna, but Tralles, Ephesus, and Rome were encouraged to pray for the church in Syria.[14] The letter to the Magnesians contains a cryptic phrase of purpose, concerning the refreshment of the Antiochene congregation with the dew of the Magnesian congregation, but that purpose is related to prayer.[15] Therefore, of the six churches to which Ignatius wrote, four were in no

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[9] *Smyrneans* 11. Compare *Philadelphians* 10.

[10] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 75.

[11] *Polycarp* 8,1.

[12] Walter Bauer, *Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Polykarpbrief*, Handbuch zum neuen Testament (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1920) 262.

[13] *Philadelphians* 10,1.

[14] *Smyrneans* 11,2; *Trallians* 13,1; *Ephesians* 21,2; *Romans* 9,1.

[15] *Magnesians* 14,1.

way requested to send either representatives or letters. Only two were asked to send delegates. The letters written from Troas: *Philadelphians*, *Smyrneans*, and *Polycarp*, make mention of either representatives or letters.

At this point Bauer might have claimed that something important occurred just before the final letters were written which caused Ignatius to change his strategy. In that case, the purpose of the delegates and/or letters would have had to have been investigated. This, however, Bauer ignored. In both the Smyrnean and Philadelphian epistles, the purpose was to congratulate the Antiochenes for the resolution of their problems.[16] The congratulations were "that they have gained peace, and have restored their proper greatness, and that their proper constitution has been restored".[17] Such statements suggest earlier unrest in Antioch, and perhaps reflect problems Ignatius had there as bishop. The peace may have been shaky. Ignatius was indeed concerned, but he also was satisfied that the present condition was proper. The news of peace in Antioch was what prompted sending messengers. The possibility of Ignatius' supporters being "routed from the field" or being "driven back" without him,[18] would have been more likely when the first letters were written, i.e., before the news of peace had arrived. Yet it is precisely these first letters from Ignatius which ask neither for delegates nor for letters to Antioch.

Bauer was impressed also by the fact that so many delegates were requested even to the rank of bishop from churches which were themselves in danger. The only mention of bishops is in *Philadelphians* 10 which Bauer read as a reference to churches near Antioch. He did not attempt to demonstrate that these anonymous churches near Antioch were threatened. His example of a troubled bishop was Polycarp, whom Bauer thought "would have preferred to undertake the journey to Antioch in person" because Ignatius had so strongly stressed the necessity of such delegates.[19] Ignatius did ask Polycarp to call a council and select a zealous and beloved person to act as God's courier to Antioch.[20] Ignatius, however, did not ask Polycarp to go. In *Polycarp* 8 he says: "I greet him who shall be appointed to go to Syria. Grace will be with him through all, and with Polycarp, who sends him." Furthermore, Polycarp

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[16] *Smyrneans* 11,2; *Philadelphians* 10,1.
[17] *Smyrneans* 11,2.
[18] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 69.
[19] P. 68–69.
[20] *Polycarp* 8,2.

was so unimpressed with the necessity of his undertaking the task, that in his letter to the Philippians he says, "I will do this if I have a convenient opportunity, either myself or the one whom I am sending representing you and me."[21] Those are not the words of a man who saw the survival of the Antiochene church endangered or one who was so worried about the state of things in Smyrna that he could not leave that city. The "orthodox" community in Antioch had experienced serious difficulties, but Bauer did not assemble evidence which proves that the conditions there prior to Ignatius' epistles demand an "orthodox" minority.[22] At the time of the writing of Ignatius' letters, neither the tone of his arguments nor the scope of his actions establish the fact that he represented a threatened minority.

In the consideration of Bauer's description of the Christian communities in Antioch and Asia Minor, three points, then, are in order. First, in both areas he has been unable to demonstrate either the priority or the majority of "heresy". Ignatius and Polycarp indicate concern about "wrong" teaching and practice, but those supporting them in the Asia Minor and Western Syrian cities which their writings reflect, probably represented majorities. Secondly, the attempt to assess minorities and priorities among "orthodox" and "heretical" communities was and is important in order to deal with the classical theory of the development of heresy. That theory will continue to hold sway until such evidence is accumulated and assessed. This assessment, however, cannot be bound to a sociological theory which views arguments for monepiscopacy to be indicative of minorities. In this period all Christians of any description were in the minority. Small groups pressured by the larger culture, may see themselves as threatened even by the smallest amount of opposition from within. One or two influential people can change the whole direction of such a group. The situation which Bauer posited, a democratic *Sitz im Leben* in which control of the council has been lost, is not necessary to explain either the deep concern of Ignatian texts, or the concern of any other texts. Since Bauer has not established an "orthodox" minority within the communities in which bishops were present, nor in Ignatius'

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[21] *Philippians* 13,1.

[22] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 67 saw the dispute between Peter and Paul (Galatians 2,11–21), the fact that Paul never again spoke of Antioch, and the cryptic reference to Antioch in Acts 18,22–23 as evidence against the possibility of Ignatius being a monarchial bishop. But he did not demonstrate that "orthodoxy" was a minority in Antioch prior to Ignatius.

home Antioch, then he has not demonstrated that Ignatius' arguments for monepiscopacy come from a threatened minority within the various sectors of Christianity. Bauer attempted to shore up that description by claiming that there were no real bishops in those communities, but failed to establish that claim, as we shall see. Thirdly, none of the evidence discussed demonstrates that "orthodoxy" was a majority throughout Asia Minor and Western Syria. The texts only indicate that "orthodoxy" was probably a majority in the specific cities mentioned. Bauer cannot claim that "orthodoxy" in these cities was threatened with extinction. On the other hand, one cannot claim that "heresy" was without power and influence in the regions, and possibly in the majority in some places. The ultimate question of plurality in these areas cannot be answered. In order to distinguish these adversaries, however, the question as to whether or not the categories of "orthodoxy" and "heresy" are even applicable to early Christianity must be examined.

II. "Heresy" and monepiscopacy

In his introduction Bauer stated that he employed the terms "orthodoxy" and "heresy" in a way which was consistent with their customary usage.[23] Using the terms in that context allowed him to emphasize the strength and priority of "heresy" in particular regions of the Mediterranean basin. Still he was careful to insist that later meanings of the terms were not applicable. He specifically denied that either Ignatius or Polycarp had a conception of "heretics" being excluded from the Church, and insisted that both made unity and reconciliation their primary goals.[24] Although the phrase "catholic church" was used for the first time in ecclesiastical history by Ignatius, it was employed in an inclusive sense rather than the exclusive sense in which it was to appear in the Muratorian Canon at the end of the second century.[25] Bauer viewed the absence of a division between "inside" and "outside" as an indication that Ignatius, the "bishop of Syria", would have had to claim all the baptized believers in Syria under his hegemony. Since there were many Gnostic teachers in Antioch, as well as other strong religious influences, it then became clear to Bauer that Ignatius could not have been a bishop worthy of the title.[26] Polycarp suffered the same fate since no separation between "heresy" and

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[23] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 2–3.
[24] Pp. 67 and 75.
[25] P. 231.
[26] Pp. 67–71.

"orthodoxy" occurred within his lifetime. He also must have claimed all the "heretics" in Smyrna to be under his jurisdiction, and therefore could hardly be considered a powerful monarchial bishop in light of "heretical" strength in that city. If these two champions were not truly bishops, then it is unlikely that those Ignatius mentions as bishops in other cities could properly wear the title.[27]

Bauer is probably correct in asserting that no clear separation between "orthodoxy" and "heresy" can be constructed from the Ignatian and Polycarp letters. The observation about the different meanings of the term "catholic church" in Ignatius and the Muratorian Canon is important in tracing developments in early Christianity. There are, however, developments which Bauer overlooked, precisely because he stated the issue in terms of separation or division. He insisted that the word "heresy" when it appears in Ignatius means "Sekte" rather than "Ketzerei".[28] This is consistent with his later contention that Ignatius considered the opponents to be inside the community of faith. Both Lampe and Grant, however, point out that the term means "Ketzerei". Ehrhardt suggests that particularly in Tralles a separation between Ignatius' supporters and opponents had occurred because no word of reconciliation appears in the Trallian epistle.[29] There is no call to re-

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[27] Pp. 75–76 and 71–72.

[28] Bauer, *Die Briefe*, 235 concerning *Trallians* 6,1.

[29] G. W. H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968) 51 and Robert M. Grant, *The Apostolic Fathers: New Translation and Commentary*, Vol. 4, *Ignatius of Antioch* (London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1966) 76 in reference to *Trallians* 6,1. Arnold Ehrhardt, Christianity before the Apostles' Creed, *The Framework of the New Testament Stories* (Manchester, University Press, 1964) 180–181 views the word "heresy" as meaning "sect" but claims that there was a separation in Tralles in which the opponents appear to have been "irretrievably lost". The comparison in which the word occurs in *Trallians* 6,1 is strong evidence for its use in the sense of "Ketzerei". *Ephesians* 6,2 is enigmatic, as is Hermas *Sim.* 9,23,5. Neither of those references supplies a clear context in which to determine the exact meaning. I Clement 14,2 has used the term to mean "strife" or "party spirit". Ἑτεροδοξία as a noun in *Magnesians* 8,1 and in verb form in *Smyrneans* 6,2 only appears in Ignatius among the so called "Apostolic Fathers" in the sense of "another or irregular opinion". His letter to Polycarp 3,1 employs ἑτεροδιδασκαλέω. I Clement 11,2 uses ἑτερογνώμων of Lot's wife, indicating a "change of mind". Hermas, *Man.* 6,1,2 contrasts the two ways with the use of ὀρθός. J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, Vol. II. Sect. 1 (London, Macmillan and Co., 1885) 28 on the basis of the Syriac and Armenian translations emended Ignatius' *Ephesians* 1,1 with the phrase ἐν γνώμῃ ὀρθῇ καί. If his emendation were correct, that would be the closest approximation of the term "orthodoxy" to appear in the "Apostolic Fathers". The word "orthodoxy" itself does not occur. Although word studies without strong contextual evidence are misleading, this collection suggested by the references in

pentance in that letter, and the contrast in which the word "heresy" appears is one between "Christian food" and that "strange plant, which is heresy". In the same letter, further distinction is made between those who are inside the sanctuary with the bishop, presbytery, deacons, and ordinances of the Apostles, and those who are outside the sanctuary. The latter are not of pure conscience. In addition the advice is explicitly given to beware of these people, to be deaf to what they say and to flee from their teachings.[30]

The Trallian letter, then, distinguishes between outside and inside by viewing the adversaries as outside. The names which Ignatius calls his opponents throughout his epistles tend to strengthen this image. The "atheists" are referred to four times as "unbelievers".[31] Although they bear the "name" – probably "Christian" – they carry it with "wicked guile". In reality they are "mad dogs" and "wild beasts" who are very difficult to heal.[32] While it is true that those who are not called Christian are not of God, some, however, use the name without actually being Christian.[33] The teachings of these adversaries are "evil". They are a "different doctrine or view" composed of "old fables", a "poisonous oil", "wicked arts", and "the snares of the prince of this world".[34] Their actions indicate a lack of expected compassion, of not caring either for love or the unlovely.[35] The consequences of following such teachings are the loss of the "Passion" and "Resurrection", "the Kingdom of God" and

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Henricus Kraft, *Clavis Patrum Apostolicorum* (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963) tends to indicate that at least in Ignatius the problem of "heresy" and "orthodoxy" was of concern.

[30] *Trallians* 6,1–7,2.

[31] *Trallians* 10,1. *Trallians* 3,2 may refer to those in the larger culture rather than to the specific opponents. *Magnesians* 5,2; *Trallians* 10,1; *Smyrneans* 2,1 and 5,3 all refer to the antagonists as "unbelievers". This collection of Ignatius' descriptions of his adversaries may be assembled without regard to the question of whether or not he combatted one or two groups. The issue concerns the possibility of his having distinguished "inside" and "outside". Virginia Corwin, *St. Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch*, Yale Publications in Religion, 1 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960) 52–87 is one of the most recent attempts to suggest at least two sets of opponents. Einar Molland, The Heretics Combated by Ignatius of Antioch, *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 5 (1954) 1–6 and L.W.Barnard, The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Vigiliae Christianae* 17 (1963) 193–206 suggest only one group.

[32] *Ephesians* 7,1.

[33] *Magnesians* 4,1 and 10,1.

[34] *Ephesians* 9,1. 10,3. 16,1. 17,1; *Magnesians* 8,1; *Philadelphians* 3,1. 3,3. 6,2; *Smyrneans* 6,2; *Polycarp* 3,1. 5,1.

[35] *Smyrneans* 6,2.

"immortality", paralleled with the gain of "death" and "unquenchable fire".[36]

The above texts serve to strengthen the suggestion that Ignatius does make a distinction between inside and outside and relegates his adversaries to a position outside the community of the faithful. Even stronger elements of his letters support this interpretation. Ignatius is the only person in this period who argued for the theological necessity of monepiscopacy. Not only does he give a series of metaphors in which the relationship of bishop, presbyters and deacons are compared with divinity, heavenly beings, and apostles,[37] he also considers baptism and the Eucharist to be under the jurisdiction of the bishop. The Eucharist is the bread of God, the medicine of immortality. Unless a man is within the sanctuary, he lacks the bread of God. Only the Eucharist which is celebrated by the bishop or his appointee is both "secure and valid".[38] The implication is that those who participate in an "invalid" Eucharist do not receive immortality and do not share in the benefits of the faith. This implication corresponds to the description of the opponents and the consequences of their teachings.

To this point the evidence appears to demand a clear differentiation between Ignatius' friends and his enemies, which may have reached the point of separation in Tralles. Separation, however, does not appear to have been the usual situation in the cities to which Ignatius wrote. *Smyrneans* 6–8 probably provides the strongest statements about the validity of the Eucharist only under the jurisdiction of the bishop. The faithful are urged to refrain from contact with the adversaries, even to the point of not speaking of them in public or in private. This might appear to be an example of separation, particularly since Smyrna is the place in which Bauer envisioned the existence of counter meetings under a "gnostic anti-bishop".[39] Yet one must step back from this tantalizing suggestion of division by noting two important aspects of this passage. First, the antagonists have not been forced out of the Eucharist because of their understanding of it. They have not been excluded or excommunicated. Ignatius might have pictured them as absenting themselves from the service in order to put the onus of division on them. It is exactly at

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[36] *Ephesians* 16,2 and 20,2; *Philadelphians* 3,3; *Smyrneans* 5,1. 7,1.

[37] *Ephesians* 3,2–6,1; *Magnesians* 2–3,2. 6,1–7,2. 13; *Trallians* 2,1–3,2. 12,2; *Philadelphians* insc., 1. 3,2. 7–8,1; *Smyrneans* 8–9,1; *Polycarp* insc., 5,2–6,1.

[38] *Ephesians* 5,2. 20,2; *Smyrneans* 8. Compare *Trallians* 7,2; *Magnesians* 4.

[39] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 73.

this point that he warns his supporters to "flee from divisions as the beginning of evils". This warning, however, is better explained by a second consideration. In this context Ignatius exhorts "all of them" to follow the bishop. There is still time for the offenders to return to soberness and to repent. Here is the practical application of Ignatius' aversion to division and his love of unity which is testified to throughout his letters.[40] One can see this reflected even in the vilest names he calls his adversaries. When they are viewed as "mad dogs" and "wild beasts" almost incapable of being healed, Ignatius mentions the "one Physician". The disruptive teachers from outside Ephesus are probably included in the "other men" for whom the Ephesians were to pray and to hope for repentance, living before them in love and gentleness so that they might become disciples of the faithful and thus find God. Similar advice was given to Polycarp in dealing with his antagonists.[41]

Within the letters, the tension between exclusion and inclusion cannot be resolved, not even by observing the differences in each individual community. Ignatius has the structure necessary to distinguish "heresy" and "orthodoxy". He describes who the opponents are, what they teach and how they act, and has theologically to his satisfaction justified a system of organization in which the bishop is in charge of the valid sacraments. The Trallian letter might be given as an instance of separation primarily because Ignatius offered no words of reconciliation in that epistle. It is always difficult, however, to prove that silence on a specific point is intentional. Ignatius' overall attempt appears to be to preserve unity, rather than to exclude impurity. Exclusion is an action which Ignatius accused his adversaries of taking, an action he only once suggested with no indication that those excluded were to be called to repentance. The opponents may have seen themselves as separate, that is, as not needing what Ignatius' supporters offered. On the other hand, Ignatius usually prays for their repentance and their return to the valid Eucharist. His letters do not indicate what is to be done with such people if they refuse to repent and to return to the bishop. The Trallian situation cannot be shown to be the way in which recalcitrant adversaries are to be handled since no previous attempt at reconciliation in that community can be established. Ignatius had taken a significant step, however, in

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[40] *Magnesians* 1,2. 13,2; *Trallians* 11,2; *Philadelphians* 2,1. 3,2. 4. 7,2. 8,1; *Smyrneans* 7,2; *Polycarp* 1. s. 5,2.

[41] *Ephesians* 7. 10; *Polycarp* 1–3.

distinguishing between "heresy" and "orthodoxy", although he offered no consistent position as to what must be done with unrepentant opposition. Polycarp gives no indication of separation, in spite of the use of strong language about his adversaries, and the possibility on Bauer's reading of his epistle, that he distinguished those presbyters who were with him from those who were not. Although his list of errors is quite scathing, he calls for moderation and repentance.[42]

Bauer emphasized the lack of separation between "heresy" and "orthodoxy" in Ignatius and Polycarp as if there was no distinction made. Precisely because of Ignatius' concern for unity and reconciliation, as well as his interest in repentance and the restoration of peace, he probably did feel some kind of claim on all the baptized of Syria. Bauer, however, stressed one part of the position and then extended it as if it were conclusive. All the force of Ignatius' derisive names, his villification of teachers and teachings, his organization of valid Eucharist under the bishop, and the lack of a word of reconciliation in the Trallian epistle indicate a distinction which could be the beginning of a justified separation, if the adversaries refused to repent and return to the bishop. Polycarp also uses strong names for his antagonists, and gives a concise list of errors to be combatted. Clear separation is to be found in neither of their writings, but they would have been leary of claiming their opponents as being anything but the most wayward of brothers.

Bauer's inability to grasp the difference between the beginning of a process and its fullest development led him to emphasize the lack of separation in Ignatius and Polycarp and to miss the attempts at distinction. His logic fell into the same trap when he insisted that the fullest development of monepiscopacy must be present in its beginning in order for it to exist at all. By positing that Ignatius would have needed to claim his opponents as "inside", Bauer intended to show that Ignatius would have had strong opposition from within. Because, in Bauer's view, a monarchial bishop should have had "unlimited power", and "full recognition" as well as never having been overcome with the ineffectiveness of his efforts, Ignatius was not the bishop of Syria.[43] Bauer's mention of the Gnostic teachers in Antioch only demonstrates that Ignatius was not a bishop, if Bauer's definitions of "inside" and "monepiscopacy" are

[42] *Philippians* 2,1. 7. 11,4.
[43] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 71, 72, and 75.

accepted.[44] The major methodological error occurs in tightening the definition of "monepiscopacy" not only to demand its fullest development, but beyond this, to demand such characteristics of monepiscopacy that it would be difficult to find many bishops in any period of history. The imposition of an "ideal" definition kept Bauer from reading the evidence correctly. While in the available literature of this period, Ignatius offers the single example of theological arguments for the necessity of monepiscopacy, it is not likely that he himself originated the office in Asia Minor. His letters to the Ephesians, Magnesians, Trallians, Philadelphians, and Smyrneans argue for finer distinctions between bishop, presbyters and deacons than has previously existed. He does not need, however, to suggest or contend for a difference between the place of Onesimus, Apollonius, or Zotion. They are bishop, presbyter and deacon. Other persons are given with the respective titles. Such distinctions were recognizable to his readers. The Philadelphians are to appoint a deacon to be sent to Antioch. Neighboring churches have sent bishops, others, presbyters and deacons.[45] The strong case which Ignatius made for the theological and organizational significance of the bishop probably was new, but prior to his writing, the offices existed and were distinguished from each other in Asia Minor, and probably in Western Syria.

It has become evident, then, that Bauer has a tendency to use peculiar definitions of important terms, employing them with these meanings in

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[44] Pp. 70–71. Bauer noticed the presence of Menander, Saturninus, Cerdo, and Basilides in Antioch around the time of Ignatius. But this information, although important, does not establish Bauer's claims about Ignatius, unless Ignatius must accept all these teachers as "Christian" and could not be a bishop with such opposition. Bauer has not demonstrated the strength of the groups following these Gnostics, nor that Ignatius would have accepted them without distinction as "Christian", nor that one can only be a bishop if one has no opponents.

Ehrhardt, Christianity before the Apostles' Creed, 180–181 criticizes Bauer's same arguments, but on other grounds. He views Ignatius as too Gnostic to represent the Antiochene community which produced the pseudo-Clementines. Heinrich Schlier, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Ignatiusbriefen*, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 8 (Giessen, Töpelmann, 1929) and Hans-Werner Bartsch, *Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochien*, Beitrag zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 2. Reihe, 44. Band (Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1940) most strongly argue for Gnostic influence in Ignatius. However, Hans Lietzmann, *A History of the Early Church*, Vol. I, trans. by Bertram Les Woolf (New York, Meridian Books, 1961) 236–248, Grant, *The Apostolic Fathers, Ignatius*, and Barnard, The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch, contest the strength of such influence.

[45] *Ephesians* 1,3–2,1. 4,1; *Magnesians* 2; *Trallians* 1; *Philadelphians* insc., 10; *Smyrneans* 12,2.

such a fashion as to apparently strengthen his argumentation. Probably because of this tendency, the possibility of using the terms "heresy" and "orthodoxy" as he did for the beginning of the second century has been questioned. Bauer did employ the terms with sweeping inclusiveness.[46] If they are meant to imply later definitions, then they do not fit. If, however, they are inserted in discussions of this period to signify the beginning of those developments which led to later definitions, they then become important tools. Ignatius used forms of the terms and did make distinctions which might have led to eventual separation. What is called for in the study of the documents from this era is a closer and more accurate reading of the texts in relation to these terms. The "cutting edges" in the conflicts need to be found.[47] Suggesting that such terminology will only serve to confuse the issue, avoids the beginning of issues which are in the texts.

III. "Orthodoxy" as Roman

Bauer has been unable to demonstrate that what he terms "heresy" was prior to and/or stronger than "orthodoxy" in Antioch and Asia Minor. At the same time he has also been unable to establish that monepiscopacy did not exist in these regions. Furthermore, he has misunderstood the important distinctions between "heresy" and "orthodoxy" which appear in the literature and form a background for their later separation. Therefore, Antioch and Asia Minor represent areas in which "orthodoxy", although challenged by strong and influential adversaries, was not in disarray at the beginning of the second century. If that is true, then it can be brought directly to bear on Bauer's second thesis, i.e., that Rome alone

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[46] Wilhelm Schneemelcher, Walter Bauer als Kirchenhistoriker, *New Testament Studies* 9,1 (1962) 18. Robert A. Kraft, The Reception of the Book, *Orthodoxy and Heresy*, 312–314 offers a series of penetrating questions and suggests the use of the terms should be limited to those points where they appear in the texts. Hans-Dietrich Altendorf, in his review of the second edition of Bauer, *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 91,3 (1966) 194 utters a warning concerning the difficulty of treating these issues.

[47] James M. Robinson, Kerygma and History in the New Testament, in: *Trajectories through Early Christianity* (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1971) recognizes the problems involved, but suggests that stopping the investigations at the level of overwhelming plurality may be another error of interpretation. Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966) 123 notices that "the perennial issue" concerning Origen is his "orthodoxy". Yet when one asks that question of Origen, the prior question is raised, "what is the essence of orthodoxy?" Without pressing for the answers to the "orthodoxy" and "heresy" questions which Bauer posed concerning early Christian texts, it will be difficult to define these concepts.

was the important center of "orthodoxy" in the second century. Tracing Rome's unfolding influence on the "orthodox" movement in Christianity, Bauer viewed the North African intervention in c. 250, the support of Alexandrian bishop Demetrius against Origen in c. 230, Victor's attempt to cut off the Asia Minor churches in c. 190, the letter of Dionysius of Corinth to Soter in c. 180, and the encounter between Anicetus and Polycarp in c. 154 as examples of what Rome did with its intervention in Corinth through the first epistle of Clement. On the basis of his understanding of this development, Bauer saw Rome in the second century as "from the very beginning the center and chief source of power for the 'orthodox' movement".[48]

There is certainly nothing methodologically illegitimate about tracing developments in one geographical area through a given period to see changes in opinion and action, as well as continuity of position and procedure. This must be considered one of the strongest points of Bauer's presentation. The claim, however, that "orthodoxy" stems from Rome will have to be supported both by the lack of influential bases elsewhere, and the proof that I Clement interposes its interest on Corinth in a way dissimilar to that of other literature of its period, and quite similar to later Roman interventions. The deficiency of important centers of "orthodoxy" has been contested above. It is, however, significant to notice how Bauer fails to grasp the similarities of I Clement and related literature of this period. He sets the stage for his interpretation of I Clement by indicating that its interest in another center is much like that of other writings from the period, and then claims I Clement to be the basis of the peculiar Roman position of intervention.[49] He does not discuss I Peter, which is also probably from Rome and is concerned with particular regions of Asia Minor. This would indicate not only a concern on the part of Rome for Corinth, as I Clement testifies, but also in Asia Minor. Bauer noted the apparently Roman influence on some of the Asia Minor literature, particularly in the coupling of Peter and Paul as the symbol of apostolic leadership, and the development of the later pseudo-Clementines in Antioch.[50] On the other hand, the Pastorals and the Apocalypse give

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[48] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 231.

[49] Pp. 93–98.

[50] Pp. 115–133 particularly indicate Roman influence throughout the Mediterranean. Karlmann Beyschlag, *Clemens Romanus und der Frühkatholizismus*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 35 (Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1966) extensively confirms such influence.

evidence of cross influences of various centers in Asia Minor. Polycarp wrote to Philippi in Macedonia in response to a letter from that community. Ignatius shows a wide geographical range of influence and concern. He not only wrote to instruct communities in Western Asia Minor about faith and practics, but also sent an epistle to Rome with instructions not to interfere in his martyrdom. The occasion of his writings was his journey to suffer death, but he used that opportunity to influence the various communities he wrote. The tone of the Roman letter is more favorable than any of the others. Ignatius does not hesitate, however, to warn that community of the consequences if they interfere in his going to God through the martyr's act. Nor does he fail to assert his own position as bishop of Syria paralleled to Rome's position in its region.[51] The literature of this period shows a pattern of territorial intervention or interpenetration from many Christian centers.

Furthermore, there are five important contributions which Asia Minor and Antioch made to orthodoxy – contributions which would most likely appear in a detailed definition of "orthodoxy". First, monepiscopacy may have originated in Jerusalem where it developed through an hereditary succession.[52] The cities represented in Ignatius' letters indicate the presence of the office with no hereditary overtones and distinguished from presbyters and deacons, before Ignatius wrote. Monepiscopacy, however, is not in evidence in Rome at the beginning of the second century.[53] Secondly, the theological justification of the place of the bishop in the life of the church is first visible in Ignatius, rather than in a Roman author. The conception of apostolic succession is not found in Ignatius, and does appear in I Clement.[54] Yet nothing from early second century Rome can equal the claim which Ignatius makes for monarchial episcopacy. Thirdly, the distinctions between "heresy" and "orthodoxy" which Ignatius used are beginnings which could later be pressed toward separation if oppo-

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[51] *Romans* insc., 2. 8,3.

[52] Hegesippus in Eusebius, *H.E.* 4,22,4 notices this familial relationship.

[53] The burden of proof for monepiscopacy in Rome at the beginning of the second century rests on the one arguing that case, since all the evidence speaks either of a plural episcopate, or none at all. I Clement 42 mentions bishop*s* (59,3 uses the singular form of the word for God) as does Hermas *Vis.* 3,5,1 and *Sim.* 9,27,2. Ignatius' Romans neither argues for monepiscopacy nor mentions a bishop in that city. William Telfer, *The Office of Bishop* (London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1962) 43–88 suggests that the acceptance of monepiscopacy by Rome involved a significant theological shift from the position represented at the end of the first century.

[54] I Clement 42.

nents remained rebellious. These early distinctions are not so clearly marked in the Roman literature of the period. Bauer himself thought an example of separation could be found in I John, a text which is usually ascribed to Asia Minor.[55] Fourthly, canonical developments can be seen in this region also. Marcion appears to have been the first to consciously create a canon. Asia Minor also may have a prior claim to the creation of four gospels.[56] Finally, the first liturgical texts appear to come from Syria, particularly in the form of manuals like the *Didache*. For some reason Bauer never discussed the *Didache*. It seems, therefore, highly unlikely that the spread of "orthodoxy", seen by Bauer as emanating from Rome with its organizational genius,[57] would have been functional at its heights in later centuries without monepiscopacy developed beyond hereditary connections, theologically argued, coupled with a separation between heresy and orthodoxy, a four gospel canon, and a regularized liturgy: all Syrian and Asia Minor contributions.

Bauer's second thesis is called into question because he did not recognize the strength of centers elsewhere in the Mediterranean and their contributions to the development of "orthodoxy". He also has a questionable tendency, however, to read lines of development backwards, seeing later events in earlier texts. He based the third century interventions of Rome in the first century epistle of I Clement. Yet the evidence from the second century does not demand that Rome imposed its will on other areas far removed from its local concerns until the dramatic action of Victor. The Paschal controversy of 154 is a case in point. The difficulty seems to have involved immigrants from Asia Minor, who, after settling in the vicinity of Rome, continued to celebrate Easter according to the date and customs of their homeland. Anicetus was trying to establish a uniform practice in his own region, not attempting to intervene in Asia Minor. The immigrants apparently appealed to their champion, Polycarp. We do not know the exact circumstances under which he came to Rome, but there is no evidence that he was summoned there by Anicetus. While

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[55] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 96. Bauer argues wrongly, p. 91, that the difference between Jewish and Gentile Christians in Asia Minor becomes a difference between "orthodoxy" and "heresy" in the late first or early second centuries. If he were correct, his observation would be a further contribution of the area to a classical definition of "heresy" and "orthodoxy".

[56] Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen, *Die Entstehung der christlichen Bibel*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 39 (Tübingen, J.C.B.Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1968) 174/206, particularly 202.

[57] Bauer, *Rechtglaubigkeit*, 232–233.

there, Polycarp tried to convince Anicetus of the correctness of the Asia Minor custom just as much as Anicetus tried to convince him of the correctness of the Roman custom. Both failed, and did not agree on everything, but parted in peace. Anicetus even invited Polycarp to celebrate the Eucharist.[58] Since this was Roman territory, the stronger argument most probably came from Polycarp and the Asia Minor contingent. They were not merely left in peace to follow their own customs. They practiced them in the Roman region. Bauer is incorrect to suppose that in these events the Roman powers were strategically biding their time until Asia Minor weakened.[59]

It must not be assumed, however, that all such confrontations between Rome and other areas were to have these mixed resolutions. Rome was a very important center. The letters of Dionysius of Corinth well indicate that the economic power of Rome and the influence which came from that strength had penetrated the empire. Dionysius not only praises I Clement, but congratulates Soter on following and even advancing the Roman custom of sending supplies for the poor and those in the mines.[60] Such assistance made a profound impression on Dionysius, and doubtless carried some theological implications. We are, however, unaware of exactly what those pressures toward "orthodox" development were.[61]

Victor's actions were the strongest. The Paschal question had evidently become more acute throughout the Mediterranean basin. Eusebius suggests that there were a number of synods, and specifically mentions ones in Jerusalem, Rome, Pontus, Gaul, and Osrene. Only Victor, however, made the attempt to cut off as unorthodox those who did not agree. This may have been due to his North African heritage which looked to Rome for much of its leadership.[62] In any case, such action is a clear indication of his sense of power and authority, but it was not an action

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[58] Eusebius, *H.E.* 5,24,16–17.

[59] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 131.

[60] Eusebius, *H.E.* 4,23,10.

[61] Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 125–126 suggests on the basis of this letter that in 95 during the problems which prompted the writing of I Clement, the Romans sent money to support the former leadership in Corinth. It is an interesting conjecture, but not a demonstrable position.

[62] Bernhard Lohse, *Das Passafest der Quartadecimaner*, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, 2. Reihe, 54. Band (Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1953) 122–127. He follows Bauer, *Rechtgläubigkeit*, 14 in suggesting that the existence of a synod in Osrene is questionable. Cyril Richardson, A New Solution to the Quartodecimian Riddle, *Journal of Theological Studies* (1973) 74–84 proposes further distinctions among the Quartodecimian parties.

which occurred without being vigorously contested. Eusebius quotes not only the replies representing various bishops from Asia Minor, notably Polycrates of Ephesus, but also the interesting correspondence of Irenaeus.[63] There is little doubt that Rome should be seen as one of the most important centers of "orthodoxy" and one of the most vital sources of its power throughout the second century. That is particularly true in the deeds of Victor, and the tradition of almsgiving which Dionysius recognized as having a history prior to Soter. Even then, the contribution and influence of other regions in the development of orthodoxy must not be underplayed. Irenaeus, who viewed Rome as the type of all orthodox churches, was himself from Asia Minor and as a young man had listened to Polycarp. Irenaeus ministered in Gaul to an area which was strongly influenced by immigrants from Asia Minor.[64] As one of the major architects of orthodoxy and opponents of heresy, he refuted Victor's right to excommunicate the churches in Asia Minor and to make them alter their apostolic customs. The beginnings of Roman dominance in orthodoxy might be found in the lifetime of Victor, but neither the Anicetus–Polycarp meeting, nor the intervention of Rome in Corinth through the epistle of I Clement indicates such dominance. Therefore, Bauer's second thesis fails to stand up to scrutiny because he underrated the strength and influence of centers in Asia Minor and Syria, and because by imputing later developments into his interpretations of earlier ones, he pushed Roman centrality back to a point in history where it did not exist.

Conclusion

Walter Bauer's negative assessment of the classical theory of heresy has been accepted by many scholars. The daring quality of his position in 1934 must not be forgotten. The fallacy of both his positive theses, however, has not been properly emphasized. At the beginning of the second

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[63] Eusebius, *H.E.* 5,23–24.

[64] The account of the Gaulican martyrs in Eusebius *H.E.* 5,1,17 mentions "Attalus, a native of Pergamum". 5,1,49 speaks of "Alexander, a Phrygian by race ... who had lived for many years among the Gauls". The fact that the letter is addressed to Asians and Phrygians is probably due to an immigration of Christians from those areas to Gaul. Irenaeus claims to have seen and listened to Polycarp in *Adv. Haer.* 3,3,4) and in his letter to Florinus in Eusebius, *H.E.* 5,20. Norbert Brox, *Offenbarung, Gnosis und gnostischer Mythos bei Irenäus von Lyon. Zur Charakteristik der Systeme*, Salzburger patristische Studien des internationalen Forschungszentrums für Grundfragen der Wissenschaft, 1 (Salzburg–München: A. Pustet, 1966) 144–150 questions the exactness of Irenaeus' memory of these details about Polycarp, but supports Polycarp's influence on Irenaeus.

century, Antioch and Asia Minor give evidence of "orthodox" communities which had opponents, but have not been proved either to be minorities or to be in danger of extermination. When the strength and contributions of these centers to the development of orthodoxy is recognized, it is impossible to see Rome as the dominant center of "orthodoxy" at the beginning of the second century. Therefore, in assessing Bauer's work, even though details are conceded as incorrect, it should not be asserted that the major premise of the book stands.[65] The negative attack on the classical theory of heresy stands, but the positive reconstructions fall.

In criticizing Bauer's work, it is important to recognize that a number of his arguments are conjecture based on silence.[66] Historians of early Christianity could well learn to distinguish between evidence and lack of evidence, and more freely admit the latter. On the other hand, to avoid working in the gaps is not possible, since we possess such a small fragment of the materials which once existed. It is entirely legitimate to search for methods through which groups now without the witnesses they once had, are allowed, in fact enabled to speak. Bauer's major methodological errors, however, are not confined merely to the treatment of silence. A large proportion occur in his treatment of the texts. He postulates a democratic council in which "orthodoxy" was a threatened minority in order to explain Ignatius' concern and argumentation for monepiscopacy, but is unable to demonstrate that Ignatius' supporters were a minority in any of the communities associated with Ignatius or that they did not have

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[65] Kraft, The Reception of the Book, 314–316 indicates that "there is much in Bauer's treatment that invites supplementation or reassessment" but makes the comment under the heading of "Specific Details". Yet he recognizes that a "fresh approach" to "North Africa, Rome and other western regions", "Asia Minor and the Aegean area", and "the whole question of east Syrian Christianity" is in order. Helmut Koester, GNOMAI DIAPHOROI: The Origin and Nature of Diversification in the History of Early Christianity, *Trajectories through Early Christianity*, 114 claims that "Bauer was essentially right" particularly in light of the Nag Hammadi discoveries.

[66] Kraft, The Reception of the Book, 311 is correct to insist that "*ad hominem* blasts and apologetic counter-charges" will not advance the state of the problems. Bauer cannot be dismissed because he is "conjectural". It will prove more rewarding to study the texts and create new interpretations. Investigating the texts, however, indicates that Bauer's two major theses may be rejected precisely because of the methodological problems which Kraft mentions, i.e., "that Bauer has sometimes used language suggesting more confidence in his reconstruction than the evidence would seem to warrant, and that sometimes there is no direct evidence to support his interpretation, or he has overgeneralized on the basis of ambiguous data." More damaging is the indication that he has misread the texts.

bishops. He uses terms such as "monepiscopacy", "orthodoxy", and "heresy" and strengthens or weakens their meanings according to his theory. The basic error is in reading history backwards, either by demanding that the fullest or even "ideal" stage of a development must be present at its beginning in order for it to exist, or by imposing later events on earlier ones to support his interpretations. Frankly, he misreads the texts. One should be cautious in following his lead in places where there are few texts and much silence, when it can be demonstrated that he does not proceed on good grounds with the existent texts.

Positively, Bauer divides his study into areas, attempting to treat each individually. It is perhaps wise to concentrate our efforts even further by investigating separate cities within these areas. Bauer is also to be followed in researching the lines of development of "orthodoxy" and "heresy" in early Christianity. We may take the lead of Dobschütz not only in reading the individual hermeneutic of each document, but also in sketching the social, economic, and political environment of the communities which stand behind the documents.[67] In viewing the importance of the various regions over against each other, we would do well to continue research into the traditions behind such architects of orthodoxy as Irenaeus.[68] In

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[67] Ernst von Dobschütz, *Vom Auslegen des Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927) 16 suggests the investigation of the New Testament literature with a view to the individual hermeneutic of each book. That could profitably be expanded to all early Christian texts. His *Christian Life in the Primitive Church*, trans. by George Bemner and ed. by W.D. Morrison (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904) studies early Christian ethics in terms of its social setting. For a penetrating analysis of the need for this latter approach see Leander E. Keck, On the Ethos of Early Christianity, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 42,3 (1974) 435–452. Keck and Wayne A. Meeks chair a group of the American Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature which is studying the social world of Christianity in Antioch of Syria in the first four centuries. See Meeks, The Social World of Early Christianity, *The Council on the Study of Religion Bulletin* 6,1 (February, 1975) 1, 4–5. Edwin A. Judge, St. Paul and Classical Society, *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 15 (1972) 19–36 gives an excellent survey of the possibilities for such investigations. The Disciples Institut zur Erforschung des Urchristentums, Tübingen, Germany is investigating Christianity in its urban environments in Antioch of Syria, Corinth and Ephesus.

[68] André Benoit, *Saint Irénée: Introduction a l'Étude de sa Théologie* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1960) 9–41 reviews the problem of sources with an interest in defending a synthetic attempt to study Irenaeus' theology. Brox, *Offenbarung*, 105–167 deals with these questions with a view to explaining Irenaeus, while Martin Widmann, Irenäus und seine theologischen Väter, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 54,2 (1957) 156–173 attempts to find a way between portraying Irenaeus as a dull traditioner or the first systematic theologian. We should avoid a concept as broad as an "Asia Minor Theology" which Friedrich Loofs, *Theophilus von Antiochien 'Adversus Marcionem' und*

this way historians indebted to Bauer's attempts can move beyond his efforts toward better reconstructions of early Christianity.[69]

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die anderen theologischen Quellen bei Irenaeus, Texte und Untersuchungen, 46,2 (Leipzig, J.C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1930) began to propose. But the contributions of that region to the formation of orthodoxy in one such as Irenaeus and the influence Antioch may have had on Asia Minor merit the continued study of what theological themes dominated the churches in those areas.

[69] Helmut Koester's GNOMAI DIAPHOROI, *Trajectories*, 114–157 is a stimulating piece which deserves attention. What is probably most needed is more penetrating work on specific areas, as the Research Team for the Religion and Culture of the Aegean in Early Christian Times and its newsletter, *Numina Aegaea* indicate Koester is pursuing.

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THE LAW IN PHILO AND PTOLEMY: A NOTE ON THE LETTER TO FLORA

BY

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In his commentary on Ptolemy's Letter to Flora, G. Quispel has noted that in formulating his position on the Law Ptolemy draws upon catholic tradition, adapts it to his own hermeneutical scheme, and uses it against the position of the Marcionites.[1] He further correctly points to the Jewish background and suggests that Ptolemy has utilized Jewish-Christian conceptions in presenting his distinctions with regard to the Law.[2] In this article I should like to call attention to some passages in Philo, which have not been noted by Quispel or previous commentators and which show that distinctions not only with regard to various levels of meaning in the Law but also with regard to different origins for different passages in the Law were familiar in the Hellenized Judaism of the Diaspora prior to the time of Ptolemy. Indeed, these passages in Philo seem to provide us with an insight into important antecedents for Ptolemy's attitude to the Law. A consideration of these passages also reminds us once again of the contribution to Gnosticism on the part of Hellenized Judaism (whether in Palestine or in the Diaspora),[3] a lesson which the Nag Hammadi documents are increasingly instilling within us.

Before we consider Philo, it may be helpful to recall the distinctions which Ptolemy introduces into the Law. At the start, we should note that Ptolemy does not discuss creation but advises Flora that this topic is

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[1] G. Quispel, ed., *Ptolémée: Lettre à Flora*, SC 24 (Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1949; 2nd ed. 1966) 9 and 23.

[2] Quispel writes: "Nous supposons donc que *Ptolémée a connu*, directement ou indirectement, *les conceptions des cercles judéo-chrétiens sur l'Ancient Testament*, que nous avons citées plus haut. Ce résultat ne laisse pas de surprendre: la conception des péricopes faussées, loin d'être l'invention fantasque et éphémère de quelque gnostique, remonte jusqu'aux milieux juifs qui ont vu naître le christianisme" (*Ptolémée*, 23).

[3] See, for example, R. McL. Wilson, *The Gnostic Problem* (London, Mowbray, 1958) and K. Rudolph, Randerscheinungen des Judentums und das Problem der Entstehung des Gnostizismus, *Kairos* 9 (1967) 105–122.

reserved for a later time when she is "counted worthy of the apostolic succession" (Epiph. *Pan.* 33,7,8–9).[4] In this preliminary instruction Ptolemy distinguishes within the Law contained in the Pentateuch a first category which is the law of God. He further distinguishes within the law of God three different sub-categories of legislation: (a) the pure law, that is, the ten commandments, which contain both command (*prostaxis*) and prohibition (*apagoreusis;* 5,3)[5] and which come from the Fashioner and Maker of the world (7,4) but which need to be perfected (5,1); (b) the law which is typical (*typikos*) and symbolic (*symbolikos*) and enacted according to the image of the pneumatic and superior (5,2); (c) the law which is bound up with evil and has been abolished by the savior (5,1). In his own words Ptolemy expresses it as follows:

> "That one part, the law of God himself, is in turn divided into three parts: the pure legislation which is not mixed with evil, which is therefore properly called 'law', which the Saviour came not to destroy but to fulfil for that which he fulfilled was not alien to him, (but required fulfilment), for it was not perfect; next, the law which is intertwined with baseness and injustice, which the Saviour destroyed because it was not consonant with his nature. The third division is that (law) which is exemplary and symbolic, that which is ordained according to the image of the spiritual and transcendent (things). This the Saviour changed from being perceptible (to the senses) and phenomenal into the spiritual and invisible. Now the law of God which is pure and unmixed with evil is the Decalogue, those ten sayings engraved on the two tablets for the forbidding of those things which one must avoid and for the enjoining of things which we must do" (5,1–3).[6]

Further, Ptolemy distinguishes within the Law contained in the Pentateuch a second category, i.e. legislation derived from Moses. Ptolemy

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[4] Ed. Quispel, *Ptolémée*, 66–69. Subsequent references to Ptolemy's letter to Flora are from Epiph. *Pan.* chapter 33, in Quispel's edition. Thus only the section and paragraph numbers will be given. However, when the English translation is provided, the translation will be taken from W. Foerster, *Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts*, Vol.1: *Patristic Evidence* (trans. R. McL. Wilson; Oxford, Clarendon, 1972) 154–161.

[5] See also 3,1; 4,1; and 5,6.

[6] Foerster, *Gnosis*, Vol.1,157–158. The text is provided in the edition of Quispel, *Ptolémée*, 56: Πάλιν δὲ δὴ τὸ ἓν μέρος, ὁ αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος, διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία τινά· εἴς τε τὴν καθαρὰν νομοθεσίαν τὴν ἀσύμπλοκον τῷ κακῷ, ὃς καὶ κυρίως νόμος λέγεται, ὃν οὐκ ἦλθε καταλῦσαι ὁ σωτὴρ ἀλλὰ πληρῶσαι (οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀλλότριος αὐτοῦ ὃν ἐπλήρωσεν, ‹ἔδει δὲ πληρώσεως›· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν τὸ τέλειον) καὶ εἰς τὸν συμπεπλεγμένον τῷ χείρονι καὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, ὃν ἀνεῖλεν ὁ σωτὴρ ἀνοίκειον ὄντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει.

Διαιρεῖται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ τυπικὸν καὶ συμβολικὸν τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα τῶν πνευματικῶν καὶ διαφερόντων νομοθετηθέν· ὃ μετέθηκεν ὁ σωτὴρ ἀπὸ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ φαινομένου ἐπὶ τὸ πνευματικὸν καὶ ἀόρατον.

Καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος, ὁ καθαρὸς καὶ ἀσύμπλοκος τῷ χείρονι, αὐτὴ ἡ δεκάλογος, οἱ δέκα λόγοι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ ἐν ταῖς δυσὶ πλαξὶ δεδιχασμένοι, εἴς τε ἀπαγόρευσιν τῶν ἀφεκτέων καὶ εἰς πρόσταξιν τῶν ποιητέων.

states explicitly that he means legislation which does not ultimately come from God and through Moses but rather derives from Moses' own mind (4,2) and is contrary to God's law. He writes thus:

> "Once the Saviour was talking with people who were discussing with him the subject of divorce, where the existing legal prescription permitted divorce. Now the Saviour said to them, 'Because of your hard-heartedness Moses permitted you to divorce your wives. From the beginning it was indeed not so. For God', he went on, 'joined together this union, and what the Lord joined together', said he, 'man shall not dissolve' (Matt. 19,8, 6 par). Thus he shows that there is a law of God which forbids the wife being divorced from her husband, but that there is another law, that of Moses, which permits the dissolving of the union because of hard-heartedness. So Moses laid down a law which is contrary to that of God, for dissolving is contrary to not dissolving" (4,4–6).[7]

Lastly, Ptolemy distinguishes within the Law of the Pentateuch a third category, the traditions of the elders, which are also contrary to the law of God. Ptolemy states the matter in these words:

> "The Saviour further makes it clear that there are also some traditions of the elders interwoven with the law. 'For God', he says, 'has said: "Honour thy father and thy mother that it may be well with thee", but you', he says, addressing the elders, 'you have declared that that by which you might have been helped by me (must be) a gift of God; and have annulled the law of God by the tradition of your elders" (4,11–12).[8]

Turning now to Philo, we note that Philo presents Moses as a legislator in *De vita Mosis*, *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus*. In discussing the sacred books which the lawgiver Moses has left behind, Philo states that there are two parts: the first, which is the historical part and treats of creation (cf. Ptolemy 7,8–9, who reserves creation for a later instruction)

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[7] Foerster, *Gnosis*, Vol.1,156. The text is provided in the edition of Quispel, *Ptolémée*, 52: Διαλεγόμενός που ὁ σωτὴρ πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τοῦ ἀποστασίου συζητοῦντας αὐτῷ, ὃ δὴ ἀποστάσιον ἐξεῖναι νενομοθέτητο, ἔφη αὐτοῖς ὅτι »Μωυσῆς πρὸς τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ὑμῶν ἐπέτρεψεν τὸ ἀπολύειν τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ. Ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν οὕτως. Θεὸς γὰρ, φησί, συνέζευξε ταύτην τὴν συζυγίαν, καὶ ὃ συνέζευξεν ὁ κύριος, ἄνθρωπος«, ἔφη, »μὴ χωριζέτω«.

Ἐνταῦθα ἕτερον μὲν ‹τὸν› τοῦ θεοῦ δείκνυσι νόμον, τὸν κωλύοντα χωρίζεσθαι γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν τοῦ Μωυσέως, τὸν διὰ τὴν σκληροκαρδίαν ἐπιτρέποντα χωρίζεσθαι τοῦτο τὸ ζεῦγος.

Καὶ δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐναντία τῷ θεῷ νομοθετεῖ ὁ Μωυσῆς· ἐναντίον γάρ ἐστι ‹τὸ διαζευγνύναι› τῷ μὴ διαζευγνύναι.

[8] Foerster, *Gnosis*, Vol.1,157. The text is provided in the edition of Quispel, *Ptolémée*, 54: Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰσίν τινες συμπεπλεγμέναι παραδόσεις ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, δηλοῖ καὶ τοῦτο ὁ σωτήρ. »Ὁ γὰρ θεός« φησίν »εἶπεν· τίμα τὸν πατέρα σου καὶ τὴν μητέρα σου, ἵνα εὖ σοι γένηται. Ὑμεῖς δὲ« φησίν »εἰρήκατε« τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις λέγων· »δῶρον τῷ θεῷ ὃ ἐὰν ὠφεληθῇς ἐξ ἐμοῦ, καὶ ἠκυρώσατε τὸν νόμον τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ τὴν παράδοσιν ὑμῶν« τῶν πρεσβυτέρων.

and particular persons who were either rewarded for their obedience or punished for their disobedience; and the second, which contains commands and prohibitions (*De vita Mosis* 2,45–48).[9] Since there is probably a lacuna in *De vita Mosis* 2,65,[10] where Philo would have discussed these commands and prohibitions, we turn our attention to *De decalogo* and *De specialibus legibus*, where Philo introduces distinctions that are similar to those of Ptolemy. First of all, the ten commandments as commands (*prostaxeis*) and prohibitions (*apagoreuseis*) come from God himself (*De dec.* 175–76):

> "This is all that need be said regarding the second five to complete our account of the ten oracles which *God gave forth Himself* as well befitted His holiness. For it was in accordance with His nature that the pronouncements in which the special laws were summed up should be given by Him in His own person, but the particular laws by the mouth of the most perfect of the prophets whom He selected for his merits and having filled him with the divine spirit, chose him to be the *interpreter* of his sacred utterances.
>
> Next let us pass on to give the reason why He expressed the ten words or laws in the form of simple *commands* or *prohibitions* without laying down any penalty, as is the way of legislators, against future transgressors. He was God, and it follows at once that as Lord He was good, the cause of good only and of nothing ill."[11]

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[9] Philo, *De vita Mosis* 2,45–48 (trans. F.H.Colson, LCL [Cambridge, Harvard University, 1966] 6,470–471): "The above is sufficient in itself as a high commendation to the lawgiver; but there is another still greater contained in the sacred books themselves, and to these we must now turn to shew the great qualities of the writer. They consist of two parts: one the historical, the other concerned with commands and prohibitions, and of this we will speak later, after first treating fully what comes first in order. One division of the historical side deals with the creation of the world, the other with particular persons, and this last partly with the punishment of the impious, partly with the honouring of the just. We must now give the reason why he began his lawbook with the history, and put the commands and prohibitions in the second place. He did not, like any historian, make it his business to leave behind for posterity records of ancient deeds for the pleasant but unimproving entertainment which they give; but, in relating the history of early times, and going for its beginning right to the creation of the universe, he wished to shew two most essential things: first that the Father and Maker of the world was in the truest sense also its Lawgiver, secondly that he who would observe the laws will accept gladly the duty of following nature and live in accordance with the ordering of the universe, so that his deeds are attuned to harmony with his words and his words with his deeds."

[10] See the note of Colson in LCL 6,480 and his discussion in the appendix in LCL 6,606–607.

[11] Philo, *De decalogo* 175–176: Τοσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς δευτέρας πεντάδος ἀποχρώντως λέλεκται πρὸς ἐκπλήρωσιν τῶν δέκα λογίων, ἅπερ ἱεροπρεπῶς ἔχρησεν αὐτὸς ὁ θεός. ἦν γὰρ ἁρμόττον αὐτοῦ τῇ φύσει, κεφάλαια μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδει νόμων αὐτοπροσώπως θεσπίσαι, νόμους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ μέρει διὰ τοῦ τελειοτάτου τῶν προφητῶν, ὃν ἐπικρίνας ἀριστίνδην καὶ ἀναπλήσας ἐνθέου πνεύματος ἑρμηνέα τῶν χρησμῳδουμένων εἵλετο.

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν τοὺς δέκα λόγους ἢ νόμους ἀπεφήνατο

In a similar conception to that of Ptolemy, God is for Philo also Father and Maker of the world and Lawgiver in the truest sense (*De vita Mosis* 2,48).[12] In addition to being the author of these general principles which summarize the particular laws, God is also for Philo the author of some particular laws (*De dec.* 19).[13] For Philo too there is a symbolic (*symbolon*) meaning to the Law, as he expresses it in *De dec.* 48–49:

> "Admirable too, and worthy of the Godhead, is the saying that the voice proceeded from the fire, for the oracles of God have been refined and assayed as gold is by fire. And it conveys too, *symbolically*, some such meaning as this: since it is the nature of fire both to give light and to burn, those who resolve to be obedient to the divine utterances will live for ever as in unclouded light with the laws themselves as stars illuminating their souls."[14]

According to Philo there is also a second category of material to be distinguished within the sacred books. Some parts of these books come from Moses, i.e. particular laws. Philo offers one example of this material in these words:

> "These considerations the prophetic author of our laws had before his eyes when he proclaimed a rest for the land and made the husbandman stay his work after six

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ψιλαῖς προστάξεσι καὶ ἀπαγορεύσεσι κατὰ τῶν παραβησομένων, ὡς ἔθος νομοθέταις, μηδὲν ὁρίσας ἐπιτίμιον· θεὸς ἦν, εὐθὺς δὲ κύριος ἀγαθός, μόνων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος, κακοῦ δ' οὐδενός. Text and trans. F. H. Colson, LCL [Cambridge, Harvard University, 1966] 7,92–93. The terminology employed here by Philo to discuss the decalogue (*prostaxis* and *apagoreusis*) is distinctive in contrast with LXX, Josephus, and NT. Since – as we pointed out above – Ptolemy uses this same terminology, the terminology as well points to the dependence of Ptolemy on Hellenized Diaspora Judaism for his material. In contrast to their use of *prostaxis* and *apagoreusis*, the LXX uses *prostagma* while *apagoreusis* does not appear there at all. In the new Josephus lexicon the only entry for *apagoreusis* has *prorrēsis* as its antonym rather than *prostaxis* (there are numerous entries for *apagoreuō*). In the NT neither *prostaxis* nor *prostagma* nor *apagoreusis* occurs (*prostassein* does appear in the NT, e.g. Matt 8,4). Although Ptolemy can also use other nomenclature, e.g. *nomos* (5,1), *prostagma* (5,5) or *nomothesia* (7,1), he does employ *prostaxis* and *apagoreusis* when discussing the content of the decalogue (e.g. 5,3).

[12] See note 9.

[13] Philo, *De dec.*19: "Now we find that those which He gave in His own person and by His own mouth alone include both laws and heads summarizing the particular laws, but those in which He spoke through the prophet all belong to the former class." Trans. Colson, LCL, 7,14–15.

[14] Philo, *De dec.* 48–49: παγκάλως μέντοι καὶ θεοπρεπῶς εἴρηται ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ φωνὴ προέρχεσθαι· ἠκρίβωται γὰρ καὶ βεβασάνισται τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγια καθάπερ χρυσὸς πυρί. μηνύει δὲ καὶ διὰ συμβόλου τι τοιοῦτον· ἐπειδὴ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ μὲν φωτίζειν τὸ δὲ καίειν πέφυκεν, οἱ μὲν τοῖς χρησμοῖς ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι καταπειθεῖς ὡς ἐν ἀσκίῳ φωτὶ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον βιώσονται τοὺς νόμους αὐτοὺς ἀστέρας ἔχοντες ἐν ψυχῇ φωσφοροῦντας. Text and Trans. Colson, LCL, 7,30–31. Cf. *De spec. leg.*1,277 and 3,178.

> years. But he gave this enactment not only on the grounds which I have mentioned but also moved by that habitual kindliness which he aims at infusing into every part of his legislation, thereby impressing on the readers of the sacred scriptures the stamp of good and neighbourly customs."[15]

As God's inspired prophet, Moses is the interpreter (*hermēneus*) of his sacred utterances (see *De dec.* 175–76 as quoted above).[16]

Although Philo does not derive any of the precepts of the sacred books from Ptolemy's third category, the traditions of the elders, it should be noted that Philo claims to gather certain aspects of the story of the life of Moses from the elders (*De vita Mosis* 1,4).

In his section on Moses as a prophet in *De vita Mosis* 2,187–91 Philo presents a similar series of distinctions. He writes as follows:

> "I have discussed the first three, and shewn that Moses was the best of kings, of lawgivers and of high priests, and will now go on to shew in conclusion that he was a prophet of the highest quality. Now I am fully aware that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses; but I will confine myself to those which are more especially his, with the following preliminary remarks. Of the divine utterances, some are spoken by God in His own Person with His prophet for interpreter, in some the revelation comes through question and answer, and others are spoken by Moses in his own person, when possessed by God and carried away out of himself. The first kind are absolutely and entirely signs of the divine excellences, graciousness and beneficence, by which He incites all men to noble conduct, and particularly the nation of His worshippers, for whom He opens up the road which leads to happiness. In the second kind we find combination and partnership: the prophet asks questions of God about matters on which he has been seeking knowledge, and God replies and instructs him. The third kind are assigned to the lawgiver himself: God has given to him of His own power of foreknowledge and by this he will reveal future events. Now, the first kind must be left out of the discussion. They are too great to be lauded by human lips; scarcely indeed could heaven and the world and the whole existing universe worthily sing their praises. Besides, they are delivered through an interpreter, and interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing. The second kind I will at once proceed to describe, interweaving with it the third kind, in which the speaker appears under that divine possession in virtue of which he is chiefly and in the strict sense considered a prophet."[17]

In analyzing this passage of Philo, one notes that he begins by acknowledging that all things written in the sacred books are oracles delivered through Moses. Then among the divine utterances he distinguishes first those that are spoken by God in His own person with his divine prophet as interpreter. Thereby, Philo in this passage includes together in this first category both the general principles uttered by God himself and

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[15] Philo, *De spec. leg.* 2,104 (trans. Colson, LCL, 7,368–371). See also *De spec. leg.* 1,262. 344; 2,58. 64; 3,24. 47. 91. 117.

[16] See also *De dec.* 18.

[17] Trans. Colson, LCL, 6,540–543.

the particular laws which are the interpretations of these principles. Secondly, Philo distinguishes those oracles that are mixed, i.e. those which have questions from Moses and answers from God.[18] Thirdly, Philo distinguishes those oracles which derive from the prophet himself, in which God has granted him the gift of foreknowledge so that he can foretell future events.[19]

In conclusion, then, although Philo is well known for his allegorical interpretation of the Law, for his discussion of different levels of meaning in the Law, we have seen that he also distinguishes different sources or origins for various parts of the Law. Thereby it becomes clear that in this respect the Hellenized Judaism of a Diaspora Jew such as Philo has prepared the way for Ptolemy, and thus we see a further specific example of Quispel's general statement that the gnostic attitudes toward the OT go back to Jewish and Jewish-Christian milieus. Obviously, though, Ptolemy reinterprets these views. While for both Philo and Ptolemy the maker of the world is the lawgiver, for the former that God is the only and perfect God while for the latter he is a second and merely righteous God. Further, for Philo the distinctions are not meant to be negative[20] whereas in Ptolemy the distinctions provide the means to end certain parts of the Law. Again, for Philo attribution of certain parts of the Law to Moses is meant to show that Moses was a prophet and interpreter and that God has spoken through him. In opposition to this view Moses, for Ptolemy, has formulated these laws alone from his own mind and thus they can be discarded. Lastly, for Philo the Law is perfect; but for Ptolemy the Law, even in its best form, is only righteous.

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[18] E.g. the incident concerning the blasphemer in Lev 24,10–16 is treated in *De vita Mosis* 193–208 (trans. Colson, LCL,6,544–551).

[19] E.g. Moses' foretelling of the Exodus *De vita Mosis* 2,246–257 (trans. Colson, LCL,6,572–579).

[20] Cf., however, some of Philo's contemporaries who retained the symbolic meaning of the sacred books but rejected the literal observance of the Law: *De migratione Abraham* 89–93 (trans. F.H.Colson and G.H.Whitaker, LCL [Cambridge, Harvard University, 1958] 4,182–185).

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DATING ATHANASIUS' VITA ANTONII

BY

B.R. BRENNAN

A more precise dating of the *Vita Antonii* has recently been proposed by L.W. Barnard[1] who suggests on the basis of a supposedly 'cool yet respectful' attitude displayed towards the Emperor in *Vita Antonii*, 81, that the work fits somewhere between the *Apologia ad Constantium*, in which Athanasius praises the Emperor and the *Historia Arianorum* in which he comes to identify Constantius as the forerunner of Antichrist. Because of this supposedly transitional attitude, Barnard argues that the *Vita* must have been written late in 357 or early in 358. My aim here is to show that such a theory of transition of attitude according to date of composition is too simplistic since Barnard does not give a correct account of the differing nature of the works on which he bases this theory.

If the three works discussed were all written under exactly the same conditions, free from external restraints, then one could perhaps range them according to a development of attitude and attempt to date them from this. But Barnard, while recognizing that the *Apologia ad Constantium* is a public work, and that the *Historia Arianorum* was written as a *historia arcana* for Athanasius' faithful followers, seriously misreads the *Vita Antonii* by saying that it, like the *Historia*, 'was written for private circulation among the Egyptian monks'.[2] This equation is fundamental to Barnard's thesis and from it he argues that since both the *Vita* and the *Historia* were private works in which Athanasius could speak his mind, the 'cool and detached attitude' to the Emperor, displayed in the *Vita* must therefore procede the hostile attitude of the *Historia*.

It is the keystone of this argument that is its weakest point. The *Vita Antonii* was not written for private circulation in the way that the *Historia* was, nor was it written for the Egyptian monks. In the Preface to the *Vita*,

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[1] L.W. Barnard, The Date of S. Athanasius' Vita Antonii, *Vigiliae Christianae* 27 (1974) 169–175.

[2] *Ibid.* 175.

Athanasius is clearly writing to monks outside of Egypt who are wishing to vie with the Egyptians: Ἀγαθὴν ἅμιλλαν ἐνεστήσασθε πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ μοναχοὺς, ἤτοι παρισωθῆναι, ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλεσθαι τούτους προελόμενοι τῇ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑμῶν ἀσκήσει. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν λοιπὸν μοναστήρια, καὶ τὸ τῶν μοναχῶν ὄνομα πολιτεύεται.[3]

These monks are living overseas. Athanasius mentions information of Antony coming to them from the shores of Egypt and himself excuses his hasty composition by a reference to the ending of the sailing season.[4] The monks Athanasius is writing to have already heard of Antony from others[5] and since later in the *Vita* the spread of Antony's fame is detailed as extending to Africa, Spain, Gaul and Rome,[6] it is therefore most likely that Athanasius was writing to monks in the western provinces. Earlier Athanasius himself had taken word of Antony to Rome[7] so it seems safe to locate Athanasius' correspondents in the west. One thing is quite certain, the *Vita* was not written for the Egyptian monks.

Unlike the *Historia Arianorum*, the *Vita Antonii* was intended for public circulation. In the valedictory chapter, Athanasius urges the monks abroad to read the *Vita* to other brethren, so that they may learn what the life of a monk should be and he advises them to read the work to the pagans as well, so that they may learn of Antony and his powers and come to acknowledge Christ as God.[8] There is never any suggestion that the work is of a secret nature. If the work were designed to be for private circulation only, amongst Athanasius' closest followers, as was the *Historia Arianorum* then we would find Athanasius taking the same sort of precautions outlined when he sent that work to the monks of Egypt – he included a covering letter asking them to read the account and send it back, and he warned them not to allow anyone to take a copy of it or to transcribe it for themselves.[9] The epistolary nature of the Preface to the *Vita* precludes a covering letter, and one advising secrecy would be quite inconsistent with Athanasius' attitude as revealed in chapter ninety four, where he advocates the fullest possible distribution of the work. The *Vita Antonii* is therefore a very different type of work from the *Historia*.

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[3] Athanasius, *Vita Antonii*, Preface.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Vita Antonii* 93.
[7] See Jerome, *Ep.*127, *Ad Principiam Virginem de Vita Sanctae Marcellae*, 5.
[8] *Vita Antonii* 94.
[9] Athanasius, *Ep.*52, *Ad Monachos I*, 3.

When Athanasius writes about the Emperor in the *Vita*, we must allow for the fact that he is writing for a public audience of Christians and Pagans in the west. Here he does not have the degree of freedom to voice his real opinion of the Emperor, as he does in the secret *Historia Arianorum*. Athanasius uses the *Vita Antonii* in his battle with the Arians,[10] but we should not expect to find an already hunted man inviting a charge of treason by publicly slandering the Emperor in a work designed to circulate freely in the western provinces. Since Athanasius was writing on these two levels, public and private, it is impossible to claim on the grounds that Barnard advances, that the *Vita* was written before the *Historia Arianorum* and shows a transitionary attitude. The work could just as easily have been written after the *Historia* since the supposedly 'cool yet reserved' attitude to the Emperor displayed in the *Vita* is explained, not by the date of the work in relation to Athanasius' other writings but by the considerations detailed above. Athanasius wrote his *Historia Arianorum* late in 358 and the *Vita Antonii* may have been written before this, at the same time as this, or after this. Barnard's discussion does not provide a convincing method for dating the work more precisely.

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[10] *Vita Antonii* 69; 70; 82; 89; 91.

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GREGORY OF NYSSA AND THE SIMILE OF THE BANQUET OF LIFE

BY

PAUL J. ALEXANDER

Gregory of Nyssa's treatise *De infantibus qui praemature abripiuntur* is his answer to a question posed by a certain Hierius. This man had presented Gregory with the problem "why one person's life is extended into old age while another lives only long enough to draw a breath of air and to end his life immediately".[1] In his reply Gregory first discusses the question in relation to the notion of divine retribution and then within the framework of divine providence. It is in this second part dealing with infant mortality in relation to God's governance of the world that the simile of the banquet of life plays a large role.

Here Gregory dismisses with a passing reference cases of children killed by their parents. He had mentioned them earlier and they present no difficulty for him as he takes it for granted that such infanticide will usually occur as the result of illegitimate unions and therefore represent God's censure and judgment of the parents' unlawful unions.[2] For Gregory the real problem of the theodicy, the process of calling God to account (ἀπαιτεῖν τὸν λόγον), arises only where an infant is tended by his parents with loving care and earnest prayer and yet dies from disease. Here Gregory ventures a conjecture (εἰκάζειν). Perfect providence will not only cure passions once they have arisen, it will also

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[1] P.G.46,165D–168A: τίνος χάριν τῷ μὲν εἰς γῆρας μακρὸν παρατείνεται ἡ ζωή, ὁ δὲ τοσοῦτον μετέχει τοῦ ζῆν ὅσον δι' ἀναπνοῆς τὸν ἀέρα σπᾶσαι καὶ εὐθὺς καταλῆξαι τὸν βίον.

[2] P.G.46,184B: (νήπια) ὅσα τῆς παρανόμου κυήσεως ἔλεγχος γίνεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν γεννησαμένων ἐξαφανίζεται, cf. 169B: κἂν βαρβάρων τύχῃ γονέων καὶ μὴ νενομισμένῳ κυηθῇ γάμῳ.

prevent man's involvement in forbidden activities from the outset. God, because he knows both past and future, will hinder evil from reaching its fulfillment and human life from becoming the vehicle (ὕλη) for evil.

Gregory illustrates his conjecture by a lengthy elaboration of the simile (ὑπόδειγμα) of the banquet of life. It takes up an entire column in Migne and he returns to it at a later stage where it is combined with the image, borrowed ultimately from Demosthenes, of the persistent reveller at a banquet bespattering the other guests with the "dregs of his evils".[3] In fact the late Cardinal Jean Daniélou suggested, in a remarkable analysis of the treatise but perhaps with some exaggeration, that the simile dominates the entire second part of the treatise.[4] At the end of the section here under discussion Gregory reverts to the point made at the beginning, which the simile of the banquet of life is meant to render more vivid: the death of infants removes both vehicle (ὕλη) and opportunity (καιρός) for evil in cases where God through his foreknowledge and philanthropy foresees deeds of extreme wickedness.[5]

Initially, Gregory elaborates the simile in straightforward fashion. A banquet takes place, good cheer of all kinds (παντοδαπή τις εὐωχία) is laid out, there is a chairman for the occasion.[6] He has remarkable qualifications. He knows exactly the characteristics of each guest, as well as the dishes appropriate or harmful to his constitution, and has the authority and power either to let him continue at the banquet or to send him away, as is most advantageous for him. The chairman will be guided by the principle that to the end of the banquet decorum should prevail and that no guest should overact, get drunk or suffer mental disturbance. Naturally, any participant who is dismissed will be inclined

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[3] *Ibid.*, 184C–185A, cf. Demosthenes, *On the Crown* 50: ... ὥσπερ ἐωλοκρασίαν τινά μου τῆς πονηρίας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων κατασκεδάσας.

[4] Jean Daniélou, Le traité 'Sur les enfants morts prématurément' de Grégoire de Nysse, *Vigiliae Christianae* 20 (1966) 159–189, esp. 179.

[5] P.G. 46,185C: ὁ λόγῳ τὰ πάντα ποιῶν ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς κακίας τὴν ὕλην μὴ διδοὺς καιρὸν τῇ προαιρέσει τῇ διὰ τῆς προγνωστικῆς δυνάμεως γνωρισθείσῃ κτλ. On Gregory's view of the function of similes in general, see *In diem luminum*, p. 229,19 ed. E. Gebhardt (vol. IX,1, Leiden 1967): τὰ ὑποδείγματα ἐμψυχότερον ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸν λόγον ἐργάζεται ...

[6] P.G. 46,184C (ἐπιστατείτω), cf. 184D (τοῦ ἐπιστάτου). The normal technical term is συμποσίαρχος, but Plutarch (*Quaestiones convivales* 1,4, ed. G. N. Bernardakis, vol. IV [Leipzig 1892] 26,23), for example, uses ἐπιστάτης as an equivalent (see also 23,2 ἐπιστασία). Gregory probably found the more generic term more suitable for the application of his simile.

to charge the chairman with poor judgment but he will eventually acknowledge his gratitude after he considers the debauches of others who indecorously remain at the banquet, their drunkenness, vomiting, headaches and ribald conversation.

One might expect that Gregory has now exhausted the dimensions of his simile. The feast or banquet with its varied fare stands for life, the guests allowed by the chairman to remain are the individuals reaching normal age, those sent away are the *ahori*, the subject of the treatise, and the wise and powerful chairman is God. Indeed, Gregory seems ready at this point to apply the simile to the problem of the infants who die prematurely.[7] Surprisingly, however, he postpones the drawing of the conclusions and elaborates with rich culinary detail the great variety of food offered at the table of life. The reader realizes belatedly that Gregory had artfully foreshadowed this development already at the beginning of the simile.[8]

In this second part of the simile God is implicitly compared less to the chairman of the banquet than to an experienced cook, caterer or dietician.[9] Furthermore, the linguistic disguise of the simile here frequently becomes entirely transparent and metaphorical, so as to reveal the underlying ethical and metaphysical problem. Not all the food at the banquet is sweetened with the honey of pleasure but life is beset with rather bitter mishaps. Salty and pungent dishes make life's relish difficult to digest, the mixing bowls of deceit are filled with every type of mixture and produce a variety of physical and mental ailments: delusion, disturbance, shameful retribution.[10]

Gregory does not state explicitly why he does not end his development of the simile with the characterization of the *dramatis personae* (chairman and guests) and why he delays its application until he has introduced the variety of pungent food offered at the banquet. Perhaps the reason

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[7] P.G. 46,185A: Εἰ δὲ νενόηται ἡμῖν τὸ ὑπόδειγμα, ῥᾴδιον ἂν εἴη προσαγαγεῖν τὸ ἐν τούτῳ καταληφθὲν ἡμῖν θεώρημα τῷ προκειμένῳ νοήματι.

[8] *Ibid.*, 185B: ... πολλήν τε καὶ παντοδαπὴν τῶν ἐδωδίμων τὴν παρασκευήν, cf. 184C: παντοδαπή τις εὐωχία.

[9] *Ibid.*, 185B: ... ἔστιν ὅπου καὶ τοῖς αὐστηροτέροις τῶν συμπομάτων (*lege* συμπτωμάτων) τὴν ζωὴν ἐπαρτύεσθαι, οἷα δὴ φιλοτεχνοῦσιν οἱ τῶν περὶ γαστέρα καὶ θοίνην ἡδονῶν τεχνῖται ...

[10] *Ibid.*: ... ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἐν οἷς ἅλμη τὸ ὄψον ἐστὶν ἢ στῦψις ... δύσληπτον ποιεῖ τὴν καρυκείαν τοῦ βίου, πληρεῖς δὲ οἱ τῆς ἀπάτης κρατῆρες παντοδαποῦ κράματος. With the "mixing bowls of deceit" Gregory means the illusions of earthly existence, see the comparison of "the multicolored deceit of this life" with "Circe's mixing bowl" (*Vita Moysis*, p. 142,12 ed. H. Musurillo [vol. VII, Leiden 1964]).

given by him for the inclusion of these dishes by the experienced cook (caterer, dietician) furnishes a clue: some of it is designed to rekindle the flagging appetites of the guests, others serve as emetics. Possibly Gregory wishes to suggest that man's proclivity to evil is insufficient to account for the fate of the *ahori*. In addition, so he seems to argue, there are present in creation a number of elements necessary for the physical and moral functioning of human existence but capable of being misused by the individual.[11] It is God's foreknowledge of the concurrence of the human penchant to evil with the existing opportunity (καιρός) for wrongdoing by the perversion of essentially beneficial elements that justifies the death of the *ahori*.

At long last Gregory now proceeds to the lesson of his simile. A person who misbehaves at the banquet is quickly and for his own good (κερδαίνων) ordered, obviously by the chairman, to leave the assembly of guests lest his continued presence be instrumental in catering to his greed. This is, Gregory concludes, "the success of perfect providence", namely the prophylactic treatment of passions before they arise. This is the reason why God in his purposefulness and love for man deprives newborn infants of both the means and the opportunity for the evil which he foresees.

Gregory employs the simile of the banquet of life in several other works. It occurs in *De hominis opificio* composed probably in A.D. 379.[12] Here Gregory wishes to explain why man was created last. God is conceived as "a good host" (τις ἀγαθὸς ἑστιάτωρ) who first furnishes and adorns his house, couch and table and prepares the food and then only brings in his guest. In the same way God,

> the wealthy and lavish host of our (human) nature adorned our dwelling with beautiful features of all kinds, prepared this great and manifold banquet and then created man assigning him the function not of acquiring what does not belong to him but of enjoying what is ready for him.[13]

The thought here is considerably simpler than in *De infantibus*, yet similar.

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[11] *Ibid.*, 185B: ... τὰς ὀρέξεις τῶν δαιτυμόνων ἀναρριπίζοντες; 185C: ... τὸν ἔμετον ... ἀνεκίνησαν; 185D: ... ὅταν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἔχοι.

[12] G. May, Die Chronologie des Lebens und der Werke des Gregor von Nyssa, in: *Ecriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse*, ed. M. Harl (Leiden 1971) 57.

[13] Ch. II, P.G. 44,133C: ... κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁ πλούσιός τε καὶ πολυτελὴς τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν ἑστιάτωρ παντοίοις κάλλεσι κατακοσμήσας τὴν οἴκησιν καὶ τὴν μεγάλην ταύτην καὶ παντοδαπῆ πανδαισίαν ἑτοιμασάμενος, οὕτως εἰσάγει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἔργον αὐτῷ δοὺς οὐ τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν μὴ προσόντων, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν παρόντων.

God here is not compared with the chairman but with the host of the banquet, humanity is represented by its ancestor, Adam, Gregory again emphasizes the varied character of the banquet and in general the simile serves to demonstrate God's providential care for man.

In his eighth homily *In Ecclesiasten*, composed before A.D. 381, Gregory uses the simile once again.[14] In this passage he comments on verses from *Ecclesiastes* (3,10ff.) difficult both linguistically and in content. According to Gregory, the biblical citation means that God gave man, together with his other benefactions, the mental capacity of discerning the proper use of every one of them. But man, following wicked advice, perverted the usefulness of divine gifts into its opposite. He then illustrates his interpretation by the simile of the banquet of life. He thinks of God as of a host (ἑστιάτωρ), as in *De hominis opificio*, who sets the table for his guests and in particular provides knives and forks for the banquet "such as are furnished by those practising this art".[15] One of the invited guests misuses these eating utensils and cuts himself or another participant with a knife or gauges out his neighbor's or his own eye with his fork. In this case nobody would blame the host but one would rather hold the guest responsible who perverted the utensils for a purpose not intended by the former. It is another variation on the familiar theme, except that here and in *De infantibus* the simile functions specifically to emphasize man's rather than God's responsibility for evil while in *De hominis opificio* the image does not go beyond underlining God's providential governance of the world.

Probably, there are further passages where Gregory uses the simile of the banquet of life.[16] For the moment the texts discussed so far should

[14] P.438f. ed. P.Alexander (vol. V, Leiden 1962): ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τραπέζης πᾶσαν προθεὶς παρασκευὴν εὐωχίας καὶ σκεύη τινὰ πρὸς τὴν τῆς τροφῆς συνεργίαν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχοντα συμπαραθείη, οἷα δὴ παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοτεχνούντων κατασκευάζεται ... ἔπειτά τις τῶν ἐπ' εὐωχίᾳ συγκεκλημένων ὑπαλλάξας τῶν προκειμένων τὴν χρῆσιν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὰ μὴ δέοντα χρῷτο ... εἴποι τις ἄν, ὅτι τῇ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ἑστιάτορος ὁ δεῖνα εἰς κακὸν ἀπεχρήσατο, οὐ τοῦ παρασκευάσαντος τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν ἐκβησομένων προετοιμάσαντος, ἀλλὰ τῆς κακῆς τῶν προτεθέντων χρήσεως εἰς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος προαγαγούσης τὸν ἀβούλως τοῖς προκειμένοις χρησάμενον. On the date of the work, see May, Die Chronologie etc., 56f.

[15] P.438,16: παρὰ τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοτεχνούντων, cf. *De infantibus*, P.G.46, 185B: φιλοτεχνοῦσιν.

[16] However, the rhetoric of the banquet at the beginning of *De deitate adversus Euagrium*, p. 331 ed. E.Gebhardt (Vol.IX,1, Leiden 1967) and of the panegyric on St. Stephen, p. 4 ed. G. Lendle (Leiden 1968), as well as in the description of the banquet of Job's sons and daughters in *In Pulcheriam*, p. 470 ed. A. Spira (Vol. IX,1, Leiden 1967) is not connected by Gregory to problems of human life in general.

suffice to demonstrate Gregory's skill in exploring the possibilities of the simile. To identify the characteristic features of Gregory's use of the simile it should be of interest to consider briefly its classical antecedents. Here again no claim will be made for completeness of documentation, but a few of the most important occurrences of the simile will be examined.[17]

The earliest example is attributed to Aristotle, but does not occur in his extant works. It is cited in the chapter on death of the florilegium ascribed to Maximus Confessor but dating in fact probably from the end of the tenth century. The fragment reads as follows: "It is best to withdraw from life as from a banquet being neither thirsty nor drunk." The statement is clearly connected with Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a means and could be authentic.[18] The simile emerges again, but in a different context, in a fragment of a disciple of Theophrastus, Bion the Borysthenite (ca. 325–255 B.C.), who urged his listeners to bear as long as possible the strokes of misfortune but declared that when life becomes inbearable,

> "I do not wait but depart without feeling annoyance"

and thence made its way into Cynic and Stoic lectures (*diatribai*).[19] It was also used, in the generation after Aristotle, by Epicurus and by a younger Peripatetic, Hieronymus of Rhodes (ca. 290–230 B.C.). Cicero expresses in the *Tusculan Disputations* the opinion that in one's life one should follow the regulation obtaining at Greek banquets: drink or leave (ἢ πῖθι ἢ ἄπιθι). A man should either share with others in the pleasure of drinking or he should withdraw from the banquet lest he join in the intoxication of drunken men. In the same way he should escape from injuries of fortune that he cannot bear. Cicero adds that those were the sentiments of Epicurus and that Hieronymus (of Rhodes) expressed them

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[17] Some of the pagan examples were collected by André Oltramare, *Les Origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne 1926) esp. 10 and n. 2,53,111 and n. 2,115,275 and n. 4. This useful book came to my attention after my own work was completed.

[18] P.G. 91,901C: Ἐκ τοῦ βίου κράτιστόν ἐστιν ὑπεξελθεῖν ὡς ἐκ συμποσίου μήτε διψῶντα μήτε μεθύοντα. On the date of the florilegium, see H.-G. Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im Byzantinischen Reich*, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, 12. Abt., Zweiter Teil, Erster Band (Munich 1959) 440. For Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a mean, cf. for example *Eth. Nic.* 2,6, 1106a.

[19] Bion *apud* Teletem, p. 16 ed. O. Hense (Leipzig 1909): ... οὐχ ὑπομένω, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐκ συμποσίου ἀπαλλάττομαι οὐθὲν δυσχεραίνων, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ βίου, ὅταν [ἡ] ὥρα ᾖ, 'ἔμβα πορθμίδος ἔρυμα'. The editor further refers to various uses made by Arrian, in his writings about Epictetus, of the simile of the banquet of life, cf. Epictetus, *Entretiens*, 2,16,37, ed. J. Souilhé, vol. II [Paris 1949] 67; *Encheiridion* 15, p. 435 ed. H. Schenkl, *Epicteti Dissertationes* (Leipzig 1894); frg. XVII, *ibid.*, p. 416.

in so many words. Novel features of this use of the simile are that reference is made here to one of the συμποτικοὶ νόμοι and above all that Epicurus, as well as Hieronymus, with Cicero's approval, more explicitly than Aristotle and Bion, connected the simile with a justification of suicide.[20]

From Epicurus and perhaps from the Stoic and Cynic diatribes a direct line leads to Lucretius, Horace, Seneca and Pseudo-Plutarch.[21] To the same tradition also belongs the elaborate discussion paralleling five legitimate reasons for ending a banquet (a great crisis, the party crashed by disorderly revelers, spoiled food, scarcity of food, and drunkenness) with as many grounds for ending one's life (danger to one's city, unethical demands by a tyrant, severe illness, poverty, and foolish talk), a passage that although of late date seems to incorporate earlier Stoic material.[22]

It should be noted that the entire classical tradition relates the simile to death and in many instances to suicide. There remains to discuss a non-Christian passage that links the classical tradition with Gregory. Philo the Jew enquires in his *De opificio mundi*, as Gregory was to do three centuries later in *De hominis opificio*, why man was created last. Philo compares God, "the lord of the universe", to hosts (ἑστιάτορες) who do not invite guests to a meal before they have everything prepared for the feast (εὐωχία).[23] The Philonic passage is clearly the (direct or indirect) model for Gregory's use of the simile of the banquet of life in *De hominis opificio*, but in contrast to the classical texts Philo's approach to the simile has nothing to do with death or suicide. Moreover, none

[20] Cicero, *Tusc disp.* 5,118, edd. Dougan and Henry (vol. II, 302): *Mihi quidem in uita seruanda uidetur illa lex quae in Graecorum conuiuiis obtinetur: 'aut bibat,' inquit, 'aut abeat.' et recte, aut enim fruatur aliquis pariter cum aliis uoluptate potandi aut, ne sobrius in uiolentiam uinulentorum incidat, ante discedat, sic iniurias fortunae quas ferre nequeas defugiendo relinquas. haec eadem quae Epicurus, totidem uerbis dicit Hieronymus.* See also Hermann Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig 1887) fr. 499, and F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, vol. 10 (Basel and Stuttgart 1959) fr. 10e, p. 12f.

[21] Lucretius 3,931 ff.; Horace, *Sat.* 1,1,117–119, cf. 2,2,214; Seneca, *Epistulae ad Lucilium*, 61,4, ed. F. Préchac, vol. II [Paris 1947] 94; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Cons. ad Apoll.* 34, p. 248,23 ed. Paton and Wegehaupt.

[22] H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, III (Leipzig 1903) fr. 768, p. 190, 35 ff.

[23] Philo Judaeus, *De opificio mundi*, 1,77, p. 26 ed. L. Cohn (vol. I, Berlin 1896): καθάπερ οὖν οἱ ἑστιάτορες οὐ πρότερον ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλοῦσιν ἢ τὰ πρὸς εὐωχίαν πάντα εὐτρεπίσαι ... τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμὼν οἷά τις ... ἑστιάτωρ ἄνθρωπον καλεῖν μέλλων ἐπί τε εὐωχίαν ... τὰ εἰς ἑκάτερον εἶδος προευτρεπίσατο, ἵν' εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσελθὼν εὐθὺς εὕρῃ καὶ συμπόσιον ... ἱερώτατον.

of the classical examples had referred to the figure of a personified host. To the extent that control over the banquet is mentioned in pagan passages, as for instance in the *Tusculan Disputations*, it is represented by impersonal authority (νόμος συμποτικός, *lex quae in Graecorum conviviis obtinetur*).

Judaeo-Christian tradition took over the simile of the banquet of life from classical and post-classical pagan literature. Further searches may well discover pagan authors anticipating Philo and Gregory in introducing a personal agent, host or chairman, into the simile, for example as an illustration of divine providence. It remains true, however, that such a figure was indispensable for Jewish and Christian writers moving within the tradition of a monotheistic faith, and they may have been the first to introduce it into the classical simile. In *De hominis opificio* and in the homilies *In Ecclesiasten* Gregory of Nyssa thought of this agent as the host of the banquet, but in *De infantibus* he replaced him by a chairman (ἐπιστάτης), presumably because he wished to invest him with great authority.[24] Undoubtedly, this change was related to Gregory's other departure from his own earlier usage of the simile of the banquet of life (and of Philo's), the return to its classical link with the problems of death.

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[24] See Plutarch, *Quaestiones convivales* 1,4, pp. 22 ff. ed. G. N. Bernardakis (Leipzig 1892) on the qualification and prerogatives of the συμποσίαρχος or ἐπιστάτης.

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SOME REMARKS WITH REGARD TO AUGUSTINE'S CONCEPTION OF MAN AS THE IMAGE OF GOD

BY

CORNELIA W. WOLFSKEEL

Following the general tradition of the catholic church of his day[1] Augustine regarded the biblical words in Genesis, according to which God made man in His own image and likeness, as referring to the human soul, which is gifted with reason. God is a spirit. This implies from Augustine's point of view a merely spiritual sense of man as the image of God.[2] As a matter of fact according to Augustine a human being has, or rather, is a soul,[3] which is as such gifted with reason and uses the body as a tool. Actually this conception of man does not let room for any doubt with regard to the question, whether a female human being has to be considered an image of God or whether this qualification does apply only to the male. Whenever commenting upon the biblical story of the creation of mankind[4] in the book Genesis, Augustine defended the doctrine that God created man and woman (cf. *Genesis* 1,27: *masculum et feminam creavit eos*) equally human. This means that according to Augustine both, man and woman were created as image of God. The conception that woman as well as man was created in the image and likeness of God was kept upright by Augustine during his whole lifetime. On the other hand we must say, that with regard to woman as a soul gifted with reason, which conception is the due consequence of his own definition of a human being in general,[5] Augustine speaks in different ways at different occasions. In this context we want first of all to mention a passage in *De diversis quaestionibus 83*, number 64, where,

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[1] Cf. H. Somers, Image de Dieu. Les sources de l'exégèse Augustinienne, *Révue des Études Augustiniennes* 7 (1961) 105–125.

[2] Cf. *Soliloquia* 1,1,4; 1,2,7; *De genesi ad litteram contra Manichaeos* 1,17,27.

[3] Cf. *De mor. eccl. cath.* 1,27,52 (P.L. 32,1332): *Homo igitur, ut homini apparet anima rationalis est, mortali atque terreno utens corpore.*

[4] Cf. *De genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus*; *De genesi ad litteram contra Manichaeos*; *De genesi ad litteram* 3,21,33.

[5] Cf. *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* 1,27,52; (P.L. 32,1332). See also note 3.

as we shall show more clearly below, Augustine's allegorical interpretation of the story of the Samaritan woman (St. John 5,46) has to be understood as referring to the fact, that women in general as human beings are gifted with rational souls. Augustine tells us (ch. 7), that the five husbands of the Samaritan woman are to be regarded as the five[6] possibilities of sense perception, which are as such legal,[7] especially at an early age. A child is entitled to live by its senses, but this rule does not apply to a grown-up person. An adult is able to use his *rational* mind and should do so. When Christ in the gospel ordered the Samaritan woman to call her own husband, he meant according to Augustine, that she should use her rational mind which is the legal husband of every adult's soul.[8] Everybody will in due time reach the age of being capable of rational thinking. If a person is able at that very time to reach the level of grasping the Truth at once, he (or she) will no longer make use of the senses as leaders.[9] Such a person will have a rational spirit for a husband, by whom he (or she) will let his (or her) senses be ruled. As a matter of fact when the soul of such a person is no longer directed by its senses, it has the divine Logos as its legal husband. When we consider Augustine's interpretation of the story of the Samaritan woman we must come to the conclusion that, according to this story, there is no difference between a male and a female human being in the spiritual sense of the word. This conclusion fits in with the doctrine of the creation of man and woman as image of God.

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[6] Chapt. 7: *Est ergo alius intellectus, ut quinque viri intelligantur quinque corporis sensus: unus quia ad oculos pertinet quo lucem istam visibilem et quoslibet colores formasque corporum cernimus: alter aurium, quo vocium et omnium sonorum momenta sentimus; tertius narium, quo varia odorum suavitate delectamur; quartus in ore gustus, qui dulcia et amara sentit; et omnium saporum habet examen; quintus per totum corpus tangendo diiudicat calida et frigida, mollia et dura, levia et aspera, et quidquid aliud est quod tangendo sentimus. Istis itaque carnalibus quinque sensibus prima hominis aetas imbuitur necessitate naturae mortalis qua ita post peccatum primi hominis nati sumus, ut nondum reddita luce mentis carnalibus sensibus subditi carnalem vitam sine ulla veritatis intelligentia transeamus. Tales necesse est esse infantes et parvulos pueros, qui nondum possunt accipere rationem.*

[7] *Et quia naturalis sunt isti sensus, qui primam aetatem regunt, et Deo artifice nobis tributi sunt, recte dicuntur, id est mariti, tamquam legitimi, quoniam non eos error vitio proprio, sed Dei artificio natura contribuit.*

[8] *Est* (sc. *spiritus intelligentiae*) *enim animae quasi maritus quodam modo spiritus hominis, qui animalem affectionem tamquam coniugem regit.*

[9] *Cum autem quisque venerit ad eam aetatem ut iam possit capax esse rationis, si veritatem statim conprehendere potuerit, non iam illis sensibus rectoribus utetur, sed habebit virum, spiritum rationalem, cui sensus illos in famulatum redigat, servituti, subiiciens corpus suum ...*

The Samaritan woman has been ordered by Christ to call her own husband, which means to use her own rational mind, so that her soul might be able to reach the level of contemplating the eternal Truth,[10] or in other words, the ideal Forms,[11] which are according to Augustine in *De div. quaest. 83*,43 in the mind of God. It is clear from Augustine's interpretation of the story of the Samaritan woman, that as far as their souls are concerned man and woman are both fundamentally image of God. It also is beyond any doubt, that in the view of Augustine in the above mentioned passage there has to be made a distinction between the human rational mind and its true object and aim of knowledge, the eternal Truth itself. On the other hand it seems to be the divine Truth itself, which can bring the human soul into its right condition (see n. 10) and make it apt to fulfill its own capacities. If Augustine says that the soul, if it has been able to reach the level of contemplating the eternal Truth immediately after its becoming capable of rational thinking (see n. 9), will function well and that in any other case[12] it will be overpowered by the senses, we must assume, that although the Truth and the rational mind of man are two different substances, there still is a connection between the one and the other, and exactly this connection makes that the latter performs its function well.

Christ, being the eternal Truth, which in Augustine's Platonic way of thinking has to be identified with the ideal Forms, is the head of the rational mind of a human being and its true and legal husband.[13] When

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[10] "*Voca*" *ergo inquit, "virum tuum", id est spiritum, qui in te est, quo potest homo intelligere spiritualia, si eum lux Veritatis illustret. Ipse adsit, cum loquor tibi, ut spiritualem possis accipere aquam.*

[11] The identification of Truth itself and the ideal Forms is a doctrine which Augustine kept upright from the beginning until the end of his writing period.

[12] This conclusion may be drawn from the end of chapter 7: "*Et nunc quem habes, non est tuus vir", quia non est in te spiritus, qui intelligit Deum, cum quo legitimum possis habere connubium. Sed error diaboli potius dominatur, qui te adulterina contaminatione corrumpit.*

The lack of spiritual understanding, as shown by the Samaritan woman, is according to Augustine's allegorical interpretation the very consequence of the non-presence of her intellectual mind. On the other hand it is always the presence of the rational mind or rather its being bent to God, that guarantees the soul's understanding of all things, which are of spiritual order: *Hic ergo spiritus hominis cum praesens est, id est, intentus, et se pietate subiicit Deo, intelligit homo, quae spiritualiter dicuntur.*

[13] *Cum anima non iam* (*viz.*, when it has become *capax rationis*), *quinque viris, id est quinque corporis sensibus subdita est, sed Verbum divinum habet legitimum virum, cui copulata et inhaerens, cum et ipse spiritus hominis haeserit Christo, quia caput viri* (*vir* standing here according to Augustine for rational mind of a human being) *Christus est* (I Cor. 11,3), *amplexu spirituali aeterna vita sine ullo separationis timore perfruitur.*

to the contrary at the age of becoming *capax rationis* the soul does not bend itself toward the eternal Truth, it is overpowered by its senses under the influence of the devil, who acts in that case as if there were no rational mind at all (*tamquam intellectu absente*).[14] In case of the soul's rational mind not being in touch with the Truth, the soul itself loses the power of its rational mind, which has to control the soul's lower functions.

From the above it is clear that in Augustine's conception the rational mind in its functioning depends entirely on its being in constant touch with the eternal Truth. It also is an obvious fact, that a human being's rational mind has a double function. It has to bend itself towards the eternal Truth for a double reason. First of all (it has to do so) because it has to understand all that is spiritual, secondly, because only then it can control the senses. Augustine does not tell us in this passage, how the human mind does practically control the senses. However, we may assume, that it does so by means of reasoning, this being its second-essential function, after that of contemplating the ideal Forms. In this case we must say, that, if the mind's ability to control the senses depends on its capacity of reasoning (and what else can we say?) this capacity is only due to the mind's holding communion with the Truth.[15]

On account of *De libero arbitrio* 2,12,24 we may come to the assumption, that according to Augustine it is the Truth (= Forms), which causes the capacity of reasoning of the rational soul and that it is this capacity which may lead the rational soul towards its highest possible level, the contemplation of Truth itself. This means, that even if a soul has not yet reached its highest level, it may still have a certain capacity of reasoning. With regard to Augustine's conception of the rational mind and its reasoning in *De div. quaest. 83*,64 this means, that even if a soul has not bent itself towards the Truth at the due time, but is still found to be able to reason afterwards, this soul must be in touch with the Truth up to a certain degree without being aware of it. Is not this explanation of the thinking power of the soul opposed to the conception that if a soul does not reach the level of Truth, when it has to do so, it is entitled to be overpowered by the senses? Well, this only seems to be so. Actually

[14] After the words we already quoted in note 9 Augustine continues: *Cum autem* (*autem* having the signification of "at the contrary") *diaboli error, tamquam absente intellectu, in anima dominatur, adulter est.*

[15] Also elsewhere in Augustine's early writings we find this conception. See for instance *Soliloquia* 2,20,34, where discursive thinking is explained by the intuitive awareness of the Forms in the human mind.

there is no contradiction at all, for even such a soul, which is more or less overpowered by the senses, is not entirely excluded from reasoning power, in whatever bad manner this may be. In the case of the Samaritan woman there is a deficiency of reasoning power, but there still is some. The dialogue with Christ would not have been possible without it, although at the same time it shows in a symbolical way the shortcomings of the rational mind. But if there is reasoning power, however ill functioning it may be, there is also rational mind.[16] And if there is a functioning mind, there has to be a connection between it and the Forms, whatever this connection may be. So the deficiency of rational mind of the human soul after all turns out not to be an absolute defect. It rather is a state of the human soul, in which the soul needs restoring, but can also be restored at any time under influence of the Truth. Such a recovery of the fallen soul always implies for young Augustine the well functioning of the rational mind as the due consequence of the fact, that it is properly in constant touch with the Truth. Young Augustine holds the view that even the fallen soul is not uncapable of getting to be in touch with the Truth in the way it is meant to be. This may be a very long and difficult way, if the soul has not reached the Truth immediately after becoming *capax rationis*, but it still belongs to the soul's possibilities, which on their turn are due to the Truth itself. First of all, there is the neoplatonic way, presupposing the soul's reasoning and its being in touch with the ideal Forms up to a certain degree. Next there is the way of grace, which presupposes the acceptance of the fact of the incarnation of the Truth and a certain thinking power of the soul as well,[17] the latter being a necessary condition for the former.

From the preceding pages it will be clear that according to Augustine in every grown-up human being, which is not entirely deprived of reasoning power, there is a link between this capacity of thinking and reasoning and the ideal Forms themselves. This connection can be described as follows: a) it is the eternal Truth that provides the capacity of reasoning and discursive thinking of the soul; b) it is reasoning, that may lead at the end toward the contemplation of the Truth; c) the soul's reaching the level of contemplating the ideal Forms implies its total restoration, which must, will it be perfect, include the restoration of its capacity of

[16] Cf. *voca virum tuum*, which words are an indication, that the non-presence of rational mind does not imply its non-existence.

[17] See P. Courcelle in *Augustinus Magister*, 53ff. for a discussion of this issue.

discursive thinking and the correct function of its rational mind.[18] When we draw the conclusions from young Augustine's conception of the relation between the Truth and the human reasoning mind with regard to his conception of the human being as image of God, we must say, that there cannot be any reason to doubt that a woman as such is fundamentally gifted with a rational mind, the more or the less fit for discursive thinking, which depends on its holding communion with the Truth.

For young Augustine the difference between the sexes has nothing to do with the human soul, but only with the body. It is with this conception in mind that he comments in *De genesi ad litteram contra Manichaeos* 1, 30[19] upon the words: *Masculum et feminam* in the following sense: ... *Quod autem scriptum: est "masculum et feminam" ... rectissime quaeritur quemadmodum accipienda sit coniunctio masculi et feminae ante peccatum ... Licet enim nobis eam spiritaliter accipere, ut in carnalem fecunditatem post peccatum conversa esse credatur ...* Here Augustine does not give an explanation for the sexual differences of the human body, which in the case of a male as well as of a female body is only the wrapper of the soul.[20] He does not answer the question a modern reader might ask him, *viz.*, to explain why God, who is "the highest and supreme Good", made the human body with sexual differences, the existence of which did not make any sense until after the fall? Augustine's silence on this issue might be explained from his attitude toward sexuality, which is wellknown from the *Confessions.* In the discussion with the Manichaeans it would have been rather out of order to say, what has not been stated explicitly but as a matter of fact is the implicated explanation, *viz.*, that God, the supreme Good, anticipated the consequences of the fall, which in fact justified the sexual differences of the bodies. Augustine might have been slightly aware[20a] of a certain inconsistence in his way of reasoning but has not gone so far in this early treatise as to say that God did anticipate the consequences of the fall, which could not have taken place without man's own free will. However, this early treatise does not let any room to doubt the fact that a female and a male human being are equally gifted with a rational mind, nor that a human being is only image of

[18] The dialogue between Christ and the Samaritan woman shows her rational mind failing, but gradually recovering as well. See also *De Ordine* 1,32 and 33.

[19] This work dates from 389.

[20] See Somers' already quoted article in *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 7 (1961) 115.

[20a] The words *licet enim nobis eam spiritualiter accipere* ... could be taken as an indication, that Augustine was aware of a certain lack of clearness in his interpretation.

God as far as its rational mind is concerned.

Also in *De genesi ad litteram liber imperfectus* 3,20,30 Augustine keeps this view upright. In this passage we read: *Illic etiam illud non est praetereundum, quia eum dixisset "ad imaginem nostram", statim subiunxit "et habeat potestatem piscium maris et volatilium caeli", et caeterorum animalium rationis expertium, ut videlicet intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei, in quo irrationabilibus antecellit. Id autem est ipsa ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel siquo aliquo vocabulo commodius appellatur.* So we may conclude that according to Augustine in 393 the formula that man was created "in the image and after the likeness of God" was meant with regard to man's rational soul. That furthermore a woman as well as a man was considered by Augustine to be in the possession of a rational soul is the natural implication of *De Gen. ad litt. lib. imp.* 6,5,8, which reads: *Neque enim dicendum est, masculum quidem sexto die factum, feminam vero posterioribus diebus; cum ipso sexto die apertissime dictum sit, "masculum et feminam fecit eos, et benedixit eos", et caetera, quae de ambobus et ad ambos dicuntur.*

It is much later, to wit in book III of *De genesi ad litteram*, chapter 22, that Augustine, who maintains his spiritual and intellectual conception of the image of God upright, expresses as his opinion, that, although a woman is image of God as well as as man, there should be a difference in rational thinking between the two sexes. In chapter 22,34 we read: *Licet enim subtilissime disseratur ipsam mentem hominis, in qua factus est ad imaginem Dei, quandam scilicet rationalem vitam, distribui in aeternae contemplationis veritatem et in rerum temporalium administrationem, atque ita fieri quasi masculu met feminam illa parte consulente, hac obtemperante: in hac tamen distributione non recte dicitur imago Dei, nisi illud, quod inhaeret contemplandae incommutabili Veritati.*

From this passage and its immediate context we may draw the following conclusions. First of all we may conclude that man and woman are fundamentally different beings, not merely as far as their bodies are concerned, but also with regard to their souls.[21] Next we must say, that Augustine

[21] Augustine goes on in the above quoted passage: ... *Sed propter unitatem coniunctionis, fecit Deus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem Dei. Ac ne quisquam putaret solum spiritum fieret ad imaginem Dei, fecit illum, inquit, masculum et feminam fecit illos, ut iam etiam corpus factum intellegatur. Rursus ne quisquam arbitraretur ita factum, ut in homine singulari uterque sexus exprimeretur, sicut interdum nascuntur, quos androgynos vocant, ostendit se singularem numerum propter coniunctionis unitatem posuisse et quod de viro mulier facta est, sicut postea manifestatur, cum id, quod hic breviter dictum est, coeperit explicari* ...

still claims that a woman, although she has an inferior rational mind (one, that needs the advice of the superior male's mind), was created as image of God as far as the highest part of her soul is concerned, this part of the soul (*mens*) being the true and real image of God in the soul of both sexes.[22]

Here the modern reader must ask Augustine a certain question. Does not the fact that a woman is gifted with a *mens* imply her having the capacity of discursive thinking on the same level as a man? Are not we compelled – such on account of other passages than the one under discussion – to assume that there is a certain connection between the soul's capacity of contemplating the Truth (= Ideas) and its capacity of discursive reasoning? To put the same question into other words: Does not the *cognitio intellectualis rerum aeternorum* at least imply the soul's disposition for the well functioning of its discursive reasoning and for its possibilities to acquire a perfect *cognitio rationalis rerum temporalium*? And on the other hand does not the possession of a *mens* as the capacity of contemplating the Truth presuppose a fundamental ability to reason? By the time *De genesi ad litteram* was written Augustine had accepted the well known doctrine of illumination.[23] However this theory of knowledge does not exclude the connection between the soul's capacity of contemplating its real and true object of knowledge, the eternal Truth (= Ideas), and its capacity of discursive thinking with regard to the *res temporales*. After having made a distinction between *sapientia* as the result of the *cognitio intellectualis* and *scientia* as the result of the *cognitio rationalis* Augustine himself says in the same chapter of *De Trinitate*,[24] that before reaching the level of the former, the soul normally acquires the latter.

On account of Augustine's theory of knowledge, as found in his later works, we cannot bus assume that there is a reciprocal connection between the *cognitio intellectualis* and the *cognitio rationalis*. So we believe, that it is the due consequence of Augustine's own doctrine, that any person, who is in possession of an intuitive knowledge of the eternal Ideas, is also capable of good rational thinking with regard to the visible

[22] See the end of ch. 22,33.

[23] See *De Trinitate* 12,15,24.

[24] *Relinquentibus itaque nobis ea quae sunt exterioris hominis, et ab eis quae communia cum pecoribus habemus introrsum ascendere cupientibus, antequam ad cognitionem rerum intelligibilium atque summarum quae sempiternae sunt, veniremus, temporalium rerum cognitio rationis occurrit,*

world. Therefore the above mentioned remark concerning a woman's intelligence in *De genesi ad litteram* III is very strange. It does not tally either with his theory of knowledge or with his conception of a woman as image of God. When we find this conception in *De gen. ad. litt.* 9,2,4, even expressed in a stronger way, we feel compelled to find some acceptable explanation for what we already considered an inconsistency in Augustine's way of thinking. Such an explanation seems to be found in the fact, that Augustine changed (as we also know from other passages) his original interpretation of the Paulinian statement in the letter to the Corinthians 1,9,3. Writing *De genesi ad litteram* Augustine took this statement litterally. This might explain, why he could call a woman's mind in general inferior in comparison to a man's,[25] although this is obviously in contradiction with his theory of knowledge as found in his later works, and with his interpretation of the biblical doctrine of the creation of man and woman "in the image and likeness of God" as well.

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[25] See also *De Trin.* 14,12,22.
[26] See *De genesi ad litt.* 9, *passim.*

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IUPPITER-IOVIS BEI COMMODIAN

VON

EBERHARD HECK

Nachdem Commodian das 1. Buch seiner *Instructiones* mit einer programmatischen *Praefatio* (1,1) eröffnet, dann das Gebot, allein Gott zu verehren, erläutert (1,2) und die Götter der Heiden generell als Dämonen, d.h. wegen ihres Verkehrs mit Menschenfrauen von Gott verstoßene ehemalige Engel erklärt hat (1,3), konkretisiert er diese Entgöttlichung der alten Götter, indem er einige dieser Götterfiguren in ihrer – keineswegs vorteilhaften – Menschlichkeit vorstellt. Die Reihe eröffnet *Saturnus* (1,4), ihm folgt (1,5–6) *Iuppiter*, oder, wie er am Ende seiner Entmythologisierung heißt, *Iovis*. Daß hinter diesem Namenswechsel bzw. dieser Namenskürzung nicht ein *metri vel numeri causa* gebotener Wechsel zu sehen ist, sondern eine inhaltliche Aussage im eben angedeuteten Sinn, ist natürlich nicht mehr als eine Vermutung, der ich im Folgenden etwas nachgehen will. Zunächst gebe ich den Text *Instr.*1,4,7–1,6,1:[1]

... (*Saturnus*) *lapidem pro filio sorbsit:*
sic deus evasit, dicitur modo Iuppiter ille.

1,5: *IUPPITER*
Iuppiter hic natus in insula Creta Saturno
Ut fuit adultus, patrem de regno privavit.
Proinde nobilium uxores sororesque delusit.
Praeterea sceptra fecerat faber ille Piragmon.
Initium caelum, terram Deus et mare fecit;
Terribilis autem iste medio tempore natus
Ex antro processit iuvenis furtimque nutritus.
Respice querellas: Alter est Deus, non Iovis ille.

1,6: *DE FULMINE IPSIUS IOVIS AUDITE*
Dicitis o stulti: 'Iovis tonat, fulminat ipse'.

[1] Zitiert ist nach den Ausgaben von J. Martin, CCL 128 (Turnhout 1960), und – hier gleichlautend – A. Salvatore, *Commodiano, Instructiones, libro primo*, 2 Bde., Collana di studi latini 13. 14 (Napoli 1965–66); zur Kommentierung verweise ich auf Salvatores 2. Band (Note esegetiche – leider keine vollständigen Analysen der Gedichte; ins-

Übersetzung:

(Saturn) verschlang anstelle seines Sohnes einen Stein. So entkam ein Gott – der heißt nun Iuppiter.

1,5 Iuppiter: Dieser Iuppiter, auf der Insel Kreta dem Saturn geboren, sowie der erwachsen war, beraubte er den Vater der Königsherrschaft. Alsdann trieb er sein Spiel mit den Frauen und Schwestern der Adligen. Außerdem hat seinen Stab ja der Schmied Pyragmon gemacht. Anfangs Himmel, Erde und Meer hat Gott gemacht; dieser schreckliche Mensch aber, in der Mitte der Zeit geboren, kam, verstohlenerweise genährt, als junger Mann aus einer Höhle hervor. Sieh auf die Schuldvorwürfe: Ein andrer ist Gott, nicht der Iovis da.

1,6 Hört vom Blitz eben dieses Iovis: Oh ihr Toren, ihr sagt: 'Iovis selber donnert, er blitzt'.

Auf den übrigen Text des 6. Gedichts, das die knappen Aussagen des 5. nochmals expliziert, gehen wir nicht weiter ein, sondern wir befassen uns mit der, jedenfalls bei genauem Zusehen, auffallenden Behandlung des Nominativs von *Iuppiter*:

Ausgangs des 4. Gedichts wird dieser überlebende Sohn Saturns in einer Uberleitung zum 5. Gedicht als *Iuppiter* vorgestellt bzw. wird bemerkt, das sei die gängige Benennung.

Diese Form erscheint wieder im akrostichischen Titel des 5. Gedichts und am Anfang desselben: *Iuppiter hic*, rückbezogen auf *Iuppiter ille* 1,4,8. Korrespondierend mit beiden Versen, 1,4,8 *Iuppiter ille* am Versende und 1,5,1 *Iuppiter hic* am Versanfang, schließt das Gedicht 1,5,8 mit dem Versende *non Iovis ille.*

Daß dieser Nominativ *Iovis* kein Produkt metrischen Zwanges ist, kann – soweit die noch nicht hinreichend geklärte Metrik Commodians[2] solche

besondere würde es lohnen, 1,5 und 1,6 einander durchgängig gegenüberzustellen). Meine Übersetzung basiert auf Salvatores Kommentierung und soll hier nur „kürzester Kommentar" sein.

[2] Die Skizze bei Martin, Ausg. XIV–XVIII (mit der älteren Literatur) ist inzwischen durch folgende Publikationen überholt: J. Perret, Prosodie et métrique chez Commodien, *Pallas* 5 (1957) 27–42; S. Mariner, Enfoques recientes del problema de Comodiano. Discusion, *Actas del II congreso español de estudios clasicos. Publicaciones de la sociedad españa de estudios clasicos* 5 (Madrid 1964) 121–128; K. M. Abbott, Commodian and his verse, *Classical studies presented to B.E.Perry. Illinois studies in language and literature* 58 (Urbana, Ill. 1969) 272–283. Unbestritten ist, daß Commodians Verse am Modell des daktylischen Hexameters orientiert sind (Einschränkungen bei Abbott), ebenso, daß sie weder rein quantitierend noch rein akzentuierend sind, doch ist strittig, ob ein quantitätsbezogenes oder ein akzentbezogenes Prinzip vorwiegt, und ungeklärt ist das etwaige Verhältnis von Versiktus und Wortakzent zueinander. Vielleicht hilft ein zur Zeit im Tübinger Zentrum für Datenverarbeitung von N.Castrillo durch-

Aussagen zuläßt – mit einer gewissen Sicherheit behauptet werden; denn ein Kolon *non Iúppiter ílle* – dem das Vorausgehende, um die zusätzliche Silbe freizumachen, auf verschiedene Weise angepaßt werden könnte[3] – ergäbe sowohl vom Versiktus wie vom Wortakzent her einen genauso glatten Versschluß wie *nón Iovis ílle;* zudem würde es 1,4,8 genauer entsprechen.

Vielmehr wird man eine inhaltlich bestimmte Absicht Commodians unterstellen dürfen: In dem Augenblick, in dem Iuppiter durch den Aufweis seiner irdischen Herkunft (V.1), seines sozusagen politisch wie moralisch allzumenschlichen Lebenswandels (V.2–3), der nichtgöttlichen Herkunft seines angeblichen Gottesattributs (kein Blitz, sondern nur eine Art Marschallstab, V.4; vgl.1,6,23–24) und endlich (V.6–7 – mit gegenübergestelltem Hinweis auf Gottes Weltschöpfung V.5[4]) seiner Geburt in historischer Zeit und der alles andre als göttlichen Umstände seines Aufwachsens, also durch Aufweis seiner *humanitas* im Sinne von Min. Fel.23,13, seinen Status als Gott eingebüßt hat, verliert Iuppiter gleichzeitig das in seinem Namen, jedenfalls der Nominativform, mitgegebene Vaterprädikat, das sich damit, *ex negativo*, auch für Commodian als

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geführtes Projekt metrischer Analyse der Dichtungen Commodians die Klärung dieser Fragen fördern.

[3] Ich führe solch ein Experiment – das nur die metrische Möglichkeit von *non Iuppiter ille* anstelle von *non Iovis ille* plausibel machen soll – durch in Annahme der Voraussetzung, unter der es am schwierigsten ist, nämlich der Orientierung am Modell des quantitierenden daktylischen Hexameters mit Berücksichtigung der Freiheiten Commodians: Das vom 5. Longum um eine Stelle vorzuziehende *non* könnte, wie *Instr.*1,7,3 das *non* an gleicher Stelle zeigt, das 2. Breve des 4. Metrums einnehmen. Dem könnte der vorausgehende Versteil – hinter dem 3. Longum, ein Bereich, in dem Commodian nach Perrets Untersuchungen besonders frei verfährt – etwa schon durch Weglassen des *est*, also *alter deus* oder *deus alter*, angepaßt sein; die Messung von *alter* und erst recht die von *deus* (vgl. allein *Instr.*1,4!) schwankt bei Commodian sehr, und zwei lange Silben anstelle zweier Brevia sind bei ihm nicht selten; zwei positionslange Silben in dieser Stellung z.B. *Instr.*1,1,3 (unsicher). 1,3,1. 1,7,1. 1,10,7. Noch einfacher etwa: *Deus est, sed non Iuppiter ille.* Aber genug des Durchspielens!

[4] Dieser Vers 5 enthält übrigens (wie schon V.4, nach Verg. *Aen.*8,424ff.; s. Salvatore, Note eseg.36) eine charakteristisch ‚umfunktionierte' Vergilreminiszenz: Martin z.St. zieht schon *Aen.*6,724 an: *principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis ... spiritus intus alit eqs.*; dazu kommt *Georg.*4,221f. *deum namque ire per omnis terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum.* Diese zwei Stellen, für Min. Fel. (19,2; in seiner Nachfolge Lact. *Inst.*1,5,11f.) der Paradebeleg für die Anerkennung nur eines die Welt lenkenden Gottes durch die vorchristlichen Dichter – deshalb nennt Minucius Vergil ausdrücklich! –, biegt Commodian in eine Paraphrase von Gen.1,1ff. um. Er gehört zwar selber zu den *Carm.*583 kritisierten Vergillesern, ist aber noch nicht, wie vor ihm Minucius, hernach Lactanz, bereit, diese Bildungstradition ausdrücklich in der Werbung für sein Christentum einzusetzen. S. dazu unten Anm.8 und 9.

allein dem Christengott vorbehaltenes Gottesprädikat erweist.[5] *Iovis* für *Iuppiter* ist dann kein Vulgarismus,[6] sondern bewußte Reduzierung durch Commodian.

Diese Vermutung wird bestätigt durch die Probe auf die ganzen *Instructiones*: Nachdem 1,5,8 aus *Iuppiter Iovis* geworden ist, kommt der Nominativ *Iuppiter* bei Commodian nicht mehr vor,[7] wohl aber, und das ist eine Gegenprobe, noch zweimal die Form *Iovis* als Nominativ, nämlich gleich 1,6,1 – hier verkürzt Commodian sogar den Namen im Munde der angesprochenen Heiden – und 1,7,4 *aut Iovis in stella credatur.*

Commodian hat also die Entmythologisierung = Re-Humanisierung der heidnischen Gottheit gesteigert bis zum Entzug des Vaterprädikats, das er im Namen *Iuppiter* mitgegeben sah (vgl. Gell. 5,12,5 ‚*Iuppiter*', *id plenum atque integrum est* ‚*Iovispater*'), und er hat dies an exponierter Stelle, nämlich am Anfang und am Ende des Gedichts 1,5, zum Ausdruck gebracht durch die Gegenüberstellung von *Iuppiter* und *Iovis*, die verstärkt ist dadurch, daß sowohl im letzten Vers des vorausgehenden Gedichts *Iuppiter ille* wie im ersten Vers des folgenden Gedichts, wenngleich da im Vers an weniger hervorgehobener Stelle, die verkürzte Form *Iovis* erscheint; hinzu kommt die Gegenüberstellung von Nominativ *Iuppiter* und Genitiv *Iovis* in den akrostichischen Titeln der Gedichte 1,5 und 1,6.

Solch ein Detail – man ist versucht, es ein Kabinettstückchen zu nennen –, das nur eines von mehreren in Commodians *Instructiones* und im *Carmen* ist,[8] sollte davor warnen, Commodians Dichtungen ohne

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[5] S. dazu A. Wlosok, *Laktanz und die philosophische Gnosis*, AHAW 1960,2,232ff., bes. 236f. (Vaterakklamation in alten Götterbezeichnungen eben wie Iuppiter u.dgl.); 241f. m.Anm. 63 (exklusive Verwendung der Vaterbezeichnung für den Christengott bei Lact.). Lact. *Inst.* 4,4,11 *solus pater vocandus est qui creavit* kann geradezu als Kommentar zu Comm. *Instr.* 1,5,8 in Verbindung mit V. 5 dienen; zu Iuppiter in diesem Sinne vgl. Lact. *Inst.* 1,11,40–43.

[6] So anscheinend Salvatore, Note eseg. 36,31, nach seinem Verweis auf C.H. Grandgent, *An Introduction to Vulgar Latin* (New York 1962) 163 zu schließen. Belege für *Iovis* = *Iuppiter* – seit den altlateinischen Szenikern – bei Georges, *Hdwb.* II⁸, 442 *s.v.* Iovis.

[7] S. A.F. van Katwijk, *Lexicon Commodianeum* (Diss. Amsterdam 1934) 188 und Martin, Index nominum, Ausg. 211. Die obliquen Casus interessieren hier nicht; allerdings ist nach unserem Befund bei der Anordnung der Belege in Indices und bei Übersetzungen ab 1,6 inscr. für die obliquen Formen als Lemma nicht *Iuppiter*, sondern *Iovis* zu substituieren.

[8] Ich erwähne nur die Kritik des traditionellen Bildungsbetriebs und seiner hernach forensisch tätigen Produkte *Carm.* 579–604, die mit ihren Klassikerreminiszenzen (s. Martin, Ausg. z.St.), aber zumal mit ihrer rhetorischen Aufmachung (deutlich etwa 593–598) zeigt, daß Commodian aus eigener Erfahrung kennt, wovon er redet. Er hat offenbar wie Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Cyprian usw. die römische Rhetoren-

weiteres als Produkte eines nur notdürftig mit lateinischer Sprache und Metrik vertrauten Ausländers[9] anzusehen; sie enthalten anscheinend mehr an bewußt eingesetzter Technik, als ihre scheinbare ‚Primitivität' vermuten läßt.

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schule durchlaufen. Daher fällt es mir schwer, zu glauben, Commodians Normwidrigkeiten in Metrik und Sprache resultierten aus Unvermögen und nicht aus Absicht (s. flgd. Anm.). Commodian als Produkt der Rhetorenschule mit einem individuellen Stilwillen würdigt auch A. Salvatore, Atteggiamenti espressivi nelle Instructiones di Commodiano, *StudRom* 11 (1963) 509–525.

[9] So J. Martin, Commodianus, *Traditio* 13 (1957) 1–71 (Neubearbeitung – mit Nachträgen und einem Anhang über die Commodianforschung seit 1957 von mir – demnächst in: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II: *Religion*, hrsg. v. W. Haase), hier 54. Abgesehen davon, daß die Frage der Herkunft Commodians noch nicht sicher geklärt ist (schließen die von Martin beigebrachten sprachlichen und religionsgeschichtlichen Indizien Afrika als Heimat wirklich aus?), ist zu erwägen, ob Commodians Dichtungen nicht Ausdruck einer Haltung sind, wie sie Tertullian (wenn auch mehr speziell für die Philosophie als generell für die Bildungstradition) etwa *Praescr. haer.* 7,9–13 formuliert hat, sei es, daß Commodian darin ein Unicum gewesen ist, sei es, daß er für uns einziger Repräsentant einer „bestimmten unklassischen Konvention" ist – so die Vermutung von K. Thraede, Untersuchungen zum Ursprung und zur Geschichte der christlichen Poesie I, *JbAC* 4 (1961) 108–127, hier 115 innerhalb seiner für die Commodianinterpretation richtungweisenden Einleitung. Zu Commodians Verwertung der Bildungstradition s. auch L. Callebat, Tradition et novation dans la poésie de Commodien, *Pallas* 13 (1966) 85–94, mit Beispielen.

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REVIEW

Makarios/Symeon, *Reden und Briefe.* Die Sammlung I des Vaticanus Graecus 694(B). Herausgegeben von Heinz Berthold. I: Einleitung und Tabellen, die Logoi B 2–29; II: Die Logoi B 30–64, Register (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte). Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1973. Pp. LXXX, 265; VIII, 309. M 118.—.

The unknown Syrian author who wrote under the pseudonym Macarius is possibly the most influential mystic of the Christian tradition, because he made an impact upon Syriac Christianity and Islamic mysticism, Greek and Russian orthodoxy, German Pietism (Gottfried Arnold) and Anglo-Saxon Methodism (Wesley). From the historical point of view he is important, because he is a representative of Syrian Encratism. It has been observed long ago that during a certain period in Mesopotamia only unmarried or divorced people were admitted to baptism. Even Aphraates still alludes to this practice, though in his time there did exist married Christians. Now, Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 3,82,6 refutes the concept of Tatian, according to which baptism necessarily leads to complete abstention from sexual intercourse. This view, then, was not indigenous in Edessa, but imported by the Encratite Tatian. It may be that it was generally admitted by all Syrian Christians before the late introduction of Catholic Christianity. It certainly was adopted by the Gospel of Thomas which teaches that only bachelors can enter the bridal chamber of eternal life (*logion* 75). It is this version of Christianity, rather than Messalianism, which is reflected in Macarius' work. In fact, as J. Gribomont has shown (*Epektasis. Mélanges J. Daniélou* [Paris 1972] 611–625), Messalianism, originally the name of a wild charismatic movement in Mesopotamia, became a label attached by opponents of mysticism to some teachers of a spirituality which had very little in common with the primitive outbreaks of irrationalism so characteristic of heterodox Messalianism.

Ever since the first edition by Johannes Picus (Paris 1559) the West has known Macarius mainly through his fifty *Homilies*, to which G. L. Mar-

riot added seven new ones in 1918. But in 1941 Hermann Dörries revealed the existence of another collection of 64 *Logoi* in two Vatican manuscripts. Later on still other manuscripts of the same type were discovered which contributed to the constitution of the text of this *editio princeps*. In a valuable introduction Berthold describes the various collections of Macarius, works' which are as many recensions of a later date and vary to such an extent that it is impossible to reconstruct the *ipsissima verba* of the mystic himself

Then follows the text. It is difficult to express a considered opinion upon it. In the first place there are hundreds of mistakes in the punctuation, which make reading extremely difficult. In the second place there are quite a few misprints that render the critic uncertain and suspicious, because he never can be sure that he is basing himself upon the manuscript reading. But certainly we should read ἀλήϑειν = to grind, not ἀληϑείαν in II, 200,6: the idea is that the evil one obliged the soul to grind in a dark mill, namely the body. On the whole, however, one gets the impression that the text of Codex Vaticanus Graecus 694 (B) has been completed succesfully with important variants especially from Codex Vaticanus Graecus 710 (A) and Codex Athous Dionysiou 269 (Y), which both represent an older text of the same collection. One probably should not blame the editor but the publisher for the unfortunate presentation of the Greek text.

Sub calce paginae we find references to biblical texts and sometimes also to passages in Greek fathers which are supposed to be quoted. This procedure is wholly uncritical. It is an established fact that the author of these treatises knew and quoted the Gospel of Thomas, as can be expected from an Encratite in Mesopotamia. Not only do we find here that "the Kingdom of God is spread upon the earth and men do not see it" (II, 43,12 = *logion* 113), but also, not noticed by the editor, an allusion to *logion* 1: "then the soul marvels and reigns and rests" (I, 40,17). There are many more hints at the Gospel of Thomas in these texts. Then, the use of the Diatessaron is so obvious and so ubiquitous, that it needs not to be proved. Let it suffice to observe that in II, 207,13 we find the Greek equivalent of *vado et mitto vobis paracletum*, attested as a Diatessaron reading both by the Acts of Archelaus (31), of Syrian origin, and by the Manichee Felix (Augustinus, *C. Fel.* 1,2; Mani, a Mesopotamian, and the Manichees of course used Tatian's Harmony). This, however, is a very remarkable and deviating variant of John 14,16.

Quite apart from these quotations from the Gospel of Thomas and

the Diatessaron we find in Macarius Jewish Christian Gospel traditions parallel to but not always identical with the Pseudo-Clementine writings. Jerome tells us that in his times the Jewish Christians of Beroea (Aleppo) were still having their own Gospel, the Gospel of the Nazoraeans. Therefore it is not astonishing to find such a tradition in a Mesopotamian author of the fourth century. It is, however, of the utmost importance to see that Macarius in this respect offers a good parallel for another Syrian author of the fourth century, Aphraates, who equally used the Diatessaron and besides a Jewish Christian Gospel tradition, as I have shown in my book on Macarius, p. 81. Therefore it is misleading not to mention these variants and simply to refer to the canonical Gospels. One rather should prove that the canonical Gospels were known to Macarius, in whatever texttype or version that may have been the case. Similar criticisms can be made of the references to Fathers of the Church. In two remarkable passages, I, 249 and II, 79 Macarius says that Christians are beams of the sun Christ who are drawn back towards him at their death. The editor refers to Ps. Gregory of Nyssa, *Epistula* 26, where I find nothing of the kind. The true parallel is in the Valentinian writing *De resurrectione* of the Jung Codex: "We are his beams and we are encompassed by him until our setting which is our death in this life. We are drawn upward by him like beams by the sun, without being held back by anything" (45,31–39). The concept and wording are so similar, and parallels in other writings so completely absent that one is inclined to accept that Macarius knew the writing *De resurrectione*.

The editor supposes, like others before him, that the so-called Macarius is to be identified with a teacher of the Messalians, mentioned by Theodoretus of Cyrus, and called there Simeon of Mesopotamia. This, however, is not certain. It has been established that the Great Letter of Macarius was a source of *De instituto christiano* by Gregory of Nyssa. Nor is it of any avail to deny the authenticity of the latter writing, because Gregory quoted another passage of Macarius (I, 183) in his adress on the occasion of the ordination of Gregory of Nazianze as bishop of Constantinople in 381 (*In suam ordinationem*, 340,4–19), in which he praises the ascetes from Mesopotamia. Recently, I found in *Contra Eunomium* (2; I, 348,10) a passage which is also leaning heavily upon Macarius (III, 27,1). This shows that Gregory used this source in several of his works. But this means that the works of Macarius were written long before the outbreak of the Messalian revival. As a matter of fact Macarius warns against the excesses of all charismatic sects, and reflects a stage of develop-

ment in which a certain spirituality still found its place within the Church and had not yet become sectarian. But then the author and the movement he represents become much more important. They prove to have influenced Gregory (and perhaps even Basil the Great) and so to have been instrumental in making the Church aware of the fact that the Spirit is God. And this led to the dogmatic definition of the Oecumenical Council at Constantinople in 381, where the Church proclaimed that the Spirit is adorable. This is set forth in the only Confession which all Christian Churches have in common, the so-called *Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum*. Syrian mysticism rather than Plotinian philosophy forms the background which makes this decision understandable.

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BEMERKUNGEN ZU TERTULLIANS POLEMIK GEGEN MARCION

(ADVERSUS MARCIONEM 1, 1–25)

VON

E. P. MEIJERING

Meinem hoch verehrten Lehrer
J.N. Bakhuizen van den Brink
zum 80. Geburtstag

In diesem Aufsatz soll der Versuch gemacht werden die ersten fünfundzwanzig Kapitel des ersten Buches der Schrift Tertullians *Adversus Marcionem* auf ihre theologisch-philosophische Argumentation hin zu untersuchen mit der Absicht den theologie- und philosophiegeschichtlichen Hintergrund ans Licht zu bringen sowie klärende Parallelen aus anderen Schriften Tertullians heranzuziehen. Hierbei paraphrasieren wir die Gedanken Tertullians im Haupttext so kurz wie möglich und weisen hauptsächlich in den Anmerkungen auf den theologischen und philosophischen Hintergrund hin sowie auf Parallelen aus anderen Schriften Tertullians.[1]

Nachdem Tertullian das Schicksal früherer Editionen seiner Polemik gegen Marcion beschrieben hat und seinen persönlichen Angriff auf Marcion in der Gestalt einer ebenso glänzenden wie gehässigen Darstellung seiner Person geführt hat,[2] beginnt er seine theologische Polemik

[1] Der Verfasser beabsichtigt demnächst eine ausführlichere Studie zu den ersten zwei Büchern der Schrift *Adversus Marcionem* vorzulegen. – Ich danke Professor P.G. van der Nat, Leiden, für seine Hinweise auf mehrere für die Analyse wichtige Einzelheiten.

[2] Solche persönlichen Angriffe auf die von ihm bekämpften Ketzer finden sich

mit dem berühmten Präskriptionsbeweis:[3] die Ketzerei des Marcion ist schon deshalb verwerflich, weil sie der ursprünglichen Tradition gegenüber neu ist.[4] Tertullian lockert den Präskriptionsbeweis jedoch bewusst,[5] um sich dem Verdacht zu entziehen, er scheue die inhaltliche Polemik gegen Marcion infolge mangelnden Vertrauens in seine eigene Sache.

Marcion behauptet die Existenz zweier Götter, nämlich des Schöpfers, den auch die orthodoxen Christen bekennen, und den er nicht leugen kann und den anderen Gott, dessen Existenz er freilich nicht beweisen kann. Er ist zu dieser Auffassung gelangt wegen seiner falschen Interpretation des Gleichnisses vom guten Baum, der gute Früchte trägt, und des schlechten Baumes, der schlechte Früchte trägt.[6] Tertullian wirft dem Marcion wie vielen anderen und vor allem den Häretikern ungesundes Interesse für die Frage, woher das Böse stamme, vor[7] sowie ungebührlich grosse Neugierde. Diese Neugierde offenbart sich nach Tertullian in dem Bestreben mehr wissen zu wollen als was offenbart worden ist.[8] In der letzteren Beschuldigung folgt Tertullian (wie so oft) dem Irenäus.[9] Dieses ungesunde Interesse für die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Bösen und diese Neugierde haben Marcion dazu gebracht das Gleich-

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häufiger bei Tertullian, siehe J. H. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes*, ACW 24 (Westminster, Maryl.–London 1956) 102, Fussn. 4.

[3] *Adv. Marc.*1,1,1–5. Über das Vorkommen dieses Beweises bei Tertullian und dessen Bedeutung siehe J. H. Waszink, *op. cit.*, 101 f und die dort angeführte Literatur.

[4] Über Tertullians – nicht immer übereinstimmende – Ansichten zur Kategorie *novum* siehe *infra* 89.

[5] Der Präskriptionsbeweis wird, um ausführliche Polemik zu ermöglichen, ebenfalls gelockert in *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,1 und in *Adv. Prax.* 2,3.

[6] *Adv. Marc.*1,2,1. Eine Anspielung auf dieses Gleichnis findet sich ferner in *De carne Christi* 8,4 und in *Adv. Herm.* 13, vgl. J. H. Waszink, *op. cit.*, 124.

[7] Die ‚vielen (anderen)' sind nach Tertullians Ansicht zweifellos die Philosophen, siehe *De praescr. haer.* 7,5: *eadem materia apud haereticos et philosophos volutatur, idem retractatus implicantur: und malum et quare.* Über die Behauptung, die Ketzer hätten ihre Theorien den Philosophen entnommen, siehe *infra* 96.

[8] Vgl. *De praescr. haer.*7,12: *nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Jesum*; *Adv. Marc.* 2,21,2, wo *curiositas* der *simplicitas veritatis* gegenübergestellt wird. Siehe auch *De anima* 1,6: *praestat per deum nescire, quia non revelaverit, quam per hominem scire, quia ipse praesumpserit*, und 2,7, vgl. J. H. Waszinks Erläuterungen in seiner Ausgabe von *De anima*, SS. 96 und 113f.

[9] Siehe Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,39,1: ἄμεινον καὶ συμφορώτερον, ἰδιώτας καὶ ὀλιγομαθεῖς ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης πλήσιον γενέσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ πολυμαθεῖς καὶ ἐμπείρους δοκοῦντας εἶναι, βλασφήμους εἰς τὸν ἑαυτῶν εὑρίσκεσθαι δεσπότην. – Aus *Adv. Val.* 5,1 geht klar hervor, dass Tertullian mit der antignostischen Polemik des Irenäus vertraut war.

nis vom guten und schlechten Baum so auszulegen, dass der schlechte Baum der böse Schöpfer böser Werke sei, der gute Baum hingegen der andere Gott sei. Dieser andere Gott ist der allein gute, der seine Gottheit in Christus offenbart.[10]

Gegen die Lehre von den zwei Göttern führt Tertullian an, die christliche Wahrheit habe klar festgestellt, Gott müsse einer sein, oder er sei gar nicht.[11] Diese Behauptung des Tertullian stützt sich wahrscheinlich auf die *regula fidei* (das Glaubensbekenntnis), die nach Tertullian die Einheit und Einzigkeit Gottes betont.[12] Das Wesen Gottes bedeutet bereits, dass Gott einer sein muss. Soweit der Mensch die begrenzte Möglichkeit hat Gott zu definieren,[13] definiert Tertullian Gott in einer Weise, die nach seiner Meinung die Zustimmung aller finden wird: als den Allergrössten (*summum magnum*), ewig, ungeworden, unerschaffen, ohne Anfang und ohne Ende.[14] Tertullians Behauptung, seine Definition werde die Zustimmung aller finden, stützt sich wohl auf die weit verbreitete Ansicht, der eine Gott sei mit seiner Allmacht durch die Schöpfung erkennbar.[15] Diese Definition findet klare Unterstützung von z.B. Aristides[16] und Irenäus.[17] Tertullian spitzt seine Ausführungen ferner zu auf die Definition Gottes als *summum magnum*:[18] Wenn Gott der Aller-

[10] *Adv. Marc.* 1,2,2–3. Als Beweis für seine These beruft Marcion sich auf *Jesaja* 45,7, wo der Schöpfer ja selbst sage: *ego sum qui condo mala*, vgl. *Adv. Marc.* 2,14,1 und 2,24,4.

[11] *Adv. Marc.* 1,3,1.

[12] *De praescr. haer.* 13,2 sagt vom Inhalt der *regula fidei* aus: *unum omnino Deum esse nec alium praeter mundi conditorem.* Vgl. zum Thema der Einzigkeit Gottes Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 17,5ff und 18,5ff und die Bemerkungen dazu von J. Beaujeu, *Minucius Felix, Octavius. Texte établi et traduit* (Paris 1964) 104; ferner die wichtige Studie von E. Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum* (Leipzig 1935).

[13] Hier schliesst Tertullian sich wohl den im Mittelplatonismus geläufigen Ausführungen zur Inadäquatheit der menschlichen Erkenntnis des Göttlichen an (oft ausgedrückt mit dem *terminus technicus* ἀμυδρός). Siehe dazu C. Andresen, *Logos und Nomos. Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum* (Berlin 1955) 338f; J. H. Waszink, Bemerkungen zu Justins Lehre vom Logos Spermatikos, *Mullus, Festschrift für Theodor Klauser* (Münster i.W. 1964) 386; J. Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux IIe et IIIe siècles* (Tournai 1961) 50; E. P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius. Synthesis or Antithesis?* (Leiden ²1974) 19f.

[14] *Adv. Marc.* 1,3,2.

[15] Für Parallelen aus der heidnischen und christlichen Literatur siehe P.G. van der Nat, *Q.S.F. Tertulliani De idololatria. Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, Part I (Leiden 1960) 39.

[16] *Apologia* 1: αὐτὸν οὖν λέγω εἶναι θεὸν ... ἄναρχον καὶ ἀίδιον, ἀθάνατον.

[17] Siehe *Adv. Haer.* 2,1,1; 2,12; 2,56,1: *sine initio et sine fine ... est omnium Dominus;* 3,8,3: *ipse enim infectus et sine initio et sine fine.*

[18] *Adv. Marc.* 1,3,2–6. Diese Ausführungen sind zu vergleichen mit Tertullians

grösste ist, dann kann ihm keiner gleich gestellt werden, da Gott nicht mehr der Allergrösste wäre, wenn er seinesgleichen hätte. Als der Allergrösste muss Gott der Einzige sein, es können nicht zwei Götter gleichzeitig die Allergrössten sein. Einige Gelehrte[19] sind der Meinung, dass zwar Tertullians Definition Gottes als des Ewigen, des Ungewordenen usw. Parallelen in der heidnischen und in der christlichen Literatur vor Tertullian habe, nicht jedoch seine Ausführungen zu Gott als dem Allergrössten und deshalb Einzigen. Unserer Meinung nach muss dieses unwahrscheinlich genannt werden. Tertullian betont zweimal, alle würden seiner Definition Gottes als des Allergrössten zustimmen, dann muss er aber seinen Beweis, dass dieser Titel die Einzigkeit Gottes einschliesst, so führen, dass er wirklich allen einleuchtet, und das geschieht am einfachsten, wenn er sich auf eine bekannte Argumentation stützen kann. U.E. findet sich diese Argumentation bei Xenophanes. In einem der Fragmente des Xenophanes findet sich die These, Gott müsse einer sein, da er der Stärkste von allen sei. Wenn es mehrere Götter gebe, dann müssten sie alle gleich stark sein. Gott sei jedoch von allen der Stärkste und Beste.[20] Dieses ist keine gesuchte und ferne Parallele, da auch Irenäus Kenntnis des Xenophanes verrät,[21] und da, wie R. M. Grant gezeigt hat,[22] die vorsokratische Philosophie die frühchristliche Theologie mit beeinflusst hat. – Ferner betont auch Irenäus, die Gnostiker machten den Fehler den höchsten Vater mit niedrigeren Emanationen zusammenzunehmen, das sei jedoch unmöglich.[23]

Beweisführung gegen Hermogenes, dass die Materie nicht ewig, d.h. göttlich, sein kann, weil dies der Einzigkeit Gottes widersprechen würde, *Adv. Herm.* 4–6, vgl. J. H. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes*, 109ff.

[19] A. Bill, *Zur Erklärung und Textkritik des 1. Buches Tertullians Adversus Marcionem*, T. u. U. 38,2 (Leipzig 1911) 19, und E. Bosshardt, *Essai sur l'originalité et la probité de Tertullien dans son traité contre Marcion* (Florence 1921).

[20] Diels, *FVS* 21, A 31: τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν τὸν θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξ., ὃν ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ, φησίν, ὄντων ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον θεός.

[21] In *Adv. Haer.* 2,15,3 (vgl. 2,17; 2,19,2; 2,22) bezieht Irenäus sich auf Xenophanes, siehe R. M. Grant, Early Christianity and Pre-Socratic Philosophy, *Harry Austin Wolfson Jubilee Volume*, American Academy for Jewish Research (Jerusalem 1965) 376ff; vgl. E. P. Meijering, *God Being History. Studies in Patristic Philosophy* (Amsterdam–Oxford 1975) 22,25,29.

[22] Siehe den in der vorigen Fussnote genannten Aufsatz von R. M. Grant.

[23] Siehe *Adv. Haer.* 2,12: ... *annumerant reliquis Aeonibus Propatorem. Pater enim omnium enumerari non debet cum reliqua emissione: qui non est emissus cum ea quae emissa est: et innatus cum ea quae nata est: et quem nemo capit cum ea quae ab eo capitur, et propter hoc incapabilis ... Secundum enim id quod melior quam reliqui non debet cum eis annumerari.*

Als Beispiel für die Möglichkeit der Existenz zweier allergrössten Götter wird von den Marcionitern die Existenz irdischer Königreiche angeführt, die innerhalb ihrer eigenen Grenzen die Allergrössten sind und doch mehrere zugleich sind, – in dieser Weise könne doch Menschliches mit Göttlichem verglichen werden.[24] Tertullian erwidert, auf diese Weise könne nicht nur die Existenz zweier allergrössten Götter bewiesen werden, sondern auch die Existenz so vieler wie es Königreiche auf Erden gebe. Die Natur selbst und der Prophet Jesaja widersprechen nach Tertullian dem Gedanken, Gott könne mit irgend etwas anderem verglichen werden.[25] Ferner sollte ein klarer Unterschied gemacht werden zwischen Gott und göttlichen Eigenschaften, menschliche Eigenschaften könnten vielleicht mit göttlichen Eigenschaften verglichen werden, aber nicht mit Gott selber.[26] Ausserdem hinke das Beispiel, da der König in seinem Reiche zwar der Allergrösste sei, jedoch auch auf seinem Throne noch unter Gott stehe und daher im Vergleich mit Gott aufhöre der Allergrösste zu sein.[27] Dasgleiche Argument verwendet Irenäus.[28] Unter den Königen, führt Tertullian ferner aus,[29] müsse einer der Grösste sein, nämlich der König der Könige, dem die anderen unterworfen seien. Könige, die in ihrem eigenen Reiche die Grössten sind, können mit einander verglichen werden, dann ergibt sich, wer von ihnen der Grösste und Stärkste ist. In verschiedenen Reichen könne es jeweils die Stärksten geben, was eigene Macht und Wesen betrifft könne jedoch nur einer der Allergrösste sein. Genau so muss, wenn zwei allergrösste Götter verglichen werden, nur einer sich als der Allergrösste von beiden erweisen, da einer sich im Vergleich zwar als gross, aber doch als schwächer als der noch Grössere ergibt. Dieses führt zu dem Schluss, dass es entweder keinen allergrössten

[24] *Adv. Marc.* 1,4,1. A. Bill, *op. cit.*, 28 führt als Parallele Cicero, *De republ.* 1,26 an. Siehe auch die von J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig 1907) 178, 186, 191 angeführten Parallelen.

[25] *Adv. Marc.* 1,4,2. Hier bezieht Tertullian sich wieder auf die früher ausgesprochene Ansicht, die Schöpfung lehre einen Gott der seinesgleichen nicht hat, siehe *supra* 83. Der Schriftbeweis bezieht sich auf *Jesaja* 40,25.

[26] *Adv. Marc.* 1,4,2.

[27] *Adv. Marc.* 1,4,3.

[28] *Adv. Haer.* 4,4,1: *Qui enim super se habet aliquem superiorem, et sub alterius potestate est, hic neque deus neque magnus rex dici potest.*– In *Ad Scapulam* 2,7 äussert Tertullian sich über das Verhältnis zwischen dem Kaiser und Gott: *Colimus ergo et imperatorem sic quomodo et nobis licet et ipsi expedit, ut hominem a Deo secundum; et quicquid est a Deo consecutum est, solo tamen Deo minorem ... Sic enim omnibus maior est, dum solo Deo minor est.* Siehe ferner *Apol.* 30,1 ff.

[29] *Adv. Marc.* 1,4,4–6.

Gott gibt – ein unvollziehbarer Gedanke – oder dass der Allergrösste seine Grösse nicht mit einem anderen teilen kann. – Diese ganze Gedankenreihe scheint eine Ausarbeitung der Argumentation des Irenäus gegen die Existenz vieler Götter mit jeweiliger eigener Schöpfung zu sein: alle diese Götter begrenzen sich gegenseitig, sie sind in ihren eigenen Grenzen eingeschlossen, werden deshalb von etwas grösserem umschlossen und sind daher keiner wirklich Gott; weil ihnen im Vergleich mit anderen immer etwas fehlt, kann keiner von ihnen der Allmächtige genannt werden.[30]

Weshalb gibt es nur zwei allergrösste Götter nach den Marcionitern?, fragt Tertullian im Verlaufe seiner weiteren Polemik. Wenn es mehr als einen Allergrössten gibt, dann sollte man mehr als nur zwei behaupten. So sei Valentin grosszügiger als Marcion, da er bis zu dreissig Äonen lehre.[31] Wenn eine Vielzahl an allergrössten Göttern unmöglich ist, dann ist auch die Zweizahl unmöglich, da die Zweizahl bereits eine Pluralität bedeutet. – Nach einer Wiederholung seines früheren Argumentes gegen die Existenz zweier allergrössten Götter fährt Tertullian fort: Wenn die beiden allergrössten Götter sich völlig gleich sind, dann ist das Allergrösste, das in beiden ist, also eines. Wenn keiner von beiden den anderen übertrifft, dann ist die Zweiheit überflüssig.[32] Pluralität der Gottheit müsste sich auf die grösste Vernünftigkeit stützen, weil sonst auch die Verehrung des Göttlichen zweifelhaft wird. Mit zwei allergrössten Göttern konfrontiert, könne man *entweder* beide verehren, dann müsse man jedoch Angst haben, dass das Übermass an Verehrung nicht für Religion, sondern für Aberglaube gehalten werde, *oder* mann könne nur einen verehren, dann müsse man jedoch Angst haben den Anschein zu erwecken die völlig überflüssige Pluralität zu beschämen. Deshalb wäre es besser gar keinen zu verehren als nur einen in Sorge oder beide ohne guten Grund.[33] Dieser

[30] *Adv. Haer.* 2,1,4: *Oportet enim aut unum esse qui omnia continet ... aut multos rursus et indeterminatos factores et deos, ab invicem quidem incipientes, ad invicem autem desinentes per omnem partem: et alios omnes a foris ab altero quodam maiore contineri, et velut inclusos et manentes in suis unumquemque eorum confiteri necessitas erit, neminem autem horum omnium esse Deum. Deerit enim unicuique eorum partem habenti ad comperationem omnium reliquorum, et solvetur Omnipotentis appellatio.*

[31] *Adv. Marc.* 1,5,1. In *Adv. Prax.* 3,6 gibt Tertullian nicht in so ironischer Weise dem Valentin den Vorzug im Vergleich zu Marcion, eher scheint seine Formulierung dort zu implizieren, die Lehre des Valentin sei noch eine Steigerung der Ketzerei des Marcion: *eversio enim monarchiae illa est ... cum alius deus infertur adversus creatorem cum Marcione, cum plures, secundum Valentinos et Prodicos.*

[32] *Adv. Marc.* 1,5,3–4.

[33] *Adv. Marc.* 1,5,4–5.

Gedankengang will offenbar klar machen, dass Pluralität im Göttlichen Gottesdienst unmöglich macht.[34]

Tertullian ist sich dessen bewusst, soweit nur die Zweizahl *gleicher* Götter widerlegt zu haben, während doch Marcion die Existenz zweier *ungleicher* Götter behauptet, nämlich eines richtenden, wilden und kriegerischen und eines sanftmütigen, ruhigen, nur guten, ja sehr guten Gottes.[35] Tertullian entgegnet, dass die Definition Gottes als des Allergrössten auch die Existenz zweier verschiedener Götter unmöglich macht. Wenn Gott der Allergrösste ist, und wenn Marcion nicht die Gottheit des Schöpfers leugnet, dann muss er zugeben, dass der Schöpfer der Allergrösste ist, und dann kann er nicht eine Verringerung im Allerhöchsten anbringen indem er den einen Allergrössten (nl. den Schöpfer) einem anderen Allergrössten (nl. dem guten Gott) unterwirft. Unterwerfung bedeutet Verringerung und das lässt das Wesen des Allergrössten nicht zu. Auch der gute Gott kann nicht der Allergrösste sein, wenn der Schöpfer seinen Wert verringern kann. Wenn es zwei Allergrösste gibt, dann kann nicht der eine grösser oder geringer als der andere sein. Marcion muss die Gottheit des Schöpfers leugnen und leugnen, dass er der Allergrösste ist. Indem er jedoch den Schöpfer als Gott bekennt bekennt er beide Götter als die Allergrössten. Man kann nicht dem einen etwas entnehmen oder dem anderen etwas zufügen. Die Gottheit schliesst Verschiedenheit aus.[36] Dass der höchste Gott nichts anderem unterworfen sein dürfe, ist auch ein von Irenäus betonter Satz.[37] Die Behauptung des Tertullian, der gute Gott Marcions erleide seitens des Schöpfers eine Verringerung, findet später seine Erläuterung, wenn Tertullian erklärt, der Schöpfer beeinträchtige das Werk des Erlösers.[38]

Die Marcioniter können dem entgegen halten, das Wort ‚Gott' sei

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[34] Vgl. in diesem Zusammenhang die Ausführungen in *Apol.* 13,2 wo Tertullian behauptet, bei der Vielzahl der Götter verehrten die einen die eine Gruppe von Göttern die anderen eine andere, dabei würden die jeweils nicht für Verehrung erwählten Götter beleidigt. – Vgl. Ciceros Definition von Aberglaube, *De nat. deor.* 2,72 und die Anmerkungen von A.S.Pease in *M.T. Ciceronis De natura deorum* (Harvard 1958) 738, ferner seine Anmerkungen zu 1,45, *op. cit.*, 303, und zu *De div* 2,148 in *M.T. Ciceronis De divinatione liber secundus*, Part II (The University of Illinois 1923) 579.

[35] *Adv. Marc.* 1,6,1: *Certi* (sc. *sumus*) *Marcionem dispares deos constituere, alterum iudicem, ferum, bellipotentem, alterum mitem, placidum et tantummodo bonum atque optimum;* vgl. hierzu Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 1,25,1.

[36] *Adv. Marc.* 1,6,2–4; vgl. auch die Ausführungen hierzu in *Adv. Herm.* 7.

[37] Siehe z.B. *Adv. Haer.* 2,4,4 und 5,4.

[38] Siehe *infra* 94.

auch auf andere übertragbar, da das Psalmwort ja auch sage „Der Gott der Götter steht in der Versammlung der Götter" und „Ich habe gesagt: Ihr seid Götter", – wie nun diesen anderen Göttern auf Grund dessen nicht der Titel des Allergrössten zukommt, so auch nicht dem Schöpfer.[39] Irenäus hat bereits zu diesem und zu anderen Textworten Stellung genommen und erklärt, in absoluter Weise könne nur der wahre Gott ‚Gott' genannt werden, wenn für andere das Wort ‚Gott' gebraucht werde, dann beziehe es sich auf solche die durch Gottes Adoption zu Göttern gemacht worden seien.[40] Irenäus berichtet, die Gnostiker behaupteten, der von ihnen gefundene höchste Gott sei seinem Wesen nach Gott, der Schöpfer sei es nur dem Namen nach.[41] Tertullian nimmt zu diesem Argument der Marcioniter in folgender Weise Stellung:[42] Auch vom Gotte Marcions kann dann behauptet werden, er sei, genau wie die Dämonen[42a] und Menschen nur dem Namen nach Gott. Wenn der gemeinsame Besitz von Namen etwas über Positionen besagt, dann beleidigen viele schlechte Sklaven die Namen von Königen. Dadurch werden die Könige jedoch nicht geringer in ihrer Würde, denn auch die Abgötter der Heiden sind Götter für das Volk, doch ist keiner von ihnen deshalb ein Gott, weil er Gott genannt wird. Der Titel des Allergrössten wird deshalb nicht für das Wort oder den Namen ‚Gott' beansprucht, sondern für die Substanz Gottes. Die bereits gegebene Definition Gottes[43] bezieht sich auf die Substanz und die Stellung Gottes. Auch Marcion tut dasgleiche bei seinem Gott. Deshalb muss, wenn es zwei Götter gibt, beiden das Wesen des Allergrössten auf Grund der Gesetzmässigkeit der Substanz und nicht auf Grund zufälliger Namensgebung eigen sein. Dann ergibt sich aber (was bereits gezeigt wurde), dass es weder zwei gleiche Allergrösste geben kann (da das Allergrösste keinen Vergleich zulässt) noch zwei ungleiche (da das Allergrösste keine Verringerung zulässt). – Es dürfte klar sein, dass Tertullian hier seine Argumente aus der alten

[39] *Adv. Marc.* 1,7,1; vgl. *Psalm* 82,1. 6 und die Ausführungen hierzu in *Adv. Herm.* 5,2 und *Adv. Prax.* 13,4.

[40] *Adv. Haer.* 3,6,1.

[41] *Adv. Haer.* 4,1,1: *manifeste falsa ostenduntur ea quae dicunt circumventores et perversissimi sophistae, dicentes naturaliter et Deum et Patrem esse quem ipsi adinvenerunt; Demiurgum vero naturaliter neque Deum, neque Patrem esse, sed verbo tenus dici.*

[42] *Adv. Marc.* 1,7,2ff.

[42a] Zur Bedeutung *angeli* = Dämonen siehe letztlich P. G. van der Nat, Art. ‚Geister', *R.A.C.* (1975) 724–726.

[43] *Adv. Marc.* 1,3,2, siehe *supra* 83.

Debatte bezieht, ob die Wörter den Dingen φύσει oder θέσει gegeben seien.[44] Albin (von dessen Werk Tertullian Kenntnis genommen hat)[45] berichtet, dass nach Platon die Namen θέσει und nicht φύσει gegeben werden, er fügt jedoch hinzu, dies bedeute nicht, dass die Dinge zufällige Namen haben, sondern die Dinge haben die zu ihrem Wesen passenden Namen.[46] Solche ausgeglichenen Positionen kann Tertullian in diesem Zusammenhang natürlich nicht gebrauchen, deshalb greift er einfach die Behauptung heraus, die Namen seien zufällig.[47]

Tertullian setzt nunmehr seine Polemik fort mit einem Angriff auf den der Vergangenheit gegenüber *neuen* Gott der Marcioniter.[48] Gerade diese Neuheit beweist, dass Marcions Lehre Ketzerei ist. Tertullian behauptet in seiner Polemik gegen Marcion (und in anderen Schriften) fortlaufend, das Neue sei an sich verwerflich.[49] Einige Male behauptet Tertullian jedoch auch gerade das Gegenteil, nl. das Neue verdiene den Vorzug.[50] Wie so oft führt Tertullians *ad hoc* Argumentation ihn zu Widersprüchen.[51] In diesem Zusammenhang kann gesagt werden, Tertullian beweise mit seiner gelegentlichen Behauptung, gerade das Neue sei vollkommener als das Alte, seine in der Polemik gegen Marcion aufgestellte These, das Neue habe einen natürlichen Reiz (dem man widerstehen müsse).[52] Tertullian hat offenbar selbst hin und wieder diesem Reiz nicht widerstehen können. – Die Götter der Heiden sind wegen jeweilig neuer Konsekration

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[44] Siehe hierzu Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 1,24; vgl. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, I (Göttingen ⁴1970) 41ff; ferner H. Chadwick, *Origen Contra Celsum. Translated with an Introduction and Notes* (Cambridge ²1965) 23.

[45] Siehe *De anima* 28,1 und 29,4 mit J.H. Waszinks Ausführungen in seiner Edition, 41*–44*.

[46] *Epitome* 6,10. Siehe z.B. den Satz: ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα ὄργανον πράγματος οὐχ ὃ ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατάλληλον τῇ φύσει.

[47] *Adv. Marc.* 1,7,5: ... *ex substantiae lege, non ex nominis sorte* ...

[48] *Adv. Marc.* 1,8.

[49] Siehe z.B. *Adv. Marc.* 1,6: *In tantum enim haeresis deputabitur quod postea inducitur, in quantum veritas habebitur quod retro et a primordio traditum est*; *Adv. Marc.* 1,9,1; 1,22; *Adv. Herm.* 1; *De carne Christi* 2,5–6; *Adv. Prax.* 2,2; *De praescr. haer.* 31,3.

[50] Siehe die von J.H. Waszink in seiner Edition von *De anima*, S.360 angeführten Stellen. In *De anima* 28,3 behauptet Tertullian, dass die Wahrheit nichts mit alt oder neu zu tun hat. Siehe auch die Bemerkung in *De virg. vel.* 1,2: *Haereseis non novitas quam veritas revincit. Quodcunque adversus veritatem sapit, hoc erit haeresis, etiam vetus consuetudo.*

[51] Vgl. J.H. Waszink, a.a.O.: „Tertullian tinkers with conceptions familiar to him." – Zu Widersprüchen innerhalb der Ausführungen Tertullians siehe auch P.G. van der Nat in seiner Edition von *De idololatria*, S.12*.

[52] *Adv. Marc.* 1,9,1: *ipsamque naturalem novitatis gratiositatem volui repercutere.*

neue Götter. Ein neuer Gott ist jedoch immer ein falscher Gott.[53] Die wahre Gottheit wird weder vom Alter noch von der Neuheit, sondern von der Wahrheit bestätigt. Der Grund ist, dass (Gott als) die Ewigkeit über die Zeit erhaben ist, da sie die Zeit selbst ist. Hiermit meint Tertullian offenbar, dass die Ewigkeit (der ewige Gott) als unendliche Zeit weder Anfang noch Ende hat.[54] Der Gedanke, dass die Ewigkeit keinen Anfang und kein Ende hat (und deshalb unendliche Zeit ist) kommt bei Tertullian häufiger vor.[55] Tiefsinnige Gedanken zu diesem Thema, wie sie sich im Platonismus im Anschluss an *Timäus* 37 C ff finden, bietet Tertullian nicht. In seiner Polemik gegen Marcion ist Tertullian alles daran gelegen, dass Gottes Wesen keinen Anfang hat und deshalb nicht neu sein darf.[56] Da er als Definition von Ewigkeit gegeben hat „ohne Anfang und ohne Ende", sieht er sich auch gezwungen zu betonen, Gott komme der Begriff ‚alt' nicht zu, da dieser Begriff das Ende impliziert, wie der Begriff ‚neu' den Anfang einschliesst. Dieses ist an sich nicht einleuchtend. Wenn etwas alt ist braucht das nicht zu bedeuten, dass es ein Ende haben wird, ausserdem betont Tertullian öfters das Alter der Offenbarung.[57] Von seiner Definition der Ewigkeit her argumentiert Tertullian hier deutlich *ad hoc*.[58]

Tertullian wendet sich nunmehr der Bekämpfung der These zu, der neue Gott sei vor seiner Offenbarung unbekannt gewesen.[59] Es gibt unbekannte Götter, aber das ist griechischer Götzendienst (vgl. *Apostelgeschichte* 17,23), und es gibt unbestimmte Götter, aber das ist römischer Aberglaube.[60] Unbestimmte Götter sind weniger bekannt, weil weniger bestimmt und deshalb unbekannt in sofern sie weniger bestimmt sind. Der Gott Marcions muss im Hinblick auf die Gegenwart unbestimmt und

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[53] Vgl. *Apol.* 10,5.

[54] Siehe *Adv. Marc.* 1,8,3.

[55] Siehe *Adv. Herm.* 4,1: *Quis alius aeternitatis status quam semper fuisse et futurum esse ex praerogativa nullius initii et nullius finis?* Vgl. *Adv. Herm.* 7,2 und *De anima* 24,7. Zu Ausführungen über die Ewigkeit siehe auch *Adv. Herm.* 5 und 11; *Adv. Marc.* 2,3.

[56] Siehe *infra* 103ff.

[57] Siehe *supra* Fussnote 50.

[58] In *Adv. Marc.* 1,8,3 ist die These *deus si est vetus, non erit* die notwendige Parallele zu *si est novus, non fuit*. Im folgenden Satz formuliert er übrigens vorsichtiger: *novitas initium testificatur, vetustas finem comminatur*. Zu Gott als dem Richter und Messer der Zeit vgl. die Ausführungen in *Adv. Marc.* 2,3,4. Zum Satz *quod facit* (sc. *aeternitas*), *pati non potest, caret aetate quod non licet nasci* vgl. *Adv. Marc.* 2,3,4: *ergo nec tempus habuit ante tempus quae fecit tempus, sicut nec initium ante initium quae constituit initium.*

[59] *Adv. Marc.* 1,9.

[60] In *Ad Nat.* 2,9,3 berichtet Tertullian, dass es nach Varro bei den Römern *dei certi, dei incerti* und *dei electi* gebe.

im Hinblick auf die Vergangenheit unbekannt genannt werden. Sowie der bekannte Schöpfergott ihn unbekannt gemacht hat, so macht der bestimmte Schöpfergott ihn unbestimmt. Wenn Gott unbekannt und verborgen war, dann hat ein Gebiet der Dunkelheit ihn umschattet, ein Gebiet das selbst auch neu, unbekannt und im Hinblick auf die Gegenwart unbestimmt ist, und in seiner Unendlichkeit zweifellos grösser als der Gott den es verbarg, betont Tertullian, hier u.a. eine bei Irenäus geläufige Argumentation übernehmend.[61] Tertullian stellt kurz fest, Gott könne auf Grund seiner Grösse nicht unbekannt gewesen sein und auf Grund seiner Güte habe er nicht unbekannt sein dürfen, vor allem wenn er in beider Hinsicht den Schöpfer übertreffen soll.[62] Ausführlich argumentiert Tertullian dann, dass der neue Gott in der Weise gekannt werden muss wie der Schöpfergott, der schon vor ihm bekannt war, gekannt wurde. Jede frühere Sache schreibe der späteren die Norm vor. Dies bedeutet, dass der Gott Marcions sich nach der Analogie des Schöpfergottes offenbaren muss. Tertullian spricht diesen Grundsatz mehrere Male aus.[63] Wie bereits beobachtet worden ist,[64] findet sich dergleiche Gedanke bei Irenäus, der ihn für die Auslegung schwieriger Bibeltexte verwendet.[65] Über die Herkunft dieses Gedankens besteht keine Übereinstimmung zwischen den Forschern die hierzu Stellung genommen haben. Bill verweist auf Aristoteles und die Stoa,[66] Sider hingegen hält

[61] Siehe Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,1,1: *id quod continet eo quod continetur maius est*; ferner *Adv. Haer.* 2,7,2; 4,33,2. Vgl. Athanagoras, *Supplicatio* 8 und Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 1,11,2–3; *Adv. Herm.* 38.

[62] Auf dieses Argument wird Tertullian sich später ausführlicher beziehen, siehe *infra* 100, 103ff.

[63] *Adv. Marc.* 1,9,5: *Omnis res anterior posteriori normam praeministravit*; ferner 1,9,7: *ad normam et formam et regulam certorum probentur incerta*; *Apol.* 3,2: *cum sit iustius occulta de manifestis praeiudicare quam manifesta de occultis praedamnare*; *De res. mort.* 19,1: *manifestiora quaeque praevaleant et incertis certiora praescribant*, 21,2: *incerta de certis et obscura de manifestis praeiudicari.* Vgl. auch *Adv. Marc.* 2,17,3: *Nulla posteritas non a primordiis accipit*, und *De test. an.* 5,6: *potiora sunt ad instruendam animam priora quam posteriora, quae et ipsa a prioribus instrui sustinebant.*

[64] A. Bill, *op. cit.*, 36 und G. Quispel, *De bronnen van Tertullianus' Adversus Marcionem* (Leiden 1943) 25.

[65] *Adv. Haer.* 2,9,1: *omnis autem quaestio non per aliud quod quaeritur habebit resolutionem, nec ambiguitas per aliam ambiguitatem solvetur apud eos qui sensum habent, aut aenigmata per aliud maius aenigma; sed ea quae sunt talia ex manifestis et consonantibus et claris accipiunt absolutiones.* Zu Tertullians Verwendung dieses Leitsatzes in der Bibelexegese siehe G. Zimmermann, *Die hermeneutischen Prinzipien Tertullians* (Würzburg 1937) und H. Karpp, *Schrift und Geist bei Tertullian* (Gütersloh 1955) 24ff.

[66] A. Bill, *op. cit.*, 36f: Hier wird auf Aristoteles, *Anal. post.* 1,71b 9–22, Cicero, *Acad. prior.* 26 und Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.* 8,314 hingewiesen.

den rhetorischen Hintergrund für wichtiger.[67] U.E. hat Sider Unrecht, da Tertullian der Philosophie einmal den Vorwurf macht,[68] sie fälle über das Unbestimmte ein Urteil auf Grund des Bestimmten, und sie beriefe sich auf Beispiele alsob alles verglichen werden könnte. Dies bedeutet, dass Tertullian sich in seiner Polemik gegen Marcion bewusst eines philosophischen Leitsatzes bedient. Auch hier zeigt sich wieder die typische *ad hoc* Argumentation Tertullians: er wirft der Philosophie vor, in dieser Weise lasse sie keinen Raum für Gottes Freimacht,[69] während er selbst dem Gotte Marcions die Freiheit entnimmt sich anders zu offenbaren als der Schöpfergott. – Die stoische Lehre von der Erkenntnis durch Analogie scheint hier nahezuliegen.[70] – Der bekannte Gott, so fährt Tertullian fort, muss existieren, sonst wäre er nicht bekannt. Die Existenz des unbekannten Gottes hingegen ist, solange er unbekannt ist, unsicher. Deshalb entspricht es der Vernunft, dass das Unsichere nach der Norm des Sicheren bewiesen wird. Wenn das Unsichere nach einer ebenfalls unsicheren Norm bewiesen werden soll, dann bekommt man nur eine Anhäufung von unsicheren Fragen. Die beiden Götter des Marcion sind von derselben Art, nl. ungeworden, ungeschaffen und ewig, dann müssen die übrigen Eigenschaften nach der aufgestellten Regel festgestellt werden, und dann kann nicht einer Gott sein, der heute unsicher ist, weil er früher unbekannt war, während von demjenigen, von dem fest steht, dass er existiert, es deshalb fest steht, weil er nie unbekannt und deshalb nicht unsicher war.[71]

Tertullian erläutert ferner den Gedanken, dass Gott nie unbekannt gewesen sein kann. Seit dem Beginn der Schöpfung ist Gott bekannt, da die Schöpfung Gott offenbaren soll, betont Tertullian, wie Irenäus.[72]

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[67] R.D.Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford 1971) 50 zitiert den Satz Quintillians *per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem dubiis adferens ... neque enim certa incertis declarantur.*

[68] *De anima* 2,2: *de certis incerta praeiudicat, provocat ad exempla, quasi comparanda sint omnia.*

[69] *De anima* 2,2: *nihil divinae licentiae servat.*

[70] Siehe hierzu E.Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 3,1 (Leipzig ^{5}1923) 75.

[71] Es sollte nicht übersehen werden, das im Laufe dieses Kapitels das Wort *incertus* eine leichte Bedeutungsverschiebung erfährt. Anfangs wird es als ‚unbestimmt' gebraucht (konform der Formel *dii incerti*), danach gebraucht Tertullian es im Sinne von ‚unsicher', und zwar in dem Sinne unsicher, dass ein *deus incertus* auch nicht existieren kann.

[72] *Adv. Marc.* 1,10,1; vgl. Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,4,5: *invisibilis quidem poterat eis esse propter eminentiam, ignotus autem nequaquam propter providentiam.* Siehe auch den Gedankengang in *Adv. Haer.* 2,22,4.

Deshalb beginnt die Erkenntnis Gottes auch nicht mit Moses und seinen fünf Büchern, da Moses ja auch die Kenntnis Gottes seit Adam und nicht seit Ägypten beschreibt.[73] In diesem Zusammenhang stellt Tertullian die These auf (die sich häufig bei ihm findet), die Seelen hätten eine natürliche Gotteserkenntnis.[74] Die Seele geht der Prophetie voran.[75] Der von der Seele erkannte Gott ist älter als der Gott Marcions, deshalb muss der Gott Marcions von ihm die Norm empfangen. Gott wird niemals verborgen sein, er wird immer erkannt, gehört und gesehen werden in der Art wie er will.[76] Gott hat die Welt als Beweis für seine Existenz und Einigkeit erschaffen, während der Gott Marcions sich noch plagt um erwiesen zu werden.

Die Marcioniter erwidern, jeder sei doch seinen eigenen Leuten mehr bekannt als anderen.[77] Tertullian nimmt dieses Gegenargument auf und erklärt, Gott könne nichts ausser sich haben, deshalb sei alles das Seine. Der Schöpfer fülle den ganzen Raum.[78] Der Gott Marcions hätte der Norm des Schöpfers folgen müssen und sich durch eine Schöpfung erweisen müssen, wie ja auch die falschen Götter der Heiden faktisch wegen ihrer Wohltaten vergötterte Menschen seien.[79] Der Gott Marcions konnte sich entweder nicht durch eine Schöpfung offenbaren, oder er wollte es

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[73] *Adv. Marc.* 1,10,1. In *Adv. Iud.* 2 betont Tertullian, bereits im Paradies habe Gott sein Gesetz gegeben.

[74] Siehe die Schrift *De testimonio animae*; ferner *De carne Christi* 12,5; *De res. mort.* 3; *De anima* 41,3. Siehe zu diesem Thema J.H. Waszinks Erläuterungen in seiner Edition von *De anima*, SS.454f. Er weist auf den Zusammenhang mit der stoischen Lehre der κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι hin. – In *Apol.* 17,4–18,1 unterscheidet Tertullian drei Quellen der Erkenntnis Gottes: aus der Schöpfung, aus dem *testimonium animae* und (in vollkommenerem Masse) aus der Heiligen Schrift.

[75] *Adv. Marc.* 1,10,3: *Ante anima quam prophetia.* Vgl. *De test. an.* 6,1: *ut et naturae et deo credas, crede animae.*

[76] *Adv. Marc.* 1,10,4. Dieser Nachdruck auf den Willen Gottes (der sich nicht immer leicht in Einklang bringen lässt mit der These, Gott tue nicht plötzlich neue Dinge) findet sich auch bei Irenäus, z.B. *Adv. Haer.* 4,34,5: *Ille autem volens videtur ab hominibus, a quibus vult, et quando vult, et quemadmodum vult*; siehe ferner E.P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 19ff, 59. Vgl. Tertullian, *Adv. Iud.* 2,2: *omnibus gentibus eandem legem dedit, quam certis statutis temporibus observari praecepit quando voluit et per quos voluit et sicut voluit.*

[77] *Adv. Marc.* 1,11,1.

[78] *Adv. Marc.* 1,11,2–3. Zu dieser Argumentation siehe *supra* 91.

[79] *Adv. Marc.* 1, 11, 4–7. Hiermit will Tertullian sagen, dass die Götter der Heiden, die vergottete Menschen sind, die wegen ihrer Wohltaten vergottet wurden, der Norm des Schöpfers folgen (der sich ja durch die Wohltat der Schöpfung erweist), während der Gott Marcions dieser Norm nicht folgt. Zum Thema der Vergottung der Menschen bei den Heiden vgl. aus der Fülle der Beispiele Tertullian, *Apol.* 10; *De spect.* 6,4; 13,3; *De idolol.* 15,2; Aristides, *Apol.* 7,4.

nicht. ‚Nicht können' ist eines Gottes unwürdig. Es fragt sich, ob ‚nicht wollen' Gottes würdig ist.[80] Um diese Frage beantworten zu können fragt er Marcion, ob sein Gott sich in der Offenbarung in Christus offenbaren wollte oder nicht. Die Antwort muss hier bejahend lauten. Dann muss die Frage gestellt werden, weshalb er sich in der Unehre des Fleisches zu erkennen geben wollte, und zwar einer um so grösseren Unehre, da es nicht einmal wahres Fleisch war. Denn dieses ist schändlicher, dass er die Substanz des Fleisches vorlog und am Kreuze hängend den Fluch des Schöpfers über sich ergehen liess.[81] In viel ehrenhafterer Weise hätte er sich durch eine eigene Schöpfung zu erkennen geben können, vor allem weil er sich gegenüber dem Schöpfer zu erkennen geben musste, dem er vom Anfang an nicht auf Grund von Werken bekannt war. Es ist doch merkwürdig, dass der Schöpfer, der nach den Marcionitern nicht wusste, dass es noch einen Gott über ihm gab, sich mit solch grossen Werken zu erkennen gab (obwohl er das wegen seiner vermeintlichen Einzigkeit nicht nötig hatte), während der erhabenere Gott es nicht tat, obwohl er wusste, dass der niedrigere Gott so mit Werken ausgerüstet war. Er hätte grössere Werke schaffen müssen, um sich so als der grössere Gott zu erweisen. – Dieser Gedankengang soll die Antwort geben auf die Frage, ob es Gottes würdig gewesen wäre sich nicht durch eine Schöpfung offenbaren zu wollen. Tertullian gibt hierauf keine direkte Antwort, aber er

[80] *Adv. Marc.* 1,11,7–8. Tertullian hat zum Thema der Macht und des Willens Gottes und deren Verhältnis mehrmals Stellung genommen: *Adv. Marc.* 1,17,4, hier wird der Gedanke, Gott habe sich nicht offenbaren können oder wollen als Gottes unwürdig verworfen; *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,4–6 (der gleiche Gedanke); *Adv. Herm.* 10 (siehe dazu J. H. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes*, 119f); *De carne Christi* 3,1 (für Gott ist nur unmöglich was er nicht will); in *Adv. Prax.* 10,9 spricht er die Identität des Könnens und Wollens in Gott aus: *Dei enim posse velle est et non posse nolle. Quod autem voluit et potuit et ostendit.* Vgl. hierzu Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,44,2: Φύσεως κρείττων ὁ θεὸς καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ τὸ θέλειν ὅτι ἀγαθός ἐστιν· καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι ὅτι δυνατός, und Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 3,70 und 5,23. – Quispel hat *op. cit.*, 28 bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass sich bei Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 5,4 ein ähnlicher Gedanke findet wie in *Adv. Marc.* 1,24, siehe ferner *Adv. Haer.* 2,4,3. Als Hintergrund dieser Erörterungen der Macht und des Willens Gottes muss vielleicht die Beweisführung des Epikur gegen die Vorsehung gelten: Vernichtet Gott das Übel nicht weil er es nicht kann oder weil er es nicht will?, siehe Laktanz, *De ira dei* 13,19; vgl. E. P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 35f.

[81] Zur nicht wirklichen Leiblichkeit Christi als einer Lüge Gottes vgl. *Adv. Marc.* 1,24,5, *De carne Christi* 5,8, *De anima* 17,14 (dazu die Ausführungen von J. H. Waszink in seiner Ausgabe von *De anima*, S. 253) und vor allem *Adv. Marc.* 3,8–11. Vgl. als Hintergrund Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 3,19,5: *et quemadmodum illos seduxit, ut videretur eis ipse hoc quod non erat, et nos seducit, adhortans perferre ea, quae ipse non pertulit*; vgl. ferner *Adv. Haer.* 3,31; 4,52,2; 5,1,2.

suggeriert sie: Wenn der Gott Marcions sich mittels der scheinbaren Menschwerdung offenbaren wollte, dann ist es des wahren Gottes unwürdig sich nicht in einer viel ehrenhafteren Weise offenbaren zu wollen.

Jeder Existierende muss einen Existenzgrund haben, und dieser Grund muss sein, dass er eine Sache als sein Eigentum hervorbringt, so fährt Tertullian fort.[82] Was keine Sache hervorbringt hat keinen Existenzgrund und existiert deshalb nicht. Deshalb darf es keinen Gott ohne Schöpfung geben. Ein Gott, der ohne Schöpfung vom Menschen Glauben verlangt, während der Mensch gewöhnt ist auf Grund von Schöpfungswerken an Gott zu glauben, kann nicht sein. Wenn der Gott Marcions ein Schöpfungswerk hinausschiebt oder ganz darauf verzichtet, so grenzt das an Schamlosigkeit und Böshaftigkeit – Schamlosigkeit, weil er einen Glauben fordert auf den er keinen Anspruch machen kann, und Böshaftigkeit, weil er die Mehrzahl der Menschen des Unglaubens schuldig macht, da er nicht für Anlass zum Glauben gesorgt hat. – A. Bill[83] hält den philosophischen Hintergrund dieses Gedankens für unerklärt. Wir möchten auf die Möglichkeit hinweisen, dass Tertullian hier einen anderweitig aufgestellten Grundsatz auf Gott anwendet: Nach Tertullian hat alles was existiert einen Grund weshalb es existiert, und dieser Grund ist, dass es eine Auswirkung hat.[84] Als Hintergrund kann der stoische Gedanke angeführt werden, das Wirkliche sei dasjenige, das die Kraft habe zu wirken, ein Gedanke der sich auch auf die Gottheit als die letzte Ursache bezieht, die nl. eine wirkende Ursache ist.[85]

Tertullian gibt nunmehr eine Antwort auf das Gegenargument der

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[82] *Adv. Marc.* 1,12. Wir paraphrasieren hier *rem habere* als „eine Sache als sein Eigentum hervorbringen", da Tertullian dieses Wort *res* im Verlaufe dieses Kapitels mit *opera* und *pignus* erläutert und auf Gottes Schöpfungsaktivitäten bezieht.

[83] *Op. cit.*, 45ff.

[84] Tertullian äussert diesen Gedanken wenn er erklären will, weshalb die Häresien solch eine Auswirkung haben, siehe *De praescr. haer.* 1,2–3: *vane ergo et inconsiderate plerique hoc ipso scandalizantur quod tantum haereses valeant. Quantum si non valerent, non fuissent. Cum quid sortitum est, ut omnino sit, sicut causam accipit ob quam sit, sic vim consequitur per quam sit nec esse non possit.*

[85] Siehe E.Zeller, *op. cit.*, 119 und 136. Zeller zitiert Seneca, *Ep.* 65,12: *quaerimus quae sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus.* A.Bill, *op. cit.*, 45 weist als mögliche Parallele auf Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 3,12,14 hin, wo gesagt wird, der Schöpfer sei grösser als der Gott der Gnostiker, da er Werke geschaffen hat. Derselbe Gedanke ist von Irenäus in *Adv. Haer.* 2,46,2–4 ausgesprochen worden. Diese Parallelen können jedoch eher auf die Argumente Tertullians in *Adv. Marc.* 1,9–11 bezogen werden, da der spezifische Gedanke, etwas sei nur wirklich, wenn es eine Wirkungsursache sei, von Irenäus nicht ausgesprochen wird.

Marcioniter, diese Schöpfung sei eines Gottes unwürdig.[86] Er stellt gleich am Anfang die These auf, die Welt sei nicht Gottes unwürdig, da Gott nicht seiner unwürdiges schafft, obgleich er die Welt für den Menschen und nicht für sich selbst geschaffen hat, und obgleich jedes Werk geringer ist als der Künstler der es geschaffen hat. Dass die Welt um des Menschen willen geschaffen worden ist, betonen auch Irenäus und Origenes.[87] Der Grundsatz, das Erschaffene sei geringer als der Erschaffer, wird auch in der weiteren Polemik Tertullians gegen Marcion ausgesprochen.[88] Ausserdem ist nichts schaffen unwürdiger als etwas unwürdiges schaffen, da das Unwürdige Hoffnung auf Würdigeres bietet. Die Häretiker erhalten ihre Inspiration von den Philosophen.[89] Nun, bei den Griechen bedeutet das Wort für Welt nicht Schmutz, sondern Schmuck und Erhaltung.[90] Die griechischen Philosophen haben die angeblich unwürdigen Elemente für Götter erklärt.[91] Auch der Populärglaube erklärt aus Scham für die Erzählungen über gestorbene Menschen (die zu Göttern gemacht wurden) die Götter für natürliche Substanzen, so z.B. den Jupiter für eine glühende Substanz. – Diesem ganzen Gedankengang liegt auch die von Irenäus aufgestellte These zu Grunde, die Ketzer trieben es noch schlimmer als die Philosophen, denen sie doch ihre Theorien entnommen haben.[92]

Wenn die Marcioniter, so fährt Tertullian fort,[93] die kleinen Tierchen, die der höchste Schöpfer gemacht hat (wobei er seine Grösse im Kleinen zeigt) verspotten, so sollen sie z.B. das Spinnengewebe nachahmen oder auf ihren Betten Mückenstiche aushalten. Wie müssen die grossen Werke sein, wenn man von den kleinen Werken so begünstigt oder geschädigt

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[86] *Adv. Marc.* 1,13.

[87] Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,8; 4,14; 5,29; 2,41,1; Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 4,74ff; 4,23; 4,29. Wie H. Chadwick gezeigt hat, nehmen die Christen hier eine These auf die von den Stoikern gegen die Akademiker verteidigt wurde, siehe *op. cit.*, Xf.

[88] *Adv. Marc.* 2,9,7: *opus enim aliud sit necesse est ab artifice, id est inferius artifice.* Vgl. Irenäus 2,37,3: *in quantum minor est ab eo qui factus non est ... ille qui hodie factus est et initium facturae accepit, in tantum secundum scientiam ... minorem esse eo qui fecit. Non enim infectus es, o homo, neque semper coexistebas Deo.*

[89] Dieser Grundsatz wird von Tertullian häufiger ausgesprochen, siehe z.B. *De praescr. haer.* 7,2; *De anima* 3,1; siehe ferner die Stellen, die J. H. Waszink in seiner Edition von *De anima* S. 115 anführt.

[90] Gemeint ist natürlich das Wort ‚kosmos'. Siehe hierzu *Adv. Herm.* 40,2 und *Apol.* 17,1, beide Male wird dort das Wirt ‚kosmos' mit *ornamentum* übersetzt.

[91] Den Ausführungen zu diesem Thema liegt offenbar die Kenntnis von Handbüchern zu Grunde, genau wie den Ausführungen des Irenäus zur Philosophie in *Adv. Haer.* 2,18.

[92] *Adv. Haer.* 2,18,1; vgl. *Adv. Haer.* 2,8,2.

[93] *Adv. Marc.* 1,14,1–2.

wird, dass man den Schöpfer in diesen kleinen Werken nicht verachten kann? Tertullian biegt hier die stoische Rechtfertigung der Vorsehung um, die z.B. behauptet, die Wanzen sorgten dafür, dass wir nicht zu lange schlafen.[94] – Die Marcioniter sollen den Menschen betrachten, so wird dieses Werk des Schöpfers ihr Wohlgefallen finden, ihr eigener Gott sei ja aus Liebe zu diesem Menschen auf die Erde herabgekommen, ausserdem verachte ihr eigener Gott die Werke des Schöpfers nicht, wasche er die Seinen doch im Wasser des Schöpfers, salbe er sie doch mit Öl des Schöpfers, ernähre er sie doch mit Milch und Honig, offenbare er seinen Körper doch mit dem Brot des Schöpfers,[94a] ja sogar in seinen eigenen Zeremonien benötige er Bettelgaben des Schöpfers. Marcion erhebe sich als Schüler jedoch über seinen Meister, da er vernichten will dessen sein Meister bedarf. Marcion tut dieses jedoch unaufrichtig, denn er begehrt selbst was er vernichten will, da er den Genuss der irdischen Güter nicht verschmäht.[95] Der einzig passende Beweis für das Misfallen der Welt des Schöpfers wäre der freiwillige Hungertot, aber dann wird man auf jeden Fall in eine Materie des Schöpfers aufgelöst.[96]

Nun behaupten die Marcioniter,[97] auch ihr Gott habe eine Schöpfung, nl. seine Erde und seinen Himmel. Tertullian wird auf den dritten Himmel später zu sprechen kommen. Zunächst sagt er, die Schöpfung hätte auf jeden Fall zugleich mit den Schöpfer erscheinen sollen. Während der Gott Marcions im 15. Jahre des Kaisers Tiberius erschienen sei, sei seine Schöpfung im 15. Jahre des Kaisers Severus immer noch nicht erschienen. Wie ist es möglich, dass der Gott Marcions wohl in dieser Welt erscheinen

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[94] Siehe M. Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, 100. Zur Rechtfertigung des Vorsehungsglaubens bei heidnischen und frühchristlichen Schriftstellern siehe J.H. Waszinks Edition von *De anima*, S.188. Wir möchten als besondere Parallele zu Tertullians Ausführungen noch auf Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,47,2 hinweisen: *Hi enim ... ne quidem muscam, aut culicem, aut tale quid ex his quae sunt contemtibilia animalia pusilla perficere possunt praeter eam rationem, quae ab initio a Deo per seminum demissionem in his quae sunt eiusdem generis, naturaliter facta sunt, atque fiunt animalia.* Vgl. auch Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 2,48.

[94a] Vgl. zu Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 1,14,3: *Sed ille quidem ... nec panem* (sc. *creatoris*) *reprobavit quo ipsum corpus suum repraesentat*, Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,51,1: *Quomodo autem iuste Dominus, si alterius patris exsistit, huius conditionis quae est secundum nos, accipiens panem suum corpus esse confitebatur*; siehe G. Quispel, *op. cit.*, 26.

[95] *Adv. Marc.* 1,14,3–4. Ein gleichartiges Argument führt Irenäus gegen die Gnostiker ins Feld, die sich an der Tatsache stossen, dass die Juden beim Auszug aus Ägypten Gold und Silber stahlen: Nach Irenäus kann man sich nur dann ohne Heuchelei daran stossen, wenn man selbst völlig isoliert von den Heiden, nackt und ohne Obdach in den Bergen wohnt, siehe *Adv. Haer.* 4,46,3.

[96] *Adv. Marc.* 1,15,5.

[97] *Adv. Marc.* 1,15,1–3.

kann, seine Schöpfung jedoch nicht? Wenn die Welt wohl den Gott Marcions, aber nicht seine Schöpfung fassen konnte, so war die Schöpfung mehr als ihr Schöpfer.[98] – Tertullian bespricht nunmehr die Art des Raumes.[99] Der höchste Gott hat auch eine Welt unter sich und über dem Schöpfer (nach der Lehre der Marcioniter), diese Welt muss er nach Tertullians Interpretation dann zwischen seinen Füssen und dem Haupt des Schöpfers gemacht haben. Dann muss aber auch der höchste Gott im Raum gewesen sein und hat er die Welt im Raum erschaffen, und deshalb ist der Raum dann grösser als der Gott und seine Welt, da das Umfassende grösser ist als das Umfasste.[100] Vielleicht, so fügt Tertullian mit dem ihm eigenen grimmigen Humor hinzu, finden sich noch weitere Stücke leerer Raum, in die sich noch ein dritter Gott mit seiner Welt drängen kann. Tatsächlich kann man eine ganze Reihe von Göttern im System des Marcion zählen, und zwar im Ganzen neun:[101] Der höchste Gott, der diesen umschliessende Raum, die ewige Materie aus der er geschaffen hat,[102] ferner der Schöpfergott (dessen Gottheit Marcion ja nicht leugnet), der Raum in dem dieser sich befindet und die Materie aus der er schafft, ferner das Böse, das Marcion der Materie zuschreibt, und zwar von Ewigkeit her. Dieses ergibt drei Götter in den höchsten Regionen, vier Götter in den Regionen des Schöpfergottes, das macht zusammen sieben, zu diesen müssen noch der vom Schöpfer versprochene Christus und der unter Tiberius erschienene Christus hinzugefügt werden, das macht zusammen neun Götter. Hier fällt Tertullian offenbar ein, dass er bereits das ironische Argument gegen Marcion gebraucht hatte, Valentin geniesse ihm gegenüber den Vorzug, da Valentin grosszügig zweiunddreissig Götter lehre, während Marcion sich auf zwei beschränke. Wenn man schon eine Mehrzahl annehme, so solle man es nicht bei zwei Göttern belassen! Deshalb gibt Tertullian zu, Marcion sei

[98] Dieses widerspricht dem in *Adv. Marc.* 1,13,2 aufgestellten Grundsatz: *omne opus inferius est suo artifice*, siehe *supra* 96.

[99] *Adv. Marc.* 1,15,2–3.

[100] Hier nimmt Tertullian zum Teil bereits ausgesprochene Thesen wieder auf, siehe *supra*, 91,95, über Gott und den Raum, vgl. auch Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,3,1: *Instabilis igitur est secundum eos Bythus, et id quod est huius pleroma, et Marcionis Deus. Siquidem, quemadmodum dicunt, extra se habet subiacens aliquid, quod vacuum et umbram vocant, et vacuum hoc maius pleromate ipsorum ostenditur*; *Adv. Haer.* 2,7,2: *irrationale est autem et impium adinvenire locum, in quo cessat et finem habet qui est secundum eos Propator.* Vgl. G. Quispel, *op. cit.*, 23.

[101] *Adv. Marc.* 1,15,3–6.

[102] Siehe die Ausführungen in *Adv. Herm.* 4ff, wo gesagt wird, dass die Materie, wenn sie ewig ist, auch Gott sein muss.

sich nicht bewusst, dass er statt (wie allgemein angenommen wird) zwei Göttern neun Götter lehre.

Die Marcioniter behaupten nunmehr,[103] es gebe zwei Arten von Dingen, nl. die sichtbaren und die unsichtbaren, die sichtbaren gehörten dem Schöpfergott, die unsichtbaren dem höchsten Gott. Tertullian erwidert, es sei doch plausibeler zu glauben, dass ein Gott, der sichtbare Dinge geschaffen hat, auch unsichtbare Dinge schaffe, als dass ein Gott, der kein sichtbares Werk vorausgeschickt hat, wohl unsichtbare Dinge schaffe. Tertullian schiebt die Exegese des von Paulus gebrauchten Ausdruckes ‚unsichtbare Dinge' hinaus, da er mit allgemeinen Auffassungen und Argumenten die Glaubhaftigkeit des Schriftbeweises vorbereiten will.[104] In diesem Zusammenhang stellt er fest, die ganze Schöpfung bestehe aus Gegensätzen (körperlich und unkörperlich, nass und trocken, – in psychischer Hinsicht: Freude und Angst usw.).[105] Deshalb muss auch der Gegensatz sichtbare – unsichtbare Dinge auf den Schöpfer zurückgeführt werden.[106] Die unsichtbaren Dinge sind grösser als die an sich grossen sichtbaren Dinge, dann müssen die grösseren Dinge dem gehören, dem auch die grossen Dinge gehören, weil die grossen Dinge nicht dem geziehmen, von dem nicht einmal kleine Dinge erscheinen (geschweige denn die grösseren).

Die Marcioniter erwidern[107] (nach Tertullian in die Enge getrieben): „Unserem Gott genügt dieses eine Werk, nl. den Menschen aus grösster und besonderer Liebe befreit zu haben, und diese Liebe ist über alle Insekten erhaben." – Nach Tertullian muss jedoch *erst* bewiesen werden, *dass* Gott ist, *danach*, *wie* er ist. Ersteres geschieht durch seine (Schöp-

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[103] *Adv. Marc.* 1,16.

[104] *Adv. Marc.* 1,16,2: *nunc enim communibus plurimum sensibus et argumentationibus iustis secuturae scripturarum quoque advocationi fidem sternimus.* Indem Tertullian diese Folge einhält folgt er dem Aufriss der Polemik des Irenäus gegen die Gnostiker, der ebenfalls dem Schriftbeweis die Widerlegung auf Grund der Vernunft vorangehen lässt, siehe *Adv. Haer.* 2,11,2: *bene haec arbitrati sumus primo interrogare eos e contrario de suis dogmatibus, et quod non est verisimile ipsorum ostendere ... post deinde Domini sermones inferre. Praef. ad* III: *primus* (sc. *liber*) *quidem omnium illorum sententias continet ... in secundo vero destructa et eversa sunt quae ab ipsis male docentur ... in hoc autem tertio ex Scripturis inferemus ostensiones.*

[105] Zu dieser ursprünglich stoischen Lehre und deren Vorkommen in der antiken und der christlichen Literatur siehe J.H.Waszinks Edition von *De anima*, SS. 155f; hierzu können noch hinzugefügt werden Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* 2,29,4 und Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,11,1; 2,37,2.

[106] Vgl. Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,46,5: *omnia quae praedicta sunt, visibilia et invisibilia, ab uno Deo facta.*

[107] *Adv. Marc.* 1,17.

fungs-)Werke, letzteres durch seine Wohltaten (im Laufe der Geschichte nach der Schöpfung). Nicht schon deshalb, weil er den Menschen befreit hat steht fest, dass Gott ist, sondern wenn Gottes Existenz fest steht, dann wird auch von ihm gesagt werden, dass er befreit hat, weil er ja auch existieren kann ohne befreit zu haben.[108] Tertullian betont,[109] Gott hätte sich von Anfang an offenbaren sollen und nicht in Verborgenheit verbleiben sollen, da der Mensch von Anfang an in der Welt war und auch die Bösheit des Schöpfers, gegen welche der Gott Marcions der Schöpfung zu Hilfe kommt. Entweder wusste er nicht, dass Grund zur Offenbarung vorlag, oder er zögerte, oder er konnte es nicht, oder er wollte es nicht, – alle diese Möglichkeiten sind Gottes unwürdig, vor allem des höchsten Gottes. Tertullian wird auf dieses Argument später zu sprechen kommen.[110] Vielleicht, so fährt Tertullian ironisch fort, machte sich der Gott Marcions bekannt, als er es wollte und es konnte,[111] als das Gestirn ihm günstig wurde (die Marcioniter sind Astrologen und schämen sich nicht ihr Leben nach den Sternen des Schöpfers einzurichten).[112] Es fragt sich aber, ob diese Offenbarung Gottes würdig ist. Offenbarung geschieht erst durch Werke, danach durch die Verkündigung.[112a] Da dem Gott Marcions Schöpfungswerke fehlen, hätte er sich wenigstens durch Verkündigung offenbaren sollen. Diese Verkündigung darf nicht auf menschlichen Vermutungen beruhen, da Gott nur sich selbst offenbaren kann, und da der grosse Gott nicht wider seinen eigenen Willen vom kleinen Menschen in die Offenbarheit gezogen werden kann.

Die Marcioniter entgegnen,[113] ihr Gott habe sich zwar nicht von Anfang

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[108] Der Gedanke, dass die Frage, *ob* etwas ist, der Frage, *wie* etwas ist, vorangehen muss liegt auch der Formulierung in *Adv. Prax.* 5,1 zu Grunde: *Sed quia duos unum volunt esse ut idem Pater et Filius habeatur, oportet et totum de Filio examinari, an sit et quomodo sit*; vgl. auch die Äusserung des Stoikers bei Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 2,1,3: *primum docent esse deos, deinde quales sint*, und die Anmerkung hierzu von A. S. Pease in seiner Edition von *De nat. deor.*, S. 544. Vielleicht steckt dieser Gedanke auch hinter der Formulierung des Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,37,1: *patriarchae et prophetae ... disseminaverunt in terra adventum Filii Dei, quis et qualis erit.*

[109] *Adv. Marc.* 1,17,4. Dieses ist auch ein beliebtes Argument des Irenäus gegen die Gnostiker, siehe *Adv. Haer.* 2,4,4; 2,3,3; 2,4,3; 2,22,5. Ein gleichartiges Argument führt nach Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 4,7 (vgl. 6,78) Celsus gegen das ganze Christentum ins Feld, vgl. E. P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 33f, 58, 143.

[110] Siehe *infra* 103ff.

[111] *Adv. Marc.* 1,18.

[112] Für Tertullians Angriff auf die Astrologie siehe *De idol.* 9. Die Unvereinbarkeit der Astrologie mit dem christlichen Glauben wird in *De idol.* 9,8 betont.

[112a] Die Offenbarung auf Grund der Verkündigung ist nach *Apol.* 18,1 die vollkommenere, vgl. *supra* Fussnote 74.

[113] *Adv. Marc.* 1,19.

an durch eine Schöpfung, wohl aber in Christus offenbart. Tertullian erwidert, er werde in wenigen Worten zeigen, dass Christus der Offenbarer des Schöpfers sei. Christus hat es (nach Marcion) seiner würdig gefunden im 15. Jahre des Kaisers Tiberius aus dem Himmel zu gleiten.[114] Marcion trat erst zu Zeiten des Kaisers Antoninus auf und verkündigte als erster diesen Gott.[115] Was zuerst zu Zeiten des Antoninus erschien, kann nicht schon zu Zeiten des Tiberius erschienen sein. Der Gegensatz zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium ist von Marcion aufgestellt worden und damit auch der Gegensatz zwischen dem Gott des Gesetzes und dem Gott des Evangeliums. Der Gott Marcions ist nicht von Christus, sondern von Marcion offenbart worden. Von der Erscheinung Christi bis zur Vermessenheit Marcions[116] kannte man keinen anderen Gott als den Schöpfer, und dieser Gott war der Gott des Gesetzes und des Evangeliums.

Die Marcioniter halten dem entgegen,[117] Marcion habe durch die Trennung von Gesetz und Evangelium nicht eine neue Glaubensregel gebracht, sondern die früher gefälschte Glaubensregel wieder gebessert. Tertullian ruft dem gegenüber aus, dass Christus in seiner grossen Langmut die Verdrehung seiner Verkündigung hingenommen habe, bis Marcion ihm zu Hilfe kam.[118] Die Marcioniter behaupten nach Tertullian mit Unrecht, Petrus und die übrigen Apostel seien von Paulus hinsichtlich

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[114] Diesem Gedanken kann Tertullian unmöglich zustimmen, weil er bereits gesagt hat und noch ausführlich argumentieren wird, dass das Heilswerk des guten Gottes viel früher hätte beginnen müssen, siehe ferner *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,10. Auch Irenäus betont, Gott habe nicht zur Zeit des Tiberius begonnen sich um die Welt zu kümmern, siehe *Adv. Haer.* 4,11,1: *Si autem ... a temporibus Tiberii Caesaris commemoratus est Pater providere hominibus ... tunc quidem oportuit ... causas tantae incuriae et negligentiae eius inquiri.*

[115] In *Adv. Marc.* 1,21 betont Tertullian, von den Aposteln und in den Kirchen mit apostolischem Ursprung sei der Gott Marcions nicht verkündigt worden. Vgl. *De praescr. haer.* 23,11 und Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 3,4,2: *neque ante Marcionem erant, qui sunt a Marcione.*

[116] Zur Vermessenheit des Marcion (die hierin besteht, das er es wagt mit einer neuen Lehre anzukommen) vgl. *Adv. Marc.* 1,1,4: *Marcion ... Amazona audacior*; Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 3,1,1: *nec enim fas est dicere quoniam ante praedicaverunt* (sc. *apostoli*) *quam perfectam haberent agnitionem; sicut quidam audent dicere, gloriantes emendatores se esse apostolorum*; siehe auch *Adv. Haer.* 3,2,2. Plotin übt ähnliche Kritik an den Gnostikern, siehe *Enneade* 2,9,6 und 2,9,14, vgl. E.P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 73.

[117] *Adv. Marc.* 1,20.

[118] Vgl. hierzu die ironische Bemerkung in *De praescr. haer.* 29,2–3: *Aliquos Marcionitas et Valentinianos liberanda veritas expectabat. Interea perperam evangelizabatur, perperam credebatur.*

ihrer Lehre gerügt worden.[119] Diese Rüge, so betont Tertullian, bezieht sich jedoch auf den Lebenswandel, nl. den Umgang mit den Juden, an dem Paulus als ein Jude, der sich gerade erst zum Christentum bekehrt hat, Anstoss nimmt, obwohl er selbst später allen alles wurde, auch den Juden ein Jude. Die Rüge bezieht sich nicht auf die Einheit der Lehre, die die Apostel gerade mit Handschlag bekräftigten. Die falschen Brüder, die Paulus im Brief an die Galater bekämpft, weil sie die Galater einem anderen Evangelium zuführen wollen, verkündigen nicht das Evangelium eines anderen Gottes und eines anderen Christus, sondern wollen das Evangelium mit jüdischen Zeremonien verbinden. Diese Zeremonien waren jedoch schon früher vom Schöpfer durch seine Propheten ausgeschlossen worden, als er seinen neuen Bund verhiess. Der Apostel betrachtet diejenigen als falsche Brüder, die das Evangelium Christi von dem bereits vom Schöpfer angekündigten Neuen abführen wollen und zu etwas altem hinführen wollen, während dieses Alte bereits vom Schöpfer verworfen war. Hier gibt Tertullian sich offenbar grosse Mühe zu zeigen, der neue Bund liege in der Verlängerung des alten und sei deshalb nicht plötzlich neu.[120] Ähnliches führt auch Irenäus aus.[121]

Wenn, so fährt Tertullian fort,[122] der Apostel einen neuen Gott verkündigen will, weshalb macht er dann keine Vorschriften über den neuen Gott, sondern nur über das alte Gesetz, aus welchem anderen Grund als weil das Gesetz des Schöpfers weichen musste, während der Glaube an den Schöpfer bestehen blieb? Wenn ein neuer Gott von Paulus verkündigt würde, dann wäre jegliche Diskussion über das Halten des Gesetzes überflüssig, da der neue Gott jeglicher Erwähnung des Gesetzes den Boden entzogen hätte. Die Diskussion bezog sich nicht auf den Schöpfergott, sondern auf den Lebenswandel im Zusammenhang mit dem Gesetz. – Wenn die Glaubensregel nach der apostolischen Zeit eine

[119] *Adv. Marc.* 1,20,3–4. Tertullian behandelt dieses Thema ausführlicher in *De praescr. haer.* 23f.

[120] Ausführlicher äussert Tertullian sich hierzu in *Adv. Marc.* 3,2–4. Siehe z.B. 3,2,3: *Atquin nihil putem a deo subitum, quia nihil a deo dispositum.* Tertullian benötigt diesen und ähnliche Gedanken um auszuschliessen, dass im Laufe der Geschichte Unvorhergesehenes geschieht, da das die Möglichkeit des von ihm bekämpften *novus deus* der Marcioniter einschliessen könnte. Vielleicht führt dieser Gedanke ihn auch zu der öfters aufgestellten (sich auf I. *Cor.* 11,19 stützenden) These, die Häresien seien im Neuen Testament bereits vorhergesagt worden, siehe die von J.H.Waszink in seiner Edition von *De anima*, S.114 gesammelten Stellen. Dann sind nicht einmal die Häresien etwas unvorhergesehenes.

[121] Siehe hierzu E.P.Meijering, *God Being History*, 60ff.

[122] *Adv. Marc.* 1,21.

Fälschung erlitten hat, so war das offenbar in der apostolischen Zeit selbst nicht der Fall, und dann kann keine andere Überlieferung der Apostel anerkannt werden als die sich heute in den apostolischen Kirchen findet. In diesen Kirchen findet sich jedoch der Glaube an den Schöpfer. Folglich ist der neue Gott von Marcion erdacht worden. Ein Gott kann aber nicht von den Sinnen eines Menschen erdacht werden, es sei denn dieser Mensch ist ein Prophet, d.h. nicht bei seinen (eigenen) Sinnen. Wenn Marcion ein Prophet genannt werden kann, dann muss das bewiesen werden.[123]

Tertullian wendet sich nunmehr[124] einer Untersuchung des Gottes Marcions zu und der Frage, in welcher Hinsicht er gegenüber dem Schöpfer den Vorzug geniesst. Zur Untersuchung der Güte Gottes (Marcion stellt seinen Gott als den guten Gott dar)[125] sind gewisse Regeln nötig. Erst will Tertullian jedoch diese Güte finden. Zunächst greift er auf sein bereits vorgebrachtes Argument[126] zurück, die Güte Gottes hätte sich von Anfang an erweisen sollen, da Tod, Sünde und Teufel sich bereits manifestiert hatten, denn die Güte Gottes muss dieser ersten Regel entsprechen, dass sie zu Hilfe kommen muss sobald ein Grund dafür da ist. Nur dann kann sie sich als natürliche Güte erweisen, denn bei Gott müssen alle Eigenschaften natürlich und ungeworden sein, um ewig zu sein, damit sie nicht als zufällig und nur zeitlich betrachtet werden.[127] Da die Güte Gottes seine natürliche Güte ist, kann nicht sein, dass Gott seine Güte eine Zeit lang nicht ausüben konnte oder wollte (die Natur kann sich selbst ja nicht nicht wollen und das Nichtkönnen ist Gottes unwürdig).[128] Wenn er seine Güte nicht ausüben wollte, so grenzt das an Böswilligkeit. Was ist bösartiger als nicht helfen wollen, wenn man es

[123] Zu diesem Satz und dem möglichen Zusammenhang mit der Stellung des Tertullian zum Montanismus siehe E. Evans, *Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem, Edited and translated*, O.E.C.T. (Oxford 1972) XVIII.

[124] *Adv. Marc.* 1,22.

[125] *Adv. Marc.* 1,17,1.

[126] *Adv. Marc.* 1,17,3, vgl. *supra* 100.

[127] Im Verlaufe dieses Kapitels erläutert Tertullian diesen Satz näher dahin, dass anfangende Güte auch enden könne, *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,7: *nam et a primordio non fuit et in finem sine dubio non erit. Potest enim et non esse quandoque, sicut non fuit aliquando.* – Auch Albin und Origenes betonen, Gott dürfe keine akzidentellen (nicht wesentlichen) Eigenschaften haben, siehe *Epitome* 10,4: οὐδὲ συμβέβηκέ τι αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ πρώτῳ νῷ); *De princ.* 1,2,10: *hoc quod accidit etiam decidere potest*; vgl. 1,5,5; 1,6,2; 1,8,3. Zur Bedeutung dieses Gedankens bei Athanasius siehe E.P. Meijering, *Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius*, 66ff.

[128] Hier wird ein früherer Gedankengang wieder aufgenommen, nl. *Adv. Marc.* 1,11,6ff, siehe *supra* 95f.

kann? Die ganze Anklage, die die Marcioniter gegen den Schöpfer erheben, muss gegen ihren eigenen Gott erhoben werden, da dieser die Raserei des Schöpfers unterstützt, indem er den Erweis seiner Güte hinausschiebt. Wer die Macht hat etwas zu verhindern, dem kann die Schuld gegeben werden, wenn es doch geschieht.[129] Was soll man von einem Arzt denken, der die Krankheit verschlimmert indem er Hilfe hinausschiebt, um sie später um so teurer und ruhmreicher genesen zu können?[130]

Als weitere notwendige Regel für die Güte Gottes führt Tertullian an, diese Güte müsse rationell sein, da es keine irrationelle Güte Gottes geben könne.[131] Tertullian verwirft (hier ein Argument des Irenäus aufnehmend) die Rationalität des Gottes Marcions allein schon deshalb, weil er sich um das Heil eines Menschen kümmert, der einem anderen gehört.[132] Tertullian ist sich dessen bewusst, dass die Marcioniter erwidern werden, dass die ursprüngliche und vollkommene Güte sich darin zeige, dass sie ohne verwandtschaftliche Verpflichtungen freiwillig Fremden erwiesen wird, konform dem Gebote, wir wollten auch unsere Feinde lieben (zu denen die Fremden gehören). Tertullian erwidert, dass der Gott Marcions, da er sich von Anfang an nicht um den ihm von Anfang an fremden Menschen gekümmert habe, damit zeige, dass er nichts mit

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[129] *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,8: *Nam in cuius manu est quid ne fiat eius iam deputatur cum fit.* Diese These steht übrigens in klarem Gegensatz zu den Ausführungen in *Adv. Marc.* 2,5ff, in denen Tertullian das Gegenargument der Gnostiker zu widerlegen versucht, das lautet: *Si deus bonus et praescius futuri et avertendi mali potens, cur hominem ... passus est labi deo obsequio legis in mortem circumventum a diabolo* (*Adv. Marc.* 2,5,1). Zu einer ähnlichen Inkonsequenz bei Irenäus siehe E. P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 33ff und 64ff.

[130] Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang interessant, dass Cyrill von Alexandrien das Beispiel des Arztes gebraucht, um gerade das Gegenteil zu beweisen: ein guter Arzt wartet bis die Krankheit ihren Höhepunkt erreicht hat, um sie dann leichter heilen zu können, so wartet auch Gott bis die Sünde ihren Höhepunkt erreicht hat, siehe *Adversus Anthropomorphitas* 24. Zu *Adv. Marc.* 1,22,10 vgl. *supra* Fussnote 114.

[131] *Adv. Marc.* 1,23. Es ist klar, dass Tertullian hier einen stoischen Gedanken aufnimmt. Zur Rationalität der stoischen Gottheit siehe E. Zeller, *op. cit.*, 141ff. Siehe auch Tertullian, *De fuga* 4,1–2, ins besondere den Satz: *Quid enim divinum non rationale? ⟨Quid rationale⟩ non bonum? Quid bonum non divinum?*

[132] Siehe Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,51,1: *Quemadmodum bonus erit, qui alienos homines abstrahit ab eo qui fecit, et ad suum advocat regnum?* Auf diese Parallele bei Irenäus weist schon G. Quispel hin, *op. cit.*, 23; siehe ferner Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 5,2,1: *vani autem et qui in aliena dicunt Deum venisse velut aliena concupiscentem, uti eum hominem qui ab altero factus esset exhiberet eo Deo, qui neque fecisset, neque condisset*, und 5,17,1: *Aut quomodo iustus qui aliena rapit?* A. Bill, *op. cit.*, 80 weist auch auf Origenes, *Contra Celsum* 6,53 hin, wo Origenes dem Celsus vorwirft, er führe als Argument gegen das ganze Christentum an, was die Christen gegen Marcion als Argument anführen, nl. Gott proklamiere sich als der Vater von ihm fremden Kindern.

ihm zu tun haben wolle. Ausserdem gehe dem Gebot, den Feind und den Fremden zu lieben, das (von Christus bestätigte) Gebot des Schöpfers voran, den Nächsten wie sich selbst zu lieben. Die Forderung der nicht verpflichteten Güte ist eine Betonung der verpflichteten Güte. Die Güte zu dem Eigenen ist die primäre, die Güte zu dem Fremden ist die sekundäre, wie kann dann die sekundäre Güte dem zugeschrieben werden, dem die primäre fehlt, da er ja keinen eigenen Menschen hat?[133] Es kann keine rationelle Sache ausserhalb einer Ordnung geben, noch weniger kann die Vernunft in einer Sache die Ordnung verlieren. Angenommen, es gebe eine rationelle Güte, die als eine sekundäre beginne, nl. als Güte zu dem Fremden, dann kann die in anderer Weise widerlegt werden: die sekundäre Güte kann nur rationell sein, wenn sie gerecht ist. Was aber ist ungerechter als einem Sklaven wohltun, um ihn damit seinem Herrn zu entnehmen, während er sich noch im Hause seines Herrn befindet und von dessen Vorräten lebt? Genau das macht der Gott Marcions indem er in die Welt eines anderen einbricht. Wenn rationelle Güte so etwas macht, was würde dann die irrationelle Güte machen? Wie kann man in der Welt des Schöpfers einem anderen Gott dienen? Wie kann der andere Gott so gut sein, dass der Mensch durch ihn sündig (gegenüber dem Schöpfer) wird, wie kann er so gnädig sein, dass er den Schöpfer und Herrn des Menschen erzürnt macht?

Gott muss nicht nur ewig rationell, sondern auch in jeder Hinsicht vollkommen sein, fährt Tertullian fort.[134] Die Güte des Gottes Marcions ist aber nicht vollkommen, da sie nicht allen Menschen erwiesen wird, die Mehrzahl der Menschen geht ja verloren.[135] Güte ist die Aktivität Gottes, die Menschen errettet, Böswilligkeit ist die Aktivität, die Menschen nicht errettet. Da mehr Menschen nicht errettet werden als wohl

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[133] Vgl. hierzu Tertullians Bemerkung in *Apol.* 9,4: *Cum propriis filiis Saturnus non pepercit, extraneis utique non parcendo perseverabat*, und *Ad Scap.* 1,3: *Ita enim disciplina iubemur diligere inimicos quoque et orare pro iis qui nos persequuntur, ut haec sit perfecta et propria bonitas nostra, non communis. Amicos enim diligere omnium est, inimicos autem solorum Christianorum.* – Dass die vom Schöpfer gebotene Nächstenliebe von Jesus bestätigt wird, betont auch Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,22,2. Ferner sagt auch Irenäus, das Gebot der Feindesliebe sei eine Ausdehnung des Gebotes der Nächstenliebe, *Adv. Haer.* 4,24,2.

[134] *Adv. Marc.* 1,24. Zu den Eigenschaften *aeternitas, ratio* und *perfectio* weist A. Bill, *op. cit.*, 82f als Parallele auf Chrysipps Definition Gottes hin: θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀθάνατον, λογικόν, τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ (*S.V.F.* II 1021).

[135] E. Evans, *op. cit.*, 65, Fussnote 1 weist mit Recht auf Irenäus *Adv. Haer.* 4,51,1 hin: *et quare bonitas eius deficit, non omnes salvans?* Vgl. G. Quispel, *op. cit.*, 23.

errettet werden, ist also die Böswilligkeit des Gottes Marcions grösser als seine Güte. Dem Schöpfergott kann man diesen Vorwurf nicht machen, da er ja der Richter ist, der seine Güte verteilt, nicht ausgiesst. – Ferner beweist die Tatsache, dass die Erretteten nur zur Hälfte errettet werden, nl. nur ihre Seele und nicht ihr Körper, dass die Güte des Gottes Marcions nicht vollkommen ist. Es ist jedoch nicht recht und billig, dass nur die Seele errettet wird, da der Leib der Diener der Seele ist, und deshalb die Seele mehr verantwortlich für die Sünde ist als der Leib; der unschuldigere Teil des Menschen geht dann verloren.[136] Ferner zeigt sich die Unvollkommenheit der Güte des Gottes Marcions darin, dass der Mensch, nachdem er zum Glauben an ihn befreit worden ist, nicht sofort dem Wirkungsbereich des bösen Schöpfers entrissen wird. Aber auch die Marcioniter leiden noch unter Krankheit, Krieg, Ungetieren usw. Der vollkommen gute Gott sollte nicht erst in der Zukunft, sondern schon jetzt davon befreien. Hier nimmt Tertullian die bereits von den Marcionitern vorgebrachten Argumente gegen den Schöpfer auf.[137] Er schirmt seinen eigenen Glauben klar ab indem er erklärt, er stehe in einem Verhältnis zu dem Schöpfer, Richter und beleidigten Herrscher des Menschengeschlechts. Hiermit rechtfertigt Tertulian, dass er in der Welt des Schöpfers von Übeln geplagt wird. Die Marcioniter hingegen verkündigen einen nur guten Gott. Man kann aber nicht die vollkommene Güte eines Gottes beweisen, von dem man nicht vollkommen frei gemacht wird.

Tertullian wendet sich nunmehr der Frage zu,[138] ob die Marcioniter Recht haben, wenn sie Gott nur gut nennen wollen und alle anderen Gefühle und Affekte, die Tertullian als des Schöpfers würdig betrachtet, in ihrem Gott abstreiten.[139] Tertullian beschuldigt Marcion, dass er dem Gott Epikurs den Namen Christus gibt,[140] indem er nl. den Satz des

[136] Vgl. hierzu *De res. mort.* 15,6–8; 16,1–4. Zum Verhältnis Seele–Leib vgl. Irenäus, *Adv. Haer.* 2,53: *anima possidet et principatur corpori ... corpus enim organo simile est, anima autem artificis rationem obtinet.* – Tertullians Ausführungen in *Adv. Marc.* 1,24,5 zur Erschaffung des körperlichen Menschen und dem Anhauch Gottes, durch den die Seele entsteht, können am besten zusammen mit den ausserordentlich schwierigen Ausführungen in *Adv. Marc.* 2,9 analysiert werden.

[137] Siehe *Adv. Marc.* 1,13–14, *supra* 96 f.

[138] *Adv. Marc.* 1,25,2ff.

[139] Es sollte nicht übersehen werden, dass auch Christen, an deren Rechtgläubigkeit Tertullian nicht gezweifelt haben wird, die Affektlosigkeit Gottes betont haben, z.B. Aristides, *Apologia* 1: Λέγω εἶναι θεὸν ... ἀνώτερον πάντων τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἐλαττωμάτων, ὀργῆς τε καὶ λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν; siehe ferner *Apol.* 7,3. Siehe zu diesem Thema M. Pohlenz, *Vom Zorne Gottes* (Göttingen 1909).

[140] In *De praescr. haer.* 7,3 und 30,1 führt Tertullian Marcions Lehre auf die Stoa zurück. In seiner Schrift gegen Marcion spielt seine Behauptung, Marcion beziehe

Epikur auf seinen Gott anwendet, nl. dass das glückselige und unverwesliche Wesen weder sich selbst noch anderen Mühsal verursacht.[141] Tertullian entgegnet, Marcion solle dann konsequent sein und seinen Gott für völlig bewegungslos erklären, das tue er jedoch nicht, weil er seinem Gott den Heilswillen zuschreibt. Tertullian will offenbar sagen, dass Marcion in seiner epikuräischen Theologie nicht konsequent ist. Tatsächlich erklärt Epikur, dass Gott, wenn ihm der Zorn fremd ist, auch keine Gunst anderen erweisen kann.[142] Allein schon die Tatsache, dass Gott nach so langer Zeit von Ruhe das Gefühl bekam um den Menschen zu erretten, beweist, dass er dem Impuls eines neuen Willens erlegen ist, und damit auch anderen Gefühlsregungen. Der Wille findet seinen Antrieb in der Begierde, denn man will, was man begehrt.[143] Ausserdem besorgt Gott, indem er das Heil des Menschen will, es begehrt und dafür sorgt, sich selbst und anderen Mühsal. Gott schafft sich dabei einen Gegner, nl. die Sünde oder den Tod, und vor allem den Schöpfergott. In diesem Kampf benötigt man seine Diener, als da sind Zorn, Uneinigkeit, Hass, Verachtung, Entrüstung usw. Im Kampf um die Befreiung des Menschen benötigt der gute Gott alle diese Gehilfen, d.h. solche Gefühle und Affekte, – hätte er sie nicht, dann wäre seine Güte schon deshalb irrationell, weil sie die Gefühle und Affekte nicht hat die sie haben muss.

Der Rahmen dieses Aufsatzes erfordert, dass wir unsere Bemerkungen zur Polemik Tertullians gegen Marcion hier abbrechen. Die Analyse der

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seine Gedanken von Epikur, eine wichtige Rolle, siehe ausser 1,25 auch 2,16,2; 4,15,2. In 5,19,7 bringt er Marcions Lehre mit Epikur und der Stoa in Zusammenhang.

141 *Adv. Marc.* 1,25,3: *quod beatum et incorruptibile sit neque sibi neque alii molestias praestat.* Dieser Satz des Epikur findet zich z.B. bei Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1,17,30. In *Apol.* 47,6 äussert sich Tertullian in folgender Weise zu dem Gotte Epikurs: *otiosum et inexercitum, et ut ita dixerim, neminem rebus humanis.* Siehe als weitere Parallelen die von E. Evans, *op. cit.*, 71, Fussnote 1 gesammelten Stellen.

142 Siehe Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 1,16,43; Laktanz, *De ira dei* 4,1; 4,11; 15,5 und 15,6: *Si est in deo laetitiae adfectus ad gratiam et odii ad iram necesse est habeat et timorem et libidinem et cupiditatem ceterosque adfectus qui sunt imbecillitatis humanae.*

143 *Adv. Marc.* 1,25,4: *Quae autem voluntas sine concupiscentiae stimulo est? Quis volet quod non concupiscet?* Vgl. Irenäus, *Fragm.* 5 (ed. Harvey): θέλησίς ἐστι νοῦς ὀρεκτικός, καὶ διανοητικὴ ὄρεξις, πρὸς τὸ θεληθὲν ἐπινεύουσα, vgl. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* 3,3,1113a 9–13; ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν. Siehe hierzu K. A. Neuhausen, *De voluntarii notione platonica et aristotelea* (Wiesbaden 1967), 120f. – Nach Irenäus *Adv. Haer.* 1,25,1 schreibt Marcion dem Schöpfergott *concupiscentia* zu, wenn er ihn *bellorum concupiscentem* nennt. – Zum Begriff der *nova voluntas* bei Augustin und in der platonischen Tradition vgl. E. P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 136ff.

Ausführungen Tertullians kann und muss noch vertieft werden. Als vorläufiger Schluss kann bereits gezogen werden, dass auch auf seine Polemik gegen Marcion zutrifft, was bereits von seiner übrigen Polemik festgestellt worden ist: die zwar nicht tiefsinnige, aber wohl scharfsinnige Beweisführung des Tertullian verdankt vieles dem christlichen Schrifttum aus dem zweiten Jahrhundert (vor allem dem etwas weniger scharfsinnigen aber auch etwas tiefsinnigeren Irenäus) und der heidnischen Philosophie.

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THE MIRROR AND I COR. 13,12 IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

BY

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It is well known that the epistemology of Clement of Alexandria has a strong Neoplatonist flavour, in that it stresses the need for a transcendent and extra-corporeal vision of the divine. However, unlike Plotinus, Clement uses the language of gnosticism to convey the fundamental aspects of his theory of knowledge. Again unlike Plotinus, and unlike Irenaeus, the first great Christian adversary of the gnostics, Clement's own polemic against gnostic speculation is mitigated by a genuine interest in this particular branch of heterodox Christianity: he even chooses to build his own theology around its key term, γνῶσις. On the level of terminology this marks a clear break with earlier representatives of Christian thought, such as Paul, for whom the idea of πίστις was the cornerstone of religious epistemology. Statistically speaking γνῶσις is a minor term in Pauline vocabulary, whereas a glance at Stählin's index[1] shows it to be the principal technical term used by Clement.

Clement's gnosis can of course be considered in two ways: as a body of esoteric teachings, or as a manner of grasping the deity. Clement may well have envisaged a detailed system of gnostic teaching, as is suggested by Daniélou,[2] but it is certain that the term designates a certain kind of approach to God. The true gnostic is destined to become a celestial creature, to gaze upon God face to face and to enter into a form of ontological union with this highest form of reality. Subjection to the body and to its imperatives was to be overcome in order to free the mind from the shackles which would mar its perception of supra-terrestrial reality. Accordingly ordinary human concepts are considered inadequate

[1] Vol. iv of the edition in the series *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller* (Leipzig 1905–36) by O. Stählin. Quotations are based on this edition (vol. ii revised by L. Früchtel).

[2] J. Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux ii^e et iii^e siècles* (Tournai 1961) 416.

and even misleading, since the nature of God is totally other: his "otherness" implies his ineffability and incomprehensibility. Negative theology replaces cataphatic, or propositional, theology. Within this perspective, the ethical side of early Jewish Christianity is lost within a general epistemological approach to religion, since the flesh and sins of the flesh are simply considered to be impediments to the ἐποπτεία, or the mystic contemplation of the divine. The Stoic ideal of impassivity (ἀπάθεια) is pressed into the service of a theory of knowledge; he who is free from the passions is more alive to the appreciation of higher forms of existence.

Between these two extremes lies the possibility of an intermediate or preparatory form of knowledge, and in fact Clement did accept the need for props in the course of the soul's pilgrimage. I have shown elesewhere[3] that he looked to secular culture for certain insights, and of course the catechetical teaching of the early church fell into this category of initial intellectual training. This partial apprehension of true reality is often expressed by Clement through the image of the mirror, in most cases by means of an interpretation of 1 *Cor.* 13,12: βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον.

The mirror was a frequently used instrument of divination in Hellenistic culture: Clement himself condemns it at one point, together with a number of other objects (dice, ball, hoop, apples, top, and a tuft of wool) as an element of pagan divination rites.[4] To this passage may be added a number of others collected by Netoliczka in Pauly-Wissowa,[5] Reitzenstein,[6] Dupont,[7] Hugedé[8] and others. A good example of such practices may be found in a text of Zosimus[9] dating from the early fourth century and describing a special metal based on a compound of silver and gold, supposedly invented by Alexander and used by him for the fabrication of mirrors which possessed certain magical properties: such mirrors could deflect lightning, protect from demons, and had the power to transform

[3] *Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d'Alexandrie* (Leiden 1973); cf. S. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria* (Oxford 1971) 9–60.

[4] *Protrepticus* 2,18,1.

[5] *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, herausgegeben von G. Wissowa (Stuttgart 1893 sq.) art. κάτοπτρον.

[6] *Historia Monachorum und Historia Lausiaca* (Berlin 1916) 251 (see 242–255).

[7] J. Dupont, *Gnosis. La connaissance religieuse dans les Epîtres de Saint Paul* (Louvain/Paris 1949) 121 ff.

[8] N. Hugedé, *La métaphore du miroir dans les Epîtres de Saint Paul aux Corinthiens* (Neuchâtel/Paris 1957) 49–88.

[9] Syriac text translated by Berthelot, *La chimie au moyen âge*, ii (Paris 1893) 260–266.

the image of the person using them.[10] The end of the passage refers to certain Jewish practices involving mirrors and associated with the name of Solomon.

It is clear however that these primitive magical uses constitute only one aspect of the significance of the mirror in late antiquity: a form of allegorical interpretation employed the image of the mirror to describe certain forms of self-knowledge, and even of knowledge of extra-terrestrial realities. Zosimus himself gives an allegorical interpretation of the function of the mirror,[11] considering it as a sort of divine being which reveals to the soul all those faults and impurities which require purification. In his letter to Marcella, Porphyry[12] compares our knowledge of God to contemplation in a mirror, and the fundamental text in the Platonic tradition is *Alcibiades* I, 133a ff.[13]

Paul's use of the image in I *Cor.* 13,12 ("through a glass, darkly") undoubtedly reflects this tendency to use the idea of the mirror on a secondary allegorical level, particularly as an illustration in epistemological contexts. Paul is often the centre of a controversy over the relative importance of Jewish/Christian, or Hellenistic sources, and this particular verse has only added fuel to the controversy: however it seems clear that he is here using to his own ends an image with which a Hellenistic community (that of Corinth) would be familiar. The cultural background of those for whom the letter was intended must be taken into account, since Paul is always sensitive to the need for apologetics. Further, his use of such a multi-purpose image need not imply a specific reference to Hellenistic magic, nor indeed any specifically Hellenistic interpretation of the idea in question. All that is meant is that in contrast to the perfect eschatological seeing ("face to face") man's present understanding is prophetic, i.e. achieved through intermediate rather than direct means.[14]

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[10] See also Apuleius, *Apologia* 42,6; Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 2,10.

[11] Berthelot, *op.cit.*, 262.

[12] Ch.13.

[13] See J.Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971) 192f. Pépin notes a comparison between this text and Clement, *Strom.*1,19,94,3–5 (examined below).

[14] Harnack (Das hohe Lied des Apostels Paulus von der *Liebe* ... (1 Kor.13), *Sitzungber. Akad. Berlin, Philol.-hist. Kl.*, 1911,i,132–173) followed by Kittel (*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, s.v. αἴνιγμα) suggests a Jewish background for I *Cor.* 13,12. In *Numbers* 12,8 Yahweh declares that he will speak to Moses "mouth to mouth, clearly (ἐν εἴδει LXX) and not in enigmas". A slight change in the vocalisation of the hebrew word rendered by εἶδος in Greek gives the sense "mirror" or "window",

Dupont rightly concludes[15] that the idea of vision in a mirror, and particularly the vision of God in a mirror, had become a common-place in the time of Paul, losing any specific Platonic or Stoic sense.

Clement himself discusses mirrors on a number of occasions and most frequently in relation to the imagery of I *Cor.* 13,12. Other references state that the mirror bears no grudge towards the ugly man simply because it shows him as he is;[16] that men who deck themselves out before mirrors are no better than women (*Paed.* 3,3,17,3); that very costly sets of mirrors are to be shunned as vain luxuries (*Paed.* 3,2,11,2; cf. *Paed.* 3,4,26,3; *Paed.* 3,2,11,3). The text of I *Cor.* 13,12 ("For now we see in a mirror, in enigma (i.e. prophetically), but then face to face") is one which Clement was particularly ready to quote to illustrate his idea of religious epistemology. A more detailed study on the use of Paul by Clement remains to be carried out, but it is clear that he tends to seize on Pauline texts involving the term γνῶσις (this is particularly true of the passage I *Cor.* 2,5–15).

One characteristic of Clement's interpretation of I *Cor.* 13,12 is that the category of knowledge and that of ethics come together. "Numerous are the stakes and ditches of lust which hinder us, and the pits of wrath and anger which must be surpassed, and all the machinations we must avoid of those who plot against us – we who would no longer see the knowledge of God "in a mirror" " (*Strom.* 4,3,12,2). As is generally true in Alexandrian theology, the notion of the flesh and its passions is seen in an epistemological context: indulging the flesh is a crime against one's ability to *know*, rather than against some moral code. A similar subtle confusion of the moral and the epistemological dimension occurs in *Strom.* 6,12,102,2, where it is said that the gnostic will be initiated into

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and this change was effected in rabbinic interpretation (see Harnack; Kittel, *ibid.*; H. Achelis, Katoptromantie bei Paulus, in: *Theologische Festschrift für N. Bonwetsch* [1918] 62; J. Dupont, *Gnosis* ..., 115; N. Hugedé, *La métaphore du miroir* ..., 39ff.). This suggestion does not however stand up to examination: (i) the mirror vision of God in the reinterpretation of *Numbers* 12,8 is supposed to represent direct contact, whereas in Paul it represents a lesser form of knowledge; (ii) the mirror vision of *Num.* 12,8 is said *not* to be enigmatic, whereas that of Paul is said to be ἐν αἰνίγματι.

The term αἴνιγμα is to be taken in a loose sense (see Kittel, *op. cit.*, and Appendix ii in my *Connaissance religieuse* ...): it comes to mean sign, or symbol rather than enigma in the strict sense.

[15] *Op. cit.*, 133.

[16] *Protrept.* 2,18,1. Exactly the same sentiment, together with the extension of the idea to the doctor who tells his patient the dismal truth, may be found in Epictetus, *Diss.* 2,14,21.

the face to face vision of God after purification by the knowledge which comes from the Son. This passage contains a remarkable demonstration of Clement's eclecticism: in the first place *Matt.* 5,8 (μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται) is associated with I *Cor.* 13,12:[17] Thus the idea of purity of heart is made to interpret Paul's idea of true γνῶσις, that of seeing face to face. However further on the term μυῶ indicates the presence of imagery borrowed from the mysteries: the gnostic is *initiated* into the face to face vision. Accordingly one may read another level of meaning into the καθαρός of *Matt.* 5,8, since Clement surely intends to recall the preliminary purification required for initiation (see note 18). A similar passage may be found in *Strom.* 7,10,57,1 where the same combination of *Matt.* 5,8, I *Cor.* 13,12 and a certain use of mystery language may be found. The gnostic is said to traverse the mystic peaks (or levels, τὰς προκοπὰς τὰς μυστικὰς) until he reaches perfect rest, where he who is pure in heart may contemplate (ἐποπτεύειν) God face to face with knowledge and understanding (ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ καταληπτικῶς). The latter term may be understood in relation to *Strom.* 6,5,39,3 where God is said to be ἀκατάληπτος to the human being in his untranslated state.

The same mystery vocabulary may be found in *Strom.* 7,11,68,4, where the ultimate reward of the pure (καθαρά) gnostic soul is said to be the contemplation (ἐποπτείαν) of God face to face. The idea of a confrontation with God "face to face" is virtually obliterated by that of the ontological unity of the gnostic and his creator: the gnostic is the friend, lover and son of God, but this relationship culminates in oneness (*Strom.* 7,11,68,2). Similarly in *Strom.* 7,3,13,1, the pure in heart attain "the transcendently clear and absolutely pure and insatiable vision" (ἐναργῆ δὲ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἀκόρεστον ... θέαν),[18] going beyond all of the "holy ranks" (ἁγίας τάξεως) which were distributed as abodes for the gods, embracing the divine vision not *in or through*

[17] This is frequently the case with Clement's exegesis of I *Cor.* 13,12: see also *Strom.* 7,10,57,1; *Strom.* 7,3,13,1; *Strom.* 5,1,7,5; *Strom.* 5,6,40,1.

[18] εἰλικρινῆ has Platonic connotations: see *Phaedo* 66a, 81c, 67b; *Phileb.* 52d. In particular *Phaedo* 66a, on the knowledge of reality, is very close: ... εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων etc. In addition it should be noted that the idea of purity of heart is also familiar in Plato (*Phaedo* 67b: μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ): it is likely that this did not escape the eclectic sensibility of Clement in his use of *Matt.* 5,8. The term ἐναργῆ may have a technical Epicurean sense: see my *Connaissance religieuse* ..., Appendix I.

mirrors (ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ διὰ κατόπτρων).[19]

At one point the face to face confrontation with God is seen as the "unspeakable heritage" of the gnostic and is coupled with I *Cor.* 2,9: ἣν ὀφθαλμὸς οὐκ εἶδεν καὶ οὖς οὐκ ἤκουσεν καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίαν ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἀνέβη. This combination underlines the strong eschatological character of the gnostic's vision in the thought of Clement, and in fact I *Cor.* 2,9 is often used to describe the ultimate reward.[20] The term heritage (κληρονομία) recalls of course the New Testament theme of the inheritance (i.e. salvation[21]) and it is clear that Clement, like the gnostics, envisaged a two-fold form of eschatology: the first for those whose special capacity enabled them to attain the vision of God while still in the flesh (realised eschatology) and the second for those who were obliged to wait until they were removed from the flesh.

The same verse (I *Cor.* 13,12) is used, somewhat curiously, to demonstrate the principle of the *arcanum*, namely that the vision of reality is given to a privileged few. This typically Alexandrian notion of the hiddenness of the truth is associated with I *Cor.* 13,12 on at least two occasions: first in *Strom.* 5,1,7,5, where it is asserted that the truth is granted to a few only (ὀλίγοις), and that Plato also recognizes the principle of the elect by stating that only a handful attain knowledge of the divine during their terrestrial existence.[22] Secondly in *Paed.* 1,6,36,6 a distinction is drawn between those capable of eating meat and those as yet limited to milk (I *Cor.* 3,1–3): the more solid nourishment is the complete revelation "face to face", to be given to those capable of receiving it. One is again aware of the specifically Alexandrian form of Christianity which draws a distinction between the ordinary believer and those belonging to a form of spiritual aristocracy.

However some attention must now be paid to a number of passages which raise specifically epistemological questions. One text in particular is worth quoting in full: ναὶ μὴν κατ' ἔμφασιν ἀληθείας ἄλλοι θέλουσιν

[19] No particular significance can be attached to the variation in preposition. J. Behm (Das Bildwort vom Spiegel, I Kor. xiii, 12, in: *Festschrift R. Seeberg* [Leipzig 1929] i, 315–342) lists a number of different usages of the idea of the mirror, including (i) those which emphasize the clarity of the surface of the mirror, and hence of the image; (ii) those which illustrate the Socratic γνῶθι σαυτόν; (iii) and those which stress the uncertain or transient character of the mirror image. The prepositions διά, ἐν and even πρός are all common, and appear to be interchangeable.

[20] *Strom.* 4,22,135,3; *Strom.* 4,18,114,1; *Protr.* 10,94,4; *Quis dives* 23,3 etc.

[21] E.g. *Gal.* 3,18; *Col.* 3,24.

[22] *Epinomis* 973c.

εἰρῆσθαί τινα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις. ὁ μὲν οὖν θεσπέσιος ἀπόστολος ἐφ' ἡμῶν γράφει· "βλέπομεν γὰρ νῦν ὡς δι' ἐσόπτρου", κατ' ἀνάκλασιν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἑαυτοὺς γινώσκοντες κἀκ τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν θείου τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὡς οἷόν τε συνθεωροῦντες· "εἶδες γάρ", φησί, "τὸν ἀδελφόν σου, εἶδες τὸν θεόν σου." τὸν σωτῆρα οἶμαι θεὸν εἰρῆσθαι ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν· μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσιν "πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον", τότε ἤδη ὁριστικῶς καὶ καταληπτικῶς, ὅταν καθαρὰ ἡ καρδία γένηται.[23]

Clement is endeavouring to justify his sympathetic approach to secular culture: one view is that the philosophers have developed their theories by virtue of a "reflection of the truth" (κατ' ἔμφασιν ἀληθείας): this term can suggest the reflection of a mirror, although not necessarily so.[24] In this case however the immediate quotation of I *Cor.* 13,12 indicates that Clement's mind was working along these lines, comparing knowledge to the contemplation of a reflection in a mirror. W. Bousset[25] originally saw this passage as a condemnation of the validity of Greek philosophy but this judgment has been contested by Molland,[26] followed recently by Pépin.[27] It is certain that Clement intended to give a positive evaluation of ordinary human perception of God, perhaps even more positive than Molland suggests. In the first place he contends that the expression ἐφ' ἡμῶν applies not to believers but to human kind in general, thereby implying that knowledge "by mirrors" was universally available. This may or may not be the case: I see no way of closing the debate at this level. However certain other arguments may be used in support of Molland's point of view.

Firstly in 94,7 Clement explicitly admits the possibility of Greek philosophers being able to circumscribe (διορῶσι) God by means of "reflection" and "clear vision" (κατ' ἔμφασιν δὲ καὶ διάφασιν): this acceptance of the value of certain procedures of secular philosophers is further endorsed by the "we" (ὁρῶμεν) of the following sentence. The whole of mankind without distinction is eligible for this form of knowledge. That Clement considers the mirror in a positive light (Molland

[23] *Strom.* 1,19,94,3–6.

[24] ἔμφασις can often mean "significance", "expression" or "appearance", and in most cases Clement uses it in the former sense (*Strom.* 6,2,4,3; *Strom.* 5,5,29,4; *Paed.* 3,1,3,1; *Strom.* 5,14,116,3; *Strom.* 5,8,45,4; *Paed.* 1,8,71,2). Only in the following passages is the translation "reflection" possible: *Strom.* 1,19,94,7; *Strom.* 5,13,87,2.

[25] *Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (1915) 210.

[26] E. Molland, Clement of Alexandria on the origin of Greek Philosophy, *Symbolae Osloenses* 15–16 (1936) 57–85, see 65ff.

[27] J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971) 193.

himself seems somewhat dubious of this) is also suggested by the fact that his quotation of I *Cor.* 13,12 omits the words ἐν αἰνίγματι, thus diminishing the idea of obscurity. It has been suggested that these words do not in fact belong to the original text, but were initially a marginal note added by a scribe seeking to explain the expression δι' ἐσόπτρου.[28] However Clement himself used a Ms. containing the words ἐν αἰνίγματι, as indicated by *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 15,2, where the full version is given, although it is noteworthy that on four other occasions the verse is quoted without the words ἐν αἰνίγματι.[29] Such an omission can only indicate a desire on the part of Clement to give a more positive content to the idea of contemplation in a mirror.

However the precise form of knowledge thus provided is still to be defined. The next step in Clement's argument is that we know ourselves (ἑαυτοὺς γινώσκοντες) in it, contemplating the efficient cause (τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον) from that in us which is divine. The question here is two-fold: how does Clement define the efficient cause, and what in man does he consider to be divine? The efficient cause can only be God, on the basis of the definition given in *Strom.* 8,9,28,2 where the efficient cause of a statue is said to be the sculptor himself. One may compare this with Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140a4, where the efficient cause is associated with the quality of making (ποίησις) as distinct from doing (πρᾶξις), and is defined as the τέχνη which brings something into existence.[30] Closer to Clement, Athenagoras states that God is the efficient cause of the universe, and it would seem reasonable to interpret Clement in the same way.[31] Next, the expression "that in us which

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[28] E. Preuschen, Das Rätselwort im Spiegel I Kor. 13,12. *ZNW* 1 (1900) 180–1; J. Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das N.T., E. Meyer, V (Göttingen 1910) 319. Von Soden's edition of the New Testament (*Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, Göttingen 1913) gives ἐν αἰνίγματι without comment: that of Tischendorf (*Novum Testamentum Graece*) notes the omission in Clement's quotations, apart from *Excerpta* 15,2. But the full version is universally attested in Patristic sources as listed at the Centre d'Analyse et de Documentation Patristiques of the University of Strasbourg: the thesis of Preuschen and Weiss must be rejected (see Dupont, *Gnosis* ..., 135–137).

[29] *Paed.* 1,6,36,6; *Strom.* 1,19,94,4–6; *Strom.* 5,1,7,5; *Strom.* 5,11,74,1.

[30] It should be noted that Clement makes the efficient cause equivalent to the cause δι' ὅ (*Strom.* 8,9,27,2–3). The latter was usually considered to be the instrumental cause: the confusion of the primary and instrumental causes is condemned by Philo (*Quæst. in Gen.* 1,58). Later the cause δι' ὅ was to be reserved for the Son/Logos, thus leading to Arian subordinationism: see J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne* (Paris 1964) 348–355.

[31] *Supplicatio* 19,3.

is divine" is explained by the *agraphon*: "You have seen your brother, you have seen your God."[32] The *agraphon* is in turn interpreted as a reference to Christ (τὸν σωτῆρα οἶμαι θεὸν εἰρῆσθαι ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν).

It is clear that Clement is bringing into play a large number of ideas, and doing so as elliptically as possible, in accordance with his usual allusive manner of writing. The sequence of his thought is as follows: we may know ourselves by contemplating ourselves in a mirror; by self contemplation we are in fact contemplating the efficient cause in ourselves (among us?); that is, God. We are able to do this because of the fleshly presence of Christ as our "brother", i.e. as one of us. By contemplating ourselves, or one of our number in particular, the person Christ, we are in fact contemplating God.

The circle may be completed independently of Clement by reference to those texts which present Christ as a mirror, again in the same general context of catoptromancy,[33] whereby self contemplation in a mirror becomes a form of divination. That is, Christ is a mirror capable of providing much more than a mere reflection. The fundamental text may be found in the *Wisdom of Solomon* 7,26, where the hypostasis wisdom, later to become Christ, is said to be the immaculate image and mirror of the father. In the *Acta Johannis*[34] Christ claims to be a mirror to those who know him, and in the 13th *Ode of Solomon*[35] (1–4) Christ is described as the mirror by which one may contemplate one's real self. Undoubtedly behind this form of speculation lies the concept of the eye as mirror, based on the fact that one's own image is reflected in the eye of the person opposite. In this way one seemed to see oneself as through the eyes of another.[36] This would be particularly appropriate in the case of contemplation of Christ as mirror.

But the essential of this passage has been misunderstood to convey a conventional Platonic theme, whereby the contemplation of oneself led

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[32] Loosely referred to by Molland as a *gnome* (*op. cit.*, 65ff.). This *agraphon* occurs three times, twice in Clement (*Strom.* 2,15,70,5 and the passage under discussion), and once in Tertullian, *De orat.* 26. Cf. Resch, *Agrapha*, T.U. xxx, 3/4 (Leipzig 1906) 182; Ruwet, Les "agrapha" dans les œuvres de Clément d'Alexandrie, *Biblica* 30 (1949) 133–160, 141–2; F. Edgar Bruns, Biblical citations and the Agraphon in Pseudo-Cyprian's Liber de Montibus Sina et Sion, *Vigiliae Christianae* 26 (1972) 112–116.

[33] See M. Philonenko, *Joseph et Aséneth* (Leiden 1968) 193.

[34] 95–96 (M. Bonnet, *Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha* 1,2 [Darmstadt 1959] 198).

[35] See for example J. R. Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon* (Cambridge 1909).

[36] Cf. *Alcibiades I*, 133a: "And have you noticed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic in front of him, as in a mirror; and we call this the pupil, for in a sense it is an image of the person looking?"

to a knowledge of the divine, simply because the human being contained in himself an element of divinity.[37] According to the classical Neoplatonic interpretation of the γνῶθι σαυτόν, by contemplating one's own individual νοῦς, one could reach the contemplation of the highest νοῦς since they are in fact one. Thus the γνῶθι σαυτόν leads to a contemplation of νοῦς by νοῦς, in either an upwards or downwards direction (νοῦς contemplated by Νοῦς).[38] However Clement sidesteps this idea by making the divine element in us equivalent to Christ: thus the divinity of man is contained in one man in particular, representing the incarnation of divinity. We have here a christological interpretation of the idea of self-knowledge through a mirror, one which places full emphasis on the epistemological value of the incarnation.

Clement concludes in 94,6 that after the putting away of the flesh it will be possible to contemplate face to face, that is ὁριστικῶς and καταληπτικῶς. These terms signify that the mind will be able to grasp or circumscribe God, and contrast strangely with other statements by Clement that God is beyond definition of this kind,[39] in particular that he is ἀκατάληπτος.[40] One possible explanation may be that in this case Clement wished to give a christological interpretation to both parts of the verse, i.e. that *Christ* is to be contemplated face to face after the putting away of the flesh. In *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 11,3–12,1 Christ is referred to as the πρόσωπον of the Father (*Matt.* 18,10 is applied to the Son): a πρόσωπον can be embraced or bounded by the mind since it has a definite form – a σχῆμα (see *Excerpta* 15,2 quoted below). On this basis the words ὁριστικῶς and καταληπτικῶς become comprehensible, since Christ, as a delimited entity, does not transcend the limits of the mind (περιγεγραμμένα: *Excerpta* 11,2).

Another attempt to describe the future contemplation "face to face" in epistemological terms may be found in *Strom.* 5,11,74,1, where it is

[37] See J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu*, 192, who does not notice the christological interpretation of the brother in the *agraphon* "you have seen your brother, you have seen your God": A. Méhat, *Étude sur les "Stromates" de Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1966) 452–453. The expression τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον has indisputably Platonic overtones (see *Rep.* 589e, *Tim.* 90c), but the originality of Clement is to attach it to the person of Christ as representative of humanity.

[38] See Plotinus, *Enn.* 5,4,3,7: Julian, *Orat.* 6, 183a ff.; H. D. Betz, The Delphic Maxim ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ in Hermetic Interpretation, *Harvard Theological Review* 63 (1970) 465–484. Cf. also P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même de Socrate à saint Bernard*, I (Paris 1974).

[39] *Strom.* 2,2,6,1; 5,12,81,5; 5,12,78,3; 6,5,39,2.

[40] *Strom.* 6,5,39,3.

explained that this means κατὰ μόνας ἐκείνας τὰς ἀκραιφνεῖς καὶ ἀσωμάτους τῆς διανοίας ἐπιβολάς ("by those sole, pure and incorporeal contacts of the intellect"). In this case it can only be the contemplation of the supreme God that is envisaged: the senses can grasp sensible objects only; thus the apprehension of God must be purely "intellectual". Hence the emphasis on the pure and incorporeal perception of the intellect. The expression ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας is known to be a technical term of Epicurean epistemology. Diogenes Laertius[41] states that the followers of Epicurus spoke of the φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας as one of the criteria leading to certainty, and this is confirmed by Clement himself who uses the term ἐπιβολή to mean a contact of the mind with something certain.[42] Rist suggests that Epicurus treats the mind as one of the senses, thus envisaging a quasi-concrete encounter of the mind and the perceived entity:[43] hence the translation "contact" for ἐπιβολή. The idea of the mind encountering, or coming into contact with God is certainly appropriate to *Strom.* 5,11,74,1, where sensible perception, which can only function through sensible intermediaries such as the mirror, is distinguished from that of the mind, which can encounter or "touch" God.

We have here an excellent answer to the question of how Clement could have interpreted the expression πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον in relation to the transcendent God. The problem is broached in *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 15,2, where the text is unfortunately damaged, but which undoubtedly places the πρόσωπον in the category of circumscribed or defined entities, and states the principle that that which is circumscribed can only contemplate entities subject to the same limits: Σχῆμα μὲν οὖν σχήματι θεωρεῖται, καὶ πρόσωπον προσώπῳ, καὶ ἐπιγινώσκεται τὰ γνωρίσματα τοῖς σχήμασι καὶ ταὶς οὐσίαις. And in *Excerpta* 11,2 Clement poses the question of how God, who is formless, can be said to have a face, thereby raising the question of how such an entity can be apprehended.

It is at this point that the Epicurean notion of the contact of the intellect is useful to Clement, since it avoids the idea of knowledge by "apprehending", "grasping", "defining" or "embracing". Such a form of knowledge, conceived on the model of sense perception, is based on

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41 10,31.

42 *Strom.* 2,4,16,3.

43 *Epicurus: an Introduction* (Cambridge 1972) 32–37. Rist discusses the evidence provided by Clement's remarks on Epicurus (see note 42).

the idea of a simple contact or meeting between the intelligence and God, without the necessity of a process of reflection or definition.

In conclusion it can be said that Clement, in accordance with his general theology, combines ethical notions with epistemological in his interpretation of I *Cor.* 13,12. The possibility of seeing God "face to face" is open to the "pure in heart": purity of heart is interpreted as an escape from matter and from perception based on the senses. In conformity with Paul himself Clement sees this vision as the full, eschatological, inheritance. In respect of the first part of the verse, Clement often omits the words ἐν αἰνίγματι, although it is clear that he knew them to be part of the text: in this way the idea of the obscurity of the vision "in a mirror" is mitigated. It is considered as a legitimate and valid way of obtaining knowledge. The vision in a mirror is interpreted as a reference to the contemplation of one's fellow man, and this is extended to Christ himself, who is the πρόσωπον of the Father. When the expression πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον is used of the knowledge of the transcendent God himself, Clement employs the Epicurean notion of perception as contact, to avoid the idea that the mind reflects on, or "grasps" God.

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RHETORICAL METHOD IN ATHANASIUS

BY

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As far as I know, the influence of rhetoric on Athanasius has never been fully examined; so I have attempted this task in a short paper which leaves room for correction and further development. I shall not discuss the subject in all its aspects; for instance, I have nothing to say about style and diction; and I shall not consider the arrangement and division of the orator's material, which takes such a prominent place in ancient text-books on the rhetorical art. My principal concern will be with the methods of argument used by Athanasius, with what the ancient writers would call his πίστεις or proofs, since it is this part of the subject which bears most closely on the history of Christian doctrine and on dogmatic theology itself; by studying his methods of argument we can gain some useful insights into the validity or otherwise of his conclusions, and also into the reliability or otherwise of his judgements on other theologians, whether congenial to him, or opposed.

Our subject falls within the large and general question of Athanasius' knowledge of Greek culture; but I cannot discuss this now. One might instead raise the more limited question: what knowledge did Athanasius have of the rhetorical text-books? Here we have only internal evidence to help us; and the points I shall bring out will I hope prove suggestive; but let us first note that there is no real need to argue that Athanasius had read such text-books himself. I think it is by no means improbable that he had at least a nodding acquaintance with them; but the point is not of vital importance. The study of rhetoric had a pervasive influence on the Greek literature of late antiquity; in particular, it left clear traces on Christian authors whom we can be certain that Athanasius will have read; thus even if he made no formal study of rhetorical technique, a man of his intelligence will have absorbed a great deal, simply by imitation, from the writings of Irenaeus, Origen and Eusebius, to name only three; not forgetting the fact that a fair outline knowledge of the classical Greek philosophers could have been gained from an attentive study of such a work as Eusebius' *Praeparatio Evangelica.*

I shall divide my examination into three parts. In the first, I shall attempt to prove the general point by considering the kinds of argument that rhetorical theorists normally recommend, and exhibiting the parallels that I have found in Athanasius. In the second, I shall inspect some of Athanasius' arguments in greater detail, and on occasion consider the question of their validity. In the third, I shall revert to some more general points of rhetorical method, or what I might perhaps call rhetorical strategy, which are not to my knowledge discussed in the ancient manuals; here once again we come upon problems of validity which give our investigations some bearing on central questions of historical and dogmatic theology.

I

From the rhetorician's point of view, most writings on Christian doctrine belong to deliberative, rather than to forensic or to epideictic, oratory (to use Aristotle's division); they are not written for the law-courts, nor are they mere displays of virtuosity: yet in general they are not concerned with practical questions, except in the rather limited sense of what one ought to believe. Using a different division (taken from Aelius Theon of Alexandria) one might say that they are concerned with *theses*, general questions, rather than with *hypotheses*, questions about individual men and particular events; though the latter will be relevant, of course, where the life and death of Christ are in view. As an example of the *thesis* Theon gives the three questions εἰ γαμητέον, εἰ παιδοποιητέον, εἰ θεοί εἰσι: should one marry, should one beget children, do gods exist? – of which the first two are practical questions and the last theoretical, that is to say, a question of fact. Theon, therefore, would regard the major doctrinal works of Athanasius as dealing with theoretical *theses*.

What kinds of persuasion were considered appropriate in such cases? A writer in the Aristotelian tradition would take note of non-rational means of persuasion, namely the emotions one might arouse in ones hearers, and the impression one might convey of ones own character – in Aristotle's terminology, πάθη and ἤθη respectively. But let us set these aside for the moment, and consider the third and for him the most important method, that of argument.[1] What kinds of argument were normally recommended, and how were they applied? To take the second and less important question first: any given topic of argument could be

[1] *Rhet.* 1,2, 1356 a 1 ff. What we have called "argument" is further divided into "examples" and "enthymemes", 1356 b 1, the latter being arguments *sensu stricto*.

developed by reference to a list of *staseis*, a check-list of relevant factors not so very unlike Aristotle's own list of categories. The systems of *staseis* were very varied, but a typical example is the list of six given by Theon and also by Aphthonius, and again with minor variations by Hermogenes;[2] thus any given topic of argument, e.g. "this story is unconvincing", could be developed with reference to the person concerned, the action, the place, the time, the manner, and the matter or cause (πρόσωπον, πραχθέν, τόπος, χρόνος, τρόπος, αἰτία). Clement of Alexandria shows us how a scheme of this kind could be adapted for more general use; thus at *Paed.* 2,14,4 he argues that although all things have been created for the use of men, one should not use them all, or all the time; the disciple has to take account of the occasion, the time, the manner, and the relationship (καιρός, χρόνος, τρόπος, πρός τι); and at *Strom.* 2,137,3 he actually mentions the question εἰ γαμητέον and argues that one should not marry anyone at any time; rather, there is a time when, and a person whom, and an age at which it is right to marry; and one should consider the character of ones intended, and ones own motives. Athanasius himself shows traces of a similar list applied to the interpretation of Scripture, in *C. Ar.* 1,54 and 2,7 and *Decr.* 14; in difficult cases one should not quote Scripture at random, but should consider [τὸν] καιρὸν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα διόπερ ἔγραψε; which suggests that the rhetorical scheme may have come to him via some work of scriptural exegesis, very probably one of Origen's commentaries.

What then were the typical topics of argument? One might perhaps distinguish between the means employed and the points one tries to make. As to the former, Aphthonius gives us an example of how to handle a celebrated dictum, a χρεία; first, restate it in plain but not too commonplace terms (τὸ παραφραστικόν); next refer to the cause or reason for it (τὸ τῆς αἰτίας); then argue that the opposite suggestion is absurd (ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου); give an imaginative illustration (παραβολή) or actual examples (παραδείγματα); appeal to antiquity (μαρτυρία παλαίων) and round off with a summary (ἐπίλογος).[3] And as to the points one tries to make, one can again refer to Aphthonius, who on this subject is both entertaining and easily accessible in English, since his discussion has been incorporated (without due acknowledgement) into a little book by

[2] Theon in *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel (Leipzig 1854) II,94, cf. 78. Aphthonius, *ibid.* 22. Hermogenes, *ibid.* 16.

[3] *Prog.* 12,3; *op. cit.* 23–5.

J. G. Davies entitled *The Social Life of Early Christians.*[4] Aphthonius takes as his example the mythical tale of Apollo and Daphne, and suggests that one might impugn it by first inveighing against its originators, then narrate it (the ἔκθεσις), and then argue against it on the grounds of its obscurity, its impossibility, its impropriety, its inconsistency and its failure to conduce to moral improvement (ἐκ τοῦ ἀσαφοῦς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου, ἐκ τοῦ ἀπρεποῦς, ἐκ τοῦ ἀνακολούθου, ἐκ τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου).[5] This is heady stuff; for instance, the story is shown to be impossible; since granted that Daphne was born of the earth and a river, how could she have been brought up? Either in the water, in which case she would have been drowned; or under the earth, in which case she would not have been seen by Apollo! And so on. But of course the student orator was expected to be able to present the opposing case and defend the story on the basis of its clarity, possibility, propriety, consistency and moral value.[6]

Theon in both cases gives us longer lists, in which most of Aphthonius' elements reappear. For instance a thesis can be rejected on the grounds that it is obscure, impossible, unplausible, invented, incomplete, redundant, self-contradictory, badly-constructed, improper and immoral, or (one hopes) on any appropriate selection of these points; the key words are ἀσαφές, ἀδύνατον, ἀπίθανον, ψευδές, ἐλλείπει, πλεονάζει, μάχεται, τάξις, ἀπρεπές, ἀσύμφορον.[7] A little later he shows how one might defend a theoretical thesis, in this case, that gods take care of the world, εἰ προνοοῦσι θεοὶ τοῦ κόσμου: one would argue that the thesis is possible, is natural, is generally accepted, has the authority of wise men and lawgivers and other men of good reputation, is in accordance with natural justice and with nature in general, is consistent with what we know of the divine, is necessary to our knowledge, indeed for existence itself; further, the opposite thesis is absurd; analogies can be produced, including small-scale examples; and the doctrine is commended by its context, in that it is necessary in order that virtue should exist – in Aphthonius' terms, by τὸ συμφέρον.[8]

It will surely be evident that Athanasius exhibits many parallels both to

[4] London 1954; see pp. 83–4. Davies mentions Theon, but not Aphthonius, in his bibliography.

[5] Cf. Hermogenes, Spengel II,9: ἐκ τοῦ ἀσαφοῦς ... ἀπιθάνου ... ἀδυνάτου ... ἀνακολούθου ... ἀπρεποῦς ... ἀσυμφόρου.

[6] *Op. cit.* 27–32. Cf. Hermogenes, *ibid.* 9.

[7] *Ibid.* 93.

[8] *Ibid.* 126.

the vocabulary of these writers and to the methods of argument they recommend. Arguments about what is suitable or unsuitable to God's dignity are exceedingly familiar from the *De Incarnatione* 6–10, expressed as τὸ πρέπον, τὸ ἁπρεπές, and also τὸ ἄτοπον. He commends Christian doctrine as consistent and reasonable (ἀκόλουθος, εὔλογος); and he attacks Arian doctrine as inconsistent (ἀσύστατος) in *C. Ar.* 1,23–5, though here the words used are slightly different. The charges of incompleteness and redundancy are very clearly noticed at *De Inc.* 20, where he says that it is better to incur the charge of tautology than to omit what should have been written; and he frequently apologizes for repeating himself (*C. Ar.* 1,31, and other passages noted by Newman in Robertson's edition). At the same time, a rather different kind of pleonasm, the deliberate accumulation of examples, is a trick which he occasionally fancies, as at *C. Gent.* 23, where he expatiates on the theme that different nations have different gods, or *De Inc.* 35, where he demonstrates that many of the Old Testament worthies had fathers. He clearly holds that Arian theology carries no moral advantage,[9] and moreover that it is impossible, as we shall see, relying on the *reductio ad absurdum*; so we have found parallels to all six of Aphthonius' points except that of obscurity; this is a little less characteristic, but at *C. Ar.* 1,24 he does complain that the Arian doctrine is μωρὰ καὶ ἄδηλος, and of course he frequently insists on the lucidity of his own; the word λευκός is often used to make this point. And we have detected most of Theon's points as well, and many of his methods; I shall mention in a few moments the argument from contraries, and that from analogy; meanwhile let us notice a particularly clear case of the argument ἐκ τοῦ μέρους, from the small-scale example, at *De Inc.* 42, where he actually states the principle that whatever is assumed about the whole must apply to the part (ὁποῖα γὰρ ἂν περὶ τοῦ ὅλου νοήσειαν, τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦ μέρους αὐτοὺς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι). A man's strength pervades his whole body, and so can be found in a single member, the toe; but man is part of the universe; so likewise the Logos pervades the whole universe, but also reveals himself in a single man.

But I would like to attempt a rather more ambitious proof of my present thesis, the general influence of rhetoric on Athanasius. Aristotle

[9] See e.g. *C. Ar.* 2,43. Newman's note 8 in Robertson's English edition refers to other passages where Arians are compared to serpents, dogs, lions, wolves, hares, chameleons, etc.; all which goes somewhat beyond conventional vituperation.

in his *Rhetoric* (2,23) gives us a list of no less than twenty-eight topics, or methods of argument. I shall submit that in Athanasius we can find examples of all of them. This part of my paper has, if you will pardon me, a slightly epideictic character; I shall not pretend that all my examples are equally cogent; but I hope the general effect will be found convincing. It will, however, be deficient in τάξις, since I intend to follow Aristotle's own order, or rather lack of order, in setting out his examples. He begins with,

1) The argument from opposites; cf. Athanasius *C. Gent.* 33; the soul is opposed to the body, and the body is mortal; therefore the soul is immortal. So also *De Inc.* 31; dead men are powerless, but the Saviour still acts; therefore he is alive.

2) The argument from similar inflections, ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων, which is mentioned several times in the *Topics*; for instance, if what is just is desirable, then what happens justly is desirable; but then it is desirable to be justly put to death. In this case the consequence is an absurdity which refutes the thesis, and I have not found an exact parallel in Athanasius; but he uses a similar grammatical transference at *C. Ar.* 3,22: ἐπὶ τοῦ Λαζάρου φωνὴν μὲν ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρωπίνην ἠφίει· θεϊκῶς δὲ, ὡς θεός, τὸν Λάζαρον ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν.

3) The argument from relative terms; cf. the extremely familiar point that no one can be a father without having a son, therefore the Son must be coeternal with the Father.

4) The argument ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, or *a fortiori*; cf. *De Inc.* 17, taken from Eusebius (*D.E.* 4,13,7–8; 7,1,24–5); if the sun is not defiled by its contact with earthly bodies, *a fortiori* (πολλῷ πλέον) the Logos, who made the sun, is not defiled, but rather purifies his mortal body.

5) The argument from consistency; cf. *C. Ar.* 1,30; the Arians condemn those who use unscriptural phrases, yet they do so themselves.

6) The argument based on considering the time, ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν. Cf. *Apol. de Fuga* 15, there are times when it is right for the saints to take flight; or again, *Decr.* 14, Proverbs 8,22 applies to the Word at the time when he became man.

7) *Tu quoque*; or in Aristotle's terms, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὑτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα. Many examples, including *C. Ar.* 2,38, the retort that the Arians themselves posit two original principles, with its neat description of the ground of complaint: οὐχ ὁρῶσι κατ' αὐτῶν φθάνουσαν ἣν αἰτιῶνται ματαίαν μέμψιν.

8) From definition; so *C. Gent.* 18: man is defined as a being capable

of knowledge; so men were capable of inventing the arts, and there is no need to postulate divine inventors by way of justifying polytheism.

9) From the different senses of a word, ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς; cf. Athanasius' discussion of the word ἀγέννητος, *C. Ar.* 1,30 *al.*; or of the word "son", *Decr.* 6.

10) The argument ἐκ διαιρέσεως, by elimination, found in *C. Gent.* 20, which I shall discuss a little later.

11) The argument by induction. *C. Gent.* 23 gives many examples to show that each nation has its own gods.

12) The argument from judgements previously given. Cf. *Decr.* 2: the Arians have already been condemned at Nicaea, and should behave accordingly.

13) The argument ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, which here I think means, considering whether particular cases upset the rule, cf. *Topics* 2,4, 111 b 4–11. So cf. *Syn.* 43–5, on the disagreement between the councils of Antioch and Nicaea, which breaks the general rule that the Fathers are unanimous.

14) The argument ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος, from good or bad consequences; much the same as what Aphthonius calls τὸ συμφέρον. Cf. *Vit. Ant.* 42: faith in Christ has the comforting effect of routing the demons.

15) Retorting a dilemma; cf. *C. Ar.* 1,25, where Athanasius retorts, has God himself come to be out of nothing, or was he there before he came to be? – the question which you Arians ask about the Word.

16) Exploiting the contrast between your opponent's professions and his real wishes; cf. *Decr.* 15: the Arians profess to honour the Father by contrast with the Son, but really mean to dishonour him by saying that once he was ἄλογος and ἄσοφος. (I do not, of course, intend to endorse this view of the Arians' motives).

17) The argument by analogy; *C. Gent.* 16 gives various illustrations of the general point that acts correspond to natures.

18) The argument from cause and effect; cf. *De Inc.* 29: if a snake or a lion is no longer feared, that is because it is dead. So Christians no longer fear death, since it has been destroyed by Christ.

19) Criticism of inconsistent behaviour. *Decr.* 4–5 criticizes Eusebius for subscribing at Nicaea and then changing his mind.

20) Inferring hypothetical causes. *Ad Afros* 8 points out the awkward consequences of the view that the Son's unity with the Father results from virtue and moral progress.

21) Examining the reasons for an action; cf. *Sent. Dion.* 6–9, on the

reasons which led Dionysius to emphasize the humanity of the Son.

22) Tertullian's paradox: the apparently incredible must be true. Cf. possibly *De Inc.* 50: the Resurrection is too extraordinary to have been invented; the Greeks never invented such a story about their gods.

23) Refutation by finding inconsistencies; cf. *C. Gent.* 18: if pagan gods are worshipped because they invented certain arts, then one ought to deify all inventors; but of course they do not.

24) Explaining the reason for a false opinion; cf. *Ad Amun*: scrupulous anxiety about physical purity is implanted by the devil in order to discourage conscientious ascetics.

25) Argument from the cause to the effect – the reverse of 18; cf. *Apol. ad Const.* 11: people do forge letters, so doubtless my alleged letter was forged.

26) The question "Is there a better course?"; cf. the objection mentioned in *De Inc.* 44: if God wished to save men, why did he not do so νεύματι μόνον, by a mere nod, as when he made the world?

27) Comparing present with past cases; once again the affair of Dionysius is the obvious example.

28) The argument ἐκ τῶν ἁμαρτηθέντων, making use of an opponent's errors; see *Decr.* 3, which exploits the embarrassments of Eusebius and his namesake over the Nicene Creed.

We have seen, then, that all twenty-eight of Aristotle's topics can be paralleled in Athanasius. I am not arguing for a *conscious* use of the rhetorical device in every case; it is only occasionally that Athanasius uses precise technical terms which could suggest this. However, he sometimes does so, for instance with his formula about character, time and place, or his neat formulation of the *tu quoque* argument. And the same impression is given by his use of stock examples; for instance, at *Sent. Dion.* 4, the skill of a shipwright needs to be judged from his whole output, not from a single trireme. But as I have said, I am concerned not so much with what Athanasius intended, but with what he was actually doing; and that is, using the accepted techniques of the rhetorician to promote his theology.

II

In the space that remains, I will direct your attention towards a selection of these arguments which raise problems of validity in a specially acute form, and so may affect our judgement of Athanasian theology. First, let us consider the dilemma, and the rather similar problems that

arise over arguments ἐκ διαιρέσεως, by elimination. I am inclined to think the dilemma should not be regarded as an argument in its own right, but rather as a feature which may appear in presenting several different arguments; for instance, the argument from consistency could be presented in the form, *either* the Arians must withdraw their criticism of unscriptural phrases, *or* they must themselves abandon the word ἀγέννητος. But for arguments of this type to be valid, it is essential that they take account of all the possible alternatives. I cannot help feeling that there are some important cases in which Athanasius does not observe this crucial principle. For instance, he incessantly confronts the Arians with the crude alternative, either a Son fully equal to the Father, or a creature just like any other creature; he dismisses any suggestion that the Son enjoys some sort of intermediate status, which appears even in the polemical language of the *Thalia*, and is fairly readily inferred from Hebrews 1,4 (which he works hard to reinterpret), not to mention Alexander's phrase μεσιτεύουσα φύσις μονογενής. Hence he condemns the Arians both for refusing to worship the Logos and for consenting to do so (*C. Ar.* 3,16), since this means that they intend to worship a created being;[10] and when he does come to consider the Arian formula "a creature, but not as one of the creatures", etc., in *C. Ar.* 2,19, he evades this important point by a piece of crude dialectic, saying in effect that no creature can be exceptional, and then goes on to make the valid but exactly contrary point that *none* of the creatures is exactly like any other! Thus the Arian formula is condemned both as contradictory and as insufficiently distinctive. Both these lines of persuasion are recommended in the text-books, as we have seen; but it takes some nerve to advance them both in the same paragraph.

These dubious tactics are only partly disguised by the more respectable point that the Arians do not recognize the distinctive sense of the word γέννημα. But it is not of course true (as a quick reading of Athanasius might suggest) that γέννημα is a term reserved for the Son, while ποίημα necessarily refers to creatures. Human beings as such can be called God's γεννήματα, on the authority of Isaiah 1,2, which Athanasius quotes without adverse comment on any misuse at *C. Ar.* 1,37;[11] and the saint himself contends, *ibid.* 2,3, that ποίημα does not necessarily imply a

[10] Cf. also *C. Ar.* 1,8; *Ad Epp. Aeg.* 13; *Ad Adelph.* 3; also *C. Ar.* 3,64 with its charge of polytheism, which has been often repeated, and which is presumably a reply to the charge of ditheism brought against the Nicenes.

[11] Cf. *Decr.* 10 and Opitz, *Urkunde* 14,11 *ad fin.*

created being. What then is his complaint against the Arians? It is that they act inconsistently – using "double balances", *ibid.* 2,4 – in that when they refer to the Son they refuse to use the term γέννημα in its distinctive (and exalted) sense, but insist on stressing the distinctive (and pejorative) sense of the term ποίημα. And such a criticism will be perfectly just, provided we can be sure that the Arians, or some of them, depressed the sense of ποίημα in the manner Athanasius describes. But have we adequate evidence of this, if we avoid making the *a priori* assumption that what Athanasius says about his opponents must be objective and free from rhetorical exaggeration?

Moreover, if we believe (as I think we should) in an immeasurable interval which separates the divine from the human level, are we bound to conceive this as a gulf which is empty and unoccupied? Would an intermediate being make it any less? And is it really certain that God's originative power is restricted to one of two alternative processes, either generating a being fully equal to himself, or creating beings radically inferior? Or is this an analogy taken too hastily from human life, and one which is in any case embarrassed when we come to consider the mysterious origin of the Holy Spirit? And is the cause of Christian theology really betrayed if we hold that the Son is a creature superior to Thrones and Archangels in much the same degree as these are superior to worms and beetles? For it is clear that on some occasions at least Arius expressed views of this kind.[12]

By way of a change from these anxious reflections, let me point to another misuse of the dilemma, which is logically much grosser, though of less theological significance. At *C. Gentes* 20 Athanasius asks the question, how can statues convey any knowledge or presence of God? If it is through the matter of which they are made, then it is superfluous to give them this form; if the form is the effective means, then there is no need to impose it on artificial matter; but if the skill of the artist is what matters – for in this case Athanasius is giving us a trilemma – it would be more reasonable to worship the artist. I think the fallacy can best be shown by constructing a parallel, if you will not think this beneath the dignity of a scholarly discussion. – What reason have we for thinking that

[12] Arius calls the Son πλήρης θεός (Opitz, *Urkunde* 1,4, all MSS and Latin versions); cf. Philo, *Det.* 54, Ath. *C. Ar.* 2,29, and for application to the Logos, Origen, *In Joh.* fr. 11. N.B. also the Arian use of Ps. 44/45,6ff. (Ath. *C. Ar.* 1,46). Even the Thalia has μονογενὴς θεός (John 1,18) ... ἑκατέρων ἀλλότριος, unlike both (the Father and creatures?).

bread is nutritious? Is it because of its matter? In that case uncooked flour would be equally wholesome. Or because of its form? Then loaves made of clay or dung would serve us as well. Or because of the skill used in its preparation? In that case, it would be more logical to eat the baker. – Obviously there are cases in which a combination of factors is required, and no one of them taken by itself can be effective; just as a ship will be seaworthy only if its materials are sound *and* its design correct *and* its construction conscientiously carried out. The apparently logical structure of the dilemma serves to distract our attention from this simple fact; and because we agree with Athanasius' conclusions, we are apt to overlook the imbecillity of his argument.

I will next consider a family of arguments which I believe is not mentioned in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, though he discusses it at length in the *Prior Analytics* under the title εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον or the like.[13] The most familiar English title is *reductio ad absurdum*; but this is really too narrow, since not all arguments of this type depend on a paradox. Rather, they have the unimpeachable logical structure, If *p*, then *q*; but not *q*; therefore not *p*. And the falsity of *q* can be established in various ways. If *q* is indeed self-contradictory, then of course the argument is valid. But it may be simply counter-factual; Athanasius uses an argument of this type at *De Inc.* 2: if there were no providence, then there would be no diversity in the world; but we can see that the world is diversified, and is not a simple homogeneous mass; therefore there is providence. Again, *q* may be contrary to accepted opinion, or – what is really the same thing – it may involve a generally-admitted error; I shall return to this case in a moment. Another possibility is that *q* involves a infinite regress; this is an argument frequently used by Aristotle; and Athanasius both uses it himself (e.g. *C. Ar.* 2,26; 3,64; *Decr.* 8) and refers to its use by Arians (*C. Ar.* 1,21); it could have been found in Irenaeus (2,1,2) or Eusebius (*P.E.* 7,22).

But I would like to reflect for a moment on the argument that such-and-such a doctrine involves an admitted error – on what we may call *reductio ad haeresim*. It is obvious that this is a very ancient technique; to look no further back, we find Plutarch arguing that Chrysippus is no better than Epicurus,[14] which for him is of course a potent condemnation; and Origen uses the same argument against Celsus.[15] What I think has

[13] Esp. 2,11–14.
[14] *Stoic. Rep.* 2, *al.*
[15] *C. Cels.* 3,80.

not been sufficiently noticed is that there is a whole series of stock charges, some of them reaching back into pre-Christian antiquity, which are turned against theologians of the most widely varying persuasions as the ingenuity of the orator can suggest. In these cases what is important and sometimes original is the connecting link of argumentation; it is extremely hazardous simply to accept the stock charge. Yet this is what has often been done by admirers of Athanasius in his treatment of the Arians.

Let me illustrate. There is first the stock charge that such-and-such a theory makes God material, composite or divisible. This was used against the Stoics by Plutarch (*SVF* II 313, 1049), Origen (*ibid.* 1051–4), Eusebius (*ibid.* 1032) and Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 1,11); against Origen, according to Pamphilus' *Apology*; against Sabellius, by Arius (in Ath. *Syn.* 16); against Eusebius, by Marcellus (Eus. *C. Marc.* 1,4,41); against Marcellus, by Eusebius (*E.T.* 1,5) and by ps.-Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 4,13); against the homoousian party, by the Arians (Ath. *C. Ar.* 2,36 and esp. *Syn.* 16); and against the Arians, by Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 3,1 – "material"; *ibid.* 2,34, *Ad Epp. Aeg.* 16, *Ad Afros* 8 – "composite"; *Decr.* 22, *Syn.* 34 – both charges).

Secondly, the charge that such-and-such a theory amounts to proclaiming two or more first principles (again no doubt pre-Christian[16]); objected against Marcion and Valentinus, by Athanasius (*Syn.* 52) and others; against Origen, according to Pamphilus; against Eusebius, by Marcellus (Eus. *C. Marc.* 1,4,46); against Marcellus, by Eusebius (*E.T.* 1,5); against the Nicenes by the Arians (Ath. *C. Ar.* 1,22. 30; 3,16. 27); and retorted by Athanasius against Asterius (*ibid.* 1,12; 2,37–8), and against Arians in general (*ibid.* 3,16. 27).

Thirdly, the charge of making Christ a mere man; objected against Origen, according to Pamphilus; against Paul of Samosata, by the Synod of Antioch (S. 31, de Riedmatten), followed by Eusebius (*E.T.* 1,20,43) and Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 3,26); against both Asterius and Eusebius, by Marcellus (Eus. *C. Marc.* 1,4,46. 55–8. 62); against Marcellus, by Eusebius (*E.T.* 1,20,45); against the Arians, by Athanasius (*Decr.* 1 and 10); also against some unnamed heretics, *Ad Maximum* 3.

Fourthly, the charge of proclaiming two Christs, two Wisdoms, or the

[16] Both Athenagoras (*Leg.* 8) and Irenaeus (2,1,2) argue that such a system is impossible, using the argument that a third principle would be required, which is certainly ancient. Cf. R.M.Grant, *The Early Christian Doctrine of God*, 105–10, and n. 18 below.

like; objected against Valentinus, by Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 3,64); against Clement, by some moderns;[17] against Origen, according to Pamphilus; against Paul of Samosata, by the Synod of Antioch (S. 17; though note that Paul expressly denies both this charge and the last, *ibid.* 21, 8); against Marcellus, by Eusebius (*C. Marc.* 2,4,24); against Asterius, by Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 1,32; 2,37–8), and more generally against the Arians (*Ad Epp. Aeg.* 16).

Fifthly, the charge of separating Christ from God, of introducing a third principle between them, or possibly above both of them;[18] objected against Paul of Samosata by Athanasius, *Syn.* 45, though I think by a misunderstanding; against Hieracas, perhaps, by Arius (*ibid.* 16, the one lamp divided into two); against the Arians, by Athanasius, *C. Ar.* 1,14. 15; and retorted against the Nicenes by the homoeousian party, according to Hilary, *Syn.* 81.

I have no doubt that this list could be greatly extended by a little research; but so much may be enough to make my point. No one can really think that *any* of the theologians mentioned committed *all* these mistakes; and it is not really convincing to argue that the Arians committed them all. They were simply conventional charges which lay ready to hand and could be made to stick. In a sense, of course, it is true that Athanasius was wholly in earnest in bringing the charges which the brought against the Arians; he was wholly in earnest about the basic doctrinal conflict, and he was prepared to use all the available weapons. But his charges are far removed from the dispassionate, authoritative criticism into which they have sometimes been translated. Is it too much to say that Athanasius, influenced by rhetorical convention, often treats the spoken and written word as an instrument of persuasion, and fails in the respect which is due to words as divine gifts to mankind and images and instruments of the divine Word himself?

But with some reluctance I must add one further comment on the *reductio*-type argument, and describe a method which I have not found mentioned in the text-books, and which I label *reductio retorta.* We remember that the *reductio* argument runs, If p, then q; but not q; there-

[17] See R.P.Casey, Clement and the two Divine Logoi, *JTS* 25 (1924) 43–56.

[18] The argument goes back to Plato, *Rep.* 597c (one Idea of each thing), *Tim.* 31ab (one earth). The form of it quoted by Eusebius, *P.E.* 7,22, and others, serves to counter the belief (held by many Stoics and some Platonists) in two original principles, God and matter, and may well be pre-Christian, since the doctrine that God created matter was apparently known to Cicero: Lactantius, *Div. Instit.* 2,8,10.

fore not *p*; where *q* is an admittedly objectionable thesis. But suppose, when faced with this argument, one retorts: You argue, if *p*, then *q*; but, *p*; therefore you argue in favour of *q*. It is obvious that this retort is unfair and misleading in the highest degree; unfair, because it saddles the opponent with the very proposition which he regards as evidently false; and unfair because (unless independent reasons in favour of *p* are produced) it simply assumes the point at issue; it is a *petitio principii* of the most blatant kind. Now on occasion Athanasius will argue in exactly this way. A very clear example occurs at *C. Ar.* 1,21. Athanasius quotes an Arian argument to the effect that if the Son is like in all things to the Father, then it necessarily follows that he also begets a son, and so on *ad infinitum*. Athanasius replies by abusing the Arians for conceiving material and earthly ideas about the Father; but their proposition occurs only as an element in a *reductio* type of argument which, as we have seen, Athanasius uses freely himself. In point of fact there is no evidence, to my knowledge, that the Arians entertained materialistic notions about God, apart from this passage, by which several scholars have been misled;[19] and good evidence that these were notions that they were particularly concerned to avoid. And the embarrassment is all the greater if we think, as I do, that Athanasius himself is in a genuine difficulty here. For if the Son really is like the Father in all things,[20] how *are* we to explain the fact that the Father begets and the Son does not?

Another example may possibly be found at *Ad Serap.* 4,1 and 2. This is a most interesting and impressive passage, and shows the real originality of Athanasius' mind. He quotes a dilemma propounded by the Tropici: If the Spirit is not a creature, then He is a Son, and the Word and He are two brothers. (Note that the heretics have apparently learnt from Athanasius, who often writes as if the alternatives, either Son or a creature, exhausted all possibilities). The dilemma continues: If, however, the Spirit derives from the Son, then the Father is a grandfather, and the Spirit is his grandson.

Athanasius' response is interesting. He professes to have sought for an answer and found nothing whatever to say, except a counter-question.

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[19] There are, to be sure, the passages already mentioned on p. 132; but here the charge of materialism rests on tenuous dialectical links which I refrain from examining in detail.

[20] Athanasius' reference to change and eternity is a material point, but is not strictly relevant to his argument, which still leaves us with an eternal Father and an eternal Son who, as Persons, eternally differ in their activities.

Finally he simply repeats the dilemma, the implication being, "Surely you cannot expect such bizarre suggestions to be taken seriously". But this obscures the fact that the Tropici only put forward these ideas as an untenable alternative to the view which they themselves held, namely that the Spirit is a creature. Athanasius' theology may be correct, and his manner the more impressive; but his method is indefensible. It embodies the error characteristic of the fallacy which I have called *reductio retorta.*

III

This paper has turned out a little longer than was expected, and I must abbreviate my third section, in which I had intended to deal with some less formal types of rhetorical strategy. There is, for example, the elementary maxim that one should present ones own case in a mild and conciliatory form, but describe ones opponents' case in the most uncompromising terms that will carry conviction, with all qualifications omitted. We have already seen Athanasius doing this with the Arian proposition that the Son is in some sense a creature. We have also looked once or twice at distraction techniques, where a difficulty is met by diverting attention from the major issue and attending to minor or verbal points. But I would like to end with one or two examples of what I call Mosaic argument. I mean by this phrase, that one does not consider ones opponent's case as a whole, but attends to some proposition taken in isolation and shows that it does not fit into the pattern of Christian orthodoxy; which too often means in effect, that it does not fit into the context of ones own system. A particularly clear example occurs at *Ad Serap.* 2,3: it is impious to say that the Son is a creature, since this necessarily leads to the conclusion that the Father is a creature. But it is obvious that this conclusion is only reached by combining the Arian dictum about the Son with the *Athanasian* principle that the Son is wholly like the Father; and there is no reason whatsoever for the Arians to argue in this way. A rather more complex instance is found at *C. Ar.* 2,21; if we combine the (Athanasian) proposition that the Son does everything that the Father does with the (Arian, or supposedly Arian) proposition that the Son is created by the Father, we are in a dilemma; either we get the absurd result – for which, of course, the Arian proposition is held responsible – that the Son is his own maker and creator; or else the Arian proposition has to be given up. But presumably the Arians would not, and need not, accept the Athanasian part of this artificial combination; they could certainly contend that the Son does not simply

duplicate the Father's activity, as the argument seems to demand, but interprets and applies it; but they would no doubt also make the generation of the Son an exception to the general rule. The argument is repeated in a simplified form at *Ad Afros* 7; if the Son is a creature and the Father is his maker, then the Son would be his own maker, since he is able to make all that the Father makes, as he has said. Once again the absurd conclusion is reached by a wholly artificial combination of Arian and Nicene principles; and it unwisely appeals to the second part of John 5,19, taken out of context; for the first part if anything favours the Arian position, and is wholly sufficient to refute the argument.

Another influential argument constructed on Mosaic lines is the contention that, on the Arian view, God was once devoid of reason (λόγος) and wisdom.[21] This conclusion is reached by combining the Arian denial of eternal generation with the Athanasian principle that God's Word and Wisdom are wholly identified with his Son. This argument has the weight of tradition behind it, since it was adopted by Dionysius of Rome, as quoted in *Decr.* 26–7; but it becomes wholly specious when directed against the Arian position, which (for what it is worth) is that God eternally possesses reason and wisdom as impersonal attributes; he did not deprive himself of these when he engendered the Son (Opitz, *Urkunde* 6,4); but equally, he did not then acquire attributes which were lacking before. And Athanasius cannot have been unaware of this Arian doctrine, since it is presupposed by his own complaints that Arianism postulates two Words, two Wisdoms; and again, that it represents the divine Word as only improperly so called. There is no reason to charge Athanasius with bad faith. He merely followed a course which the rhetorical conventions of his age permitted, but which our own more exacting requirements of candour preclude.

But the study of Mosaic arguments would take us far afield. For instance Athanasius argues, and has generally been followed in arguing, that only if the Logos is very God of very God can be impart salvation. It is of course true that Athanasius puts out a scheme of salvation which requires this conception of the Logos; his christology and his soteriology thus cohere. But it is not quite so obvious that this is the only possible scheme of salvation. Would this mean that the Father would be powerless to operate through an Arian Christ?

We live in an age of self-criticism. To an extraordinary degree the faith

[21] *C. Ar.* 1,19. 24; 2,32. *Decr.* 15; *Ad Serap.* 2,2.

of Athanasius has become the faith of the Church, and to criticize him must look as if we wished to shatter the rock from which we were hewn. Nevertheless I have come to think that the methods used by Athanasius in defending his faith will not serve to commend eternal truths to the present age; and it is for the Church's ultimate good that we seek to show where their weakness lies.

Ely, Cambridge, The Black Hostelry

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"EVANGELIUM VERITATIS" ET "VERITATIS EVANGELIUM"

LA QUESTION DU TITRE ET LES TÉMOINS PATRISTIQUES

PAR

BENOIT STANDAERT

L'*editio princeps* du second traité du Codex Jung porte comme titre imprimé *Evangelium Veritatis*. Ce choix à lui seul traduit déjà la conviction des éditeurs qu'il y a identité entre le texte dont la traduction copte a été découverte, et l'ouvrage valentinien que mentionne Irénée dans son *Elenchos* au livre III, et qui est intitulé *Veritatis Evangelium*. En fait, dès la découverte, cette identification avait été avancée comme hypothèse, mais tout aussitôt contestée. L'unanimité n'est toujours pas faite. Plusieurs problèmes se posent à partir de cette question.

A. Tout d'abord, quel est le titre du traité en question? A examiner le Codex Jung, le second traité n'a pas de titre. Des 53 traités[1] découverts, 37 portent un titre (soit en tête de l'écrit [8 cas], soit en finale [21], soit même en tête et à la fin [8]). Il reste 16 traités sans titre. Pour deux d'entre eux (Codex VI,6. 8), on peut affirmer que le traité avait certainement un titre. Parmi les 14 autres traités, neuf ne sont conservés qu'en partie: il manque le début (XI,2) ou la fin (I,4;[2] IV,2; IX,3; X,2; XIII,2), ou bien même il ne nous reste que des fragments (XII,1–3); on ne peut donc rien conclure quant à un titre éventuel. Donc, finalement, de cinq traités seulement nous sommes certains qu'il n'y a jamais eu de titre indiqué. Deux d'entre ces cinq ont tout juste la longueur de trois pages: ce peut être une raison de l'absence de titre.[3] Restent trois traités où on est réellement surpris de ne pas avoir de titre mentionné. Deux se trouvent

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[1] Tel est le nombre de traités distingués, d'après les dernières publications de M. Krause (*Abhandlungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Kairo, Koptische Reihe* Band II [1971] XII, n.3). Ce nombre pourrait encore s'accroître dans la mesure où l'étude des fragments des Codex IX et X introduira d'autres distinctions. Notre numérotation des Codex suit celle de M. Krause, qui tend à devenir la seule en vigueur.

[2] Ainsi du moins en décide M. Krause, *ADAIK, Koptische Reihe* II (1971) 18, n.17. Voir toutefois l'opinion de R. Kasser, cité à la note 8.

[3] Ainsi le suggère M. Krause, *ADAIK, Kopt. Reihe* II (1971) 19.

au Codex Jung (Codex I,1 et 2) et le troisième est le célèbre «Schrift ohne Titel», qui est le cinquième traité du Codex II. Dans ce dernier Codex, très soigné, et composé de sept traités, les quatre premiers et le septième ont tous le titre placé à la fin. Il en est de même pour le sixième, qui a en outre le même titre placé au début. Cela peut expliquer précisément l'absence d'un titre à la fin de notre cinquième traité.[4] En définitive, nous restons avec deux cas inexpliqués de traités sans titre; tous deux appartiennent au même Codex.

A examiner de plus près ce Codex, qui comporte cinq traités, on remarque que deux seulement ont un titre: le troisième et le dernier traité. Le troisième porte l'*explicit* suivant: «Le traité de la résurrection.» Ce traité est d'une écriture différente du reste du Codex. Les pages n'en sont pas numérotées comme pour les deux premiers traités ou pour le quatrième. Il ne porte pas de ruban (entrelacs fait de losanges et de points) le séparant du traité suivant, comme c'est le cas pour les trois premiers textes entre eux (p.16 et p.43). Tout le bas de la page est laissé en blanc, tandis que le traité qui suit commence à la page 51 sur une autre feuille (f. XXVI). Dans le Codex, ce traité a donc une place à part et fait exception.

Du dernier traité, seules deux pages, sans numérotation, nous sont conservées. En souscription, il y a: *prière de l'apôtre Paul.*[5] Aucune description du Codex Jung jusqu'à ce jour ne permet de savoir si ces deux dernières pages sont de la même écriture que le reste, ni comment se présente la souscription (séparée du texte par une ligne? un ruban? soulignée? semblable à la souscription de la page 50?).[6]

Les trois autres traités (Codex I,1, 2 et 4) n'ont pas de titre. Du quatrième traité toutefois, la finale n'aurait pas été conservée.[7] En réalité, après la page 136 (dernière page suivie du traité (51–136)) deux fragments de la suite sont conservés et d'après R. Kasser, un de ces deux est certainement

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[4] Ainsi encore M. Krause: «Es ist zu erwägen, ob hier der Titel des 5. Traktates fälschlich durch die Ueberschrift zur 6. Schrift verdrängt wurde», *ADAIK, Kopt. Reihe* I (1962) 14, n.9. Cf. le même, in *ADAIK, Kopt. Reihe* II (1971) 19.

[5] On a hésité longtemps s'il fallait lire «... de l'apôtre *Pierre*» ou bien «*Paul*», mais R. Kasser (*Le Muséon* 82 [1966] 101, n.6) affirme: «Ce sont bien les restes d'un ⲇ et non pas d'un ⲑ, qui suivent le ⲡ initial du nom de l'apôtre.»

[6] Le fac-similé présenté par H.-Ch. Peuch et G. Quispel (*Vig. Christ.* 8 [1954] 2) ne permet pas d'évaluer la qualité de l'écriture. En particulier la transcription du lambda surprend puisque sa graphie ne correspond pas à la manière de faire d'aucune des deux mains du reste du Codex (nous avons même vérifié l'ensemble des graphies du lambda dans toutes les écritures représentées à Nag Hammadi et dans bien d'autres manuscrits grecs de la même époque sans trouver de correspondant).

[7] M. Krause, *ADAIK, Kopt. Reihe* II (1971) 18, n.17.

la dernière page du traité en question.[8] Ce qui donnerait à ce Codex trois écrits sans titre, et tous les trois de la même main, puisque l'écriture du traité IV est la même que celle des pages 1 à 43,24.

En conclusion, il semble bien que la raison de l'absence de titre pour le second texte du Codex Jung est à chercher non pas dans le texte mais dans le Codex. Nous y constatons cette particularité de ne mentionner ni en finale (ce qui était largement le plus fréquent) ni en tête, le titre de l'ouvrage. Rien, à notre connaissance, n'explique ce fait codicologique. Il est possible que ce trait particulier soit à attribuer à un seul copiste plus qu'à une tradition. Ce résultat codicologique négatif ne permet cependant pas de conclure qu'à cette époque[9] l'ouvrage n'avait pas encore de titre.[10]

B. Les premiers mots du traité ont-ils pu constituer le titre sous lequel on mentionnait l'ouvrage? M. Krause note que pour les 37 titres connus, 16 fois le titre de l'ouvrage est précisément le début du traité.[11]

H. Jonas, étudiant l'aspect valentinien des spéculations contenues dans l'*Evangile de Vérité*, faisait remarquer qu'au moins l'auteur ne comprenait certainement pas son œuvre comme l'Evangile de la vérité.[12] Ceci n'est vrai qu'en partie, puisqu'il y a dans la première phrase de l'*Evangile* une auto-présentation où le discours s'identifie avec l'énoncé. Ce qui est dit

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[8] Voice ce qu'il écrit dans l'article, Les subdivisions du Tractatus Tripartitus (Codex Jung, p. 51–140), *Le Muséon* 82 (1962) 101, n. 5: «Depuis la p. 136 du Codex Jung, nous n'avons plus d'indice sûr nous permettant de contrôler la succession des folios et d'évaluer l'importance des lacunes. Un fait est certain cependant: la p. 140 (?) est bien la dernière du long écrit composite dont nous nous occupons ici.»

[9] Malgré la difficulté générale de datation des codex coptes, puisque jusqu'à maintenant aucun des anciens manuscrits coptes n'est daté avec précision, on situe le Codex Jung au 4e siècle. Voir les remarques prudentes du Prof. W. Till, dans: *Evangelien aus dem Nilsand* (1960) 156–157. De même l'aperçu synthétique de J. M. Robinson, *New Test. Stud.* 14 (1967–68) 370–372.

[10] Telle est pourtant la conclusion du chapitre important de M. Krause, consacré aux titres des traités des Codex I à XIII, dans *ADAIK*, *Kopt. Reihe* II, 16–21 (21).

En réalité, il règne une certaine confusion dans la discussion autour du titre. Il y a le titre comme phénomène codicologique, le titre comme l'expression avec laquelle on mentionne un ouvrage; puis enfin, il y a la première présentation du sujet par l'auteur, une sorte d'en-tête à son œuvre. Il est rare que ces trois se recouvrent simplement, et il est donc prudent de distinguer.

[11] Cf. *ADAIK*, *Kopt. Reihe* II, 20. L'auteur mentionne cependant parmi ces 16 cas le premier écrit du Codex Jung, ce qui ne se laisse pas vérifier, puisque les deux premières lignes du traité sont pour les trois-quarts lacunaires. Les conjectures reconstituent plutôt une adresse épistolaire et non pas un titre.

[12] H. Jonas, Evangelium Veritatis and the Valentinian Speculation, *TU* 81 (Berlin 1962) 96–111 (99). L'auteur distingue bien par ailleurs le titre que l'ouvrage aurait pu recevoir au cours du temps, de celui reçu à l'origine.

de la Bonne Nouvelle est porté par les paroles mêmes de l'écrit de telle manière que celles-ci deviennent de fait aussi «bonne nouvelle». Une énonciation aussi objective à comme effet que l'énoncé reflue sur le discours lui-même. Ceci permet finalement de comprendre mieux encore comment l'*Evangile de Vérité* a pu devenir le titre de l'ouvrage.[13]

C. L'évolution sémantique du mot εὐαγγέλιον au IIe siècle rend plus vraisemblable encore la formulation de ce titre. W.C. von Unnik[14] a été le premier à relever ce trait en rapport avec l'*Evangile de Vérité*. Ce n'est qu'à partir de la seconde moitié du IIe siècle qu'εὐαγγέλιον vient à signifier aussi un *texte* et non seulement le message. S. Irénée, par exemple, s'appuie sur cette ambivalence sémantique quand il critique les Marcionites et les Valentiniens. Son expression τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τετράμορφον implique les quatre *textes* aussi bien que l'unique Bonne Nouvelle. Or dans l'*Evangile de Vérité* le mot εὐαγγέλιον ne s'entend jamais d'un livre ou d'un texte comme tel, mais signifie simplement la Bonne Nouvelle, l'annonce du message. Ceci situe l'œuvre dans le temps et constitue un indice du *terminus ad quem* de l'*Evangile*. Il n'y a rien d'invraisemblable à ce que, une fois l'évolution sémantique accomplie, la première phrase ait pu évoquer la désignation du traité, son titre.

D. S. Irénée qui écrit vers la fin du IIe siècle (ca.180) mentionne un ouvrage intitulé *Veritatis Evangelium*. Que pouvons-nous dégager de son témoignage comme information sur cet écrit et en quoi cela correspond-il au texte découvert près de Nag Hammadi?

C'est au troisième livre de sa *Réfutation* qu'Irénée mentionne cet *Evangile*. Le premier livre était consacré à l'exposé de la doctrine des Valentiniens, le second à sa réfutation à partir de leurs propres écrits. Au troisième, Irénée veut manifester leur erreur à partir des Ecritures, c'est-à-dire d'abord à partir de la tradition apostolique. Son argumentation procède en deux temps: pour chaque point de doctrine, il pose d'abord la vérité telle qu'il peut la déduire de toute la tradition apostolique, ensuite, il cite les hérétiques, pour manifester comment ils confirment

[13] H. Jonas (*art. cit.*) n'exclut absolument pas cette possibilité. Par ailleurs, nous ne prétendons pas, en faisant remarquer ce trait d'autoprésentation, que l'auteur entendait lui-même intituler ainsi son écrit. Nous croyons bien plutôt que la première phrase est construite en parallèle à des textes comme Rom.1,2 et Marc 1,1, et qu'elle avait la même fonction que dans ces écrits-là: présenter le sujet et non pas à proprement parler intituler l'ouvrage.

[14] The «Gospel of Truth» and the New Testament, in: *The Jung Codex*, ed. F.L. Cross (London 1955) 106.

cette vérité de la tradition et confondent eux-mêmes leurs propres erreurs.

C'est ainsi qu'après avoir exposé l'unité de la tradition en l'unique Evangile tétramorphe, l'évêque de Lyon s'en prend à ceux qui retranchent arbitrairement des éléments de cet Evangile, ou encore lui en ajoutent.[15] Si Marcion est l'exemple de celui qui «prône moins des quatre figures d'Evangile», les Valentiniens incarnent l'autre extrême. Ce passage vaut d'être cité: *Hi vero qui sunt a Valentino iterum existentes extra omnem timorem suas conscriptiones proferentes plura habere gloriantur quam sunt ipsa Evangelia. Siquidem in tantum processerunt audaciae uti quod ab his non olim conscriptum est «Veritatis Evangelium» titulent, in nihilo conveniens apostolorum evangeliis, ut nec Evangelium quidem sit apud eos sine blasphemia. Si enim quod ab eis profertur «Veritatis» est «Evangelium», dissimile est autem hoc illis quae ab apostolis nobis tradita sunt, qui volunt possunt discere (quemadmodum ex ipsis scripturis ostenditur) iam non esse id quod ab apostolis traditum est Veritatis Evangelium.*[16]

Ce qui frappe dès la première lecture, c'est le ton, franchement polémique et ironique. L'argumentation est de composition claire, facile à dégager. Une première phrase, assez générale, introduit, en parallèle antithétique avec Marcion, la position des Valentiniens. Des expressions comme *iterum existentes extra omnem timorem* et *gloriantur*, de même plus loin *in tantum processerunt audaciae* entrent dans le genre polémique. Elles ne font que reprendre les expressions déjà rencontrées en tête de ce paragraphe (Harvey 50–51): μάταιοι πάντες καὶ ἀμαθεῖς προσέτι δὲ καὶ τολμηροί ... οἱ μὲν ἵνα πλείονα δόξωσι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐξευρηκέναι.

La seconde phrase reprend en partie la première et en précise les

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[15] «Dans ces conditions, ils font tous preuve de vanité, de manque total de formation, d'audace aussi, ceux qui rejettent la forme sous laquelle se présente l'*Evangile* et qui prônent à l'encontre soit plus, soit moins des quatre figures d'*Evangile* que nous venons de voir: les uns pour paraître avoir trouvé plus que la vérité, les autres, pour supprimer les «dispositions» du plan de Dieu sur nous.» *Adv. haer.* 3,11,9 (Harvey 51–52). Traduction de F. Sagnard (Sourc. Chrét. 34) 203.

[16] *Adv. haer.* 3,11,9 (Harvey 51–52). Ci-joint la traduction de F. Sagnard (Sourc. Chrét. 34) 205 (sauf pour l'expression *ex ipsis scripturis*): «Quant aux Valentiniens, ils se placent là encore au-dessus de toute crainte et, produisant au grand jour leurs compositions, ils se glorifient de posséder plus d'évangiles qu'il n'y en a en réalité. Car ils en sont arrivés à ce point d'audace d'intituler «Evangile de Vérité» ce qu'ils ont composé à une date récente, alors qu'il ne s'accorde nullement avec les évangiles des apôtres, si bien que même l'évangile n'échappe pas chez eux au blasphème. Si, en effet, ce qu'ils éditent est l'«Evangile de vérité» et s'il diffère de ceux que nous ont transmis les apôtres, tous ceux qui le veulent peuvent se rendre compte comment il est démontré, à partir des Ecritures mêmes, que ce qui est transmis par les apôtres n'est plus du tout l'évangile de vérité!»

expressions: *suas conscriptiones proferentes* et *plura habere quam sunt ipsa evangelia* se voient expliquées par la mention de cet ouvrage composé par eux à une date récente, intitulé «Evangile de Vérité» et qui ne concorde en rien avec les évangiles des apôtres. Le dernier membre de la phrase (*ut nec evangelium quidem sit apud eos sine blasphemia*) appartient encore au genre polémique – il y est de bon ton de traiter les autres, plus ou moins discrètement (*non sine* ...), de blasphème. La violence polémique atteint ici son point culminant: l'ironie de la phrase qui suit, tout en prolongeant la polémique, l'adoucit, car l'effet en est moins direct.[17] Le raisonnement ironique de cette dernière phrase est facile à suivre: si A (l'*Evangile de Vérité*) est égal à B (l'unique et véritable Evangile) et différent de C (les évangiles des apôtres), alorsqu'il est communément reçu que B et C sont égaux, il serait donc prouvé – et cela en s'appuyant sur C – que C n'est plus du tout égal à B! Le tour est d'autant plus piquant en latin (et sans doute en grec) qu'une même expression sert à désigner A (l'*Evangile de Vérité*) et B (le véritable Evangile). Tout l'argument est en fait polarisé par le titre *Veritatis Evangelium* qui est une provocation, tant à l'égard des quatre autres évangiles que pour l'Evangile unique et véritable.

Une fois replacé le passage dans la trame précise de l'argumentation du III[e] livre d'Irénée, il doit être aisé d'en extraire maintenant les informations qu'il pourrait contenir.

1. Il y a tout d'abord le titre *Veritatis Evangelium*. A trois reprises ces deux mots se retrouvent dans le même ordre. Faut-il en déduire qu'en grec l'expression était τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον plutôt que τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀληθείας? Une chose est certaine: τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον est une tournure nettement plus provoquante: l'expression (τὸ τῆς) implique que cet évangile se distingue des autres évangiles, qui eux, ne seraient pas «de la vérité». La réaction d'Irénée contre ce titre devient d'autant plus naturelle. Si l'on recourt au texte copte, on remarque pourtant que l'ordre des mots est l'inverse: ⲡⲉⲩⲁⲅⲅⲉⲗⲓⲟⲛ ⲛ̄ⲧⲙⲏⲉ. Mais le copte ne permet pas justement de rendre de façon distincte les deux constructions possibles en grec. Par ailleurs, si ce titre provient de la première phrase du traité, ce qui est une hypothèse, on n'explique pas facilement pourquoi l'ordre des mots en aurait été changé. Dernière remarque enfin, dans le contexte du début de l'*Evangile*, l'éventuelle construction τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον cadre parfaitement, mais alors

[17] Pour l'ironie dans l'œuvre d'Irénée, voir F. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage d'Irénée* (Paris 1947) 266–291.

la distinction que l'expression τὸ τῆς souligne, ne se situe pas entre des évangiles (comme textes) dont l'un serait le vrai et non les autres. L'accent porte plutôt sur le caractère unique de cette vérité annoncée, révélée, comme il est écrit dans la suite du traité: «L'évangile est la manifestation de l'espérance» (17,2–3); «ce n'est pas l'oubli (λήθη) qui a été manifesté» (17,36), «ce qui a été manifesté, c'est la connaissance» (18,4–6). La «bonne nouvelle» ou l' «annonce de la Vérité» (16,31) se distingue donc par rapport au règne de l'erreur, de l'oubli et de l'ignorance. Le choix de cette construction τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον en tête de l'*Evangile* introduit donc immédiatement dans la grande nouveauté du message. Mais du coup, il est exclu de considérer cette expression comme le titre que l'auteur lui-même aurait voulu donner à son œuvre: le sens de l'expression dans la phrase est trop différent de celui qu'elle reçoit détachée de son contexte.

Si toutes ces considérations reposent sur l'hypothèse que l'ouvrage mentionné par Irénée est celui que le texte copte a traduit, il est précieux de constater que jusqu'à ce point, rien ne contredit explicitement cette hypothèse.

2. *titulent*. Il y a deux façons de lire ce mot. Ou bien Irénée a seulement entendu parler d'une des œuvres valentiniennes qu'on mentionne sous le titre: *Veritatis Evangelium*. Ou bien, il a eu sous les yeux le traité en question, et en a lu la première phrase non seulement comme l'en-tête mais comme le titre.[18] L'ambivalence sémantique, à son époque, du mot εὐαγγέλιον (qui est «bonne nouvelle» et «texte d'évangile») a pu faciliter encore cette lecture. Dans le premier cas, le titre est à attribuer aux milieux valentiniens, dans le second, c'est Irénée qui en est plus directement responsable. Seul le degré d'information que possède l'évêque de Lyon, pourrait nous révéler en quelle mesure il a eu l'ouvrage entre les mains, ou s'il parle par ouï-dire.

3. *quod ab his non olim conscriptum est*.[19] *Quod conscriptum est* reprend, nous l'avons vu, la formulation plus générale de la première phrase (*suas conscriptiones proferentes*). La précision est introduite par *ab his* et *non olim*. *Non olim* veut dire que cet ouvrage qu'ils intitulent *Veritatis Evangelium* est de date récente et ne jouit donc pas de l'ancienneté des évangiles apostoliques. De même *ab his conscriptum* tend à rejeter l'autorité de ce texte, puisqu'il ne peut être question de le faire remonter aux apôtres.

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[18] Ainsi le suppose W.C. van Unnik in *The Jung Codex*, ed. F.L.Cross, 106.

[19] Pour les problèmes que soulève cette petite phrase, voir W.C. van Unnik in *The Jung Codex*, 100–101 (*non olim*) et 94 (*ab his conscriptum*). Notre interprétation éclaire différemment mais de façon complémentaire, les mêmes expressions.

Dans chaque cas, il s'agit de clichés apologétiques.[20] Chronologiquement la notation reste vague (après l'âge apostolique) et en ce qui concerne l'auteur, il n'y a rien de précis non plus: il ne fait pas partie des témoins de l'origine. Dans la mesure où ces deux remarques restrictives ne font que servir l'argument apologétique et puisent aux «topoi» classiques de l'époque, il n'est pas nécessaire de supposer ici une source d'information personnelle.

4. Il reste enfin les deux observations suivantes: *in nihilo conveniens apostolorum evangeliis*[21] et *ex ipsis scripturis ostenditur*. Toutes deux parlent du rapport du traité avec la tradition apostolique; la première se prononce sur le fond, la seconde sur la forme. Par la première remarque, Irénée dénonce la tendance de l'écrit (beaucoup plus qu'il ne critiquerait le genre littéraire); s'il y a finalement blasphème (*ut nec evangelium quidem sit apud eos sine blasphemia*), c'est bien pour des raisons de fond: cet écrit est en désaccord total avec les évangiles des apôtres. Cet énoncé est repris dans la phrase suivante: *dissimile est autem hoc illis quae ab apostolis nobis tradita sunt.*

La seconde remarque (*ex ipsis scripturis ostenditur*) concerne la méthode: ce traité cite et emprunte aux écrits canoniques. Dans l'économie de tout le passage ces deux observations ont un rôle secondaire. Elles viennent grossir l'effet blasphématoire du titre *Veritatis Evangelium*. Irénée a-t-il lu l'*Evangile* pour oser le caractériser ainsi? *in nihilo conveniens* et *dissimile* sont très généraux, et l'absolu catégorique de *in nihilo* est sans doute à mettre au compte de la polémique.[22] De même encore, il faut attribuer à

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[20] Cf. *Adv. haer.* 3,4,2–3 (Harvey 16–17) Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 118: «Avant Valentin, il n'y avait pas de Valentiniens, avant Marcion, pas de Marcionites.» De même Tertullien, *Praescr.*37,3–5: *Ita non christiani nullum ius capiunt christianarum litterarum ad quos merito dicendum est: «Qui estis? quando et unde venistis? quid in meo agitis, non mei? quo denique, Marcion, iure silvam meam caedis? qua licentia, Valentine, fontes meos transvertis? qua potestate, Apelles, limites meos commoves? Mea est possessio. Quid hic, ceteri, ad voluntatem vestram seminatis et pascitis? Mea est possessio, olim possideo, prior possideo, habeo origines firmas ab ipsis auctoribus quorum fuit res. Ego sum heres apostolorum»* (R.F.Refoulé, Sourc. Chrét.46,139–140).

[21] Vossianus dans son édition lit de préférence *in nihilo convenientes*. Cette construction au pluriel est grammaticalement plus aisée puisqu'elle s'accorde avec le verbe antécédent. Il faut toutefois préférer *conveniens*: c'est du texte et non pas des personnes qu'il est question, quand l'auteur dit: «... en accord avec les évangiles des apôtres.» Ce qui par ailleurs rend le lien de *conveniens* avec *evangelium* fort lisible et presque spontané, c'est que le centre de gravité de toute la phrase est manifestement l'*Evangile* et non pas les Valentiniens (sujet du verbe).

[22] *Nihil recte dicentes* est-il dit des mêmes Valentiniens, à propos de leur interprétation de l'Evangile de Jean: *Adv. haeres.*3,11,7 (Harvey 46) Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 193.

l'ironie ce trait introduit entre parenthèses: *quemadmodum ex ipsis scripturis ostenditur* ... Le but de ce troisième livre de l'*Elenchos*, n'était-il pas précisément de démontrer *ex ipsis scripturis* l'erreur professée par les hérétiques, comme il est dit dans la Préface: *In hoc autem tertio* (sc. *libro*) *ex scripturis inferemus ostensiones*?[23] Enfin ce jugement ne fait que reprendre, sans rien lui ajouter de spécifique, la critique adressée aux Valentiniens tout au long du troisième livre. Contrairement aux Marcionites, les Valentiniens acceptent les écrits canoniques, mais ils en pervertissent l'interprétation et derrière les mêmes mots de la tradition, ils professent une autre foi.[24]

Il n'est donc pas nécessaire d'attribuer à l'évêque de Lyon une connaissance personnelle de l'*Evangile*, à partir des traits dont il se sert pour caractériser l'œuvre.

5. L'analyse du contexte et du mode de présentation a permis de dégager les renseignements contenus dans ce passage unique qui parle de l'*Evangile de Vérité*. Dans la mesure où il n'est pas absolument évident qu'Irénée ait eu entre les mains l'ouvrage qu'il mentionne, le titre *Veritatis Evangelium* est celui sous lequel on citait l'écrit à son époque (ca. 180). Irénée s'en prend avant tout à ce titre qui en grec était plus que probablement: Τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον. Sur l'auteur ou la date de composition, Irénée ne donne que des renseignements négatifs. L'écrit n'a ni ancienneté ni autorité apostoliques. Pour le contenu ou la forme, il n'y a rien à tirer de son témoignage puisque de toute évidence les quelques traits qu'il en donne, ne proviennent pas d'une analyse précise du texte

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[23] *Adv. haer.* 3,1,1. (Harvey 1) Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 92.

[24] A propos de leur interprétation de l'évangile de Jean: *Hi autem qui a Valentino sunt eo quod est secundum Johannem plenissime utentes ad ostensionem conjugationum suarum, ex ipso detegentur nihil recte dicentes* ..., *Adv. haer.* 3,11,7 (Harvey 46), Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 1.3.

Pour leur façon de manipuler l'évangile de Luc: *Hi vero qui a Valentino sunt, cessabunt a plurimo vaniloquio suo; ex hoc enim multas occasiones subtililoquii sui acceperunt, interpretari audentes male quae ab hoc bene sunt dicta, Adv. haer.* 3,14,4 (Harvey 78), Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 268.

D'une manière plus générale quant aux Ecritures: *Reliqui vero omnes falso scientiae nomine inflati, scripturas quidem confitentes, interpretatione vero convertunt ... qui a Valentino sunt, nominibus honestius utentes et Patrem et Dominum et Deum hunc qui est Fabricator ostendentes, propositum sive sectam blasphemiorem habent ..., Adv. haer.* 3,12,12 (Harvey 67), Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 242.

Enfin quant à leur profession de foi en général, voir tout le passage de 3,16,1 (Harvey 81–82), Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 276–278. Il y est dit entre autres: *lingua quidem unum Christum Jesum confitentes, divisi vero sententia.*

en question, mais reprennent sa critique plus générale de l'ensemble des écrits valentiniens.

Seul le titre offre un point d'attache intéressant avec le texte découvert près de Nag Hammadi. Toutefois si l'on accepte le titre présumé, courant à la fin du II[e] siècle (τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον), on est contraint d'admettre que ce n'est pas ainsi que l'auteur avait intitulé son œuvre. L'expression dans le contexte du début de l'*Evangile* ne manque pas d'être signifiante, mais le sens exclue justement qu'elle ait pu désigner l'œuvre elle-même dans la pensée de l'auteur.

E. L'unique témoin patristique en dehors d'Irénée à mentionner de quelque manière l'*Evangile de Vérité* est celui que l'on désigne sous le nom de Pseudo-Tertullien.[25] L'ouvrage *Adversus omnes haereses*,[26] relégué parmi les écrits de Tertullien, compte à peine une dizaine de pages. L'original était probablement grec et datait de la fin du III[e] siècle.[27] A la différence de l'œuvre d'Irénée, on y attribue à Valentin lui-même un évangile: *Evangelium habet etiam suum praeter haec nostra* (4,6). C'est d'ailleurs toute la notice. Il s'agit de savoir si ce témoignage est indépendant d'Irénée.

C'était l'avis du grand Théodore Zahn.[28] En réalité il semble difficile d'établir, pour un texte aussi court, une relation de dépendance avec le troisième livre de l'*Elenchos*. Si l'édition de Kroymann cite d'une manière continue des références au livre premier, jamais elle ne se réfère au troisième.

En dehors du passage qui nous concerne, il y a pourtant un cas certain de dépendance. En 7,1 il est question de l'hérétique Tatien[29] qui «nie la possibilité de salut pour Adam», et le texte poursuit: *quasi non, si rami*

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[25] Que l'*Evangile de Vérité* ne soit pas mentionné dans la liste des évangiles apocryphes du *decretum Gelasianum* (début du VIe siècle) ne permet guère de conclusions. W.C. van Unnik a déjà fait remarquer cette absence (*The Jung Codex*,90). En Occident le valentinisme s'est éteint au cours du IVe siècle, et l'auteur du décret confond valentiniens et manichéens (voir 5,9,11 et les remarques de E. von Dobschuetz, *Texte und Untersuch.*38 [Leipzig 1912] 324). Le fait que plusieurs autres évangiles apocryphes, connus par ailleurs, ne soient pas mentionnés non plus dans cette liste, relativise ce silence. L'auteur ne semble avoir retenu que les évangiles attribués à un apôtre (cf. *ibidem*,296). Pour le texte PL 59, 162–164 et *Texte und Unters.*38 (Leipzig 1912) 11–13; 48–60.

[26] *Corpus Christian.*2,1401–1410=CSEL 47 (1906) Kroymann,213–226.

[27] Cf. M.Schanz–C.Hosius–G.Krüger, *Geschichte der Römischen Literatur*, III (München 1922) 327, 406 (1905, 344, 437).

[28] *Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons* (Erlangen 1888) I, 749.

[29] Comparer aussi Irénée, *Adv. haer.* 1,28,1.

salvi fiunt, et radix salva sit. Or dans Irénée, au livre troisième, on lit à propos des hérétiques qui répètent la même négation de Tatien: *quasi magnum aliquid lucrentur si ille non salvetur* (*Adv. haer.*3,23,8). Le rapprochement serait sans doute plus frappant encore si nous avions affaire aux originaux grecs. Il est facile du moins de reconnaître la même structure de phrase (*quasi non ... si ...* et *quasi si ... non*) et le même thème (les conséquences du salut d'Adam). Chez Irénée la tournure est ironique, tandisque le Pseudo-Tertullien a introduit une comparaison qui paraphrase Romains 11,26. Cette transposition s'imposait puisqu'à la différence d'Irénée (*lucrentur*), le Pseudo-Tertullien ne considérait que le seul Tatien. En outre ce changement suit un procédé qui est bien dans le goût de l'auteur.[30] La dépendance par rapport à Irénée est dans ce cas assez évidente.

En conséquence, il n'est pas exclu qu'également pour le renseignement sur Valentin en 4,6, le Pseudo-Tertullien dépende d'Irénée. Mais s'il en dépend, pourquoi l'a-t-il transformé? Ce que sa source éventuelle en effet, attribue, assez vaguement d'ailleurs, aux milieux valentiniens, lui le met directement au compte de l'hérésiarque. Cependant, la fresque historique que présente l'*Adversus omnes haereses*, s'en tient aux hérétiques en personne, sans se soucier beaucoup des hérésies comme écoles ou factions dont la menace serait d'actualité, comme c'était le cas chez Irénée. Dans cette présentation des hérétiques, un grand principe régit toute leur succession: celui qui est à l'origine d'une hérésie est tenu comme supérieur et donc pire que tous ceux qui viennent après lui. Le principe est d'ailleurs formulé explicitement en 3,3: *Nemo discipulus super magistrum, nec servus super dominum.* Ainsi l'on voit attribué à Cerdon, le maître de Marcion, la sélection faite dans le Nouveau Testament,[31] alors qu'Irénée l'attribuait constamment à Marcion. De même ce que *l'Elenchos* au premier livre attribuait aux Valentiniens, le Pseudo-Tertullien le présente comme les dires de Valentin: à deux reprises (4,3 et 4), on trouve transposés les λέγουσιν et ὡς λέγουσιν d'Irénée[32] en *inquit*.[33] Il n'est donc pas du tout

[30] Ainsi en 3,3 est insérée la citation de Matth.10,24: *Nemo discipulus super dominum.* De même en 6,2 on trouve cité Matth.7,17: *Omnis arbor bona bonos fructus facit, mala autem malos.* Une même note sapientielle d'inspiration néo-testamentaire caractérise les trois passages.

[31] *Adv. omnes haeres.*6,1.

[32] *Adv. haer.*1,4,2.

[33] La différence notée plus haut entre les deux auteurs pour le passage qui concernait Tatien, est en fait du même ordre.

surprenant de voir attribué à Valentin personnellement ce qui pour Irénée n'était le fait que des disciples (*quod ab his non olim conscriptum est*).

Cette unique petite phrase sur l'évangile de Valentin contient d'ailleurs d'autres indices qui trahissent sa dépendance par rapport au passage d'Irénée (3,11,9). Notons tout d'abord l'élément comparatif, commun aux deux textes: *habet suum praeter haec nostra – plura habere quam sunt ipsa evangelia.* Bien sûr, dans les deux cas nous nous trouvons en face d'une traduction. Mais au-delà des mots, l'idée même de présenter cet «évangile» comme cinquième, en concurrence avec les quatre évangiles canoniques, rappelle bien la problématique et le contexte d'Irénée. Le curieux *praeter haec nostra* apparaît de plus comme une solution un peu maladroite (voir les hésitations de la tradition manuscrite) pour transposer le *quam sunt ipsa evangelia* du texte d'Irénée, sans réemployer le mot d'évangile. *Nostra*, forme personnelle, est d'autant plus surprenant que tout le genre littéraire de l'écrit vise à un récit objectif, sans référence ni à celui qui conduit le discours, ni au lecteur. Il est facile encore de sentir comment dans le *evangelium habet suum* résonne le *plura habere quam sunt ipsa evangelia.*

En conclusion, il semble bien que le Pseudo-Tertullien en ce passage sur l'*Evangile* comme en 7,1, dépende du troisième livre d'Irénée. La modification qu'il y apporte correspond à ses propres habitudes littéraires et n'a pas de portée objective. Nous ne pouvons tirer de cette mention aucune information qui viendrait compléter ou s'ajouter au témoignage d'Irénée.

F. En finale de cette critique externe, il est permis de réunir les conclusions:

1. L'absence de titre codicologique au second traité du Codex Jung s'explique, non pas parce que l'ouvrage n'avait pas encore de titre à l'époque où il fut mis par écrit, ni parce que sa première phrase était considérée par le copiste comme le titre, mais simplement parce que l'un des scribes du Codex en question a la particularité (exceptionnelle par rapport aux treize codices découverts) de ne pas indiquer le titre en tête ni à la suite des textes qu'il copie.

2. L'auteur de l'*Evangile* n'entendait pas à proprement parler intituler son ouvrage par ses premiers mots, même s'il y a dans la première phrase une annonce du sujet, qui est une véritable présentation de l'ouvrage. Cet aspect de l'exorde permet de comprendre comment, plus tard, les premiers mots ont pu devenir le titre de l'écrit.

3. L'évolution sémantique du mot εὐαγγέλιον au IIe siècle a très

certainement pu favoriser le choix des premiers mots du texte comme son titre.

4. Du témoignage de S. Irénée (*Adv. haer.* 3,11,9) on ne peut retenir que la triple mention du titre: *Veritatis Evangelium*. L'ordre des mots en latin correspond sans doute à la séquence grecque: τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον. Cette construction à la fois rend bien compte de la polémique particulière qu'Irénée livre au titre, et cadre parfaitement avec le contexte du début de l'*Evangile*, même si dans un sens bien différent de celui qu'y donne Irénée. Ainsi τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εὐαγγέλιον paraissent bien avoir été les premiers mots de l'original grec, et le titre sous lequel on désignait l'ouvrage à l'époque d'Irénée.

5. Le témoignage du Pseudo-Tertullien ici comme presque partout ailleurs dépend manifestement des écrits de l'évêque de Lyon. Ce qu'il en altère dans le passage considéré, est de son propre cru.[34]

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[34] Dans notre article, L'Evangile de Vérité. Critique et lecture, *New Test. Stud.* 22 (1975–76) 243–275, nous entreprenons une comparaison des fragments de Valentin avec l'*Evangile de Vérité*. Du moins selon cette analyse, le texte copte s'avère bien être une traduction d'un écrit authentique de l'hérésiarque.

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THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE TITULUS FASCIOLAE AND ITS CONNECTION WITH POPE GREGORY THE GREAT

BY

JOAN M. PETERSEN

Many visitors to Rome have become acquainted with the basilica of SS Nereus and Achilleus, the cemeterial church at the catacomb of Santa Domitilla, and have been intrigued by the story of its virtual disappearance in the early Middle Ages and its rediscovery by G. B. De Rossi in the 1870s. Some of them may also have found their way to the charming little church with the same dedication, which is situated in the so-called Passeggiata Archeologica, near the baths of Caracalla. There they will have been shown a marble pontifical throne upon which are carved the words: *S. Gregorius hic habuit homiliam vicesimam octavam*, followed by the beginning and ending of the *Homily* itself. It probably occurs to few of them to doubt the truth of this inscription or to speculate whether there is any connection between these two churches with the same dedication.

Let us first consider the pontifical throne and its inscription. The church by the baths of Caracalla which, as we shall see shortly, is of at least fourth-century origin, fell into a ruinous condition between 1475, when it was restored by Sixtus IV in preparation for the Holy Year, and 1594, when Caesar Baronius, at his own request, became its titular cardinal. He restored the church in a scholarly manner to the form of an early Christian Roman basilica, and it is still very much as he left it, in accordance with his wish, expressed in an inscription at the church, that his successors should hand it on untouched: ... *quisquis fuerit, rogo te per gloriam Dei et per merita horum martyrum, nihil demito, nihil minuito nec mutato* ... The pontifical throne was created from a number of fragments at the time of the restoration and it was Baronius himself who caused the inscription about the *Homily* and the quotation from it to be carved there.[1]

[1] V. Lais, *Memorie del Titolo di Fasciola* (Rome 1880) 48. See also O. Marucchi, *Eléments d'archéologie chrétienne*, vol. 3, *Les basiliques et églises de Rome* (2 ed., Paris and Rome 1909) 63.

It seems from his own writings[2] that Baronius was convinced that this was the church where Gregory preached, but even though the cemeterial basilica was lost to view in his day, there was literary evidence available which might have led him to be cautious. In the first place there is a sentence in the *Homily* itself, which Gregory delivered on 12 May, the feast-day of SS Nereus and Achilleus: *Sancti isti, ad quorum tumbam consistimus.*[3] When Baronius first took in hand the restoration of the church, the bodies of these saints lay in Sant' Adriano,[4] to which they appear to have been transferred in the thirteenth century by Gregory IX. There is no evidence that they ever lay in SS Nereus and Achilleus by the baths of Caracalla before they were brought there by Baronius at the completion of the restoration in 1597.[5] Secondly, the heading of the manuscripts of the *Homily* might have led him to hesitate. The majority, followed by Migne, read *habita ad populum in basilica sanctorum Nerei et Achillei,* but one of the best of them (Cod. reg. Sueciae) supplies the even more explicit *habita ... in coemeterio.* This last phrase must have been known to Baronius from the *Liber Pontificalis,* where it is stated that Pope John I (523–6) *refecit cymeterium beatorum Nerei et Achillei, via Ardeatina,* since he refers to the relevant passage in a comment in his edition of the *Martirologium Romanum.*[6]

Apart from the foregoing evidence, the church by the baths of Caracalla does not appear under the name of SS Nereus and Achilleus until the synod lists of 595, when each of its priests is described as *presbiter tituli sanctorum Nerei et Achillei,*[7] whereas internal evidence suggests 591 as the date of the sermon. It is certainly not later than 593.[8] It seems that prior

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[2] *Ep.* 63, ed. R. Albericius, *Venerabilis Caesaris Baronii epistolae et opuscula* (Rome 1770) 79.

[3] PL 76, 1212C.

[4] The greater part of the remains of SS Nereus and Achilleus were transferred to the church of Sant' Adriano in 1228 by Gregory IX, as a contemporary inscription on a stone at the church testified. When the church was secularized and restored to its former condition as the Senate House in the Forum, the stone was transferred to the Frate Mercedari in the Via Regina, where Dott. Guerrieri saw it.

[5] Cod. Vall. G99, cited by A. Guerrieri, *La Chiesa dei SS Nereo ed Achilleo* (Vatican City 1951) 63. See also the letter of Baronius cited in note 2 above.

[6] See PL 76,1210; *LP* I, p. 276. *Martirologium Romanum* (Venice 1604) 270.

[7] MGH Epp. I, pp. 366–7.

[8] The *Homiliae in Evangelia* are to be assigned to the first three years of Gregory the Great's pontificate, 590–3. The twenty-eighth *Homily,* since it was delivered on 12 May, cannot belong to the first year, because Gregory did not become Pope until 3 September. In view of PL 76,1212D, *Ubique mors, ubique luctus, ubique desolatio,* etc., it seems appropriate to 591, the year of floods, plagues, and other disasters.

to 595 the church was known as the *titulus Fasciolae*; its priests were certainly described as such in the synod lists for 499.[9] There is general agreement among scholars as to the building to which this ancient name should be assigned. The writer of the sixth-century *Acta SS Processi et Martiniani* tells the story that when St Peter was proceeding to his martyrdom, a bandage or *fasciola* fell from the wound in his foot which had been caused by his fetters: *Beatissimo autem Petro apostolo, cuius pedem attriverant compedes ferrei, cecidit fasciola apud sepem in Via Nova.*[10] Now the *Via Nova* is the older name for the modern Via di Terme di Caracalla, in which the church is situated. Though there is apparently no difficulty in connection with the identification of the street, several objections have been raised in connection with the name *fasciola* for the church. It has been pointed out that where a genitive occurs in the name of one of the titular churches, as in the synod lists for 499, it invariably refers either to the original proprietor of the house in which the Christian congregation first met or, from the late fifth or early sixth century onwards, to the patron saint of the church.[11] It has therefore been suggested that *Fasciola* is the name of the householder. Unfortunately for the upholders of this theory, no such name as *Fasciola* occurs in any Roman prosopography, and attempts to read *Fabiola* instead were thwarted long ago by the discovery of an inscribed epitaph at St Paul's-without-the-Walls to one Cinnamius Opas *lector tituli Fasciole*, which can be dated 377 precisely. Since the form *de Fasciola* also occurs, De Rossi, J.P.Kirsch, and others have tried to relate this expression to a geographical area, because in the names of the titular churches, *de* followed by an ablative invariably denotes a place-name.[12] These also were not very successful. Kirsch suggested that the area which includes the church site may have been called Fasciola, but there is no evidence for this elsewhere. De Rossi cited a papyrus of 854, which mentions *Fundus Fasciola*; but this does not take us much farther. In late Latin *fundus* can mean a property belonging to a church, and by the ninth century, case endings were not always strictly observed. Dott. Agnese Guerrieri, a more recent writer on the church, has found a phrase in a single manuscript of the *Notitia Urbis Romae* which she believes to be significant: *aream Apollinis et splenis.*

[9] MGH AA XII, pp. 410ff.

[10] *AA SS*, July vol. 1, 304–5.

[11] G.B.De Rossi, *BAC* (1875) 49–56; J.P.Kirsch, *Die römischen Titelkirchen in Altertum* (Paderborn 1918) 92.

[12] G.Marini, *I papiri diplomatici raccolti ed illustrati* (Rome 1805) 15.

She quotes the odd suggestion that the genitive singular of *splen* has been in some way confused with the dative or ablative plural of *splenium*, meaning bandage, and that this is a reference to a mineral spring dedicated to Apollo and beneficial to internal disorders. This, however, is somewhat far-fetched. The passage is plainly so corrupt that the scribes of the other manuscripts fought shy of reproducing it; one is tempted to emend it to read *apollinaris et splenii*, two words used by Pliny the Elder for henbane and spleenwort, a kind of fern, which would provide a botanical description appropriate to a semi-rural area.[13]

On the whole it seems more reasonable to treat the *Acta Sanctorum* with a little more respect. Admittedly they contain a good deal that is fanciful and unreliable, but there is probably a substratum of truth in the stories. It may well be that the episode of the bandage really occurred and that the Christians of Rome were so struck by it that they founded a chapel or oratory on the site soon after the event, perhaps in a house already existing there. This might come to be known as the chapel of the Fasciola, in which case *de Fasciola* could come to mean "of the place of the bandage". This would account for the name being different in character from those of the other titular churches and perhaps for a degree of hesitation on the part of the Christian public as to which form of it to adopt.

Let us now see what light has been thrown on the question of the identification of these two churches and the connection between them, by the discovery of the cemeterial basilica.

In the first place, the discovery of archaeological evidence on the site removed any possible doubt that this church was the "lost" cemeterial basilica of SS Nereus and Achilleus. A column shaft which can still be seen at the church, came to light, on which was carved the name Achilleus and a representation of his martyrdom. In addition to this, fragments of the Damasian epigram in honour of the two saints were discovered; this epigram was already known from the Einsiedeln *Itinerarium*, where it is described as being *in sepulcro Nerei et Achillei, Via Appia*.[14]

Secondly, further discoveries testified to the connection between the two churches. Inscriptions on two stones discovered in 1874–5 at the

[13] Cod. Vat. 3327, cited by Guerrieri, 63. For Pliny the Elder's use of *apollinaris* and *splenium* as names for herbs see *Nat. Hist.* 26,14,87,140; 25,5,20.

[14] For the fragmentary inscription, see G.B.De Rossi, *Inscr. chr.* (Rome 1857–61) vol. 2, no. 101. The complete text is in *Epigrammata Damasiana*, ed. A.Ferrua (Vatican City 1942) 101ff.; R.A.Lanciani, *Itinerarium Einsidlense* (Rome 1891) 440.

cemeterial basilica contain the names of two *lectores de Fasciola*; a *transenna* also found there bears a fragmentary inscription which can be reconstructed as *de Fasciola clericus*. Two further inscriptions found in this area testify to the burial of lay people from the neighbourhood of the baths of Caracalla in the cemetery. One of these, which was noted by Antonio Bosio, the pioneer explorer of the catacombs, is in honour of a woman called Pollecla who sold vegetables in the Via Nova, the other of a bath attendant at the baths of Caracalla.[15]

The cemeterial basilica and the titular church were probably linked together under the arrangements which are attributed by the writer of the *Liber Pontificalis* in the third century to Pope Dionysius: *Hic presbiteris ecclesias dedit et cymeteria et parrochias dioecesis constituit*, and which were set out by Innocent I in his decretal to Decentius of Eugubium in 416.[16] The titular church also seems to have been grouped under St Paul's-without-the-Walls. We know from the *Liber Pontificalis* that under Pope Simplicius (468–83) there was an arrangement whereby priests remained on duty for a week at a time at St Peter's and at St Paul's and St Laurence's-without-the-Walls, to administer baptism and hear confessions, different regions of the city being assigned to each church.[17] St Paul's clergy looked after *Regio I*, in which the titular church of SS Nereus and Achilleus was situated. The epitaph to Cinnamius Opas, to which reference has already been made, and another to Felix, who is probably identical with the Felix, father of Pope Felix III (483–93) and *presbiter tituli Fasciolae*, mentioned in the *Liber Pontificalis*,[18] suggest that this arrangement may have begun as early as 377 and certainly have continued after the death of Simplicius. It sounds like an early form of group or team ministry. Possibly Simplicius may only have been regularizing what had long been established by custom.

To return to the connection with Pope Gregory the Great, De Rossi was probably the first person in modern times to realize that the twenty-eighth *Homily* was delivered in the cemeterial basilica. He at once saw the significance of the words *Sancti isti, ad quorum tumbam consistimus*, and looked in vain for traces of the pontifical throne. It is reported that when

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[15] Antonio Bosio, *Roma sotteranea* (Rome 1632) bk III, cap. XXIII, p. 214; for the text of both inscriptions see G. Marchi, *Monumenti primitivi dell' arte cristiana* (Rome 1844) 27.

[16] *LP* I, p. 157, especially note 3.

[17] *LP* I, p. 249.

[18] De Rossi, *Inscr. chr.*, vol. I, nos 262, 831; *LP* I, p. 252.

the excavations were first carried out, a small *graffito* could be seen in the conch of the apse, showing a sacred minister in the act of praying or preaching, but today it is scarcely visible.[19]

Three questions remain to be answered:

1. Why did the *titulus Fasciolae* come to be known at the end of the sixth century as the *titulus SS Nerei et Achillei*? The answer is that we have no knowledge of any definite occasion when the change was effected; we can only note that it was part of a movement which had been gathering force during the sixth century, between the synods of Symmachus in 499 and Gregory the Great in 595, whereby the titular churches of Rome came to be known by the names of patron saints rather than of the original proprietors of the houses used for worship by the early Christians, on the sites of which they stood. It was during this period that the *titulus Eudociae* became St Peter-ad-Vincula, the *titulus Lucinae* St Laurence *in Lucina*, and the *titulus Pammachii* SS John and Paul on the Caelian hill.[20] The difficulty about this explanation is that the establishment of the cult of SS Nereus and Achilleus at the church in the Via Nova would, in accordance with Canon 14 of the Council of Carthage (401),[21] require the transfer of some relic of each of these saints to the church, and we have no record of any such transfer. This might be because at this date it was something too obvious to require mention. It is conceivable that the heads of the saints, which Baronius found preserved separately from the bodies, may have sojourned here temporarily, but there is no evidence for this.

2. Why did a scholar and antiquarian such as we know Baronius to have been, make this mistake over the identification of the church and its connection with Pope Gregory the Great? Here it would seem that there was a not unnatural misunderstanding of the word *coemeterium* which is responsible for the error. In Baronius's day the exploration of the catacombs was in its infancy and it had not yet been realized that *coemeterium* could refer both to the catacomb as burial place and to the cemeterial basilica. Consequently he failed to grasp the distinction between *coemeterium* and *basilica* on the one hand and *ecclesia* and *titulus* on the

[19] De Rossi, *BAC*, ser. 2 (1874) 15. See also Marucchi, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, *Le catacombe romane* (Rome 1905) 118.

[20] See L. Duchesne, Les titres presbitéraux, in: *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire* (Paris 1887) 217–33.

[21] J. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum ... collectio*, 3 (Florence 1759) 971.

other. A similar failure on the part of later scholars has led to some confusion over the passages in the *Liber Pontificalis* relating to these two churches; once, however, it has been grasped that *ecclesia* and *titulus* refer to the church in the Via di Terme di Caracalla and *coemeterium* to the cemeterial basilica and that in connection with the latter, St Petronilla or the Via Ardeatina is usually mentioned, all becomes clear. De Rossi was perhaps the first person in modern times to see the significance of *coemeterium*, but in dealing with the restoration of the *ecclesia* by Leo III,[22] he wrongly assigned the description in the *Liber Pontificalis* to the cemeterial basilica. Excavations carried on at the *titulus* by Mr J. H. Parker, the founder of the well-known firm of Oxford booksellers, which were almost contemporary with those at the cemeterial basilica, revealed fourth-century brick walls and pools of stagnant water, and repairs to the pavement in 1941 floods such as were described in the *Liber Pontificalis*.[23] The situation of the church built by Leo III in 814 and heavily restored by Baronius is described there as being *iuxta ecclesiam noviter a fundamentis, in loco superiore*. The walls discovered by Parker, of which the only photographic record has unfortunately been lost, are described as "a few metres behind the apse of the church", but following the curve of the apse, which fits with *iuxta eandem ecclesiam*, and the present building certainly stands on higher ground than its neighbour, San Sisto Vecchio. It looks therefore as though Parker discovered traces of that church where Cinnamius Opas was *lector*.

3. Finally, in spite of the literary evidence and the discoveries of De Rossi almost exactly a hundred years ago, why is the tradition that Gregory the Great preached his twenty-eighth *Homily* in the church by the baths of Caracalla still so widely accepted? There seem to be two reasons, both rather intangible. In the first place, there is the question of atmosphere. When once a place has become associated in the popular mind, even in error, with some holy man or woman or some religious event, it often conveys an indefinable but powerful sense of the numinous which attracts countless visitors. This phenomenon may be observed with regard to certain sites in the Holy Land, such as Mount Tabor, which has become inseparably associated with the Transfiguration, though Mount Hermon has probably a better claim to historicity. Something similar but on a smaller scale and in a lower key may have occurred at SS Nereus

[22] De Rossi, *BAC*, ser. 2 (1874) 26.
[23] *LP* II, p. 33; *NBAC* XI (1904–5) 274–5; Guerrieri, 54.

and Achilleus. The persistence of the tradition may also be regarded as an instance of human conservatism in religious matters and of the time-lag between popular knowledge and the discoveries of scholars.

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REVIEW

Les œuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie, publiées sous le patronage de l'université de Lyon, par Roger Arnaldez, Jean Pouilloux et Claude Mondésert.

24. *De specialibus legibus*, I et II. Introduction, traduction et notes par Suzanne Daniel. Paris, Editions du Cerf, 1975. LXVIII, 398 pp. F. 185.

La plupart des ouvrages de Philon consiste en commentaires, littérales et allégoriques, de la *Genèse*. Le *De specialibus legibus* est consacré à une exposition systématique de la Loi de Moyse. Pour faire une systématisation on a besoin des catégories générales, dans lesquelles on peut placer le matériel à systématiser. Comment classifier toutes ces prescriptions de la Loi mosaïque? Philon le fait selon les Dix Commandements. Tout article du Décalogue constitue une catégorie générale, un principe s'illustrant par une série de prescriptions (cf. p. XVI). En faisant cela Philon dépendait peut-être d'une tradition ancienne, qui ancrait les maintes prescriptions, souvent très ‹spéciales›, dans les Dix Commandements pour souligner leur importance.

Le présent ouvrage contient les deux premiers livres du *De specialibus legibus*, dans lesquels Philon traite les lois qui ressortissent aux cinq premiers commandements, c'est-à-dire à ceux qui expriment les devoirs de l'homme envers Dieu et ses parents. Les deux premiers commandements occasionnent une discussion sur l'existence de Dieu, sa transcendance et son culte. Parmi les troisième et quatrième commandements sont traités les vœux, les fêtes, le sabbat, l'année sabbatique, le jubilé, le jeûne. Philon rattache le cinquième commandement aux précédents parce que les devoirs envers les parents se trouvent «à la frontière des choses divines et humaines». Le premier livre commence par un développement consacré à la circoncision, le deuxième finit en rappelant les châtiments et les récompenses qui sanctionnent la transgression et l'observance de ces préceptes.

Dans une introduction instructive Mme Daniel discute la composition et le contenu des deux livres et elle résume en vingt pages la doctrine

(théologie, éthique et spiritualité) de Philon, en tant qu'elle se manifeste dans ces livres.

Le texte grec a été imprimé d'une façon consciencieuse. La traduction claire et exacte, est accompagnée de maintes notes qui montrent la compétence de Mme Daniel sur le terrain grec et égyptien, et surtout sur le terrain juif.

Dans un seul cas je ne peux pas suivre son interprétation. En 1,328 Philon mentionne une doctrine (δόξα) qui abolit les Idées et par cela confond toutes choses et les ramène à cet état de l'être antérieur à la séparation des éléments, qui ne connaît ni forme ni qualité (ἡ ἀναιροῦσα δόξα ἰδέας πάντα συγχεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνωτέρω τῶν στοιχείων οὐσίαν τὴν ἄμορφον καὶ ἄποιον ἐκείνην ἄγει), c'est-à-dire à l'état de la matière informe (ἄμορφος ὕλη). Mais, Philon dit en par. 329, cela est absurde: ἐξ ἐκείνης γὰρ πάντ' ἐγέννησεν ὁ θεός, οὐκ ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτός. Mme Daniel ne rapporte pas ἐξ ἐκείνης à ὕλη, mais à δόξα, à cause d'un Ἡ δὲ à la fin du paragraphe, qui, selon elle, fait pendant à ἐκείνης et qui ne peut s'interpréter qu'en référence à δόξα (p. 208, n. 2). Elle traduit: «Selon la doctrine des Idées (= ἐξ ἐκείνης), Dieu a créé l'univers, mais sans se consacrer toutefois lui-même à cette tâche.» Mais les mots suivants réfutent cette traduction forcée. Philon dit: «car Dieu ne pouvait pas entrer en contact avec la matière.» Evidemment ces mots expliquent οὐκ ἐφαπτόμενον αὐτός. Alors l'objet de ἐφαπτόμενος n'est pas «cette tâche», mais ‹la matière›. Par conséquent, la matière doit figurer dans cette phrase; la seule solution est d'assumer qu'elle est présente dans ἐξ ἐκείνης. Philon dit que «Dieu a créé toutes choses de la matière, sans la toucher lui-même»; ce qui est une idée bien connue dans les spéculations philosophiques sur la création du monde. (Alors Ἡ δὲ ne fait pas pendant à ἐκείνης.)

L'édition des œuvres de Philon touche à son terme. Il reste encore à publier les *Quaestiones* et quelques fragments. Le présent volume est une fin digne de l'édition des ouvrages transmis en langue grecque.

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WHERE DO DEVILS LIVE?

A PROBLEM IN THE TEXTUAL CRITICISM OF EPHESIANS 6,12

BY

CHRISTOPHER J. A. LASH

I

The 39th *Cathedral Homily* of Severus of Antioch[1] was preached on the first Sunday of Lent, 514, and is devoted to the subject of fasting, but almost half of it consists of a fairly detailed exegesis of Ephesians 6,12. The following is a literal translation of this verse as it appears in the seventh century Syriac version of the Homilies of Severus, made by Jacob of Edessa:

> For our wrestling is not against blood and flesh, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers-of-the-world of the darkness of this world, against the spirits of wickedness which are in the 'celestials'.[2]

It will be noticed at once that this lemma includes the Koiné addition τοῦ αἰῶνος between σκότους and τούτου, but since Severus' New Testament text is normally that of the Koiné, this is what one might have expected. I do not, however, think that the addition stood in Severus' Greek for two reasons. In the first place, the comment on this phrase later in the homily speaks simply of "this darkness" (*d-ḥešûkâ hānâ*) and the exegesis seems to suppose the shorter text:

> Equally Paul, in naming the demons "rulers-of-the-world", by what he adds immediately afterwards, reduces the scope of its meaning by saying "of this darkness" (*d-ḥešûkâ hānâ*), as if he were to say: I say "rulers-of-the-world" every time there is question of something which owns the darkness and the evil which is widespread in the world.[3]

In the second place, the anonymous sixth century version of this homily does not include the addition in the original lemma. Unfortunately we know next to nothing about the transmission of the Greek text of Severus'

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* The greater part of this note was originally read to the International Biblical Congress at Oxford in 1973.

[1] M. Brière, F. Graffin and C. Lash, *Patrologia Orientalis* 36,3, No. 169 (Paris 1972) 504–521.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 504, ll. 17–19.

[3] *Op. cit.*, 508, ll. 28–34.

writings, but this difference between the two Syriac versions leads me to suggest that the relationship between them is more complex than is commonly supposed and that a comparison of such differences may throw interesting light both upon the history of the transmission of Severus' text and incidentally upon that of the biblical citations contained therein.[4] This is not without its importance, since we may have to admit that many of the differences between the two Syriac versions of the Homilies arose, not from the correcting of mistakes in the earlier version by Jacob of Edessa, as is commonly assumed, but from differences in the Greek text before the two translators. In the present instance it seems to me more than likely that Severus' text of Ephesians 6,12 was not that of the Koiné.

With regard to the Syriac versions of the New Testament at this point, the Peshitto also omits τοῦ αἰῶνος, while the Harclean includes it, but marked with an asterisk.[5] The Old Syriac, as it appears in St Ephrem's Commentary on the Diatessaron, would appear to have read simply "rulers of the world of darkness", without "this". It might be suggested that the earlier translator of Severus was using the Peshitto and Jacob of Edessa the Harclean. The differences of syntax and vocabulary, however, between the earlier version and the Peshitto elsewhere in the citation rule out the former possibility, but the close similarity between Jacob's version and the Harclean here and in other New Testament citations make it likely that Jacob, while translating the Greek text of Severus, used the Harclean version as the basis of his own.

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[4] For a more detailed discussion of this point see my paper to the 1971 Oxford International Patristics Congress: *The Scriptural Citations in the Homiliae Cathedrales of Severus of Antioch and the Textual Criticism of the Greek Old Testament* (to appear in *Studia Patristica*) and my contribution to the forthcoming Marcel Richard Festschrift: *Techniques of a Translator: Work-notes on the methods of Jacob of Edessa in translating the Homilies of Severus of Antioch.*

[5] The Harclean asterisk in fact covers the *two* words "of this world" (*d-'ālmâ hānâ*) which suggests that the text he was revising was more like that used by St Ephrem than that of the Peshitto as we have it. The Armenian version both of Ephrem's Commentary and of his Explanation of the Gospel seem to suppose "this darkness", but in both places the textual tradition is confused. See L. Leloir, St Ephrem, Commentaire de l'Évangile Concordant, *C.S.C.O.* 137, *Arm.* 1 (Louvain) 254, ll. 6–9, and G. Egan, St Ephraim: an Explanation of the Gospel, *C.S.C.O.*, 291 (Louvain 1968) 68. The Peshitto also reads "*your* wrestling" and "flesh and blood". In this it seems to follow the Old Syriac as well, as it appears both in St Ephrem and in the *Liber Graduum*. See J. Kerschensteiner, Der Altsyrische Paulustext, *C.S.C.O.* 315, *Subsidia* 37 (Louvain 1970) 81.

II

The main object of this note, however, is to draw attention to an unusual textual variant in the last part of the verse, in the phrase: τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, which may be literally, if inelegantly, rendered: "the spirituals of wickedness which are in the heavenlies", or more precisely in the final words: ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. This remark presented the Fathers, as it has indeed presented later commentators, with a problem, since in other places in the Epistle the expression τὰ ἐπουράνια would seem to refer to Heaven, with a capital H, the dwelling place of God.[6] How then can the "spirits of wickedness" be said to dwell ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις?[7] The answer given by the Fathers was twofold. Either the expression means nothing more than "in the sky", "in the air", or the preposition ἐν is to be taken as equivalent to περί or ὑπέρ; that is to say: our struggle is not about earthly matters but about heavenly ones. Basil[8] and Jerome[9] favour the former view, while Chrysostom[10] and Theodore of Mopsuestia, among others, favour the latter.[11] Modern writers on the whole reject Chrysostom's view and Abbot rejects that of Basil as well.[12] Von Soden says that the expression

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[6] 1,3. 20; 2,6; 3,10. The expression ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις is only found in these five places in the New Testament.

[7] In the discussion which followed this paper, Dr J.N.Birdsall suggested that similar theological qualms may also be responsible for the omission of the phrase in Papyrus 46. Part of the problem, of course, results from the failure of Greek and Syriac to make the distinction between "Heaven" and "sky". Thus Aphraates distinguishes two *šᵉmayâ* one above and the other below the firmament (*rᵉqîʿâ*) *Dem.*14 (P.S.1,628).

[8] See, for example, the sermon *Deus non est Auctor Malorum*, P.G.31,352, and his comment on Gen.1,8 (*Hom. in Hex.*3,8: Sources Chrétiennes 26bis [Paris 1968] 230), where he says that the firmament is the "heaven where the birds fly" and that the Scriptures call τὸν ὁρώμενον τόπον οὐρανόν.

[9] E.g. *In Isaiam* 10 (C.C.L.73,419) and *In Ephes.*1,2 and 3,6 (P.L.26,466 and 546).

[10] In his commentary on this verse, where he remarks that ἐν is equivalent to ὑπέρ (P.G.62,159). "Chrysostom", remarks Swete somewhat testily, "seems to have been the parent of this unsatisfactory explanation", *op.cit. infra* n.11, 191.

[11] Theodore's comment is: *Nam quod dicit 'in caelestibus'; ut dicat 'pro caelestibus', hoc est pro regno caelorum aduersus illos nobis certamen.* See H.B.Swete, *Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistulas B.Pauli Commentarii*, I (Cambridge 1880) xxixf. and 191. A Greek fragment of his comment on Eph.1,3 suggests that he took ἐν here as the equivalent of περί (P.G.66,913A). In this he is followed by Theodoret (P.G. 82,553). Among the later Greeks, Oecumenius and Theophylact follow the view of Chrysostom (P.G.118,1252 and 14,1129). Of the Latins, the Ambrosiaster and Pelagius (P.L.17,401 and 30,839) follow Basil.

[12] *I.C.C.* ad loc., where he remarks that "there is no proof however that τὰ ἐπουράνια meant the atmosphere, and this is not the meaning of the word elsewhere". This is not supported by the great Magical Papyrus, cited by Moulton-Milligan,

is "statt ὁ ἀήρ (2,2) gewählt",[13] but Findlay rejects the 'local' view and, "following the ancient Greek commentators", sees in the expression the location, that is the subject, of the struggle, "it marks out the battle-field". He would place a comma after πονηρίας.[14] Schlier in his commentary of 1957 lines up, incompletely, the opposing forces: the odds are overwhelmingly in favour of the 'local' signification of the expression against Chrysostom's view.[15]

Severus, to return to the Fathers, following the Rabbinic principle that a single passage of Scripture may have a number of meanings,[16] accepts both Basil's view and that of Chrysostom, and he summarises both, but in addition he mentions a third way of dealing with the passage which he rejects out of hand:

> Others however, not being learned in Holy Writ and not understanding how it is expressed, give indeed the sense of this explanation (*sc.* that the reference is to "the air"), but they have dared to corrupt the expression and had the temerity to write instead of "in the celestials" (*bašmāyānyātâ*), "under heaven" (*tᵉḥeit šᵉmayâ*) and with the explanation provided by this impious fraud they conceal their own sloth and ignorance, for when they say "under heaven", we have every reason to suppose that they mean the "air".[17]

From this it seems clear that for Severus there are people who, far from

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which, though admittedly only of the third century a.d., quite clearly considers ἐπουράνιος as equivalent to ἀέριος. ἐπεουράνιον ἢ ἀέριον εἴτε ἐπίγειον εἴτε ὑπόγειον ἢ καταχθόνιον.

[13] In his commentary on Ephesians, *Hand-Kommentar zum Neuen Testament* (Leipzig 1893) 150–151.

[14] *The Expositor's Bible* (London 1904) 407. He firmly rejects any idea that Paul is influenced here by late Jewish ideas on the abode of the demons.

[15] H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Epheser* (Düsseldorf 1957) 45–48, especially the note 2 on p. 45. E. Percy, *Die Probleme der Kolosser- und Epheserbriefe* (Lund 1946) 151s. and 255ss. contains an important discussion. He remarks that "nach jüdisch-urchristlicher Auffassung auch die bösen Geister im Himmel verweilen", while Conzelmann, *N.T.D.*, 18 (Göttingen ¹¹1968) 89, writes: "Der Zwischenraum zwischen Gott und uns ('die Himmel') ist der Sitz der Mächte." J. L. Houlden, *Paul's Letters from Prison* (London 1970) 266s., holds the rather different view that the expression everywhere in the Epistle describes the place of Christ's triumph, "the upper realms above the earth, where angelic forces formerly reigned and whence Christ has now deposed them ... The word signifies less the place then the powers which had ruled there". See also Traub, art. οὐρανός, *T.W.N.T.*, 5, 540. The extraordinary remark: "Eph. 6. 12 liest Koine τοῦ αἰῶνος für ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις", and which has been reproduced unchanged in the English translation, should be corrected.

[16] Cf., for example, *Sanh.* 34a: "The School of Rabbi Yismaël taught: *And as the forge-hammer shatters the rock* (Jer. 23,29). As this forge-hammer scatters sparks, so a single text gives off meanings." Severus returns often to this idea; see *Hom.* 45 (P.O. 36,118 and 124), *Hom.* 67 (P.O. 8,263) and *Hom.* 72 (P.O. 12,73).

[17] P.O. 36,510, ll. 13–19.

simply interpreting the Scriptures,[18] have actually altered the text. Fortunately we are able to restore the Greek here with reasonable certainty, since the Syriac manuscript of Jacob's version, which dates from 867/8 a.d., has glossed the two words by adding in the margin, in Greek Uncials, ΕΠΟΥΡΑΝΙΟΙC and ΥΠΟΥΡΑΝΙΟΙC. My examination[19] of the Greek glosses in the manuscripts of this version has convinced me that they go back to the Greek *Vorlage* and are not scribal retroversions from the Syriac.

Here however our problems begin. Whom is Severus criticising? Why does he go out of this way to denounce this particular alteration as 'impious'? – and he returns to the attack a few lines further down.[20] In the first place it would appear that this variant is unknown to the Greek manuscript tradition of the Epistle to the Ephesians. Such a reading is cited in no apparatus criticus, not even that of von Soden. But the variant itself is not wholly unknown, since it is the reading supposed by the Peshitto and may well have been that of the Old Syriac as well.[21] The former has the expression: *rûḥê bîšātâ daṯḥeit šᵉmayâ* "the spirits of wickedness which (are) under heaven". Elsewhere the Peshitto translates ἐπουράνιος by *šᵉmayānâ, men šᵉmayâ* or *bašmayâ* (*always* thus in Ephesians, except for our verse). The Harclean translates the standard Greek text, but records the variant in its margin: "in those which (are) under heavens" *b-halein daṯḥeit šᵉmayâ*. This gloss is not an exact reproduction of the Peshitto and one may therefore legitimately ask whether it is an attempt to render more accurately in Syriac the Greek ἐν τοῖς ὑπουρανίοις.[22] This Syriac tradition is followed in Coptic by the Sahidic

[18] Chrysostom, for example, on Eph. 2,2 (P.G. 62,31): κατὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν, φησὶ τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ πνεύματος. τοῦτο πάλιν φησὶν, ὅτι τὸν ὑπουράνιον ἔχει τόπον.

[19] See my article for the M. Richard Festschrift mentioned above. To give but one example. In *Homily* 58 (P.O. 36,496) Severus, in speaking of anointing, twice uses the same word, according to Jacob's version (*mᵉšaḥ*). The marginal gloss however uses two different Greek words (ἀλείφειν and χρίειν) to gloss the one Syriac.

[20] *Ibid.* ll. 34 s.

[21] Always assuming that St Ephrem's text has not here suffered contamination from later Syriac versions, he seems to have read: "and the rulers of the world of darkness which (is/are) under heaven". Cf. Kerschensteiner, *op. cit.*, 81. The Armenian versions of Ephrem's Commentaries read "under". See Leloir and Egan, *opp. citt. supra* n. 6. The Armenian version of the New Testament also supposes ὑπ-, since it reads *wor i nerkʿoy yerknicʿ*. This is confirmed by the fact that in the four other places in the Epistle the word ἐπουράνιος is rendered simply by *yerknawors*, that is "heavenly". From the Syriac it is not possible to decide whether the relative is to be taken with "rulers", "world" or "darkness".

[22] M. Black, The Syrian Versional Tradition, in: *Die alten Übersetzungen des Neuen Testaments. Die Kirchenväterzitate und Lektionare*, ed. K. Aland, Arbeiten zur Neu-

version and by the Ge'ez in Ethiopic.[23] Finally the reading turns up in Latin in the writings of Gregory of Elvira († after 392). In two passages in his *Tractatus Origenis de Libris Ss. Scripturarum* this verse is quoted and on both occasions the preposition used is *sub* not *in caelestibus*.[24] The original editors, Batiffol and Wilmart, took the manuscript B, which reads *in*, as the basis of their edition[25] and for this reason the reading *sub* is only recorded as a variant in Frede's edition of Ephesians for the *editio major* of the Vetus Latina.[26] Gregory's latest editor, Bulhart, shows, I think convincingly, that the manuscript F, which reads *sub*, represents the more ancient form of the text.[27] Both Bulhart and Batiffol are of the opinion that the *Tractatus* is a translation from Greek and Batiffol is convinced that it is authenic Origen.[28] Whether this latter point is so or not, we are I think justified in asserting that a Greek reading ἐν τοῖς ὑπουρανίοις was known in fourth century Spain.

III

It would appear that Severus' source for this attack on those who change the text here is Theodore of Mopsuestia, for in the Latin version of the latter's commentary on this verse we read:

> Quidam uero pro multa fatuitate mutauerunt illud quod dixerat, in caelestibus, et ita legere uoluerunt dicentes: 'in his quae sub caelo sunt', existimantes dicere apostolum, quoniam sub caelum nobis est certamen cum illis. nouam adiectionem

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testamentlichen Textforschung, 5 (Berlin 1972) 141, note 85a, has made the interesting suggestion that these Syriac marginalia of Thomas of Harkel are "his rejected Philoxenus text". In view of the fact that the Philoxenian version itself was "a revision of the Peshitta produced in 508 a.d. by a *chorepiscopos* called Polycarp for his bishop Philoxenus of Mabbug", *ibid.* 140, the interest of this idea for our subject is evident.

[23] My attention was drawn to the reading of the Coptic versions by the kindness of M. Antoine Guillaumont. I notice however that a number of Bohairic mss. seem to suppose "under", though Horner prefers the reading "in". For this version see *The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Northern Dialect* (Oxford 1905) III, 374. The Coptic version of Athanasius' First Festal Letter, which is certainly one of Severus' sources for this homily, supposes the normal reading. See L. Lefort, St Athanase, Lettres Festales et Pastorales en Copte, *C.S.C.O.* 150, *Copt.* 19 (Louvain 1955) 3, ll. 6s. In Ethiopic both the editions of Praetorius/Platt, *B.F.B.S.*, and that reproduced in Walton's Polyglot read "under".

[24] *Tr.* 10,31 and *Tr.* 14,13. See V. Bulhart, *C.C.L.* 69 (Turnhout 1967). I have disregarded Bulhart's to my mind over-imaginative emendations in the former passage.

[25] P. Batiffol and A. Wilmart, *Tractatus Origenis de Libris Ss. Scriptuarum* (Paris 1900) viii–ix.

[26] H. J. Frede, *Vetus Latina* 24/1 (Freiburg 1962–64) *ad loc.*

[27] *Op. cit.*, vii–viii.

[28] I have not undertaken a full examination of Origen's frequent uses of this verse. A random sample shows no knowledge of our variant.

> et dignam illorum stultitiae! qui sic intellexerunt, ut ne existimaremus quoniam aduersus illos super caelum habemus pugnare.

Swete comments that "possibly Theodore refers to the Peshitto", pointing out that Theodore criticises the Syriac version of the Bible "in a bitter tone" in his commentary on the Minor Prophets.[29] It is not possible to discuss in detail here the three passages in that commentary where Theodore criticises the Syriac version. Briefly the situation is as follows. In the first passage (*Hab.* 2,11) the Peshitto is certainly correct and Theodore, who is following the Septuagint, is certainly wrong. In the second (*Zeph.* 1,5) Theodore, whose Greek is in fact that of the Lucianic revision, and the Peshitto *agree*: the translation which Theodore attacks being that supposed by the Massoretic pointing, reproduced in the LXX, which suggests that the Syriac version with which he was acquainted had more affinities with the Palestinian Syriac than with the Peshitto as we have it. In the third passage (*Zeph.* 3,1) Theodore is correct in criticising the Syriac, but the LXX, which he follows, has also mistranslated the word in question – though differently.[30] These three passages moreover are all from the Old Testament, and Theodore's comment: ἡρμήνευται δὲ ταῦτα εἰς μὲν τὴν Σύρων (*sc.* γλῶτταν) παρ' ὅτου δήποτε (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγνωσται μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ὅστις ποτὲ οὗτος ἐστιν),[31] suggests a translation whose origin was already lost in the mists of time. This point is of some importance since, whereas it is generally agreed to-day that the Peshitto of the Old Testament is very early, possibly even of Jewish origin,[32] the Peshitto of the New is certainly later, and may well not have achieved its final form until the early, or even the later, fifth century.[33] One may then legitimately ask whether the

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[29] *Op.cit.*, I,91.

[30] P.G.66,437. 452 and 465–8. See also H.B.Swete, *An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek* (Cambridge 1914) 112 and 114s. The references to Theodore's commentary on p.112 are all incorrect. They should read as at the beginning of this note. Of the Palestinian Syriac Swete writes: "This version has been made from the LXX; in the Books of Kings the text is known not to be Lucianic" (p.114).

[31] P.G.66,452D, not, as in Jellicoe, *op.cit. infra*, 66,241. Jellicoe has simply repeated the reference from Swete.

[32] See for example, S.Jellicoe, *The Septuagint and Modern Study*, (Oxford 1968) 246.

[33] See A.Vööbus, Studies in the History of the Gospel Text in Syriac, *C.S.C.O.* 128, *Subsidia* 3 (Louvain 1951) and B.Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament* (Oxford ²1968) 70. More recently M.Black, *op.cit.*, 123, has criticised Vööbus' conclusions and holds that "the famous theory of F.C.Burkitt that Bishop Rabbula of Edessa (fl. c.411 A.D.) was the 'author' of the Peshitta – a view rejected by Vööbus – is substantially correct". He thinks moreover that the "definitive text of the Syriac Vulgate"

Peshitto or Theodore's commentary is the earlier. The latter cannot be later than 428, the date of Theodore's death, and Swete suggests a date sometime after 415.[34] Swete consistently supposes that the Peshitto is the earlier, indeed that it is even earlier than Chrysostom, and he gives numerous examples in which he implies that Theodore's views derive ultimately from Peshitto readings.[35] In a number of passages, but not in all, Theodore seems to be following Chrysostom and it may perhaps be suggested that the fifth-century reviser of the Old Syriac connected with the name of Philoxenus of Mabbug, the friend of Severus, made use of the Greek Antiochene commentators in preparing his text.

Severus, even though he is using Theodore here, has altered the point of the criticism fairly considerably, since it is no longer simply a question of the location of the field of battle, but of "where the devils live". Theodore, too, rejects the change, not because it is an unauthorised alteration of the sacred text, but because he follows Chrysostom's view as to the meaning of the expression. That Severus' is thinking of the "habitat" of the demons is clear from the context, where he says that the devils "dwell in the wide spaces of the air".[36]

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did not achieve its final form "until the end of the fifth century". With regard to the Epistles the situation is very unclear and "in view of the pre-history of the Peshitta in an "Old Syriac" *Vorlage* for the Acts and Epistles, the question of a critical edition of the Peshitta Acts and Epistles becomes an urgent one". *Ibid.* 129.

[34] *Op. cit.*, I, lxii.

[35] See Swete, *op. cit.*, I, 106 (Gal. 3,10), 120 (Eph. 1,3), 123 (Eph. 1,4), 152 (Eph. 2,18), 194 (Eph. 6,19), 310 (Col. 4,16); II, 22 (I Thess. 4,3), 64 (II Thess. 3,13), 94 (I Tim. 3,2), 144 (I Tim. 4,6), 224 (II Tim. 4,5), 249 (Tit. 2,10), 256 (Tit. 3,13), 278 (Philem. 12), 285 (Philem. 22). In only two instances on the other hand does Swete notice a disagreement between Theodore and the Peshitto: II, 47 (II Thess. 1,10) and 229 (II Tim. 4,13). The second example is particularly interesting since Swete remarks that the idea that φαιλόνη means "speciem quandam libri" (in Theodore's comment) "may have been derived through Chrysostom from the Peshitto". In the first place both Chrysostom: τινες δὲ φασιν τὸ γλωσσόκομον, ἔνθα τὰ βιβλία ἐχεῖτο, and the Peshitto *beit-k^{e}tābê*, speak of a "book-*case*" and not of a "sort of book", whereas the Harclean in its margin glosses: *kerkâ yûdāyâ d-nāmûsâ*. Secondly since the Greek word φαιλόνη appears as a loan-word in both Syriac and Rabbinic Hebrew with its normal meaning of "cloak" or "mantle" (see Dalmann, *Aramaïsch-Neuhebraisch Wörterbuch*, s.v., with Strack-Billerbeck, III, 666 for references, and Payne-Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus* col. 3156 s.), there is no reason why the Peshitto should translate "book-case". According to Swete "the Harclean keeps the word untranslated in the text" (*op. cit.*, II, 286). Is the source of the error again Chrysostom? For Further discussion of the meaning of the word see C. Spicq, Pélérine et Vêtements, in: *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant* (Rome 1964) I, 389 note 2.

[36] *Op. cit.*, 506, l. 18. I must here draw attention to a serious mistranslation in my edition of this homily, since I had not realised at the time that *qaṭîn m^{e}nawātâ* almost certainly represents the Greek compound λεπτομέρης. The translation should

It is very probable that Severus himself knew a certain amount of Syriac: his friend and consecrator, Philoxenus of Mabbug, wrote exclusively in Syriac, there were a number of Syriac-speaking bishops in his province[37] and we know from Chrysostom that Syriac-speaking monks and peasants used to come into Antioch to celebrate the great feasts,[38] while Severus himself undertook at least one pastoral visitation of the towns and monasteries around Antioch during his second summer as Patriarch.[39] That Severus should criticise the Syriac versions from first hand knowledge is not then I think impossible,[40] though if Black's suggestion as to the origin of the Harclean marginalia is correct, the violence of his attack upon a reading accepted so recently by a fellow-Monophysite leader is, to say the least, surprising, especially in a public sermon. Moreover why has he altered the point of the criticism made by Theodore to a "cosmological" one? Here we enter the realm of pure speculation, but I wonder whether this paragraph is not perhaps part of Severus' anti-Manichean polemic, whether he is not attacking some Manichean, or Gnostic, understanding of the passage, even if the actual textual variant, especially if it goes back to the Old Syriac, may have originated in orthodox circles.[41] We know that Severus had much trouble with the Manichean heresy in his diocese[42] and the predilection of the followers of Mani for cosmological speculation is well known. Antioch, and Asia Minor, seem to have had a weakness for such speculations from a very early date, as witness this passage from Ignatius of Antioch, whose language recalls that of Ephesians 6,12: χρήζω οὖν πραότητος, ἐν ᾗ καταλύεται ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου. 5.1. Μὴ οὐ δύναμαι τὰ ἐπουράνια γράψαι; ... 2. καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, οὐ καθότι δέδεμαι καὶ δύναμαι νοεῖν τὰ ἐπουράνια καὶ τὰς τοποθεσίας τὰς ἀγγελικὰς καὶ τὰς συστάσεις

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read: "They dwell in the wide-spaces of the air, in the part which belongs to them in accordance with their former 'light-particled' nature." The idea is originally Epicurean, but for Severus the word means little more than 'diaphanous', 'extremely light', exactly as in Ps. Dionysius, *De Eccles. Hier.* III. 3. 14 (P.G. 3. 445A).

[37] See Mansi, *Concilia*, viii, 914. See below n. 64.

[38] See *Huit Catechèses Baptismales*, 8,1, Sources Chrétiennes 50 (Paris 1957) 247–249, from which it would seem that Chrysostom himself did not speak Syriac.

[39] See *Homm.* 55–61, P.O.4,66–94 and 8,213–268.

[40] Theodore, on the other hand, gives the impression that his knowledge of the Syriac version of the Minor Prophets at least was not first-hand (P.G.66,437).

[41] The contrary process is not of course impossible. After all St Ephrem seems to have used no other text of the Gospels except Tatian's Diatessaron.

[42] See particularly the two great Catechetical Discourses, *Hom.*21 (unedited) and *Hom.*123 (P.O.29,124–189).

τὰς ἀρχοντικάς, ὁρατά τε καὶ ἀόρατα, παρὰ τοῦτο ἤδη καὶ μαθητής εἰμι.[43] Although modern scholarly methods require us to distinguish carefully between the different heretical sects in the early Church, the Fathers themselves, even when analysing their individual doctrines, are inclined to group them by types. Thus Ephrem treats of Marcion, Mani and Bardaisan together in *Fifth Discourse to Hypatius* and he remarks:

> But as for Mani and Marcion, the one before the other after, with Bardaisan in the middle, one inquiry is directed against the three of them,[44]

while Theodore of Mopsuestia lists Marcion, Mani and Valentinus together as dualists[45] and Severus classes Marcion with Mani.[46] In the Marcionite system there were two heavens, which it was necessary to distinguish clearly, that of the "Kind Stranger" and that of the "Maker", the God of Justice and the Law,[47] while the system of Mani and Bardaisan contained no less than ten 'firmaments' (*arqî'în*).[48] As far as the Valentinians, with whom Bardaisan at least had connections, are concerned, Irenaeus describes how in their cosmology the 'Kosmokrator', who is τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πονηρίας, lives ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς κόσμῳ. Above him is the 'Demiurge' in the Seventh Heaven, which Irenaeus describes as ὁ ὑπερουράνιος τόπος, while above him again is the Mother ἐν τῷ μεσότητι, which is also described as ὁ ὑπερουράνιος τόπος. The Mother then lives above the "heavens" but outside the Pleroma – this is the meaning of ἐν τῷ μεσότητι. It has been suggested that the description of the Demiurge's dwelling should be emended to ὁ ἐπουράνιος τόπος. The emendation is attractive and would make even clearer the fact that the "Ruler-of-the-World", the Spirit of Wickedness, lives ἐν τῷ ὑπουρανίῳ τόπῳ.[49] The arrangement of the heavens in the *Ascension of Isaiah*, a work of Gnostic tendencies, is not without interest in this connection.

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[43] *Trall.*4,2–5,2. Cf. *Smyrn.*6,1. It is tempting to suggest that Chrysostom's explanation of Eph.6,12 may have been prompted by the desire to distract his flock's attention from such idle speculation to more serious matters. It would after all not be the first time that pastoral considerations had influenced biblical exegesis.

[44] C.W.Mitchell, *St Ephrem's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardaisan*, Text and Translation Society (London 1912) I, xcvii and (Syriac text) 134, ll.40–46.

[45] R.Tonneau, *Les Homélies Catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste*, Studi e Testi 145 (Rome 1949), *Hom.*5,8 (p.111) and *Hom.*13,8 (p.381).

[46] *Hom.*99 (P.O.22,227).

[47] Mitchell, *op.cit.*, II, xliii (Syriac text pp.93–95), with F.C.Burkitt's Introduction, *ibid.* cxx–cxxi.

[48] *Ibid.*xcvii and (Syriac text) 204, l.46.

[49] *Adv.Haer.* I (P.G.7,497–500). Cf. Epiphanius' citation of this passage (P.G. 41,509–512).

In this text the Saviour descends through all seven heavens and then enters the "firmament", "where the Prince of this world dwells" (10,29–31). The "firmament" is here distinguished from the "sky", which is also inhabited by wicked angels "who were plundering and doing violence to one another". Nevertheless it is clear that the "firmament" is below the "heavens", for in the account of the visionary's ascent he enters the First Heaven after having passed through the Firmament, which is the place of "Sammaël and his hosts" and of the "angels of Satan" (7,9–13). Further in his instructions to the Lord Christ, the Most High says: "Go and descend through all the heavens; descend to the Firmament and to that world (Tisserant: 'ce monde'. Cf. (?) Eph. 6,12), even to the angel in the realm of the dead" (10,7–8).[50]

Severus himself quotes a Manichean text which vividly expresses the absolute separation between the realms of Light and Dark in these dualist systems: and it should not be overlooked that on Manichean terms the problem of our passage is precisely that the "World-Rulers of this *Darkness*" are said to dwell in the "heavenly (places)", the abode of God, or of the Light:

> The whole difference between these two principles is as great as that between a king and a pig. The one conducts himself in his own domain as in a palace, while the other, like a pig, rolls in filth and feeds on and relishes sewage, or like a snake creeps into his hole.[51]

It is perhaps not without significance that the Manichean Secundinus, writing to Augustine, quotes Ephesians and continues:

> Quis enim contra arma habeat et non contra armatum aduersus illum qui mouetur? ut enim hominum corpora arma peccati sunt, ita salutaria praecepta arma iustitiae. hoc Paulus, hoc ipse testatur Manichaeus.[52]

Augustine himself in the anti-Manichaean *De Natura Boni* distinguishes carefully between the heaven *in quo sunt sidera* and the *inferior et caliginosus aer* where the birds fly:

> Quamuis iam poenaliter hunc inferum, hoc est inferiorem caliginosum aerem tamquam carcerem acceperint, qui tamen quoniam et caelum dicitur, non illud

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[50] See E. Hennecke, *New Testament Apocrypha*, II (Eng. trans. ed. R. McL. Wilson, London 1965) 656–660, with bibliography. Goppelt, followed by Danielou, has suggested Antioch as the place of origin of this work. See L. Goppelt, *Christentum und Judentum*, 77 and J. Danielou, *Le Judéo-Christianisme*, Cours "ad modum manuscripti" (Paris n.d.) 5–6.

[51] *Hom.* 123 (P.O. 29,152, ll. 20–23). See too H. C. Puech, art. Manichéisme, *Encyclopedia Universalis*, 10 (Paris 1971), 434ss., for a clear, up to date, account of Manichean cosmology.

[52] *Secundini ep.*, C.S.E.L. 25,894.

> caelum, in quo sunt sidera, sed hoc inferius, cuius caligine nubila conglobantur, ubi aues uolitant – nam et caelum nubilum dicitur et uolatilia caeli appelantur – secundum hoc apostolus Paulus eosdem iniquos angelos, contra quos nobis inuidos pie uiuendo pugnamus, "spiritalia nequitiae in caelestibus" nominat. quod ne de illis superioribus caelis intellegatur aperte dicit: "secundum principem potestatis aeris huius, qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae".[53]

In Manichean cosmology on the other hand the fixed stars "ne sont pas autres choses que des démons enchainés dans les airs",[54] while the Firmament itself was made from dried devils' skins.[55] One may note in passing that Theodore of Mopsuestia had also written a pamphlet (βιβλιδάριον) dealing with Zoroastrianism, in which he exposed that doctrine ἀπὸ τῆς κοσμολογίας ἀρξάμενος, in the words of Photius of Constantinople, who had read it.[56]

IV

The Patriarch of Constantinople provides the last link in the chain, for he too quotes this verse of Ephesians and speaks of those who have impiously altered the text:

> As regards the expression ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις some preferring the literal to the 'humane',[57] have altered the beginning of the word and understand not ἐπουρανίοις but ὑπουρανίοις – our Holy Writ not being thus expressed – and they

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[53] *De nat. boni* 33, C.S.E.L.25,871.

[54] G.Bardy, art. Manichéisme, *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, 9 (Paris 1927) 1875. H.C.Puech, *art.cit.*,435 presents the matter slightly differently: "La partie (sc. de la lumière) que la combinaison n'a affectée que médiocrement donne naissaince aux étoiles." The purpose of the chaining up of the devils, the Archontes, was to refine out of them the Light they had absorbed in their first successful attack on the Kingdom of Light. See Mitchell, *op.cit.*, I, xxxiv (Syriac p.11) and II, cxxxv–cxxxvi.

[55] St Ephrem quotes Mani himself in this connection: "When the Primal Man hunted the Sons of Darkness he flayed them, and made this heaven (*hādê šᵉmayâ* from their skins." A few lines further down Ephrem paraphrases thus: "But if the Sons of Darkness were skinned and stretched out in the air (*b-ā'ar*) ..." See Mitchell, *op.cit.*, I, xxxiii–xxxv (Syriac text pp.11a and 14a). For further discussion see H.C. Puech, Le Prince des Ténèbres et son Royaume, in: *Satan*, Études Carmelitaines (Paris 1948) 142, where he quotes a Mandean text which places the "Land of Darkness" below the "Empire of Light": "En dehors de la Terre de Lumière, vers le bas, en dehors de la Terre Tibil, vers le sud", and also *Le Manichéisme* (Paris 1949) 75, with note 294, which contains an extensive bibliography.

[56] *Bibliotheca* Cod. LXXXI (P.G.103,281). At least twice in his commentary on Galatians Theodore refers to the Manicheans as "those who", without being any more specific. See Swete, *op.cit.*, I, 5 (Gal.1,5) and 94 (Gal.5,13). Cf. R.Devresse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, Studi e Testi 141 (Rome 1948) 54.

[57] In Greek τοῦ φιλανθρώπου. Since in patristic Greek πρόχειρος means "literal" and since Photius prefers Chrysostom's exegesis, the contrast may be between 'literal' and 'tropological', though I have not found φιλάνθρωπος used in the latter sense.

> say that the demons are called ὑπουράνια that is to say the spiritual (demons)[58] of wickedness. For be their haunt in air or on the earth, they may in either case be said to be "subcelestial". Now if the meaning arrived at by these people is not impious, the alteration is not pious. For it is unnecessary either wholly or even by one letter to alter the sacred words, especially when the meaning of the correct word, as I have said, gives the sense of the expression clearly. For things which are in the οὐρανός are customarily called ἐπουράνια, such as the air; and nothing prevents those things which live in it, that is to say the spiritual demons of wickedness, from being thus named after their place of habitation.[59]

He goes on to say that personally he prefers Chrysostom's view but that "if anyone wishes to take ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις more literally as the heavenly dwelling itself (τὴν ἐπουρανίαν κατοικίαν), the mind of piety is free to take this route as well". The similarities with Severus, rather than with Theodore, are striking. For both Patriarchs the meaning arrived at is acceptable, what is rejected is the alteration; whereas for Theodore it is the meaning which is rejected. Both describe the change as "impious", whereas Theodore, a true Antiochene, simply speaks of *fatuitas* and *stultitia*. Both remark that in any case the meaning of ἐπουράνιος is 'in the sky', so that the alteration is otiose, whereas Theodore firmly adopts Chrysostom's view. Both allow the reader a free choice between the two interpretations. Finally Photius *adds* nothing essential to Severus' comment: he does not for example attempt to identify the authors of the change. Did Photius know this homily of Severus? He certainly knew of his controversial writings,[60] but I have not found a reference to the homilies. On the other hand he had certainly read Theodore of Mopsuestia, but again he does not mention his Commentaries on St Paul.[61] It is not impossible that this Homily of Severus had survived in Greek and that Photius had access to it. It contains no overtly Monophysite passages and could well have survived in a collection of homilies for Lent, possibly under some more respectable pseudonym.[62]

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[58] As the last sentence of the passage makes clear, Photius takes πνευματικά as an adjective qualifying δαιμόνια (understood).

[59] *Quaest. ad Amphiloch.* 122 (P.G. 101,712s.). Migne has at this point the despairing footnote: "Id quidem in nullo codice adhuc inuentum est." So far as I know this is still true.

[60] *Biblio.* Codd. CCXXV (P.G. 103,944), CCXXX (P.G. 103,1040 and 1077), CCXXXI (P.G. 103,1104). He seems only to have known them at second hand.

[61] *Ibid.* Codd. IV, V, VI, XXXVIII and CLXXVII. Photius makes some highly pertinent remarks on Theodore's style (P.G. 103,52).

[62] As *Homily* 77 has survived in Greek attributed to St Gregory of Nyssa and Hesychius of Jerusalem (P.O. 16,761–863). Alternatively Photius may have found the passage in a Catena on Ephesians.

If the conclusion of all this is the banal one that the devils live in the sky, I hope at least to have drawn attention to some neglected patristic evidence for this verse of Ephesians and to an interesting variant, which, though attested in Greek, Latin, Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic and Armenian[63] and in the writings of some half dozen Fathers, seems to have disappeared from the apparatus critici of the Greek New Testament since that of Wettstein in 1752.[64]

Oxford, Oriental Institute

[63] It is also the reading of the Georgian version: *romelni arian casa k'ueše*.

[64] That Severus knew Syriac is practically certain (see above p. 169). See F. Graffin in *Orient. Christ. Analecta* 197 (1974) 279–80.

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THE PREDICAMENT OF IGNATIUS OF ANTIOCH

BY

STEVAN L. DAVIES

Few members of the early church are as alive to us today as Ignatius of Antioch. In his vivid letters he presents himself and his faith to his contemporaries and to us. He is in great danger and urgently strives to send last instructions to his fellow Christians in Rome and Asia Minor. Although he is terribly uncertain about what will happen when he arrives in Rome, he seems quite certain of his present predicament. But what is that predicament and when did it occur?

Ignatius' situation, which he presents so matter-of-factly, seems to make little sense in terms of Roman law. He writes that he is in chains, 'condemned', and that, although firmly desiring to be thrown to wild beasts in Rome, he is afraid that the church in Rome will intervene and prevent his martyrdom. Samuel Laeuchli, in an essay on Ignatius, remarks that perhaps "Ignatius on that trip to Rome had lost full contact with his legal reality – which is one of the reasons why it has been impossible for scholarship to solve from his own words the puzzle of his condemnation and his extradition to Rome".[1]

While Ignatius' legal situation may have been unusual, it can make sense within the framework of Roman law and practice. It is generally assumed that there are but two possible explanations for Ignatius' journey to Rome. He might have been a Roman citizen traveling to Rome to appeal his condemnation to the Emperor or he might have been condemned and sent as a donation to the Roman games by the Governor of Syria. Neither explanation is consistent with the evidence.

Let us assume that Ignatius was in fact a citizen and that he appealed his condemnation to the Emperor. This assumption, in light of Ignatius' loathing for worldly authority and of his great desire for bloody martyrdom, is not easily made ... but it should be considered. Ignatius wrote that he was in chains and that he was to be executed by wild beasts. How-

[1] S. Laeuchli, *Searching in the Syntax of Things* (Philadelphia 1972) 107.

ever, according to the *Lex Iulia de vi publica*, no holder of the Imperium could put a Roman citizen who appealed to the Emperor in bonds.[2] The Roman soldiers who had chained Paul before trial released him from chains immediately upon learning of his Roman citizenship.[3] Although it was not strictly illegal to condemn Roman citizens to be thrown to the beasts, execution in that fashion was reserved for particularly vicious criminals. In Lyon in 177 Christian Roman citizens were carefully set aside for decapitation, while non-citizens were enthusiastically thrown to the beasts.[4] In the more tolerant Flavian age even greater care would surely have been taken to insure a Christian citizen his right to a neat execution. If a Governor did condemn a citizen to be thrown to the beasts, he would not send that citizen to Rome for the purpose. Finally, if we assume that Ignatius was a citizen and was condemned for refusing to abjure Christianity, he may not have even had the right of appeal. The correspondence of Pliny and Trajan indicates that the crime of Christianity could only be proven by confession, accusations being insufficient evidence (assuming, of course, that there was such a crime). Appeal to the Emperor was denied to confessed criminals.[5] If Ignatius was only sent to Rome for trial, as Bithynian citizens were sent by Pliny, he would not be in chains and would have no reason to call himself condemned.

If Ignatius was not a citizen, his situation is even more peculiar. No other examples exist from the Flavian age of any prisoners except citizens or prisoners of war being brought to Rome for execution. Must we assume that the stadia and beasts of Antioch were unavailable and that Ignatius could not be induced to wait? If Ignatius was in some way a donation by the Imperial Governor of Syria to the games at Rome, a single prisoner seems a rather miserly gift. Although Ignatius catalogs those men who visited him and mentions the ten soldiers who escorted him, he mentions no other prisoners. It would indeed be odd for an escort of ten men accompanying numerous prisoners condemned to death by torture in Rome to permit one of those prisoners to enjoy a series of visitors, to receive their hospitality and to dictate to them letters on the subject of the Christian faith. The ten guards and Ignatius traveled slowly, stopping for several days at a time in cities off the most direct route to Rome. No case can be made that the ten Roman soldiers were journeying to

[2] Paulus, *Sent.* 5,26.
[3] Acts 22,29.
[4] Eusebius, *Hist.Ecc.* 5,1,47.
[5] Paulus, *Sent.* 5,25.

Rome as guards for a substantial group of men condemned to die in the games. The task of escorting Ignatius was very probably not the main purpose of the ten soldiers' journey.

Ignatius assumed that the church in Rome had ample power to save him from the martyrdom he desired. It is not inconceivable that the church could intercede for an appealing Roman citizen. However, if the Roman church could easily annul an execution ordered by the Imperial Governor of Syria it must indeed have had considerable political power. There does not seem to be any evidence that the church was powerful enough at that time to annul an Imperial Governor's verdict and sentence.

In order to figure out the puzzle of Ignatius' predicament we must first locate the power of execution. The Emperor, of course, could condemn to death and execute. So could Governors of Imperial provinces. But the delegation of this power stops right there. "It is unusual," writes Ulpianus in the Digest, "for the proconsul to assign to his legates the office of examining prisoners, the object being that they should first hear what the prisoners have got to say and then send them on to him, they themselves releasing any innocent prisoner. When a man has had given him the power of life and death, or of inflicting any inferior punishment, he cannot transfer it to another."[6] Papinianus writes that "In the *Lex Iulia de vi* it is expressly provided that the judge on whom there falls the duty of holding the inquiry can delegate it if he goes away so that he has a right of delegation only in case he should be absent ... No one holds that the legate of the proconsul has the power of inflicting punishment when he takes the proconsul's jurisdiction by delegation."[7] In the words of Venuleis Saturninus, "If any offense is committed which requires severe punishment, the legate ought to have the case removed to the court of the proconsul: He has not himself the right to put to death or imprison or to inflict a severe flogging."[8]

There can be no doubt that, in the absence of the Governor of Syria, the legate of the Governor could hold an inquiry, make an indictment, perhaps even recommend a punishment, but the legate could not condemn a prisoner to death. The letters of Ignatius of Antioch reflect the situation of a man whom a legate has indicted and recommended to be thrown to beasts. The Lyon persecution of A.D. 177 is significant here, for in Lyon

[6] Ulpianus, *Digest*. 1,16.
[7] Papinianus, *Digest*. 1,16.
[8] Venuleis Saturninus, *Digest*. 1,16.

just such an inquiry was held in the absence of the Governor.[9] Christian prisoners were interrogated and imprisoned. The process of persecution then stopped until the Governor arrived. He then ordered executions.

Ignatius was not imprisoned in Antioch to await the arrival of the Governor of Syria. He was taken to Rome, to the Emperor, the only other man with the power to execute him. There are hints in the letters of Ignatius that dissention existed in the church in Antioch which ceased only after Ignatius left the city for Rome. It is possible that the legate of the Governor of Syria realized that imprisoning Ignatius in Antioch after indictment would only cause further dissention among the Christian minority. The retention in Antioch of a charismatic, anti-Jewish, anti-Docetic fighter for strong central episcopal power would, presumably, be more trouble than shipping him off to Rome at the first opportunity.

The seeming inconsistencies in the letters vanish if we consider him indicted by a legate of the Governor of Syria and recommended for execution by wild beasts. He would be chained, but the escort would be rather lax with an indicted but unconvicted man. He would be going to Rome, but would not necessarily be a citizen of Rome. He would have good reason to worry that the church in Rome could arrange his release, for indictments made by legates must have been far more easily circumvented than verdicts handed down by Governors.

Assuming that Ignatius' situation was as outlined above, the date of Ignatius' letters can reasonably be put at 113 A.D. If we are to believe Eusebius' claim that the letters were written during the reign of Trajan, they must have been written prior to January of 114 A.D. when Trajan arrived in Antioch to begin the Parthian war.[10] Trajan never returned to Rome. There would be no reason for Ignatius' journey to Rome were the Emperor in the vicinity of Antioch. 113 A.D. is, thus, the probable terminus ante quem for the letters.

Pliny began persecuting Bithynian Christians in c. 112 A.D. His ignorance of proper prosecutorial procedure is obvious and one must assume that he was suddenly prompted to begin the persecution. What would have been the cause of his sudden decision?

A little known, and possibly spurious, phrase at the beginning of the Syriac Acts of Sharbil appears to explain this: "In the fifteenth year of the

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[9] Eusebius, *Hist. Ecc.* 5,1.

[10] Eusebius, *Hist. Ecc.* 3,36. – F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* (London 1948)

autocrat Trajan Caesar [112 A.D.] ... Trajan Caesar gave command to the Governors of the countries of his dominions that sacrifices and libations should be increased in all the cities of their administration and that those who did not sacrifice should be arrested and delivered over to [punishment]."[11] Pliny wrote to Trajan, in quite a self-satisfied tone after his persecution was underway, that "there is not the slightest doubt that people have again begun to throng the temples which for a long time have been almost entirely deserted. The sacred rites, which had been allowed to lapse, again are being performed and everywhere flesh of sacrificial victims is on sale, although up till recently hardly anyone could be found to buy it."[12]

Ignatius may be referring to those Bithynian Roman citizens Pliny sent to be tried before Trajan in late 112 or 113 A.D. when he calls Ephesus a "highway for those who are going to be slain for God".[13] The gateway to Rome from Bithynia was Ephesus. There is no sign of a persecution in Asia Minor through which Ignatius travelled ... but at the time this area was governed by Tacitus the historian, whose disapproval of the Imperial Cult is well known.[14]

Following Von Premerstein's reconstruction of fragmentary evidence, F.A. Lepper attempted to reconstruct the career of one Julius Quadratus Bassos who may have been Governor of Syria from A.D. 110–113.[15] In the Parthian war, Julius Quadratus Bassos probably led several legions based near Antioch and one legion, the XIII Gemina which, prior to the outset of the war, was stationed in Dacia. We know that Ignatius was in Smyrna in August. Possibly Bassos was in Dacia during the summer of 113 organizing the XIII Gemina for their march from Dacia to Syria where Bassos, after the arrival of Trajan and Hadrian in January 114, would lead them in war.

From these scraps and pieces of evidence it seems that Ignatius wrote his letters in the year 113. He certainly did not write them later than that year. This material does not, however, *prove* that Ignatius of Antioch wrote his letters in that year, it merely makes 113 seem a most probable date. In deriving this most probable date we do more than fix a number

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[11] A. Roberts and J. Donaldson eds., *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 8 (Buffalo 1886) 676.

[12] Pliny, *Epist.* 96,10.

[13] Ignatius, *Ephesians* 12,2.

[14] H. Lloyd Jones, *Tacitus* (New York 1964) xviii.

[15] F.A. Lepper, *op.cit.*, 183ff.

for textbooks; we thereby may presume a bit more about the background of Ignatius himself. He comes, it appears, from a community where preparations for war were taking place and where the possibility of social chaos loomed with the arrival of Trajan, Hadrian and their legions.

Ignatius is not a man so mad as not even to be aware of his own legal predicament. If he had been indicted in the absence of the Governor and if a recommendation of *damnatio ad bestias* had then been made, the odd and seemingly contradictory reports he gives of his predicament hang together consistently. Thus, as we come to see that Ignatius reports a legal predicament reasonably in accord with the custom of his day, we may gain confidence that the reports he gives of the church of his time are reliable.

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PSEUDO-PAULUS UND PSEUDO-IGNATIUS

EINIGE TOPOI ALTCHRISTLICHER PSEUDEPIGRAPHIE

VON

NORBERT BROX

Aus den Echtheitsdebatten um neutestamentliche und andere frühchristliche Schriften kennt man die zahlreichen Sperren psychologischer und emotionaler Art in der Forschung, im Einzelfall bestimmte Varianten der literarischen Fälschung als solche anerkennen zu können, weil man die jeweils vorliegende Form (besonders bei Briefen) wegen ihrer vermeintlichen „Unnachahmlichkeit" nicht für fälschbar hält. Dabei spielen Fragen der Psychologie und Moral der fälschenden Schriftstellerei eine Rolle, sie sollen hier indes ausgeklammert bleiben. Es geht bei der Beurteilung von möglicherweise gefälschter Literatur zunächst ganz einfach um die Kenntnis der Täuschungsmethoden. Der Ausleger steht vor der Schwierigkeit, die Fälschung in ihren angewandten Mitteln durchschauen zu sollen, um sie tatsächlich als solche zu erkennen und dann auch auslegen zu können. Mit was hat er nun in einem Pseudepigraphon konkret an Kunstgriffen, an Technik und Taktik der Irreführung über Verfasser, Zeit und Ort der betreffenden Schrift zu rechnen? Er möchte und muß das alles einerseits wissen und erkennen; andererseits darf er aber bei der Suche danach nicht raffinierter sein wollen als der Fälscher selbst und mehr gewollt und fingiert sehen, als dieser selbst konzipiert hat.

Wegen der Variabilität der möglichen Mittel, deren sich die Fälschung bedienen konnte, gibt es höchstens sehr generelle methodische Richtlinien, nach denen mit fingierten Texten umzugehen ist. Hilfreicher dürften fürs erste gewisse „Erfahrungswerte" sein, die an den Texten selbst gewonnen sind. Was kommt an literarischen Formen und Mustern im Bereich der nachgewiesenen Fälschungen faktisch vor? Welche Verfahrensweisen sind bekannt? Welches Ausmaß an Routine und Simulation ist belegt? Derlei Informationen müssen m.E. gesammelt werden, um einen Überblick nicht nur über den Bestand unechter Schriften der frühen Kirche, sondern über das Phänomen der literarischen Fälschung

in ihren spezifischen Formen und ihren besonderen Eigenarten der Fiktion zu gewinnen. Diese kleine Studie ist als Beitrag unter anderen dazu verstanden. Sie stellt einige Beobachtungen auf diesem Gebiet zusammen.

Im späten 4. Jahrhundert wurden die sieben genuinen Ignatiusbriefe zwar einzeln verschieden stark, insgesamt aber beträchtlich durch Interpolation verbreitert und außerdem um sechs gefälschte Briefe vermehrt. Die Interpolationen und die zusätzlichen Briefe und auch die neue Sammlung in ihrer geschickten, wechselnden Reihung von Falsa und echten (interpolierten) Ignatianen (im Verhältnis 2:2:2:3:2:2)[1] stammen trotz etlicher Uneinheitlichkeit wahrscheinlich oder doch möglicherweise aus einer Hand.[2] Am fiktiven Charakter dieser Dokumente kann überhaupt kein Zweifel bestehen. Schon ein oberflächlicher Vergleich zeigt nun, daß sie sich in einer Reihe von fiktiven Zügen mit den Pastoralbriefen des NT berühren.[2a] Und darin liegen gewisse Aufschlüsse über Fälschungspraxis und -vorliebe. Und zwar handelt es sich dabei nicht nur um Imitation einer Fälschung durch eine andere, sondern die Ähnlichkeiten kommen zum guten Teil dadurch zustande, daß ein fälschender Autor aus sehr verwandten Interessen unter vergleichbaren Bedingungen zu denselben Mitteln greift wie ein Vorgänger auf dem Gebiet der fingierenden Briefschreibung. Zu einer vollständigen Durchsicht der Ps-Ignatianen soll hier zwar nicht ausgeholt werden, aber einige Auffälligkeiten verdienen schon registriert zu werden.

Merkwürdigerweise sind die beiden ersten gefälschten Ignatiusbriefe für ein spezielles Thema erfunden worden, das sich gegenüber der deutlichen dogmatischen Tendenz des Ps-Ignatius in den anderen Briefen und seinen Interpolationen als relativ geringfügig ausnimmt. Während er bekanntlich stark christologisch (*sc.* arianisch) interessiert ist und dazu auch seine gezielten Fälschungen einsetzt, sind der Brief der Maria von Kassobola (*v.l.* Kastabala) an Ignatius und dessen Antwort an Maria mit viel Zierat und Höflichkeitsaufwand allein am Thema des jugendlichen kirchlichen Amtsträgers (Bischof und Presbyter) interessiert.

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[1] Siehe O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Litteratur*, I² (1913) 151.

[2] Auf die alten Diskussionen von A. Hilgenfeld, Th. Zahn, F.X. Funk, A. Harnack müssen wir hier nicht zurückkommen. Sie sind in den Handbüchern und Literaturgeschichten zusammengefaßt.

[2a] Th. Zahn, *Ignatius von Antiochien* (Gotha 1873) 158, hat diesen Tatbestand bereits ganz kurz apostrophiert.

Hier stichwortartig der Inhalt: Maria bittet in ihrem Brief[3] Ignatius um einen Kandidaten namens Maris als Bischof für die nahe Stadt Nea (-polis)[4] und um einen Eulogios als Presbyter für den Ort Kassobola (1, 1–2). Der Grund zu dieser Fiktion wird erst aus einer nachfolgenden Argumentation erkennbar, die das Interesse enthüllt und so beginnt: „Wegen des jugendlichen Alters (ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ νέους εἶναι) der genannten Männer sollst du keine Bedenken haben" (2, 1). Um diese Bedenken zu zerstreuen, wird zuerst die sittliche Qualität dieser jungen Männer beteuert und darauf in einer Beispielkette aus dem AT gezeigt, daß schon immer junge Männer im besonderen Dienst Gottes standen, sich dort glänzend bewährten und oft genug sogar gegenüber Greisen die Besseren oder Weiseren waren. Samuel (1 Sam. 3; 9, 9. 11. 18 f.), Daniel (Dan. 13, 45), Jeremias (Jer. 1, 7 f.), Salomo (1 Kö. 3, 7. 16–28), Josias (2 Kö. 22, 1; 2 Chro. 34, 1. 3 ff.), David (Ps. 151, 1 LXX) sind die Beispiele dafür, daß jemand in sehr jungem Alter die berühmtesten gottgefälligen Missionen erfüllt hat (2, 2–5, 1). In seinem Antwortbrief[5] teilt Ignatius seine Zustimmung zu der Bitte und bereits den Vollzug ihrer Erfüllung mit (3, 1).

Der Aufwand für das Thema, daß man zur Bischofs- und Presbyterweihe auch junge Leute zulassen kann und soll, ist auffällig groß. Zwei ganze Briefe von einigem Umfang sind ihm vorbehalten. Ähnlich aufwendig ist dann weiter eine gleichinhaltliche Interpolation in der Überarbeitung des echten Magnesier-Briefes. Dort ist im echten Text von genau derselben Sorge um fehlende Anerkennung für junge Bischöfe die Rede und ein Appell zugunsten der angemessenen Hochschätzung jugendlicher Amtsträger formuliert (*Magn.* 3, 1). Und hier muß hinzugefügt werden, daß dieser Topos sich etwa gleichzeitig in den pseudo-paulinischen Pastoralbriefen findet; sie sind innerhalb ihrer variablen Abfolge von fiktiven Situationen alle auch mit dem Thema des jungen Amtsträgers (1 Tim. 5, 1 f.; 2 Tim. 2, 22; Tit. 2, 7) und gelegentlich auch mit dem Problem seiner „Verachtung" befaßt (1 Tim. 4, 12). Als Hintergrund dieser Texte in fingierten Briefen kommt eigentlich nur eine tatsächliche, aktuelle Autoritätskrise junger Amtsträger in der Kirche des Verfassers und seines Leserkreises in Frage.[6] Ignatius bezeugt im Magnesierbrief

[3] Text: F. Diekamp, *Patres Apostolici*, Vol. II (Tübingen 1913) 83–87.
[4] Als solcher kommt er im Falsum *Ep. ad Heron.* 9, 3 wieder vor (Diekamp, 232).
[5] Diekamp, 88–93.
[6] Vgl. N. Brox, *Bibl. Zeitschr.* 13 (1969) 90 f.

dasselbe[7] zur selben Zeit und wahrscheinlich für etwa dieselbe Gegend. Es handelt sich um eine spezielle Variante der allgemeinen Warnung vor Geringschätzung des Amts (vgl. Tit. 2, 15b), die aus jeweils verschiedenen speziellen Gründen einreissen konnte. Es gab offenbar immer wieder Gruppen von Amtsträgern, die sich nur schwer durchsetzen konnten.[8]

Und dieselben Bedingungen aufgrund desselben Motivs (jugendliche Bischöfe und Presbyter werden mangelhaft respektiert) kennt also Jahrhunderte später auch Ps-Ignatius. Als er Ign. *Magn.* 3, 1 las, hielt er inne und demonstrierte auch hier breit,[9] was das AT zu diesem Punkt hergab. Er ist am Thema deutlich interessiert und in dessen Behandlung versiert. In den echten Text greift er diesmal kaum ein, weil dieser ja exakt enthält, was er braucht;[10] er ersetzt συγχρᾶσθαι (= ausnutzen) aber vielleicht doch nicht von ungefähr durch καταφρονεῖν (wie 1 Tim. 4, 12). Der biblische Beweis für die Qualitäten der Jugend wird hier mit dem aufsässigen Text aus Job 32, 9 eröffnet: „Nicht die Hochbetagten sind weise, und nicht die Greise haben Einsicht, sondern Geist ist in (allen) Menschen." Und in anderer Version folgt die Beispielreihe von Daniel über Samuel, Jeremias, Salomo und Josias jetzt bis zum Timotheus der Pastoralbriefe: νέος ἦν ὁ χριστοφόρος Τιμόθεος. ἀλλ' ἀκούσατε, οἷα γράφει αὐτῷ ὁ διδάσκαλος: folgt 1 Tim. 4, 12 (*Magn.* 3, 1–6). Vorher hieß es bereits als Lehre aus dem AT: τοιγαροῦν οὐ τὸ νέον εὐκαταφρόνητον, ὅταν θεῷ ἀνακείμενον ᾖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὴν γνώμην μοχθηρόν (*Magn.* 3, 5).

Ps-Ignatius proklamiert die Indifferenz des Alters und das Kriterium der Frömmigkeit und Gesinnung als Maßstab für Gehorsam und Hochachtung gegenüber dem Bischof. Die Interpolation verrät, wie gesagt, schon durch ihre Länge das Interesse ihres Verfassers an der Sache, die

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[7] Zur Terminologie der Stelle W. Bauer, *Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia* etc. (Tübingen 1920) 221f.

[8] In der *Didache* scheinen es die Bischöfe und Diakone insgesamt zu sein, die in die bei ihnen noch ungeläufigen Funktionen der Propheten und Lehrer erst hineinwachsen mußten (15, 1) und darin noch nicht anerkannt waren: μὴ οὖν ὑπερίδητε αὐτούς (15, 2).

[9] Diekamp, 114–117. Vgl. Th. Zahn, 153–160.

[10] A. Amelungk, Untersuchung über Pseudo-Ignatius, *ZwTh* 42 (1899) [508–581] 532, nennt das Motiv trotz dieser Übereinstimmung unsinnigerweise in seinem Katalog von Merkmalen für den Spätzeitcharakter der Interpolationen: „Auch die in älterer Zeit fast durchgängig beobachtete Regel, einen würdigen Mann an die höchste Stelle im Presbyterium zu stellen, ist nicht mehr in Gebrauch: die Möglichkeit eines sehr jugendlichen Bischofs wird Magn. 3 mit einer erdrückenden Fülle alttestamentlicher Citate klargestellt."

für ihn aktuell gewesen sein muß. Und es verwundert nach den zwei referierten Briefen und dieser exkursartigen Interpolation nicht, daß man ein drittes Mal auf das Thema stößt. Der Brief an Heron,[11] der „vollkommen nach dem Muster desjenigen an Polycarp gearbeitet" ist[12] und in Anlage, Charakter und Details lebhaft an die neutestamentlichen Pastoralbriefe erinnert, zitiert innerhalb einer wenig geordneten Paränese für Diakone ohne Einleitung und ohne Kommentar oder weitere Ausführung 1 Tim. 4,12: μηδείς σου τῆς νεότητος καταφρονείτω, ἀλλὰ τύπος γίνου τῶν πιστῶν ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ (*Ad Her.* 3,3).

An dieser letzten Stelle ist der Ps-Paulus der Pastoralen in seiner unvermittelten Konstruktion von gerade brauchbaren Situationen für anfallende Paränesen exakt nachgeahmt. Daß Ps-Ignatius an derselben Thematik interessiert war und sie gerade in Fiktionen zur Geltung zu bringen suchte und im Verfahren dem Ps-Paulus der Pastoralbriefe nahekommt, ist schon eigentümlich. Hier wie dort fragt man sich nach den konkreten Verhältnissen, die die Sache so prekär machen konnten.[13] Uns interessieren aber die formalen Parallelen.

Noch im 4. Jahrhundert wird dieses Thema also fiktiv in Schreiben aus frühester Zeit eingekleidet.[14] Daß dabei speziell auf die Pastoralbriefe zurückgegriffen wurde, scheint nun aber nicht nur in 1 Tim. 4,12 seinen Grund zu haben, sondern in einer allgemeineren Affinität des Ps-Ignatius gegenüber dem Ps-Paulus und seinen Methoden. Dazu müssen einige weitere Beobachtungen einbezogen werden.

Es versteht sich von selbst, daß Ps-Ignatius bemüht war, mit etlichen Mitteln der Imitation Ignatius v. A. zu kopieren, was ihm allerdings nur schlecht gelang.[15] Eine Reihe von Kunstgriffen und brieflichen Phrasen, die seinen Produkten den Anstrich von „Echtheit" der Situation geben sollten, hat der Schreiber aber bezeichnenderweise nicht aus seinen

[11] Diekamp, 224–235.

[12] A. Amelungk, 539.

[13] O. Bardenhewer, 152, stellt zu Ps-Ignatius dieselben Vermutungen an, die man in Kommentaren zu 1 Tim. 4,12 lesen kann: „Vielleicht hatte sich in seiner (sc. des Ps-Ignatius) Umgebung ein Mangel an geeigneten älteren Kandidaten für die höheren kirchlichen Würden fühlbar gemacht. Vielleicht war er selbst seiner jungen Jahre wegen vom Episkopat oder Presbyterat ausgeschlossen worden." Ähnlich Th. Zahn, 158f.

[14] Man mutmaßt bekanntlich, daß Ps-Ignatius identisch ist mit dem Verfasser der sog. Apostolischen Konstitutionen, der also im 4. Jahrhundert sämtliches Traditionsgut der Kirchenordnung, das er aufschrieb, von den Aposteln wörtlich formuliert sein ließ.

[15] Siehe die Vergleiche bei A. Amelungk.

genuinen Vorlagen, sondern an den ihrerseits gefälschten Pastoralbriefen gelernt. Nicht nur, daß er ihnen die Beteuerung ἀληθινὸς ὁ λόγος (*Ep. ad Mariam* 4, 1) frei entlehnt haben dürfte (vgl. 1 Tim. 1, 15; 3, 1; 4, 9; 2 Tim. 2, 11; Tit. 3, 8); er verwendet auch unmittelbar dieselben Bausteine der Fiktion. Das verbreitete briefliche Motiv von der Sehnsucht des Absenders nach einem Wiedersehen mit dem Adressaten war schon für den Ps-Paulus ein sehr brauchbarer Topos (1 Tim. 3, 14; 2 Tim. 1, 4; 4, 9. 21; Tit. 3, 12);[16] bei Ps-Ignatius wird es wieder verwendet: σφόδρα ἐπεθύμουν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς (*Ad Mariam* 4, 2).

Andere Details, die ebenfalls den Eindruck der „echten Situation" machen wollen, erinnern nicht minder an die Pastoralbriefe. Dazu gehört die Ketzerpolemik in ihrem pauschalen und „archaisierenden" Stil, obwohl sich in der Kennzeichnung der Häresie inhaltlich natürlich einiges verschoben hat (*Ad Mariam* 5, 1; *Trall.* 10, 8).

Ps-Ignatius, der in die Arianismus-Debatten verwickelt war, nennt als Ketzer den Simon, Menander und Basilides und obendrein die Ebionäer, die Nikolaiten, außerdem Theodotos und Kleobulos (*Trall.* 11, 1–3).[17] Mit diesen Namen ist er im 4. Jahrhundert freilich zu spät, aber man kannte sie eben als Exponenten der Ketzereien jener Zeit, aus der die Briefe stammen wollen. Dasselbe findet sich 1 Tim. 1, 20 (Hymenäus und Alexander), 2 Tim. 1, 15 (Phygelus und Hermogenes), 2, 17 (Hymenäus und Philetus), 4, 14 (Alexander). Die Einstreuung von Namen ist überhaupt hier wie dort beliebt. Man vergleiche die Namenreihe der Bischöfe in *Ad Her.* 8, 1 mit 2 Tim. 4, 9–12. 19–21. Die Verfahren sind sehr ähnlich.[18]

Eine der auffälligsten Berührungen liegt im Bild, das die Briefe jeweils vom angeblichen Verfasser, also von ihrem „Helden" zeichnen. Beidemal ist er in Fesseln. Das war für Ps-Ignatius zwar vorgegeben durch die historische Situation der echten Ignatianen, aber das nähere Verständnis, nämlich Fessel und Leiden als Stellvertretung, stammt nicht von dort. Der merkwürdig „einsame" Weg des Ignatius zum Martyrium, der dort nicht der Weg aller Christen ist, zeigt in den echten Briefen den Bischof in einer Situation, in der er praktisch seinerseits extrem auf die Kirche angewiesen, bezüglich seines persönlichen Heils aber bekanntlich

[16] Vgl. Brox, 86–88.

[17] Die Apostolischen Konstitutionen, vielleicht also vom selben Autor, warnen vor Simon und Kleobios (6, 16: F. X. Funk, *Didascalia et Constitutiones apostolorum*, Bd. I [Paderborn 1905] 339).

[18] Th. Zahn, 159, bespöttelt die diesbezüglich geringe Erfindungsgabe des Pseudo-Ignatius.

in einer fast unerklärlichen Weise von der Gemeinde isoliert ist. Das war paränetisch und erbaulich schwieriger und längst nicht so ergiebig auswertbar wie der andere Aspekt, wonach der Bischof für die Kirche leidet. So zieht Ps-Ignatius vor: ἀντίψυχόν σου ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος (*Ad Her.* 1, 3), vergleichbar mit 2 Tim. 2, 9 f.: κακοπαθῶ μέχρι δεσμῶν ὡς κακοῦργος ... πάντα ὑπομένω διὰ τοὺς ἐκλεκτούς. Und ein Abschnitt wie *Ad Her.* 6, 1–7,2 erweckt den Eindruck einer gewollten Nachahmung von 2 Tim. und dessen besonderer Atmosphäre, denn so hat Ignatius (etwa an Polykarp) nicht geschrieben. Ignatius wird hier von seinem späten Verehrer im ähnlichen Stil verklärt dargestellt wie Paulus in 2 Tim. vom Verfasser der Pastoralbriefe, nämlich in der Pose dessen, der vor dem Märtyrertod sein Vermächtnis an den eigens bestellten und nun in seine Nachfolge eingewiesenen Kandidaten übergibt. Es geht um die Paratheke (7, 2) der Pastoralbriefe, „die ich und Christus dir übergeben haben (παρεθέμεθα)", sagt Ps-Ignatius in dieser Reihenfolge. Die Diktion und etliche Motive (z.B. Nachahmung des Ignatius durch Heron in der Erniedrigung) zeigen, daß Ignatius hier in die Rolle des Paulus der Pastoralbriefe versetzt wird, die für Ps-Ignatius offensichtlich ein dankbareres Muster darstellte als das Bild des historischen Ignatius. Nach 8, 3 setzt Ignatius seinen eigenen Nachfolger ins Amt ein, auf seinen θρόνος (7, 1), wie der sterbende Paulus es mit Timotheus tat (vgl. 2 Tim. 2 u.a.). Ignatius ist hier zum Apostel stilisiert.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch das Stichwort aus *Ad Her.* 2, 2 nicht zufällig: εἴ τις ... τὸ πάθος ἐπαισχύνεται. Sich der Passion, des Apostelleidens, der Verkündigung unter erschwerten Bedingungen „nicht zu schämen", ist ein zentraler paränetischer Topos im Mund des Apostels der Pastoralbriefe (2 Tim. 1, 8. 12. 16; 2, 15).[19] Ps-Ignatius kennt ihn von dort und legt ihn Ignatius in den Mund; Eph. 2, 2 interpoliert er wörtlich mit 2 Tim. 1, 16: καὶ τὴν ἅλυσίν μου μὴ ἐπαισχύνθη.

Ps-Ignatius kannte die Pastoralbriefe gut. Kaum ein Ausleger hat die fingierte Aufforderung 1 Tim. 5, 23 („Trinke nicht mehr nur Wasser, sondern nimm etwas Wein wegen deines Magens und deiner häufigen Schwächeanfälle") so adäquat interpretiert, wie er es in folgender Umschreibung tat: νηστείαις καὶ δεήσεσι σχόλαζε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀμέτρως, ἵνα μὴ σεαυτὸν καταβάλῃς. οἴνου καὶ κρεῶν μὴ πάντη ἀπέχου· οὐ γάρ ἐστι βδελυκτά (*Ad Heron.* 1, 1 f.).[20] Er hat die Pastoralbriefe sicher für echt gehalten und trotzdem den Sinn dieser gefälschten Notiz aus

[19] Brox, 83 f.

[20] Diekamp, 224, schrieb schon zu diesem Text: „cfr. I Tim 5, 23."

1 Tim. 5,23 sehr treffsicher gefunden, indem er sie in eine grundsätzliche Anweisung über maßvolle Askese umschrieb.[21]

Und genau das ergibt sich nämlich aus der eigentümlich gearteten Nähe des Ps-Ignatius zu den Pastoralbriefen: Er hat sich vom Ps-Paulus dieser Briefe in mancher Beziehung stärker angezogen gefühlt und literarisch inspirieren lassen als von der Autorität seiner Wahl: von Ignatius. Ps-Paulus bot ihm offenbar manches an technischen Mitteln für seine Fälschung, was brauchbarer war als die Details der echten Ignatianen, und der für die Pastoralen typische Stil etwa der Ketzerpolemik und Amtsparänese und sogar die Paulusanamnesen waren leichter übertragbar, auszuwerten und anzuwenden als die Originalitäten des Ignatius v. A. Dabei ist das Ps-Ignatianische aufs ganze gesehen nicht eine direkte Kopie dessen, was dem Verfasser aus den Pastoralbriefen bekannt und brauchbar war. In fast allen Beispielen sind die Motive in durchaus selbständiger Manier verarbeitet. Ps-Ignatius beherrscht den fiktiven Still des Ps-Paulus als seinen eigenen und verwendet darum zum Teil dieselben Topoi der fälschenden Briefschreibung.

Man tut also einen kleinen Einblick ins Fälscher-Milieu der alten Kirche. Noch im 4. Jahrhundert konnte man eine ähnliche Fiktion anfertigen wie am Anfang des 2. Jahrhunderts (diesmal nur mit der Person des Ignatius statt des Paulus). Die neutestamentlichen Falsa sind also ausgesprochen aussichtsreiche Fälschungen gewesen, wenn ein vergleichbarer Versuch sogar noch so spät mit Erfolg gemacht werden konnte. Für die Pastoralbriefe zeigt sich speziell, daß ihr gefälschter Stil sich zur Fortsetzung anbot und eignete, weil er offenbar gefragte Topoi enthielt und bestimmte „zeitlose" Ziele und Tendenzen eingefangen hatte. Aber selbstredend gibt es Fälschungen mit anderen Interessen und auch mit ganz anderen Ausdrucksformen, von denen aus die Techniken der Ps-Ignatianen und der Pastoralbriefe uninteressant waren.[22]

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[21] Auch seine Begründung mit dem Gutsein der Schöpfung (ebd. 1,2) ist adäquat, weil 1 Tim. 5,23 wahrscheinlich doch auf dem Hintergrund von 1 Tim. 4,3–5 zu lesen ist.

[22] Man vergleiche z.B. die ebenfalls mehrteilige Fiktion einer Korrespondenz des Dionysios v.Al. mit Paul von Samosata aus dem 4. Jahrhundert (E.Schwartz, *Eine fingierte Korrespondenz mit Paulus dem Samosatener*, Sitz. Ber. Bayer. Ak. 1927/3 [München 1927] bes. 53–55) oder die Texte und Beobachtungen bei L.Saltet, Fraudes littéraires des schismatiques luciférіens aux IV^{e} et V^{e} siècles, *Bull. Litt. Eccl.* 3,8 (1906) 300–326.

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PAPIAS AND CLEMENT AND MARK'S TWO GOSPELS

BY

TERENCE Y. MULLINS

With the publication of the letter by Clement of Alexandria which Morton Smith discovered in the back of an early book,[1] the witness of Papias to Mark's Gospel has been somewhat clarified. I have shown that Papias, in the phrase where he actually defends Mark's writing, does not defend Mark against the charge of not writing an orderly account, but defends him against the charge that he should not have written "a few things as he remembered them".[2] And this has to mean that he did not write many things from memory.

Furthermore, the opening statement of Papias' testimony to Mark's Gospel may be interpreted as saying that Mark translated what Peter wrote. Putting this interpretation of the opening statement together with the necessary interpretation of Papias' defense of Mark produced an interpretation of Papias as saying that Mark translated what Peter had written and then, later, added a few things to that translation.[3]

That was as far as I could go at the time. It was obvious that one of the two Marcan writings which Papias was talking about would probably correspond to Mark's Gospel as we now have it. But which one? There were two possible interpretations. Papias might have been saying that Mark had added remembered material to his original translation and thereby produced his generally accepted Gospel. This would give us the following three documents on the basis of Papias' testimony: Peter's document, an Ur-Mark translation of Peter's document by Mark, and the final Gospel of Mark. In this case, the "remembered" material to which there had been objection would be part of the Gospel of Mark as we know

[1] Morton Smith, *Clement of Alexandria and a Secret Gospel of Mark* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973).

[2] Terence Y. Mullins, Papias on Mark's Gospel, *Vigiliae Christianae* 14 (1960) 216–224.

[3] *Ibid.*, 224.

it. And, if Papias' account is correct, these additions might be identifiable; and identifying the additions would enable us to isolate the original Marcan translation.

On the other hand, Papias could be saying that Mark's Gospel is the original translation and that there existed in his day an expanded version by Mark himself which contained the questionable additions of what he had remembered.

At the time that I published there was not much evidence on either side to help one choose between the two possibilities. And there seemed little likelihood that additional evidence would appear. But the publication of Smith's book seems to indicate that the second interpretation is the correct one.

I am not, of course, trying to demonstrate that the second Gospel actually is a translation of an Aramaic original manuscript by Peter. I am trying to find out what Papias was saying, not evaluate his testimony.

If Smith is right and there did exist two editions of Mark by the same author, one as we know it and one with the additions indicated in Smith's discovery, then the testimony of Papias must be interpreted as giving an account similar to Clement's.

There are the following points of agreement between the interpretation of Papias' evidence which I gave in my article and the account given by Clement in Smith's book:

1. Mark wrote an account of Christ's doings.
2. The account was not a complete one.
3. Mark later added material to this first account.
4. The additions included sayings.
5. There was nothing wrong with what he did.
6. Peter wrote something which in some way underlay Mark's writing.

And there is the implicit suggestion in both Papias and Clement that the expanded version had given rise to objections.

There are the following non-contradictory differences between the two:

1. Papias says that Mark was Peter's translator; Clement does not but indicates that Peter was the authority for both of Mark's writings.
2. Clement indicates Rome as the place where Mark wrote his first account and Alexandria as the place where he wrote the second.
3. Clement indicates that Mark wrote his first account during Peter's lifetime and the second account after Peter's death.

The following points represent the places where Papias and Clement are farthest apart:

1. Clement says that Mark's first account was a selective one; Papias indicates that Mark translated Peter's writing.
2. Papias says that the additions were added as Mark remembered them; Clement says that Mark had his own notes and Peter's to guide him in making additions. Clement's word for "notes," however is μνήματα and this raises the possibility that Papias' ἀπεμνημόνευσεν may have been a "remembering" based in some way on μνήματα.

The resemblences between the two accounts are not so great as to suggest literary dependence between them. Yet the resemblences are sufficiently significant to suggest that they were derived from a common source. Since both Papias' presbyter and Clement himself seem to have had access to an expanded Gospel of Mark, the account of its composition probably accompanied that writing, either as oral or as written tradition.

In my article I offered a possible reason for the objections which had arisen to Mark's second writing. That reason may have had some force, but the material in Smith's book gives a much more substantial reason for Christians of the second century to object to the expanded version of Mark. The quotations which Clement gives from the expanded version and the comments which Clement delivers on those quotations show that the principal objections to the additions which Mark made were that they had become touchstones for Carpocrates and his followers who interpreted them and even expanded them to suit their blasphemous ends.

Up to this point, I have been assuming that Smith's case for the Marcan authorship of the additions will stand. I find his evidence persuasive. Yet when I read the "additions" I have the feeling that I am reading a pastiche of Mark rather than a continuation of Mark. The word count is the word count of Mark, but the sense is not.

For example, consider the reference to μία γυνή in verse 23.[4] There is nothing especially Marcan about εἷς, μία ἕν, although Smith's chart on page 125 indicates that this use occurs 37 times in Mark, a slightly higher percentage of use than in the other Gospels. But this high score is built up of phrases which must be translated "one" not "a certain" and even though both words are frequently used by Mark, the use of μία γυνή to mean "a certain woman" is decidedly not like Mark.

Again, consider the phrase Υἱὲ Δαβὶδ Ἰησοῦ, ἐλέησόν με, which the woman addresses to Jesus. This certainly is a Marcan phrase. It occurs in Mark 10,48 (cf. 10,47). But this in itself is unsettling. In the second

[4] Smith, *op. cit.*, 450.

Gospel there are eight specific calls on Jesus recorded, where aid or compassion are requested. Mark indicates that the demons had a standard phrase they used (1,24 and 5,7). But apart from the demons, no two persons asking help use exactly the same language in addressing him. So to have this woman anticipating the phrase used by the blind beggar in the very next chapter is jarringly coincidental.

Such things do not disprove the evidence for Mark's authorship of the additional material. But they do suggest strongly that if Mark was indeed the author both of the Gospel and of the additions, then Peter's hand in the writing of the Gospel was stronger than we have hitherto suspected. Mark after Peter's death may have the same style, but he certainly tends to caricature his earlier work.

In any case, the interpretation of Papias' account does not rest on proof that Mark wrote the additions given by Clement. What we can say at this point is that both Papias and Clement thought that Mark wrote an early Gospel account and then added to it later.

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IRENEUS AND THE GNOSTICS

RHETORIC AND COMPOSITION IN ADVERSUS HAERESES BOOK ONE

BY

PHEME PERKINS

Ever since the discovery of the close parallels between Ireneus' account of the Barbelo Gnostics in *Adv.haer.* 1,29 and a Gnostic writing, the *Apocryphon of John*, debates have gone on over the reliability of Ireneus' treatment of his opponents' views.[1] Originally, Carl Schmidt suggested that Ireneus had merely excerpted the passage in *Adv.haer.* 1,29 from the longer *Apocryphon of John*.[2] But since the publication of the latter,[3] differences between the two accounts – notably in the reason given for Sophia's fall – have led scholars to abandon Schmidt's proposal. Four copies of the *Apocryphon of John*, two each of a long and short recension, survive. This very popular text could easily have circulated in yet another form, that used by Ireneus.[4]

Previous discussion had assumed that Ireneus was summarizing a

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[1] The most recent attack on Ireneus' credibility has been launched by E.H.Pagels, Conflicting Versions of Valentinian Eschatology: Ireneus' Treatise vs. the Excerpts from Theodotus, *HTR* 67 (1974) 35–53. Pagels accuses Ireneus of deliberately distorting the Gnostic teaching that the psychics are saved at the final consummation and making it appear that only pneumatics are saved. P.'s treatment of Ireneus ignores the demands of the rhetorical genre in which he writes and his possible dependence upon sources like the *Apocryphon of John*, which do teach a threefold separation at the consummation. G.Quispel is surely correct when he suggests that we must distinguish a variety of theological opinions within Valentinianism, Origin and the Valentinian Gnosis, *VigChr* 28 (1974) 33–35.

[2] See C.Schmidt, Ireneus und seine Quelle in Adv.Haer.I,29, in: *Philotesia*, Festschrift P.Kleinert (Berlin 1909) 333f.

[3] The three versions from Nag-Hammadi have been published in M.Krause and P.Labib, *Die Drei Versionen des Apocryphon des Johannes im koptischen Museum zu Alt-Kairo*, ADAIK I (Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1962). A separate edition of the long version from codex II has been published by S.Giverson, *Apocryphon Johannis*, ATD V (Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1963). For the Berlin codex see W.Till, *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502*, TU 60 (Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1955).

[4] See W.Foerster, Das Apocryphon des Johannes, in: *Gott und die Götter*, Festschrift E.Fascher (Berlin 1958) 131 n.9; H.-M.Schenke, Nag-Hamadi Studien I: Das literarische Problem des Apocryphon Johannis, *ZRGG* 14 (1962) 58; J.Doresse, *The*

Gnostic source in *Adv. haer.* 1,29. Recently Frederick Wisse has challenged that position. Wisse has proposed that Ireneus copied this information from an earlier heresiologist.[5] While parts of Book One certainly are from such a work, study of genre and composition in *Adv. haer.* I suggests that this passage and several others, which Wisse had assigned to that source, do not in fact belong to it.

Briefly, Wisse assigns all material to the source, which he supposes that Ireneus would not have encountered among the Valentinians and Marcosians. Ireneus says that, in addition to his personal contacts with them, he has read commentaries by these groups (*Adv. haer.* I, *praef.*; Harvey I, 1–7). Therefore, Wisse holds that Ireneus is directly responsible for the discussion of Ptolemy's system (*Adv. haer.* 1,1–8; Harvey I, 8–80); the account of the Marcosians (*Adv. haer.* 1,13–21; Harvey I, 114–188) and two transitional explanations (*Adv. haer.* 1,9–10; Harvey I, 80–97; *Adv. haer.* 1,31,3–4; Harvey I, 243f.).[6] The rest derives from an earlier heresiologist, who has set the pattern for the patristic picture of the Gnostics as pathological system builders, split into numerous sects with clearly defined geneologies.[7] Wisse is certainly correct to point out that the picture of the Gnostics which we derive from the Nag-Hammadi material does not fit the catalogues of such heresiologists.

But some simple considerations of literary genre and style raise problems for this source analysis. Oral and rhetorical models influenced ancient writing to a far greater extent than is often realized.[8] Ireneus' rhetorical training has been amply demonstrated by William Schoedel[9]

Secret Books of the Egyptian Gnostics, trans. P. Mairet (London, Hollis & Carter, 1960) 210f.; R. Kasser, Bibliothèque gnostique I: Le Livre secret de Jean, *RThPh* 97 (1964) 145, and *idem*, Le Livre secret de Jean dans ses differents formes textuelles coptes, *Muséon* 77 (1964) 16; M. Krause, The Relation of the Apocryphon of John to the account in Ireneus, in: W. Foerster, *Gnosis, Vol. I: Patristic Evidence*, trans. R. Wilson (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1972) 103. The developments which led to the different versions probably took place before the translation of the work into Coptic, so R. Kasser, Bibliothèque gnostique I, 142f.

[5] F. Wisse, The Nag-Hammadi Library and the Heresiologists, *VigChr* 25 (1971) 215.

[6] *Ibid.*, 212–215.

[7] So Wisse, *op. cit.*, 218.

[8] On the nature of oral culture and the influence of rhetorical forms on literature see the informative work of Walter Ong, *The Presence of the Word* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967).

[9] W. R. Schoedel, Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Adversus Haereses of Ireneus, *VigChr* 13 (1959) 22–32. S. proposes that the following divisions determine the structure of *Adv. haer.*: (1) exordium, i Praef. 1–3; (2) narratio, all of book One; (3) confirmatio, books II–V.

and Robert Grant,[10] though neither has undertaken a detailed analysis of Book One. Ireneus, himself, points to such a context for understanding his work, when he apologizes for his dialect and lack of rhetorical practice – both rhetorical commonplaces.[11] The rhetorical handbooks suggest what Ireneus is about. There the student is taught to apply the methods of refutation, *anaskeuē*, and confirmation, *kataskeuē*, to myths, narratives, sayings and laws.[12] Such a refutation is to criticize an account for obscurity, improbability, impossibility, inconsistency, unsuitability, omitting necessary information, including unnecessary information, disagreeing with commonly held views, and prejudice on the part of the author. In the case of myths, their moral teaching may be attacked.[13] Rival philosophical schools opposed their own consistent doctrine and unified approach to the mass of errors and contradictions put forth by their opponents. Such attacks launch all manner of contradictions, objections and insults against the opponents – a veritable, verbal *Blitzkrieg*.[14] Since arguments for the defense appealed to the authority of the author and, in the case of myths, to allegorical interpretation,[15] an opponent would attack the author's authority and insist upon literal interpretation of the contradictions in the myth.

Ireneus' refutation of the Gnostics encompasses all of these points. The morality of the Gnostic myth is attacked by describing the immoral behavior of those who hold it: they associate with idolators; attend gladiator shows, and are sexually promiscuous (*Adv. haer.* 1,6,3f.; Harvey I,55f.). Ireneus devotes much effort to showing the absurdity of his

[10] R.M.Grant, Ireneus and Hellenistic Culture, *HTR* 42 (1949) 41–51. Also see the detailed analysis of the rhetorical structure of Tertullian's anti-heretical treatises by R.D.Sider, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* (Oxford University Press, 1971).

[11] See H.I.Marrow, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. G.Lamb (New York, New American Library, 1964) 275 on the concern for dialect, i.e. Attic (cf. also Lucian, *Rh.Pr.* 16; 20) and *ibid.*, 279f. on the mania of Hellenistic man for practicing his rhetoric. On the commonplace "ability to speak", see Schoedel, Phil. and Rhet., 27. S. gives to following examples: Plat. *Apol.* 17b; Lysias 19,1.2; Isaeus 10,1; Hermogenes, *Peri Ideou* 2,6 (Spengel II,370).

[12] See the sketch of this topic in R.M.Grant, *Earliest Lives of Jesus* (New York, Harper & Row, 1961) 38–49.

[13] The exact content of such lists varies, but the general topics remain the same. See Grant, *Earliest Lives*, 40 and the discussions of the second century rhetors Theon, L.Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* II (Leipzig 1856) 57–130 and Hermogenes, *ibid.*, 9,4–7.

[14] See D.L.Dungan, Reactionary Trends in the Gospel-Producing Activity of the early Church, in: *The Genre of the Gospels*, (Missoula, Society of Biblical Literature, 1972) 88.

[15] On *kataskeuē* see Aphthonius, *Rhet.Gr.* II,28–30.

opponents' treatment of Scripture (*Adv.haer.* 1,9f. and most of Book Two). Chapters Nine through Twelve attack the unity of the Gnostics. Their opinions are inconsistent (*Adv.haer.* 1,11; Harvey I,98–108, and 2,1–13; Harvey I,251–86), and they dispute among themselves (*Adv.haer.* 1,12; Harvey I,109–114). Indeed, they seem to be inspired by a multitude of evil spirits (*Adv.haer.* 1,9,5; Harvey I,89). Their disunity is contrasted with the world-wide unity of the catholic church (*Adv.haer.* 1,10; Harvey I, 90–97). Ireneus' famous metaphor of the Gnostic scriptural interpretation as similar to breaking up a beautiful mosaic of a king to make one of a fox or a dog (*Adv.haer.* 1,8,1; Harvey I,67f.) is alluded to in the preface's comparison of the Gnostics to those who pass off glass beads for jewels. It returns as an *inclusio* at the beginning of the conclusion to the book when Ireneus says that his work makes clear the "ill-conditioned carcase of this miserable, little fox" (*Adv.haer.* 1,31,4; Harvey I,243).[16] Ireneus' use of such images also has roots in rhetorical traditions which instructed the student to use vivid, peculiar, and striking images as a means of fixing the points of his argument in the memory.[17]

Another indication that Ireneus' procedure has been dictated by rhetorical models is his use of examples from Homer. Not only was Homer the school book of antiquity,[18] but the text of Homer also seems to have been used for rhetorical exercises in refutation and confirmation. Dio Chrysostom's *Troica* is an elaborate example of an exercise in refutation.[19] Ireneus uses faulty Homer exegesis as an illustration of the absurdities of Gnostic practice (*Adv.haer.* 1,9,4; Harvey I,86–88).[20] He returns to Homer in chapter Twelve and compares the absurdities of the Homeric deities – a commonplace? – with the Gnostic heavenly entities.

But the gems of Ireneus' rhetorical art are his parodies of Gnostic systems. In *Adv.haer.* 1,4,3f. (Harvey I,37f.), he "assists" the Gnostics in accounting for the origins of various types of water: salt water from Achamoth's tears; fresh water from her perspiration etc. (Ireneus must

[16] The note to this passage in *Ante Nicene Fathers* I,358, which identifies it as an allusion to Cant.2,15 and Lk.13,32, has missed the rhetorical allusion.

[17] The discussion of the use of such images in classical rhetorical theory is treated in F.Yates, *The Art of Memory* (Hammondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969) 17–41.

[18] On the use of Homer in education, see Marrou, *History*,226–35.

[19] See the discussions of this oration in W.Kroll, *Rheinisches Museum* 70 (1915) 607–10, and R.M.Grant, *Earliest Lives*, 44f.

[20] On the teaching of Homeric exegesis at the secondary school level, see Marrou, *History*, 231–35.

have been found of this piece of ingenuity. He repeats it in *Adv.haer.* 2,10,2; Harvey I,274.) Then in chapter Eleven, he turns his wit to the generation of the upper world and suggests a collection of Valentinian melons derived from the primal beings Gourd and Utter-emptiness (*Adv.haer.* 1,11,4; Harvey I,105f.). These brief observations are sufficient to show that Ireneus has conceived his work along well-known rhetorical lines. Such models dictate both the form and content of many of his assertions, which must, therefore, be understood as meeting rhetorical expectations and not as factual reports.

Ireneus has a further rhetorical obligation: to attack the authority to which the Gnostics appeal. Hans von Campenhausen has suggested that they had taken over the concepts of *paradosis* and *diadochē* from the philosophical schools to justify their tradition.[21] Ireneus counters with an elaborate geneology of Gnostic sects (*Adv.haer.* 1,23–28; Harvey I, 190–221) designed to show that the Gnostics cannot trace their traditions to the apostles but must admit descent from the enemy of the apostles, Simon Magus. It has been suggested that Ireneus turned to an earlier heresiological work – possibly an updated version of Justin's *Syntagma* – for this section of *Adversus haereses.*[22] Ireneus, himself, distinguishes the carefully laid out geneology of the Simonian sects from the Valentinian hydra which he must confront (*Adv.haer.* 1,30,15; Harvey I,241; II, *praef.*; Harvey I,248f.) and thus suggests that he has taken over a geneology of heresies which did not include his own opponents. Therefore, Wisse's inclusion of material on the Valentinians in Ireneus' source seems highly unlikely. Further, there are rhetorical grounds for assigning these chapters (*Adv.haer.* 1,11 and 12; Harvey I, 98–113) to Ireneus' own work: (1) they provide the necessary exposition of contradictions and disunity among the opponents; (2) chapter Twelve contains the second Homeric allusion – probably a rhetorical commonplace in a *refutatio*; (3) the second parody occurs in chapter Eleven and is typically Ireneus.

Nor can chapters Twenty-nine and Thirty be shown to belong to the source. Here comparison of style and method of treating heresies between material which is certainly Ireneus and material definitely from the source proves decisive. Wisse, himself, points to one such discrepency: the source begins each account with the name and/or descent from a Gnostic

[21] H. von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power*, trans. J.A.Baker (Stanford University Press, 1969) 158f.

[22] See the discussion in Wisse, N-H Library,213–15.

teacher. *Adv. haer.* 1,29 and 30 do not.[23] This geneological classification beginning with the name of the Gnostic teacher may have begun with Justin's *Syntagma*, since it is characteristic of his procedure in *Apol.* 1,26 where he refers the reader to his *Syntagma* for more information. Materials in *Adv. haer.* 1,23–28, which would have been added to Justin's work are constructed according to that pattern. No attempt has been made to fit *Adv. haer.* 1,29 and 30 into the scheme, however.

Further, the style of refutation in the source differs from that employed by Ireneus. The catalogue in chapters Twenty-three to Twenty-eight treats all Gnostic heresies according to a set pattern. Unlike Ireneus, its author does not summarize Gnostic sources as the much discussed divergence between his account of Basilides and the more authentic version in Hippolytus (*Ref.* 7,20–27) shows.[24] The basic pattern used in the source may also have derived from Justin. Its major features occur in his brief discussion of the heretics Simon, Menander and Marcion in *Apol.* 1,26. The aim of the source – dictated by the rhetorical demands of composing such a *syntagma*? – seems to have been to show: (1) all heresies are ultimately derived from Simon Magus; (2) all the heretics teach the *same* collection of falsehoods. Note that this aim differs from the prescriptions which govern Ireneus' composition. If we were to use this material to compose a manuel for the budding heresiologist, we would instruct him to include the following points in his description of every Gnostic heresy:[25]

(1) Its rejection of the God of the Old Testament.

(2) Its supposition that evil angels or an inferior power created the world.

(3) Its false teaching about Jesus – especially docetic Christology.

(4) The magical practices of its adherents.

(5) The idolatry and other forms of immorality practiced by its adherents.

(6) The claim made by its adherents that they have been liberated from obedience to the evil angels and/or the creator.

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[23] *Idem*, 215.

[24] On the originality of the account in Hippolytus, see J. H. Waszink, art. Basilides, *RAC* I, 1217–25. The peculiarity of the version in Ireneus is probably due to the pattern in which his source casts all heresies.

[25] Such formalized patterns are common in rhetorical literature. The student learned lists of points to be treated in speeches on different topics. See Marrou, *History*, 270–74.

The material in *Adv.haer.* 1,29 and 30 does not fit the heresiological mould of the source. But it fits very well with the style of detailed summary that Ireneus uses in describing his Valentinian and Marcosian opponents earlier in the book. Wisse's major objection to assigning these chapters to Ireneus seems to be that Ireneus had no other sources of Gnostic teaching available to him than those obtained from his opponents. Probably so. But, since stylistic and structural criteria make it unlikely that *Adv.haer.* 1,29 and 30 came from the earlier heresiologist, we can as well assume that the Gnostic sources used for these chapters were current among the Valentinians. We know that the Gnostics preserved and used many diverse materials. In his discussion of Valentinian doctrines in chapter Eleven,[26] Ireneus mentions the fact that the doctrines he is discussing there are similar to those of other Gnostics whom he will describe later – in chapter Thirty, as it turns out. Since Ireneus, others have also found parallels between the *Apocryphon of John* and the Valentinian speculations.[27] Yvonne Janssens observes that the type of exegesis found in the *Apocryphon of John* after the section with a parallel in *Adv.haer.* 1,29 is much like that for which Ireneus castigates the Valentinians in chapter Eight.[28] She also suggests that the *Apocryphon of John*'s description of Sophia's offspring as an abortion is parallel to the *ektroma* mentioned in the Valentinian myths.[29] We might also suggest that the Valentinian account of the fall of Sophia (*Adv.haer.* 1,2,2; Harvey I, 14f.) could be a reinterpretation of what we find in *Adv.haer.* 1,29. The Valentinian fall has two motifs: (1) the separation of Sophia from the embrace of her consort; (2) her restless search for the Father whom she stretches forth to reach. The myth in *Adv.haer.* 1,29 says that she was engaged in a restless search for a consort which leads her to extend herself into the lower regions. The Valentinian account could well be a platonizing, mystical reinterpretation of this mythologoumenon

[26] If the material in C.G. XI,2 (24,1–41,3) parallels that in *Adv.haer.* 1,11 as Wisse claims, *op.cit.*, 217, then this material was probably also circulating among the Valentinians. Photos of this treatise have been published in *The Facsimile Edition of the Nag-Hammadi Codices: Codices XI, XII & XIII* (Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1973) 30–47.

[27] R.Kasser, Bibliothèque gnostique I,141, suggests that the *Apocryphon of John* was as fundamental to Gnostics as the Bible to Christians. On the *Apocryphon of John* as a possible source of Valentinian speculation, see F.Sagnard, *La Gnose Valentinienne et la Témoinage de St.Irenée* (Paris 1947) 445f. and H.Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, rev.ed. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1963), 199.

[28] See Y.Janssens, L'Apocryphon de Jean, *Muséon* 84 (1971) 406.

[29] *Ibid.*, 64; 409.

along the lines of Alexandrian gnosis[30] and in such a way as to bring it into line with the Valentinian conception of the goal of gnosis as union with the heavenly syzygy (*Adv. haer.* 1,7,1; Harvey I, 59).

Thus, we may suggest that among his Gnostic commentaries Ireneus found at least two works which the Valentinians read as sources of their own systems. He is a good enough student of Gnosticism to realize that they are not strictly speaking Valentinian. They also serve his purposes admirably, since they allow him to provide ancestors for the Valentinians. Having no name for these people, Ireneus simply refers to them as "Gnostics" (*Adv. haer.* 1,11,1; Harvey I, 98; 1,29,1; Harvey I, 221). If the source Ireneus used in chapter Twenty-nine is indeed a non-Christian, Gnostic work similar to one used by the author of the *Apocryphon of John*, then, we may see these mythologoumena as reinterpreted in two Christian Gnostic contexts: that represented by the several versions of the *Apocryphon of John* and – with considerably more elaboration and transposition – that represented by the followers of Ptolemeus whose poor, little fox Ireneus has so meticulously dissected.

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[30] See Plotinus' objections to the Gnostics in *Enn.* 2,9. J. M. Robinson has suggested that C. G. VII, 5 (118,10–127,27) represents the type of Gnosis against which Plotinus argues. For the plates of this work, see *The Facsimile Edition: Codex VII* (1972) 118–127.

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TWO NOTES ON IRENAEUS

BY

W.C. VAN UNNIK

I. Irenaeus and Atticus Platonicus

In combatting his adversaries, e.g. Marcion, who made an absolute division between the good God and the just God, Irenaeus cites Plato in support, because he had a much better conception of God, as being at the same time just and good: *Adv. Haer.* 3,25,5 *quibus religiosior Plato ostenditur, qui eundem Deum et iustum et bonum confessus est.* In order to confirm this statement Irenaeus makes two quotations from Plato: a) under the heading (Deum) *habentem potestatem omnium, ipsum facientem iudicium* a passage of *Leg.* IV 715e–716a: ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχων εὐθείᾳ περαίνει κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος. τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός.– b) under the heading *factorem et fabricatorem huius universitatis bonum* the words of *Timaeus* 29e about the Demiurge ἀγαθῷ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδένος οὐδέποτε φθόνος.

These two references are connected with each other by the words: *et iterum ... ostendit.* This way of combining two quotations καὶ πάλιν (= *et iterum*) is typical, though not a peculiarity of Irenaeus. It is familiar from the New Testament (see e.g. Joh. 12,39. 19,37; Rom. 15,10–12; Hebr. 1,5), but also found in Greek pagan authors.[1] It is the technique of buttressing one idea by several quotations.

These two passages from Plato serve Irenaeus' purpose very well, because they show how the revered teacher saw the two qualities of justice and goodness in this one God.[2] They are very suitable for refuting his

[1] See W. Bauer, *Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur* (Berlin [5]1958) Sp.1203; the number of examples can easily be expanded.

[2] According to Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* 1,19, it was a matter of dispute among the Platonists whether the Master had taught monotheism or polytheism. The text of *Leg.* IV 715e–716a serves there as a testimony for the former option.

opponents. But at the same time it is very interesting to see that Irenaeus was not the first or the only author in antiquity to make use of these texts.

It is well-known that this particular quotation from the *Laws* was very popular in later antiquity. The most complete collection of references in which Irenaeus is not missing was brought together by E. des Places in an extensive footnote to his edition of the *Laws*.[3] It is a very long series. In my study on the predicate "the Beginning and the End" as applied to God[4] I have discussed a number of these texts dating from the first three centuries of the Christian era. Whereas Des Places and his predecessors[5] were exclusively interested in the textcritical value of these testimonies. I have directed my attention to the exegetical question: what meaning and application were given to these words of Plato by these later students? As far as Irenaeus is concerned the answer to this question is quite evident; he found here a prooftext for God's justice.

With regard to the latter text, that of the *Timaeus*, we may cite the dictum of Dörrie: "es ist das eine jener Wanderstellen, die zum festen Besitz aller Platoniker und darüberhinaus vieler Gebildeter geworden waren."[6] This work of Plato was, as is well-known, a favorite text-book for philosophers and theologians in the imperial period. The wider context of the use made by Irenaeus of this text was dealt with by the present writer elsewhere.[7]

Now the question may be raised of whether Irenaeus made these quotations from Plato on the basis of his own reading or took them from elsewhere. The former part of this alternative is rather improbable, even on general consideration.

Very little is known about his youth and schooling. So he may or may not have read Plato. But it is a clear fact that in his remaining works he betrays little knowledge of the great philosopher who enjoyed a great popularity in the second century, also in Asia Minor. If we com-

[3] E. des Places, *Platon, Les Lois* I 2 (Budé-series) p. 65, n. 2–p. 66.

[4] This study will appear under the title: Het Godspraedicaat "Het Begin en het Einde" bij Flavius Josephus en in de Openbaring van Johannes, in: *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen* (Amsterdam 1975).

[5] Cf. E. des Places, La tradition indirecte des Lois de Platon (Livres I–VI), in: *Mélanges J. Saunier* (Lyon 1944) 34–35.

[6] H. Dörrie, Was ist "spätantiker Platonismus"? *Theologische Rundschau* 36 (1971) 294.

[7] W. C. van Unnik, De ἀφθονία van God in de oud-christelijke literatuur, *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*, Nieuwe Serie, deel 36 (Amsterdam 1973).

pare Irenaeus' literary output with that of other Christian authors of the same age it is striking that he mentions Plato not more than three times.

Besides the passage we are discussing here there are only two more where explicit reference to Plato is made, however without a direct quotation. The first is found in *A.H.* 2, 14,3–4, where Irenaeus attacks his gnostic opponents for deriving their teachings from Greek philosophers (cf. § 2: *apud omnes, qui Deum ignorant et qui dicuntur philosophi*). The present purpose does not require a detailed analysis of the charges made there. Let it be sufficient to quote the relevant sentences: *Quod autem dicunt imagines esse haec* (sc. *extra Pleroma*) *eorum quae sunt, rursus manifestissime Democriti et Platonis sententiam edisserunt ... Plato vero rursus materiam dicit et exemplum et Deum ...* 4 *Et hoc autem quod ex subiecta materia dicunt fabricatorem fecisse mundum, et Anaxagoras et Empedocles et Plato primi ante hos dixerunt.* In reading the whole section from which these sentences are taken, it becomes abundantly clear that Irenaeus is dependent upon doxographical material. With regard to the statement *materiam dicit* etc. Grabe[8] has already referred to Apuleius, *De Platone et eius dogmate* 1, 5 (ed. Thomas, p. 86): *Initia rerum tria arbitratur Plato, Deum et materiam rerumque formas quas* ἰδέας *idem vocat*, and Ps. Justinus, *Coh. ad Gentiles* 6: τοῦ γὰρ Πλάτωνος τρεῖς ἀρχὰς τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι λέγοντος, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ εἶδος. See also Hippolytus, *Refut.* 1, 19,1 the opening-sentence of a section of which P. Wendland said: "zugrunde liegt ein Compendium der platonischen Lehre":[9] Πλάτων ἀρχὰς εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς θεὸν καὶ ὕλην καὶ παράδειγμα, which comes even closer in wording to Irenaeus' terminology.[10]

The sentence of § 4 is also formed according to the pattern of doxographies. As far as the part of Plato in it is concerned, that can also be illustrated from these same sources; cf. Hippolytus, *Ref.* 1, 19,1: Θεὸν μὲν τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ διακοσμήσαντα τόδε τὸ πᾶν ... ὕλῆν δὲ τὴν πᾶσιν ὑποκειμένην ... ἐξ ἧς διακοσμηθείσης γενέσθαι ... τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, Albinus, *Epitome* 8, 2: ταύτην (ὕλην) ... ὀνομάζει (*sc.* Plato) καὶ ὑποκείμενον, and 12, 1: ἐκ τῆς πάσης οὖν ὕλην αὐτὸν (*sc.* κόσμον) ἐδημιούργει.

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[8] In A. Stieren, *Sancti Irenaei ... quae supersunt omnia*, vol. II *Apparatus ad opera sancti Irenaei* (Lipsiae 1853) 783.

[9] Cf. the apparatus of Paul Wendland in his edition of Hippolytus, *Refutatio* (Leipzig 1916) 19, where references to other texts are also given.

[10] Interesting is the remark of Hippolytus, *Refut.* 1, 19,2: τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἶναι, ὁ καὶ ἰδέαν καλεῖ οἷον εἰκόνισμά τι ᾧ προσέχων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐδήμιούργει.

These parallels with their identical phrases confirm the opinion that Irenaeus derived his statements about Plato from a doxographical tradition and not from Plato himself.

The second passage is found in Irenaeus' attack on the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, viz. *A.H.* 2,33,2: *Ad haec Plato vetus ille Atheniensis, qui et primus sententiam hanc introduxit,*[11] *cum excusare non posset, oblivionis induerit poculum, putans se per hoc aporiam effugere: ostensionem quidem nullam faciens, dogmatice autem respondens.* – Irenaeus refutes Plato's opinion by showing the difficulties he encounters; and also by putting the mocking question: "how, O Plato, dost thou obtain the knowledge of this fact (since thy soul is now in the body), that, before it entered into the body, it was made to drink by the demon a drug which caused oblivion?" (translation of A. Roberts, in: *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, vol. V, p. 248). – For our present purpose we can dispense with a detailed discussion of the topic itself and of Irenaeus' refutation.[12] For the moment we limit ourselves to the relation of the Church-father to Plato. It is obvious and remarkable that he ascribes to Plato as the first philosopher the doctrine of the metempsychosis, but that he has no specific quotation to demonstrate this. It is also striking that Irenaeus has made a "mistake" in his historical remark. This fact may be an indication that Irenaeus did not depend upon a comprehensive Doxography, but that he used either the works of Plato himself or a handbook from the Platonic school, which first set forth the opinion of the Master and then those of his followers (and so Plato would be the first). It is clear that Irenaeus is referring here to the final passage of Plato's myth of Er (*Republ.* X 620e–621a; for the words: *ab eo qui est super introitum daemona*, cf. 620e: [Lachesis] ἑκάστῳ ὃν εἵλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν αἱρεθέντων, for *oblivionis poculum* cf. 621a: in the valley of Lethe, the souls encamp there near the river of Unmindfulness; μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος

[11] Cf. here the extensive note of W.W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei ... libros quinque adversus Haereses* (Cambridge 1857) I,377–378, who is correct in pointing out that the teaching of the metempsychosis in Greek philosophy was much older than Plato. – Stieren, *l.c.*, II,840–841 reproduces the words of R. Massuet who was inclined to emend the text by deleting the words: *qui et* and *introduxit*, because "si arctius premantur haec Irenaei verba, vix a lapsu liberari poterit". But this difficulty can be solved in another way.

[12] For the discussion of the metempsychosis in patristic sources and Irenaeus' contribution see the comments of J.H. Waszink, *Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De Anima* (Amsterdam 1947) 306–307.

πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν). Because Plato expresses his thoughts here in the form of a myth, he does not give an *ostensio*, but speaks *dogmatice*. The question of whether Irenaeus' source was Plato himself or a Platonic compendium is hard to decide. But I am inclined to think that he got it from some handbook in which the teaching of Plato on soul and body was summarized with a statement on the transmigration of the souls and the drinking of the cup of oblivion.[13] I am led to this view by the fact that Irenaeus tries to show that Plato is contradicting himself,[14] whereas the Athenian philosoper in fact gives a clear answer to the question what was the source of his knowledge, namely the adventures of Er. Had Irenaeus known the beginning and the end of that myth, he would have found the solution. But since he puts that pertinent question to Plato himself, he was unaware of that answer. This lack of knowledge leads in the direction of assuming that Irenaeus did read in his source only an abstract from the myth. However that may be, it is crystal-clear that the views of Plato on this point are completely rejected by the bishop of Lyons.

The comparison of these passages where Irenaeus mentions Plato by name and refers to his teaching reveals a remarkable difference. In the second book of *Adv. Haer.* Plato's views are completely rejected; he is even considered as one of those philosophers who did not know God and were mistaken in their conceptions. In passing we may ask if this attitude of Irenaeus has been sufficiently accounted for in discussions of the "Hellenization of Christianity". At any rate in rejecting the views of Plato, Irenaeus cuts at the roots of some Gnostic schools, for in following the erring Plato they were also erring. But in the third book he has a better opinion of the Athenian philosopher and he plays him off as a witness against his opponents. Has the church-father changed his mind in the meantime? Or should we say that he had found another chapter in a philosophical handbook which better suited his purpose? It may be

[13] J.H. Waszink, *l.c.*, 41*–44* and 304–306 has argued that Tertullian used a lost work of the Platonist Albinus in his discussion and refutation of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. This may offer an analogy to the work of Irenaeus, though this father follows a different line.

[14] See the words of Irenaeus in *A.H.* 2,33,3, following the question quoted in the text and concluding that paragraph: "For if thou hast a remembrance of the demon, and the cup, and the entrance (into life), thou oughtest also to be acquainted with other things; but if, on the other hand thou art ignorant of them, then there is no truth in the story of the demon, nor in the cup of oblivion prepared with art" (translation by A. Roberts, *l.l.*, 248).

that from this comparison a new light falls upon that expression of his, viz. *religiosior*. Then it is as though Irenaeus is saying: well, notwithstanding the fact that Plato did not know God, at this point at least he expressed ideas that are more in accordance with religious truth, much better than these Gnostics and Marcion.

Is Irenaeus also in this case reproducing a doxographical handbook? The answer to this question may be found by adducing a curious parallel which has been overlooked so far. The text we have in view is missing in the list of Des Places and I myself did not mention it either in the discussion of the *aphthonia* of God. It is found in the fragments of the philosopher Atticos, which have been preserved by Eusebius in his *Praeparatio Evangelica*.[15]

This Atticos lived in the second half of the second century.[16] According to his own testimony he was a Greek, a fellower of Plato's philosophy.[17] With all probability he taught in Athens, where at that time various philosophical schools were offering their teachings and lived in rivalry. Baudry, who published and studied the remaining fragments of Atticos' writings, gave this characteristic: "Atticos fut l'un de ces philosophes les plus remarquables. Représentant et probablement chef de l'école platonicienne, il dut jouir en son temps d'une grande autorité."[18]

The relevant passage from his book on *Pronoia* is found in Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* 15, 5,2 (Baudry, fr. 3, p. 10). The bishop of Caesarea points out that Moses and the Hebrew prophets, just as Plato, clearly showed that God's providence is concerned with the universe in its totality, whereas Aristotle limited it to the world beyond the moon and left the rest outside God's government. In this discussion, he finds a welcome supporter of his view in Atticos, who was a strong opponent of the Peripatetic philosophy.[19]

The fragment in question starts by pointing out that according to Plato belief in *Pronoia* is the best way to happiness and the best guide

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[15] The parallelism is also left unnoticed by J. Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique au IIe et IIIe siècles* (Tournai 1961) 108–109, though he mentions there in the same paragraph both Irenaeus and Atticos.

[16] J. Baudry, *Atticos, fragments de son œuvre* (Paris 1931) III–IV.

[17] Atticos, fr. 4, *ap.* Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.* 15, 6,3: ... εἰ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων Πλάτωνι πιστεύομεν οἷς αὐτὸς Ἕλλην ὢν πρὸς Ἕλληνας ἡμᾶς σαφεῖ καὶ τρανῷ τῷ στόματι διείλεκται.

[18] J. Braudy, *l.l.*, V.

[19] J. Baudry, *l.l.*, XXXII–XLIX in a long chapter under the title: "Atticos polémiste, adversaire d'Aristote."

to righteous life for men. After a quotation from Pindar[20] it continues as follows: ὁ μὲν Πλάτων εἰς θεὸν καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ πάντα ἀνάπτει. φησὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀρχήν τε καὶ μέσα καὶ τελευτὴν τῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων ἔχοντα εὐθείᾳ περαίνειν περιπορευόμενον. καὶ αὖ πάλιν φησὶν αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀγαθῷ δὲ μηδένα φθόνον ἐγγίγνεσθαι περὶ μηδενός τούτο δ' ἐκτὸς ὄντα πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ ποιεῖν, εἰς τάξιν ἄγοντα ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. In other words: Atticos quotes from Plato, *Leg.* IV 715e–716a[21] and *Tim.* 29e + 30a (somewhat free).

The striking parallelism with Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer* 3,25,5 leaps to the eye. Both these authors, who are more or less contemporaries, bring the same texts from Plato and do so in exactly the same order, while combining them in the very same way: καὶ αὖ πάλιν – *et iterum* (see before, p. 201). Of course there are some differences. Atticos has made a transposition by changing the independent sentences to dependent ones (*nominativus + indicativus > accusativus cum infitivo*), whereas the text of Irenaeus is in conformity with the original. Besides that, Irenaeus' quotation from the *Leges* is somewhat longer than that of Atticus (add.: τῷ δὲ ἀεὶ – τιμωρός); the latter adds to the words of *Tim.* 29e about the goodness of God a summary of the sequel,[22] while the former has only the words ἀγαθός ἦν – φθόνος.

These textual varieties are easily explained by the differences in purpose and setting in both authors. Irenaeus wanted to show Plato's knowledge of God who judges the world; hence he could not miss the word about δίκη – τιμωρός, whereas for Atticos the extension of God's reign was of prime importance. On the other hand that single sentence about the God who is good without grudging was sufficient for the bishop, whereas to the philosoper in his demonstration of God's *Pronoia* the words εἰς τάξιν

[20] Pindarus, fragm. 213, quoted by Plato, *Rep.* 365b and see the note in the critical apparatus of K. Mras in his edition of Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* (Berlin 1956) II, 356.

[21] There is, as everyone can see, a slight difference in word-order, because the words τελευτήν and μέσα have changed places. Atticos following the more "logical" order; this has also happened in other texts, for which see my study, mentioned before note 4.– J. Baudry, *l.l.*, 10 did not mention the parallel in Irenaeus.

[22] The complete text of Plato, *Tim.* 29e–30a reads as follows: τούτου δ' ἐκτὸς ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. Ταύτην δὲ γενέσεως καὶ κόσμου μάλιστ' ἄν τις ἀρχὴν κυριωτάτην παρ' ἀνδρῶν φρονίμων ἀποδεχόμενος ὀρθότατα ἀποδέχοιτ' ἄν. Βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας.

ἄγοντα ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας[23] were absolutely indispensable. Nevertheless, if we take into account these varieties and their good reason, the parallelism is most striking, particularly the combination of the two texts. One may even say that against the background of these differences the agreement is the more apparent. This coincidence cannot be accidental.

It goes without saying that the possibility of direct dependence of one author upon the other is excluded in this case. So the only possible explanation of the similarity is this: that both Atticos and Irenaeus made use of the same collection of prooftexts from "the most holy Plato", as Philo calls him.[24] That is to say: because the texts of these two authors are similar, but not identical, two versions at least of the same book must have been in circulation.

Have we here the traces of a Plato-florilegium? Waszink is sceptical about this matter, because, he says, "as far as my knowledge goes, nobody has as yet succeeded in recovering a clear specimen".[25] Henry Chadwick, however, in his article "Florilegium" thinks that together with doxographies and handbooks "auch kurze Zusammenfassungen in Umlauf gewesen sein (können), in denen die einflussreichsten Platotexte über Gott, die Seele u. das Wesen des Kosmos vereinigt waren";[26] in other words: the existence of such a florilegium is a possibility and a probability, but not a clear fact.

Now, if we had nothing but the fragment of Atticos, I would agree with Waszink. It is a matter of course that this teacher read the writings of Plato and had not to depend on abstracts. Moreover, the last part of his testimony from *Tim.* 29e–30a is clear evidence that Atticos himself has been at work by abbreviating and reformulating the text of Plato, by leaving out what was irrelevant for his immediate purpose. On the other hand, we may say that the two quotations in the beginning are

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[23] A literal quotation of these words is also found in Albinus, *Epitome* 12,2 and 13,3.

[24] Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber* 2,13; cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* 1,79: *Panaetius Platonem omnibus locis divinum, sapientissimum, sanctissimum, Homerum philosophorum appellat*, and *De Natura Deorum* 2,32: *quasi quendam deum philosophorum.*

[25] J.H. Waszink, Some observations on the appreciation of "the philosophy of the barbarians" in early Christian literature, in: *Mélanges Christine Mohrmann* (Utrecht-Anvers 1963) 42; his conclusion is "that the study of handbooks (of Platonist doctrine like Albinus, *Epitome*) ... was combined with the reading of entire dialogues of Plato, at all events of the primarily 'theological' ones which in the period discussed were the most popular" (*l.l.*, 42).

[26] H. Chadwick, art. Florilegium, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, VII (Stuttgart 1969) 114,2; he refers to J. Daniélou, *l.l.*, 103ff.

almost literal with only those changes that were made necessary by Atticus' introductory formula φησί; it is as though he is recalling two well-known phrases of the Master. They might have come from his own reading but for the combination, sequence and above all the parallelism with Irenaeus. And it is precisely this last point which makes us think of a florilegium.

We observed that also in the other places of the *Adversus Haereses* where Plato is cited, there are clear indications that Irenaeus uses doxographical material (see p. 203). There is not the slightest indication that he has studied the works of Plato. Yet there is that remarkable parallelism with Atticos. This can only be explained by assuming, that he had to hand a piece of paper with the heading: *Platoon peri Theou*, a collection of prooftexts that could serve various purposes and that could easily be expanded, if need be, by somebody familiar with Plato's dialogues like Atticos.

We may put the question why Irenaeus did not utilize it on other occasions as well to confute his Gnostic adversaries. The answer is a secret which died with the bishop, for he did not render account for his method as an author. But from the way he mentions Plato in the second book (see p. 203) we may infer that he had his serious doubts about the philosopher as a religious guide. In that respect he stands apart from other early Christian writers, who loved to show the agreement between the words of Moses and the prophets and those of Plato. For Irenaeus the Greek philosopher belonged to the pagans who did not know God and the way in which some Gnostics employed Greek philosophy could not make him think more favourably.

II. Ireneaus on Clemens Romanus

One of the most famous sections of Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* is that of 3, 3, 1–3 in which he gives the succession of the bishops in Rome from the days of its foundation by the apostles Peter and Paul to his own day. In that way could be given *plenissima haec ostensio unam et eandem vivificatricem fidem esse quae in ecclesia ab apostolis usque nunc sit conservata et tradita in veritate*. It is not the purpose of this short note to give yet another contribution to the well-known controversy about this Roman succession, but to discuss a particular aspect of Irenaeus' vocabulary and argument in this passage.

Twelve names are mentioned in this list, nine of which are nothing but names. Three men get a special mention: the first one Linus because

he is identified with the person of that name, who parades in a group of people whose greetings are recorded in 2 Timothy 4, 21, and number seven Telesphorus, because he was a martyr; but pride of place is given to the third man in the succession, Clemens, for about half of the whole section is devoted to him. In a litteral sense he is the most outstanding personality in this document. It is a matter of course that Clement owed this exceptional distinction to the fact that in his days [27] the Roman church wrote an important letter to the Corinthian church in the time of crisis.[28] It is easily understood that Irenaeus was all too happy to have this written testimony from this time as a powerful weapon in his refutation of the Gnostics. And he did so not without good reason. There is no need to discuss here the relation of this summary to the actual letter, since that has already been done by Botte.[29] But there are two more points in Irenaeus' account that call for comments: because they give a special note to this bishop Clement and this writing.

First of all we notice the interesting characterization of Clement, because it is used only of him and not even of his predecessors: ὁ καὶ ἑωρακὼς τοὺς μακαρίους ἀποστόλους καὶ συμβεβληκὼς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔτι ἔναυλον τὸ κήρυγμα τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τὴν παράδοσιν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχων. It is typical that Irenaeus did not refer as he did in the case of Linus, to one of the Pauline letters. He could have done so very easily by pointing to Philippians 4, 3,[30] an epistle which he uses at various places. But he preferred a different characteristic. Why? Only for reasons of variation? Or did he want to underline a fact other than just a casual reference and bring to light why Clement is such a valuable witness?

In the first place Irenaeus says that Clement "has seen the blessed apostles". This can be a reference to 1 *Clem.* 5, 3 λάβωμεν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἡμῶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀποστόλους, which is explained and expanded by the two examples of Peter and Paul. But in the course of the argument of 1 Clement it is not certain that this clause does express direct, personal

[27] For this translation of ἐπὶ τούτου see W. Bauer, *Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, 567.

[28] Irenaeus does not say that the letter was written by Clement, but by the church in Rome.

[29] B. Botte, Saint Irénée et l'Épître de Clément, *Revue des études augustiniennes* 2 (1956) 67–70.

[30] Philipp. 4,3: "they have laboured side by side with me in the gospel together with Clement and the rest of my fellow-workers." – This identification was made by Origen, *In Johannem* 6,54,279; Eusebius, *H.E.* 3, 15; Hieronymus, *De viris illustribus* 15; Epiphanius, *Panarion* 27,6,2 however makes a mistake, saying that Clement is mentioned in Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

acquaintance, because the writer mentions these "modern" victims of "jealousy and strife" side by side with those of the Old Testament and the words πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν λαμβάνειν may have a more spiritual meaning: "to be mindful of ..."[31] But Irenaeus lays stress on the personal contact of Clement with the apostles. The verb "he has seen" is not just a casual remark about seeing at a distance, but its perfect tense expresses a lasting effect.[32] This is strengthened by the following term συμβεβληκὼς αὐτοῖς which Irenaeus also used of the "presbyters" in Asia: οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἰωάννῃ τῷ τοῦ Κυρίου μαθητῇ συμβεβληκότες (*Adv. Haer.* 2,22,5). The sense is clear, for συμβάλλω means "to come in contact";[33] since the perfect tense is used it is said that these presbyters lived in close contact with John[34] and therefore could give a trustworthy testimony to the statement Irenaeus is making.[35] In the same way it is said of Clement that he had not only seen the apostles, but had also conversed with them.

To this Irenaeus adds that in Clement's ears still resounded the preaching of the apostles and that he had their *paradosis* before his eyes. For the argument of Irenaeus this is a most important fact: Clement had heard the preaching of the apostles and it was still in and around him, when he wrote his letter and put the paradosis in writing (see the words somewhat later: *ex ipsa scriptura qui velint discere possunt et apostolicam ecclesiae traditionem intelligere*). So when he heard this preaching, it did not go in one ear and out of the other; but he kept it and passed it on himself. According to Irenaeus Clement had seen and heard the apostles. Is this nothing but a (quasi)-historical intimation? Why does it seem to be so highly valued by our author? He had the letter of that church in his hands; was that not sufficient? Indeed, it offers a clear testimony to the apostolic *paradosis* precisely because it had been written under *that* bishop and he could guarantee the truth, because he had *seen and heard* the apostles.

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[31] Cf. the references in W. Bauer, *l.l.*, 1189 and also Irenaeus' own words: τὴν παράδοσιν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔχων.

[32] F. Blass–A. Debrunner–R.W. Funk, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and other early Christian Literature* (Cambridge 1961) §342,2.

[33] H.G. Liddell–R. Scott–H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford ⁹1940) 1675, *s.v.* II 4.

[34] See the variant readings in W.W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei ... Libros quinque adversus Haereses* (Cambridge 1857) I, 331, nt.2: συμβεβηκότες – συμβεβιωκότες.

[35] I deal with this point more in detail in my forthcoming article on: *The authority of the Presbyters in Irenaeus' works.*

This qualification was conclusive proof for readers in the ancient world. Since the days of Thucydides the essential requirement for a faithful historian was to be an eyewitness of the events he described. The combination of seeing and hearing is often found in antiquity among non-Christians and Christians alike to state the truth. A man who had "seen and heard" something could give evidence that was unimpeachable.[35] In other cases too, this way of arguing is used by Irenaeus.[37] So if he applies this rule in the case of Clement, his position was according to a generally accepted conception unassailable.

The second point in this passage that calls for comment has also to do with the way in which Irenaeus buttresses his argument. At the end of the paragraph on Clement he says: *cum sit vetustior epistula his qui nunc false docent*. In a different context, Irenaeus uses the same proof somewhat later, cf. *Adv. Haer.* 3,4,2–3: *per illam veterem apostolorum traditionem ne in conceptionem quidem mentis admittunt* (sc. *barbari christiani*) *quodcumque horum portentiloquium est. Neque*[38] *enim congregatio fuit apud eos neque doctrina instituta. Ante Valentinum enim non fuerunt qui sunt a Valentino, neque ante Marcionem erant qui sunt a Marcione*, etc. and then he continues to give the time in which these heritics lived, viz. under the bishops Hyginus, Pius and Anicetus, in the middle of the second century. The underlying thought here is that what is older is more reliable, what is in terms of chronology nearer to the apostles has better preserved their teachings.

This way of arguing was not made by Irenaeus *pour besoin de la cause*. He could make use of it, because it expresses an idea generally shared in antiquity: what is older is better. Cf. the statement of Fronto, ed. Naber, p. 162: *vulgo dicitur quod potius sit antiquius esse*. Jamblichus has Pythagoras say: μᾶλλον τὸ προηγούμενον ἢ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ ἑπόμενον (*Vita Pyth.* 37; cf. the saying attributed to Pythagoras in Diogenes Laertius 8,22: τὸ προηγούμενον τῷ χρόνῳ τιμιώτερον). Whether this idea stems from Pythagoras or not,[39] is a question that is not our present concern. At any rate it is a generally accepted notion in antiquity.[40] And it is

[36] See the material in my lecture: *Oog en Oor, criteria voor de eerste samenstelling van het Nieuwe Testament*, Rede ter gelegenheid van de 337e Dies Natalis der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht (Utrecht 1973) 9ff.

[37] See the article, mentioned in n. 35.

[38] For this division see the note of F. Sagnard, *Irénée de Lyon, Contre les Hérésies, livre III* (Paris 1952) 119, n. 1.

[39] C.J. de Vogel, *Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism* (Assen 1966) 74.

[40] B.A. van Groningen, *In the Grip of the Past, essay on an aspect of Greek thought* (Leiden 1953) *passim*.

well-known how Jewish and Christian apologists tried to prove the superiority of Moses and the Hebrew prophets by appealing to the fact that they preceded the Greek lawgivers and philosophers in time (see e.g. Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, passim, and Ps. Justinus, *Coh. ad Graecos*, passim).

In the succession of bishops in Rome, Clement is so valuable a witness for the apostolic tradition, because both his person and the letter that was written in his time were marked by characteristics that according to the standards of the time were conclusive proof for the truth to which they testified. The link between this person and this letter of the Roman church is made by the fact that this Clement was not the only disciple of the Apostles: ἔτι γὰρ πολλοὶ ὑπελείποντο τότε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀποστόλων δεδιδαγμένοι (note again here the perfect tense: they had once been taught by the Apostles and now possessed that teaching!). The source of this statement is not revealed. Was it a guess of Irenaeus from probability; or had he information about this point from Roman circles which he had gathered during his visit?[41] However this may be, Irenaeus appealed to it and considered it irrefutable. In this way the link in the chain of tradition was not thin, just one person; but very strong indeed: πολλοί.[42] And at the same time he had written evidence in the letter of the Roman Church. The inscriptio: ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡ παροικοῦσα Ῥώμην, was in this way very handsomely used to strengthen the point Irenaeus is making.

In this way I hope to have shown that the manner of speech in this passage was carefully chosen and could fulfil its purpose, viz. to make Irenaeus' case succesful in refuting the heretics by applying standards of truth generally accepted in antiquity.

Bilthoven, Sweelincklaan 4

[41] Whether he was in Rome during the martyrdom of Polycarp, as is maintained in the "alternative ending" of the account of that martyrium in a Moscow manuscript (see *The Acts of the Christian Martyrs*, ed. H. Musurillo [Oxford 1972] 20) may be a matter of dispute (cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, I [Freiburg i.Br. ²1913] 400: "Könnte zutreffen, ist jedoch durchaus unverbürgt und schon ihrer legendenhaften Umgebung wegen verdächtigt"). At any rate he visited Rome in 177/178 (Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 5,4,1–2).

[42] Irenaeus did not use the text of Deut. 19,15 or its echos in the New Testament, on which text see H. van Vliet, *No single testimony, a study on the adoption of the law of Deut. 19:15 par. into the New Testament*, Thesis Utrecht 1958.

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DIE FRAGE DER ERSTEN ZEUGNISSE DES CHRISTENLATEINS

VON

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Seit dem Beginn[1] der Erforschung des altchristlichen Lateins und lange danach galt Tertullian als „der Vater des Kirchenlateins" und „der Schöpfer" der altchristlichen lateinischen „Sondersprache". Aus vielen Studien[2] hat sich aber ergeben, dass diese Hypothese über die Rolle Tertullians nicht aufrecht gehalten werden kann und dass er nicht der *Schöpfer*, sondern der *erste Zeuge* des altchristlichen literarischen Lateins ist. Die Kenner sind heute denn auch nahezu einhellig der Ansicht, dass die Schriften des nordafrikanischen Autors nur gemeinsam mit den *Acta martyrum Scillitanorum*, der lateinischen Version der *Prima Clementis* und der *Passio Perpetuae et Felicitatis* die allerersten Zeugen des uns überlieferten altchristlichen Lateins sind.

Die *communis opinio* versucht J. Daniélou nun in einem kürzlich erschienenen Aufsatz[3] zu entkräften, indem er nachzuweisen versucht, dass es schon vor Tertullian eine altchristliche lateinische Literatur gegeben habe, welche auch überliefert sei, und zwar in Gestalt von *Esdras* V,[4] *De centesima sexagesima tricesima*, *De montibus Sina et Sion* und *Adversus Iudaeos* des Ps.-Cyprian.[5] Im folgenden möchten wir nun untersuchen, inwiefern J. Daniélou die bisherige Lehrmeinung tatsächlich als irrig erweisen kann; wir werden insbesondere seine sprachliche Argumentation überprüfen.

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[1] Vgl. A. von Harnack, *Sitzungsberichte der Berl. Akademie* 1895, 546; E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, II (Leipzig–Berlin 1909) 607; O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*, II (Freiburg i. Br. 1903) 340.

[2] Vgl. Chr. Mohrmann, *Études sur le latin des chrétiens*, I²–II–III (Roma 1961–1965) passim, insbes. II, 235–246.

[3] J. Daniélou, La littérature latine avant Tertullien, *Revue des études latines* 48 (1970) 357–375.

[4] Das *Esdras* V-Problem wird von anderer Seite erörtert werden.

[5] J. Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 357.

I. Ps.-Cyprian, Adversus Iudaeos[6]

Bei der Aufzählung und Behandlung der sogenannten Spezimina der vortertullianischen altchristlichen lateinischen Literatur widmet J. Daniélou der vortertullianischen Datierung von *Adversus Iudaeos* des Ps.-Cyprian[7] nur beiläufige Worte: er übernimmt die Argumente, die D. van Damme O.P.[8] für die Frühdatierung anführt. Uns will jedoch scheinen, dass van Dammes Beweisführung auf ihre Stichhaltigkeit noch untersucht werden muss.

Als eines der wichtigsten Beweisstücke für die vortertullianische Entstehung der Schrift betrachtet van Damme eine auffallende Parallele zwischen dieser „Predigt" (*Adv. Iud.* 24–25) und Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3. In der Parallele erblickt er eine Abhängigkeit Tertullians von Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos*, womit er einen *terminus ante quem* für die „Predigt" gewonnen zu haben meint, u.z. das Jahr 212 n. Chr., das Entstehungsjahr von Tertullians *Scorpiace*.[9] Wir wollen nun die beiden Texte, wie van Damme[10] es bereits getan hat, nebeneinander stellen und miteinander vergleichen.

Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 24–25	Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3:
Moysen maledicebant quoniam Christum praedicabat:	Statim ut coli Deus coepit, invidiam religio sortita est. Qui Deo placuerat, occiditur, et quidem a fratre. Quo prodivius impietas alienum sanguinem insectaretur, a suo auspicata insectata est denique non modo iustorum, verum etiam et prophetarum.
Dathan amabant quoniam Christum non praedicabat.	
Aaron repudiabant quoniam Christi similitudinem praeferebat:	
Abiron constituebant quoniam Christo contradicebat.	
David oderant quoniam Christum canebat: Saul extollebant ⟨quoniam Christum persequebatur⟩.	*David* exagitatur,
⟨Heliam fugabant⟩ quoniam Christum loquebatur: Cham servabant,	Helias fugatur,

[6] Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* zitieren wir nach der Edition von D. van Damme O.P., *Pseudo-Cyprian Adversus Iudaeos, Gegen die Judenchristen. Die älteste lateinische Predigt* (Freiburg, Schweiz) 1969.

[7] J. Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 359.

[8] *Op. cit.*, passim, insbes. 80ff.

[9] D. van Damme, *op. cit.*, 81ff.

[10] *Op. cit.*, 82.

nihil enim de Christo loquebatur.	
Hieremiam lapidabant Christum vaticinantem: Ananiam diligebant Christum adversantem.	*Hieremias lapidatur,*
Esaiam secabant Christum vociferantem: Manassen magnificabant Christum persequentem.	*Eseias secatur,*
Ioannem interimebant Christum demonstrantem:	
⟨----------⟩	
Zachariam trucidabant Christum diligentem: Iudam diligebant Christum tradentem.	*Zacharias* inter altare et aedem *trucidatur* perennes cruoris sui maculas silicibus assignans. Ipse clausula legis et prophetarum nec prophetes, sed angelus dictus contumeliosa caede truncatur in puellae salticae lucar.

Aus der Vergleichung der beiden Texte ergibt sich unseres Erachtens, dass sie hinsichtlich des Inhalts und des gattungsbedingten Aufbaus kaum in dem von van Damme postulierten Sinne voneinander abhängig sein können: „So betrachtet wird es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass Tertullian von *Adversus Iudaeos* abgeschrieben hat."[11] Zunächst hat die Aufzählung der Propheten in den beiden Schriften ihre jeweils eigene Funktion und Intention. In Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 24–25 dient die Aufzählung der Propheten nämlich nur zur Erläuterung des Satzes, dass die Juden nicht nur den Christus, sondern auch die Propheten, welche Christus verkündigten and ankündigten, verfolgt und getötet haben. Eben dieser Gleichlauf der Geschehnisse wird vom Verfasser der Schrift ausdrücklich hervorgehoben: *Dereliquit enim Israel Dominum ostendens ei terga et non faciem: nam faciem suam convertit ad idola, et interficiendo missos ad se prophetas qui de Christo praedicabant exinde consuevit Israel persequi Christum non tantum in corpore advenientem sed etiam cum a prophetis adnuntiaretur* (Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 23 s.). Die Propheten werden im soeben zitierten Text also immer im Gegensatz zu Personen gesehen und beschrieben, die Christus verfolgten oder nicht verkündigten und deshalb bei den Juden Gnade fanden. Andererseits verbindet Tertullian in

[11] D. van Damme, *op. cit.*, 83.

Scorpiace 8,3 mit seiner Aufzählung einiger Propheten nur die Absicht, einen Abriss der Geschichte zu geben und darzustellen, wie seit Abels Tagen (cf. *Qui Deo placuerat, occiditur, et quidem a fratre*) bis zur Erleuchtung des Zacharias all jene, die Gott verehrten (cf. *Statim ut coli Deus coepit, invidiam religio sortita est*), feindlich behandelt wurden: *David exagitatur, Helias fugatur* usw. Während Tertullian nur die Propheten aufzählt, reiht Ps.-Cyprian paarweise die gleichen Propheten mitsamt ihren finsteren Zeitgenossen auf.

Unseres Erachtens richtet sich der Aufbau des Textes Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 nach *Luc.* 11,51: ... ἀπὸ αἵματος Ἄβελ ἕως αἵματος Ζαχαρίου τοῦ ἀπολομένου μεταξὺ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου καὶ τοῦ οἴκου – *Vulg.-Luc.* 11,51: *... a sanguine Abel, usque ad sanguinem Zachariae, qui periit inter altare et aedem*. Die Aufzählung der *iusti* und der *prophetae* (Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3) beginnt ja bei Tertullian mit Abel, welcher von Matthäus,[12] in einem ähnlichen Kontext wie *Luc.* 11,51, *iustus* genannt wird, und endet mit Zacharias, der „zwischen dem Altar und dem Tempel ermordet wurde". Mit der Einschaltung der Aussage *David exagitatur, Helias fugatur, Hieremias lapidatur, Eseias secatur* wird nur sehr summarisch beleuchtet, wieviel Freveltaten in der Zeit zwischen Abel und Zacharias wider die *iusti* und die *prophetae* verübt worden sind. Dass die historische Reihenfolge der aufgeführten Propheten in Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 mit der Bemerkung *Hieremias lapidatur, Eseias secatur* unterbrochen wird, lässt sich möglicherweise erklären als eine Reminiszenz an *Hebr.* 11,37: ἕτεροι δὲ ἐμπαιγμῶν καὶ μαστίγων πεῖραν ἔλαβον, ἔτι δὲ δεσμῶν καὶ φυλακῆς· ἐλιθάσθησαν, ἐπειράσθησαν, ἐπρίσθησαν, ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρης ἀπέθανον – *Vulg.-Hebr.* 11,37: *Alii vero ludibria, et verbera experti, insuper et vincula, et carceres: lapidati sunt, secti sunt, tentati sunt, in occisione gladii mortui sunt.* Der letzte Satz in Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 über Johannes den Täufer: *Ipse clausula legis – salticae lucar* ist im Sinne der soeben vorgetragenen Interpretation nicht etwa eine unbeweisbare, verhüllte Kritik an der Einreihung des Johannes unter die Propheten in Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 24–25 oder eine ebensolche Polemik gegen das Vorgehen des Autors dieser Schrift, wie van Damme behauptet.[13] Schon weil Tertullian selber Johannes den Täufer

[12] Vgl. *Mt.* 23,35: ... ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος Ἄβελ τοῦ δικαίου ἕως τοῦ αἵματος Ζαχαρίου υἱοῦ Βαραχίου ὃν ἐφονεύσατε μεταξὺ τοῦ ναοῦ καὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου–*Vulg.-Mt.* 23,35: *a sanguine Abel iusti usque ad sanguinem Zachariae, filii Barachiae, quem occidistis inter templum et altare.*

[13] *Op. cit.*, 83.

unter die Propheten zu rechnen geneigt ist,[14] wäre van Dammes Interpretation abzuweisen. Vielmehr ist der Satz als Reminiszens an *Mt.* 11,10–*Luc.* 7,27 und *Mt.* 14,9 eine Andeutung des Höhepunkts der Gottlosigkeit gegen die *iusti* und die *prophetae*: Beim Ende des Zeitalters von *lex et prophetae*,[15] beim Übergang vom Alten Bund zum Neuen Bund, hat man es gewagt, jenen zu ermorden, der *clausula legis et prophetarum* war und nicht bloss Prophet sondern gar ein Engel genannt worden war: *nec prophetes sed angelus dictus.* Auch die Einordnung von Johannes dem Täufer in Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 (*Ipse clausula legis et prophetarum*) als dem Propheten, der den Übergang zwischen dem Alten und dem Neuen Bund vermittelt, braucht nicht eine Polemik gegen eine „Quelle" zu implizieren, welche Johannes den Täufer nicht als eine solche Mittlergestalt betrachtet; Tertullian beschreibt Johannes ja auch sonstwo als eine „Übergangsperson", z.B. in *Adv. Marc.* 4,33,8: *Quasi non et nos limitem quendam agnoscamus Iohannem constitutum inter vetera et nova, ad quem desineret Iudaismus et a quo inciperet Christianismus* ...; *Adv. Marc.* 5,2,1: ... *terminum in Iohanne statuens inter utrumque ordinem desinentium exinde veterum et incipientium novorum* ... Die textlichen Parallelen und die gleiche Reihenfolge – *David* (*oderant*) gegenüber *David* (*exagitatur*), *Hieremiam lapidabant* gegenüber *Hieremias lapidatur*, *Esaiam secabant* gegenüber *Eseias secatur*, *Zachariam trucidabant* gegenüber *Zacharias ... trucidatur* – können freilich auch nach unserer Meinung bedeuten, dass ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis vorliegt. Aber aus unseren bisherigen Darlegungen folgern wir ein Abhängigkeitsverhältnis, welches Tertullians *Scorpiace* 8,3 zur Quelle des Ps.-Cyprianus macht; wir setzen uns hiermit in Widerspruch zu van Damme. Unsere Argumente sind, kurz zusammengefasst, die folgenden: Die Struktur des Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 ist höchstwahrscheinlich von *Mt.* 23,25 und *Luc.* 11,51 vorgegeben und die Reihenfolge der Namen in der Aussage *Hieremias lapidatur, Eseias secatur* erklärt sich aus einer Reminiszenz an *Hebr.* 11,37. Ein zusätzliches Argument für unsere Deutung des Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses dürfte sein,

[14] Vgl. Tert. *An.* 9,3: *Nam quia spiritalia charismata agnoscimus, post Iohannem quoque prophetiam meruimus consequi*; *An.* 50,5: *Translatus est Enoch et Helias nec mors eorum reperta est, dilata scilicet ... Obiit et Iohannes, quem in adventum domini remansurum frustra fuerat spes*; Tert. *Ieiun.* 12,2: *Ut ab Iohanne paracletus obmutuisset, et ipsi nobis prophetae in hanc maxime causam extitissemus* ...; Tert. *Bapt.* 10,5: ... *cum ipsum quod caeleste in Iohanne fuerat, spiritus prophetiae* ...

[15] Vgl. J.E.L. van der Geest, *Le Christ et l'Ancien Testament chez Tertullien. Recherche terminologique*, Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, XXII (Nijmegen 1972) 35–39.

dass in Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 24–25 der Name Abels fehlt, während doch bei Ps.-Cyprianus alle Propheten des Tert. *Scorpiace* 8,3 in der gleichen Reihenfolge aufgezählt werden. Der Grund für eine Auslassung liegt sicherlich nahe, wenn Ps.-Cyprian für seine Zwecke jenen Propheten nicht gebrauchen kann, der den Christus nicht ankündigte. Wenn nun eine umgekehrte Entlehnungsrichtung angenommen werden soll, wäre zu motivieren, warum wohl Moyses und Aaron von Tertullian aus der Reihe der verfolgten *iusti* und *prophetae* ausgelassen worden seien.

Van Damme bringt auch das Argument vor, dass die Textparallelen *David oderant – David exagitatur* einen leicht begreiflichen und aufschlussreichen Unterschied aufweisen: „Der erste Unterschied *David oderant – David exagitatur*, ist leicht zu erklären durch die Tatsache, dass *odi* kein Passiv hat."[16] Aber das Passiv von *odi* liegt nicht nur in Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 26(!) vor: *Videtis quemadmodum Christum qui diligunt odiuntur*, sondern steht auch bei Tertullian, z.B. in *Apol.* 3,5: *Oditur itaque in hominibus innocuis etiam nomen innocuum.*

Ferner ist nach van Damme[17] die Frühdatierung des Pseudo-Cyprian um 175 n. Chr. auch auf Grund des Gebrauchs von *testificatio* in Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* möglich: *Et constituit ei Deus praecepti sui testificationem dicens* (cf. *Gen.* 9,9. 11): *„Omnis res cibus vobis, quasi pabulum holerum, excepta carne in sanguine vitae"*, *et posuit huius testificationis signum in arcu* (Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 14–15); *Sed etiam illis quoque Dominus testificationem posuit in montem Choreb per Moysen* (Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 17). Anlässlich der beiden Belege meint van Damme, dass der Autor hier das griechische Wort διαθήκη aus *Gen.* 9 mit *testificatio* wiedergegeben habe, weil das nächstliegende Äquivalent von διαθήκη (und zwar *testamentum*– „Bund, Vertrag"[18]) sozusagen tabuisiert gewesen sei: „Dagegen scheint die Benutzung von bestimmten Ersatzwörtern (*testificatio*, *machina*) zu zeigen, dass zur Abfassungszeit der Predigt eine Scheu gegenüber bestimmten Termini bestand, die später nicht mehr nachzuweisen ist."[19] Wir möchten nun vorschlagen, die Wiedergaben aller διαθήκη-Belege des 9. Kapitels der *Genesis* sowohl in der *Vetus Latina* wie auch in der *Vulgata*[20] durchzumustern: *Gen.* 9,9: ἐγὼ ἰδοὺ ἀνίστημι τὴν διαθήκην

[16] *Op. cit.*, 83.

[17] *Op. cit.*, 24f., 88f.

[18] J. E. L. van der Geest, *op. cit.*. 29: „L'ennui, c'est que le *testamentum* latin correspond précisément au sens de διαθήκη ..."

[19] *Op. cit.*, 88–89; vgl. ferner 24f., 30.

[20] Bekanntlich ist das Alte Testament von Hieronymus viel durchgreifender als das Neue Testament bearbeitet worden.

μου – *Vet. Lat.* I[21]-*Gen.* 9,9: *ecce ego excito testamentum meum*, *Vulg.-Gen.* 9,9: *ecce ego statuam pactum*;[22] *Gen.* 9,12: τοῦτο τὸ σημεῖον τῆς διαθήκης – *Vet. Lat.* X-*Gen.* 9,12: *hoc signum testamenti*, *Vulg.-Gen.* 9,12: *hoc signum foederis*; *Gen.* 9,13: καὶ ἔσται εἰς σημεῖον διαθήκης – *Vet. Lat.* I-*Gen.* 9,13: *et erit signum testamenti aeterni*, *Vulg.-Gen.* 9,13: *et erit signum foederis*; *Gen.* 9,15: τῆς διαθήκης μου – *Vet. Lat.* I-*Gen.* 9, 15: *testamenti mei*, *Vulg.-Gen.* 9,15: *foederis mei*. Wir entnehmen diesem Material, dass Hieronymus das Wort *testamentum* im Genesiskapitel vermieden hat, weil zu seiner Zeit *testamentum*–„Altes/Neues Testament" schon ausschliessliche Geltung gewonnen hatte, während die *Vetus-Latina*-Übersetzer ausserdem noch *testamentum*–„Bund, Vertrag" kannten. Dieses Faktum der Wortgeschichte gibt uns nun ein Mittel in die Hand, Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* mit *testificatio* anstelle von *testamentum* in eine Zeit zu datieren, in der *testamentum* als *terminus technicus* in der Bedeutung „das (Alte/Neue) Testament" galt. Der Wortgebrauch in der Art eines *terminus technicus* ist erst in Tertullians Spätwerk feststellbar; wie J. van der Geest schreibt: „Dans le sens de ‚partie de la Bible', le terme *testamentum*, devenu plus tard d'un usage courant, est encore exceptionnel chez Tertullien. Généralement, il signifie encore ‚relation d'alliance' et désigne le règlement que Dieu a établi pour ses relations avec son peuple. L'idée d'‚alliance' n'y joue pas expressément un rôle. Dans ses derniers écrits, Tertullien finit par adopter le mot pour désigner les documents de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament."[23] Wir halten den Beweis für erbracht, dass Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* frühestens aus der Zeit von Tertullians Spätwerk datiert. Der Wortgebrauch im Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* setzt übrigens entweder die neue, fachsprachliche Bedeutung „Altes/Neues Testament" oder die ambivalente Bedeutung „Bund, Vertrag–(Altes/Neues) Testament" voraus: *Adv. Iud.* 6: *Quanto ergo verius spiritalia intellegunt caelestes, et heredes patris sui praecepta, et ea quae testamento patris sui cauta sunt*; *Adv. Iud.* 7: *Vos ergo cum sitis Christi heredes, intellegite testamentum eius*; *Adv. Iud.* 8: *illum* (= *Spiritum Sanctum*) *sequatur, illo duce et magistro facillime poterit novi testamenti iura virtutemque cognoscere, quod hereditas gentibus contributa est hoc modo*; *Adv. Iud.* 9: *data certa condicione praeceptorum*

[21] Vgl. *Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel*, II. *Genesis*. Hrsg. von B. Fischer (Freiburg 1951).

[22] Vgl. *Gen.* 9,11: καὶ στήσω τὴν διαθήκην μου – *Vulg.-Gen.* 9,11: *et statuam pactum meum.*

[23] J. E. L. van der Geest, *op. cit.*, 58f.

vitae, legis et testamenti; *Adv. Iud.* 28: *Filius perpessus in prophetis, tempore quo moriebatur, in suo tempore coactus est indignatione scribere novum testamentum*; *Adv. Iud.* 43: *Ob hanc ergo causam coactus est Dominus facere novum testamentum*; *Adv. Iud.* 61: *Hic est qui rupit vetus suum testamentum et scripsit novum*; *Adv. Iud.* 70: *Ergo si fas est, capite mentem bonam: vel sero, vel tarde, intellegite testamentum novum.* Selbstverständlich sind hiermit alle *testamentum*-Belege des Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* vorgeführt.

Ein zweites Argument für eine frühe Datierung von Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* ist in van Dammes Überlegungen die Tatsache, dass *arca* als Wiedergabe von κιβωτός „Arche Noah"/„Bundeslade" vermieden und durch den allgemeineren Ausdruck *machina* ersetzt wird: *Adv. Iud.* 12: *Ex illo genere invenit hominem iustum, cui imperavit ut faceret fabricam in modum machinae capacitatis certae mensurarum conpagibus, ut illa condita cum suis fratribus Noe servaretur*; *Adv. Iud.* 64: *Consecuti atque omnia instrumenta atque possederunt lychnum septem luminum et machinam testamenti et vasa yeratia et tubas.* Van Damme meint, dass es sich um einen bewussten Austausch von *arca* durch das Ersatzwort *machina* handle. Als einen möglichen Grund für den Vorbehalt des Autors gegenüber *arca* betrachtet van Damme den profanen Wortgebrauch, denn: „Im profanen Sprachgebrauch bedeutet *arca* nun auch ‚Staatskasse', oder ‚Stadttresor'. Beim Gebrauch dieses Wortes könnten die Hörer also vielleicht den Eindruck bekommen, dass das Vermächtnis Christi ... etwas mit einem Geldtresor zu tun hat."[24] Gewiss könnte hiermit einer der Gründe gefunden sein, zumal wenn wir in Betracht ziehen, dass der Autor dieser Schrift ein Rhetor ist, der mit der klassischen Sprache vertraut ist und sich um ein hohes sprachliches Niveau bemüht.[25] Aber eben deshalb eignet sich die Verwendung von *machina* anstelle von *arca* nicht als Argument für eine Frühdatierung der Schrift. In rhetorisch ausgebildeter Sprache kann *machina* aus rhetorisch-dichterischer Variation erklärt werden, und diese mag durch die Abnutzung des seit dem Beginn der christlichen Latinität in vielen christlichen und profanen Bedeutungen[26] verwendeten *arca* provoziert worden sein. Überhaupt ist

[24] *Op. cit.*, 27.

[25] Vgl. D. van Damme, *op. cit.*, 68f., 72f.

[26] Beispielsweise: „die Arche Noah" in I *Clem. ad Cor.* 9: (*animalia*) *intraverunt cum eo* (= *Noe*) *in arcam*; Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 4,6: ... *aut Noe, arcae fabricatorem* ...; Tert. *Idol.* 24,4: *Viderimus enim si secundum arcae typum et corvus* ...; Tert. *Bapt.* 8,3: ... *pacem caelestis irae praeco columba terris adnuntiavit dimissa ex arca et cum olea reversa* ... *de caelis ubi ecclesia est arcae figura*; Cypr. *Ep.* 69,2: ... *probans et contestants unam*

die kunstvolle Umschreibung in der Stelle Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 12: *fabricam in modum machinae capacitatis certae mensurarum conpagibus* ein Indiz rhetorischen Stillwillens. Ähnliche Umschreibungen des Wortes *arca* finden sich nun nicht etwa in der frühen sondern in der vergleichsweise späten christlichen Latinität, wo *arca*–„Arche Noah" sicherlich keinen Anstoss mehr gegeben hätte: z.B. durch *machina* in Paul. Nol. *Carm.* 24, 73 s.: *scapham sequacem quadriremis machinae / ad hanc opem paraverat*; Arator 1,644–645: *Ecclesiae speciem praestabat machina quondam temporibus constructa Noe, quae sola recepit* ..., und durch *lignum* in Aug. *Tract. in Ioh.* 11,7: ... *non erat ante istos sanctus Noe, qui solus in toto genere humano cum tota domo sua meruit de diluvio liberari, in quo et in filiis eius figurata est ecclesia? Ligno portante evadunt diluvium.*

Ferner ist van Damme der Meinung,[27] dass Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* in Rom geschrieben wurde. Sein einziges Argument für die römische Lokalisierung ist der Gebrauch von *genui* statt *generavi* in dem von Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 29 zitierten Text *Is.* 1,2: *Filios genui et exaltavi: ipsi autem me repudiaverunt*. Van Damme meint nämlich, der Gebrauch des Perf. *genui* deute auf römische und der Gebrauch von *generavi* auf nordafrikanische Herkunft hin.[28] Die Tragfähigkeit dieses Arguments erscheint aber zweifelhaft, wenn wir bedenken, dass *genui* in gleichem Kontext auch in Tertullians *Adversus Iudaeos* vorkommt: Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 3,5: *Filios genui et exaltavi, ipsi autem reprobaverunt me*; Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 9,14: *Filios genui et exaltavi.*[29] Wenn wir nun noch *Is.* 1,2 in Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 29 und den gleichen Bibeltext in Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 3,5 miteinander vergleichen, will sich bei uns der Verdacht regen, dass der Autor des Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* den Text von Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 3,5 vor Augen gehabt habe und in

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arcam Noe typum fuisse unius ecclesiae; Cypr. *Ep.* 74,11: ... *qui in arca Noe fuit non potuit per aquam salvus fieri* ...; Cypr. *Ep.* 75,15: *cum vero et arca Noe nihil aliud fuerit quam sacramentum ecclesiae* ...; „die Bundeslade" z.B. in Tert. *Cor.* 9,1: ... *nec arca testamenti nec tabernaculum martyrii* ...; *Itin. Theodosii* 4: *De Hierusalem usque in Silona, ubi fuit arca testamenti Domini* ...; „die Lade" z.B. in Tert. *Pud.* 7,8: *At tu, opinor, hoc velis, ut ovem non de grege perditam faceret, sed de arca vel armario*; Tert. *Ad mart.* 4,6: *Regulus ... maluit hostibus reddi et in arcae genus stipatus undique extrinsecus clavis transfixus* ...; „das Grab", vgl. E. Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*, III (Berlin-Dublin-Zürich ³1970) 421, 487.

[27] *Op. cit.*, 40, 89.

[28] Vgl. D. van Damme, *op. cit.*, 89: „In den alttestamentlichen Anführungen weist die Bezeugung der Form *genui* (Is. 1.2 in §29) ebenfalls nach Rom, da in Afrika die gewöhnliche Form *generavi* ist"; vgl. auch S. 40: „Der Unterschied *genui-generavi* könnte auf die römische Herkunft der Predigt hinweisen."

[29] Vgl. dagegen Cypr. *Zelo* 15: *filios generavi et exaltavi, ipsi autem me spreverunt*; Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 3,13,9: *filios generavi et exaltavi*; Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 5,9,8: *filios generavi.*

seiner Vorliebe für ein gehobenes sprachliches Niveau (s. oben) das Tertullian-Zitat in absichtlich „klassischer" Adaptation übernommen habe. Unser Verdacht gründet sich zunächst auf die in höherem Grade „klassische" Endstellung von *repudiaverunt* in Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 29 und ferner auf den Gebrauch von *repudiare* anstelle von Tertullians *reprobare*:[30] *repudiare* ist ja dem klassischen Latein eigen, während *reprobare* zum nachklassischen Christenlatein gehört.[31]

Wir fassen zusammen: 1. Nach unserer Meinung sind van Dammes Argumente für eine frühe Datierung des Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* nicht stichhaltig und vermögen diese weder insgesamt noch jedes für sich zu begründen, dass die Predigt sehr früh entstanden sei. 2. Wir meinen, dass van Dammes Argument für die Lokalisierung dieser Schrift in Rom nicht recht überzeugt. 3. Hinwiederum meinen wir, dass der Autor des Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* entweder eine Bekanntschaft mit oder gar eine Abhängigkeit von den Werken Tertullians, namentlich von *Scorpiace* und *Adversus Iudaeos*, verrät; hiermit wollen wir aber nicht gesagt haben, dass die Predigt in Nordafrika entstanden sein muss, obwohl dies keinesfalls für ausgeschlossen erachtet werden darf.

II. Ps.-Cyprian, De centesima sexagesima tricesima[32]

In seiner Abhandlung über *De centesima sexagesima tricesima* folgert Hugo Koch[33] aus sprachlichen Tatsachen (s. unten), dass die Schrift aus dem. 4. Jahrhundert datiere[34] und höchstwahrscheinlich aus Nordafrika stamme.[35] Wenn J. Daniélou den von H. Koch beigebrachten sprach-

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[30] Vgl. *Vulg.-Is.* 1,2: *filios enutrivi et exaltavi, ipsi autem spreverunt me.*

[31] Vgl. A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin–français des auteurs chrétiens*. Revu par H. Chirat (Strasbourg 1954) *s. vv.*, und Ch. T. Lewis–Ch. Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford 1962) *s. vv.* Ein ähnliches Verfahren dürfen wir vielleicht auch im Zitat von *Mt.* 27,25 erblicken. In Ps.-Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 37: *sanguis huius in nobis et in filiis nostris* treffen wir nämlich den literarisch gehobeneren Gebrauch von *in* + Abl. mit der Bedeutung „über" an, während Tertullian in demselben Kontext *super* anwendet: Tert. *Adv. Iud.* 8,18: *sanguis huius super nos et super filios nostros*, cf. auch Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 2,15;3: *sanguis illius super capita nostra et filiorum nostrorum.*

[32] Edition: *Patrologia Latina, Supplementum* I (Paris 1958) Sp. 53–67.

[33] Die ps.-cyprianische Schrift De centesima, sexagesima, tricesima in ihrer Abhängigkeit von Cyprian, *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 31 (1932) 248–272.

[34] *Op. cit.*, 270: „... so scheint mir doch die ganze Haltung der beiden Ausführungen, wie gesagt, ins IV. Jh. zu weisen." Daniélou denkt hierbei irrtümlicherweise an das Ende des 3. Jahrhunderts: „H. Koch le situe à la fin du III^{e} siècle pour des raisons littéraires ..." (*op. cit.*, 364).

[35] *Op. cit.*, 270: „Als Heimat der Schrift wird doch wohl in erster Linie Nordafrika in Betracht kommen."

lichen Beweisen und Argumenten für die Abhängigkeit dieser Schrift von den Werken Cyprians nicht folgen will, geht er offenbar von dem Einwand aus, dass sie alle aus dem Prolog und dem Epilog dieses Werkes, mithin aus späteren Zutaten fremder Hand, entnommen worden seien: „Les raisons de Koch ne paraissent pas décisives, car les expressions en question se trouvent dans le prologue et la conclusion de l'ouvrage, qui sont un remaniement postérieur de seconde main."[36] Daniélous Kritik an Kochs Beweisen erweist sich aber als unhaltbar, wenn wir Koch aufmerksam lesen. Koch entnimmt seine Argumente und Beweise ja der *ganzen* Schrift, nicht einzig und allein dem Prolog und dem Epilog, wie freilich die Zusammenfassung des Aufsatzes[37] nahelegen könnte. Die Aufzählung der Belegstellen des *De centesima* zeigt, in welchen Partien Koch Abhängigkeit von bzw. Beeinflussung durch Cyprian entdecken zu dürfen glaubt: Zeile 2 s.,[38] 3, 6 s., 9, 18, 19, 21 s., 23 s., 43 s., 48 ss., 55 ss., 66 ss., 79 s., 93, 112 s., 138, 141, 143 s., 145 ss., 148 ss., 152, 154, 157, 159 ss., 164, 181, 187, 191, 195 ss., 202, 211, 253 ss., 255 ss., 266, 269, 270, 272, 273 s., 295, 297, 307 s., 309 ss., 312 ss., 342 s., 344 s., 347, 348 ss., 363 ss., 365 ss., 373, 376, 381, 387, 394, 399 s., 401 ss. Die Zuverlässigkeit der von Koch beigebrachten sprachlichen Beweise halten auch wir sicherlich nicht voll und ganz für erwiesen. Denn Kochs Argumente für die Abhängigkeit des Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* von Cyprian bestehen aus einer langen Reihe gewisser Ausdrücke,[39] die sich sowohl bei Cyprian als auch in Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* finden, beispielsweise *devotus atque dicatus*, *legi insistere*, *animus atque actus noster*, *lavacrum vitale*, *unitatis magister*. Solche Parallelen könnten ebensogut auf Cyprians Bekanntschaft mit oder Abhängigkeit von Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* beruhen oder zu einem „homiletischen Gemeingut" gehören. Keine dieser beiden Erklärungsmöglichkeiten kann Koch ausschliessen: Abhängigkeit Cyprians von Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* hält er ja nur für unwahrscheinlich, weil „ein Schriftsteller vom Range eines Cyprian es nicht nötig gehabt habe, von einem so armseligen Prediger zu lernen".[40] Weiter sei die grosse Zahl der gedanklichen und sprachlichen Parallelen eine Garantie dafür, dass sie nicht zu einem „homiletischen Gemeingut" gehören können: „Die gedanklichen und

[36] *Op. cit.*, 364.
[37] *Op. cit.*, 268–269.
[38] H. Koch zitiert Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* nach der Edition von R. Reitzenstein, in: *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* 15 (1914) 60ff.
[39] H. Koch, *op. cit.*, 250–268.
[40] H. Koch, *op. cit.*, 249.

sprachlichen Berührungen sind zu zahlreich und zu nahe, als dass sie zum homiletischen Gemeingut gerechnet werden könnten."[41] Hier handelt es sich wohl um Gefühlsargumente.

Daniélou beruft sich zudem – mit einer Verweisung nach einem Aufsatz von M. Heer[42] – auf „altertümliche Züge" des Sprachgebrauchs in *De centisema*: „Le texte présente par ailleurs des traits archaïques (*fornicaria, I Clem.* 12,1; *consummatio* = τελειότης, *I Clem.* 53,3;[43] *agonista*, Irénée, *Adv. haer.* IV,37,7; *sufferentia carnis, Perp.* 3)."[44] Diese von Heer für altertümlich erklärten Ausdrücke erweisen sich aber bei genauerer Durchsicht der Literatur als nicht beschränkt auf die von ihm aufgezählten „altertümlichen" altchristlichen lateinischen Schriftsteller und Schriften, sondern auch als geläufiges Gut der späteren christlichen Latinität. Den Ausdruck *fornicaria* finden wird ja, ausser I *Clem.* 12,1, z.B. noch in folgenden Belegen: Tert. *Pud.* 16,9: *Non scitis, quod, qui adglutinatur fornicariae, unum corpus efficitur?*; Cypr. *Ep.* 74,8: *Dat honorem Deo qui foris de adultera et fornicaria nasci Dei filios adseverat?*; Aug. *Adv. Fulg.* 12: *Quae mulier fornicaria nisi traditorum spelunca*; Ambr. *Cain et Ab.* 1,4,14: *Per os Salomonis speciem fornicariae videmus expressam*; Hier. *Ep.* 53,8: ... *Osee ... nominat ... Iezrahel et uxorem fornicariam*; Hier. *Ep.* 74,8: *qui accepit uxorem fornicariam*; Hier. *Mat.* 1,1,19: *Si qui fornicariae coniungitur, unum corpus efficitur*; Hier. *Os.* 1,2: *fornicaria est, quae cum pluribus copulatur, adultera, quae unum virum deserens alteri iungitur*; Euagr. *Alterc.* 36,5: *Quid ... interpretatur fornicaria, nisi omnibus advenientibus subiecta*?; Isid. *Etym.* 10,110: *Haec sub arcuatis prostrabantur, quae loca fornices dicuntur, unde et fornicariae.* Auch *consummatio* gibt es nicht nur in der lateinischen Übersetzung der *Prima Clementis* oder in den ältesten altchristlichen lateinischen Schriften, sondern auch in den folgenden späteren Belegen: Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 5,14,7: ... *dum dispositiones eius in Christo ignorant consummationem legi staturo* ...; Tert. *Spect.* 29,3: *metas consummationis specta*; Tert. *Adv. Val.* 31,1: *superest de consummatione et dispensatione mercedis*; Cypr. *Ep.* 13,2: *nec statim consecutio, sed consummatio hominem Deo servat*; Lact. *Inst.*

[41] H. Koch, *op. cit.*, 268.

[42] Pseudo-Cyprian vom Lohn der Frommen und das Evangelium Iustins, *Römische Quartalschrift* 28 (1914) 97–186, insbes. 107.

[43] Die Verweisung auf I *Clem. ad Cor.* 53,3 beruht wahrscheinlich auf einem Irrtum, denn dort gibt es τελειότης = *consummatio* nicht. In I *Clem. ad Cor.* 53,5 gibt es aber: ὦ τελειότητος ἀνυπερβλήτου – *o perfectae sinceritatis! Consummatio* = τελειότης treffen wir dagegen in I *Clem. ad Cor.* 50,1 an.

[44] *Op. cit.*, 364–365.

6,23,39: *quod continentiae genus quasi fastigium omnium consummatioque virtutum*; Rufin. *Basil. hom.* 1,2: *prudentiae consummatio*; Rufin. *Orig. in Cant.* 3,174C: *perfectionem consummationemque universitatis*; Aug. *Pecc. mer.* 24: *sic enim ad ipsius cursus consummationem pertinebat nullum habere peccatum ...*; Aug. *In Psalm.* 58, *serm.* 2,5: *quae sunt consummationes? perfectiones*; Ambr. *In Psalm.* 118, *serm.* 12,45: *est consummatio hominis, et multae consummationes, donec ad perfectum veniat*; Hier. *Adv. Pelag. pr.* 1,694: *cum ad consummationis culmen ascenderint*; Isid. *Sent.* 1,2,4: *consummatio alicuius facti dicitur perfectio.* Ferner ist der Gebrauch des Wortes *agonista* viel geläufiger als Heer annimmt; denn ausser in der von ihm erwähnten Stelle Iren. 4,37,7: *bonus agonista ad incorruptelae agonem adhortatur nos*[45] begegnen wir diesem Ausdruck z.B. noch in Aug. *Serm.* 343,10: *agonista exspectat athletam*; Arnob. *Comm. ad Psalm.* 93 (PL 53, col. 462B): *quaeso te, agonista fortissime, indica mihi, quo ordine hostium impetus evasisti*; Eleuth. Torn. *Serm.* (PL 65, col. 93A): *Dei electos milites verosque agonistas.* Nahe verwandt mit dem soeben nachgewiesenen Gebrauch von *agonista* ist der des von diesem Substantiv abgeleiteten Adjektivs *agonisticus*: Cypr. *Ad Fort.* 2: *... aut qui agonisticam coronam quaerit adipisci ...*;[46] Aug. *Ep.* 108,18: *... et in ipso scelere principibus agonisticis confessoribus*; Aug. *In Psalm.* 132,6: *dicturi sunt „nostri monachi ..." agonisticos eos vocant ... sic eos, inquiunt, appellamus propter agonem ... quia sunt, qui certant adversus diabolum et praevalent, milites Christi agonistici appellantur.* Das Wort *agonista* ist sogar noch in der mittellateinischen Literatur ganz gewöhnlich.[47] Was den späteren Gebrauch von *sufferentia* anbetrifft, können wir u.a. verweisen auf Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 4,15,4: *... quo suam supra in benedictionibus sufferentiam commendaret*; Tert. *Or.* 4,5: *iam hoc dicto ad sufferentiam nosmetipsos praemonemus*; Tert. *Or.* 29,1: *... sed patientes et sentientes et dolentes sufferentia instruit*; Euagr. *Sent.* cap. 1181: *sufferentia viri generat spem*; *Acta SS. Saturnini et Soc.* 7: *Domine, pro*

[45] Übrigens hält Heer den *Irenaeus latinus* voreilig für ein „archaisches" Werk, denn die Entstehungszeit steht noch keineswegs fest, vgl. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, I: *The Beginnings of Patristic Literature* (Utrecht-Antwerp-Westminster, Maryl. ³1962) 290f.: „H. Jordan and A. Souter think that this translation was made in North Africa between the years 370 and 420. According to H. Koch, however, it must have originated before 250, because Cyprian made use of it. W. Sanday goes beyond this, and assigns it to the date 200."

[46] Vgl. auch Aug. *Conf.* 4,3,5: *Erat eo tempore vir sagax ... qui proconsul manu sua coronam illam agonisticam imposuerat non sano capiti meo, sed non ut medicus.*

[47] Vgl. *Mittellateinisches Wörterbuch bis zum ausgehenden 13. Jahrhundert*, I (München 1967) s.v. *agonista*.

nomine tuo da mihi sufferentiam; *Acta S. Thyrsi Mart.* 6: *Thyrsus dixit „Per Christum, qui sufferentiam tribuit mihi, ut tanta patiar propter nomen eius"*.

Das Vorhandensein bestimmter sprachlicher Hebraismen in *De centesima* beweist nach Daniélou ferner, dass diese Schrift sehr früh entstanden sei: „On relève aussi des hébraïsmes comme *regnum perpetuitatis aeternae* (54,19)."[48] Das Hebräische dieses Ausdrucks besteht im Gebrauch des Genitivs *perpetuitatis aeternae*. Aber eine derartige Genitivkonstruktion ist ja als Folge seiner Anwendung in den das Hebräische *fideliter* interpretierenden lateinischen Bibelübersetzungen allmählich auch in den allgemeinen christlichen Sprachgebrauch übergegangen und dem *ganzen* Christenlatein eigen geworden.[49] Solche Hebraismen liefern also keinen Beweis für die vortertullianische Entstehung des *De centesima*, ebensowenig wie gewisse, von der „offiziellen" Kirche nicht allgemein akzeptierte oder verkündigte jüdische und jüdischapokalyptische Ideen, Theorien oder Symbole in dieser Schrift – Daniélou freilich will sich auf solche Elemente stützen, um seine These als richtig zu erweisen. In Schriften der „nicht-offiziellen" Kirche, etwa aus der Feder von Schriftstellern, die ebenso wie der Autor des *De centesima* aus einer oralen Tradition[50] schöpfen, sind ja diese jüdischen oder jüdischapokalyptischen Elemente durchaus nicht selten. Man bedenke in diesem Zusammenhang z.B. die altchristlichen lateinischen Grabinschriften,[51] die gewiss bis einschliesslich des 7. Jahrhunderts noch zahllose jüdische Ideen, Theorien und Gebräuche repräsentieren.

Nachdem wir uns nun mit der bisherigen Forschung auseinanderge-

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[48] *Op. cit.*, 365. Den Ausdruck *regnum perpetuitatis aeternae* finden wir übrigens nicht in 54,19, sondern in 54,18.

[49] Vgl. Chr. Mohrmann, *Études*, I, 48: „Ainsi l'exemple de l'hébreu a favorisé l'usage du génitif dans les tournures comme: *homo peccati, odor suavitatis*"; J. Schrijnen–Chr. Mohrmann, *Studien zur Syntax der Briefe des hl. Cyprian*, I (Nijmegen 1936) 86: „Die lateinischen Bibelübersetzer behielten die Konstruktion bei, und so entstanden Ausdrücke wie *corpus peccati, corpus humilitatis, odor suavitatis*, die dann auch in den allgemeinen christlichen Sprachgebrauch übergingen." Vgl. Cypr. *Ep.* 76,4: *calicem salutis*; Cypr. *Ep.* 76,2: *sacramentum salutis*.

[50] Hinsichtlich der mündlichen Tradition in Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* vgl. J. Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 368, wo er anlässlich der in *De cent.* 57,32–39 vorliegenden Variante der Parabel von *Luc.* 19,12 sagt: „... on reconnaîtra la possibilité ici d'une tradition orale de la communauté."

[51] Vgl. E. Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres*, III (Berlin-Dublin-Zürich ³1970) 421ff. Index VIII: *Religio Iudaica. Res Iudaicae*; G. Sanders, *Licht en duisternis in de christelijke grafinscripties*, I–II (Brussel 1965) passim, insbes. II, 983, *s.v.* Jodendom.

setzt haben, wollen wir einen konkreten positiven Beitrag zur genaueren Datierung dieser Schrift zu geben versuchen. Bei der Durchsicht der bisherigen Forschung zu diesem Werke ergab sich uns, dass man bis heute versäumt hat, die in *De centesima* vorhandenen Bibelzitate sprachlich zu untersuchen. Es erscheint uns nützlich, die Bibelzitate des *De centesima* in ihrem Wortlaut mit den entsprechenden Bibelzitaten bei Tertullian einerseits und bei Cyprian andrerseits zu vergleichen. Dann könnten wir möglicherweise feststellen, ob die Bibelzitate des *De centesima* sich an die „Bibeltradition" Tertullians anschliessen oder etwa an die des Cyprian; und zugleich wäre feststellbar, ob *De centesima* vor bzw. in Tertullians Zeit oder nach Tertullian datiert werden muss.

Ps. 1,5: διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀναστήσονται ἀσεβεῖς ἐν κρίσει οὐδὲ ἁμαρτωλοὶ ἐν βουλῇ δικαίων.

Tert.	Cypr.	*De centesima*
fehlt	*Test.* 3,31: propterea non resurgunt impii in iudicio neque peccatores in consilio iustorum.	*SPL* I, col. 64: non resurgent impii in iudicio neque peccatores in consilio iustorum.

Mit der Ausnahme einer einzigen Wendung, und zwar *resurgunt* gegenüber *resurgent*, hat der Bibeltext bei Cyprian und in *De centesima* einen völlig gleichen Wortlaut. Das Präsens *resurgunt* von Cypr. *Test.* 3,31 als Übertragung des griechischen Futurums ἀναστήσονται stimmt nun mit der Texttradition des *Psalterium Romanum* überein, wo wir ebenfalls *resurgunt* antreffen: *ideo non resurgunt impii in iudicio neque peccatores in consilio iustorum.*[52] Bekanntlich[53] lässt das *Psalterium Romanum* sich gewissermassen als „gemeinsamen Ahnen" der übrigen alten lateinischen Psalter betrachten; jedenfalls überliefert das *Psalterium Romanum* den Text einer urtümlichen lateinischen Version treuer als es die anderen Psalter tun. Folglich dürfen wir annehmen, dass Cyprian sich in *Test.* 3,31 an die (im *Psalterium Romanum* am treuesten überlieferte) urtümliche lateinische Version der Psalmen angeschlossen hat. Hingegen entspricht die Form *resurgent* als Wiedergabe für ἀναστήσονται in *De centesima* jener Form, welche von den anderen lateinischen Psaltern[54] geboten wird; diese Psalter – wir meinen natürlich das *Psalterium S. Germani*, das

[52] Vgl. *Le psautier romain et les autres anciens psautiers latins.* Édition critique par Dom Robert Weber, Collectanea Biblica Latina, X (Roma 1953) 5.

[53] Vgl. *Le psautier latin, ed. cit.*, VIII.

[54] Vgl. *Le psautier latin, ed. cit.*, 5.

Psalterium Mozarabicum (*Cavense*) und das *Psalterium Gallicanum S. Hieronymi*[55] – stellen ja eine spätere lateinische Tradition dar.

Ps. 118,1: μακάριοι οἱ ἄμωμοι ἐν ὁδῷ οἱ πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου.

Tert.	Cypr.	*De centesima*
fehlt	*Test.* 3,16: beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in lege Domini; *Ad Fort.* 12: beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in luce Domini.	*SPL* I, col. 66: beati immaculati, qui in via ambulant et in lege Domini.

Bei Tertullian kommt *Ps.* 118,1 nicht vor. Cyprian scheint sich im Anfangsstadium der Nutzung dieser Stelle zu befinden: dies glauben wir aus dem Befund schliessen zu dürfen, dass unsere Bibelstelle – ebenso wie *Ps.* 1,5 in Cypr. *Test.* 3,31 – einerseits in *Test.* 3,16 buchstäblich mit dem Text des *Psalterium Romanum* übereinstimmt[56] und andrerseits in Cyprians Gedächtnis noch nicht ganz fest liegt, weswegen er in *Test.* 3,16 *in lege* und in *Ad Fort.* 12 *in luce* schreibt. Der Wortlaut *ambulant in luce* in Cypr. *Ad Fort.* 12 anstelle von *ambulant in lege* erklärt sich nach unserer Meinung aus einer Kontamination von *Ps.* 118,1 (*ambulant in lege*) mit der biblischen Wendung *ambulare in luce* / *lumine*, welche ja häufig genug belegt ist (beispielsweise 1 *Joh.* 1,7: *si autem in luce ambulemus sicut et ipse est in luce*; *Job* 24,17: *et sic in tenebris quasi in luce ambulant*; *Is.* 2,5: *ambulemus in lumine Domini*; *Is.* 60,3: *et ambulabunt gentes in lumine tuo*; *Ps.* 88,16: *Domine in lumine vultus tui ambulabunt*). Die Worte des Bibelzitats in Ps.-Cypr. *De cent. SPL* I, col. 66 sind zwar die gleichen wie die bei Cypr. *Test.* 3,16 und in der Vulgata-Version von *Ps.* 118,1[57] erscheinenden Worte, aber die Wortfolge in *De centesima* deutet darauf hin, dass der Autor dieses letzteren Stückes die Worte *in via* absichtlich in den relativen Nebensatz einbezogen hat und dabei dem Ausdruck *in lege* (*Domini*) gleichsetzt; denn höchstwahrscheinlich hielt er die Verbindung *immaculati in via* für unverständlich oder für nicht sinnvoll. Dieses umdeutende Zitierverfahren scheint eine Entstehungszeit vorauszusetzen, in welcher der Text *Ps.* 118,1 schon hinreichend bekannt war – das bedeutet doch wohl: nach Cyprian – und bereits die Exegese dieser schwierigen Stelle, namentlich der Worte *in via*, begann. Die Gleichsetzung von

[55] Die *Vulgata* der Psalmen = *Psalterium Gallicanum S. Hieronymi*, vgl. *Le psautier latin*, *ed. cit.*, VIII und 4.

[56] Vgl. *Le psautier latin*, *ed. cit.*, 292.

[57] *Beati immaculati in via qui ambulant in lege Domini.*

in via und *in lege* in *Ps.* 118,1 ist nun bezeichnend für die Interpretation, welche zur Zeit des Hilarius und auch noch später geläufig war: *Prima igitur haec beatitudo est, beatos esse, qui immaculati in via sint: sed non in via fortuita et in incerta et in erratica, sed in via, in qua in lege Domini ambulatur* (Hil. *In Psalm.* 118,2); *Sed ubi erit quisque immaculatus, nisi in via? In qua via, nisi in lege Domini? ... ambulare in via, quae lex est Domini* (Aug. *In Psalm.* 118, *sermo* 1,1). Seit Hieronymus pflegt man bei der Exegese der Psalmworte *in via* unter Hinweis auf *Joh.* 14,6 das Wort *via* mit dem Herrn Jesus Christus zu identifizieren: „*Ego sum via*", *per quam qui pollutus est, transire non poterit ...* „*Beati immaculati in via*". *Et haec via erit nobis, id est Deus noster ...* (Hier. *Esai.* 10,35,3/10); „*Ego sum via et veritas et vita*"; *per ipsum enim venimus ad Patrem, et de ipso scriptum est:* „*Beati immaculati in via*" ... (Hier. *Hiez.* 12,40,32/34);[58] ... „*immaculati*" ... *Sequitur* „*in via*", *id est in ipso Domino Salvatore, qui dixit:* „*Ego sum via et veritas et vita*" (Cassiod. *In Psalm.* 118,1).

Mt. 7,21: οὐ πᾶς ὁ λέγων μοι· Κύριε, κύριε, εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν, ἀλλ' ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

Tert.	Cypr.	*De centesima*
fehlt	*Test.* 3,19: non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, Domine, introibit in regnum caelorum, sed is qui facit voluntatem patris mei qui in caelis est; *Ep.* 73,16: non omnis qui mihi dicit: Domine, Domine, introibit in regnum caelorum.	*SPL* I, col. 56: non omnis qui dicit mihi: Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum, sed qui facit voluntatem patris mei, qui me misit.

Die Matthäus-Stelle 7,21, die bei Tertullian noch nicht vorkommt, ist im Wortlaut bei Cyprian und Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* nur bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung fast identisch überliefert. Wir beobachten aber Unterschiede, die wir für gewichtig halten. Zur Wiedergabe von ὁ λέγων μοι schreibt Cyprian beidemale *qui mihi dicit*; in Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* heisst es dagegen *qui dicit mihi*. Das bedeutet: Hier treffen wir die Wortfolge des Griechischen an, und diese gilt auch in der *Vulgata*. Ein sehr wichtiger – und anders gelagerter – Unterschied zwischen Cyprian und Ps.-Cyprian lässt sich in dem Verfahren erkennen, mit dem das Wort

[58] Vgl. auch Hier. *In die dom.Pasch.* 45/46: „*Ego sum via*": *nos autem dicimus* „*Beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in lege Domini*".

εἰσελεύσεται zitiert wird. Cyprian versucht beidemale (*Test.* 3,19 und *Ep.* 73,16) die Wiedergabe mit *introibit*, Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* aber kennt *intrabit*. Auch indem Ps.-Cyprian *intrabit* schreibt, schliesst er sich enger der *Vulgata* als der Bibeltradition Cyprians an: *Non omnis qui dicit mihi: Domine, Domine, intrabit in regnum caelorum, sed qui facit voluntatem patris mei, qui in caelis est* (*Vulg.-Mt.* 7,21). Wir möchten noch anmerken, dass Ps.-Cyprian nicht etwa *voluntatem patris mei qui in caelis est* als Wiedergabe von τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρός μου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς bietet, sondern *voluntatem patris mei qui me misit*. Dieser „Irrtum" beruht höchstwahrscheinlich auf einer Kontamination infolge des Zitierens aus dem Gedächtnis; seine „Nebenquelle" für *Mt.* 7,21 mag ein ähnlicher Johannes-Text gewesen sein, und zwar *Joh.* 6,38/39: *voluntatem eius qui misit me* [2 ×] – τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με.

Joh. 6,38: ὅτι καταβέβηκα ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐχ ἵνα ποιῶ τὸ θέλημα τὸ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πέμψαντός με.

Tert.	Cypr.	*De centesima*
Res. 34,9: Ego veni, non ut meam, sed patris, qui me misit, faciam voluntatem.	*Test.* 3,19: non descendi de caelo ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui me misit; *Hab. virg.* 7 = *Test.* 3,19.	*SPL* I, col. 55: non descendi de caelo ut faciam voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem eius qui me misit.

Offensichtlich wird *Joh.* 6,38 einerseits in Tert. *Res.* und andererseits in Cypr. *Test.*, *Hab. virg.* und Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* mit unterschiedlichem Wortlaut geboten. Wir folgern, dass Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* auch diesmal sich genauer der lateinischen Bibeltradition der Zeit Cyprians oder des Autors Cyprian selbst anschliesst, als dass er die Bibel im Einklang mit Tertullian zitiert. Καταβέβηκα erscheint bei Tertullian als *ego veni*, bei Cyprian und im Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* aber als *descendi* ohne *ego* und mit *non*, letzteres zur Wiedergabe von οὐχ (ἵνα). Ferner gibt es bei Tertullian keine Wiedergabe von ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, während Cyprian und Ps.-Cyprian dafür *de caelo* bieten. Und schliesslich hat Tertullian in Übereinstimmung mit der *Vetus-Latina*-Tradition[59] *patris* als erläuternden Zusatz in der Übertragung von τοῦ πέμψαντός με, also: *patris qui me misit* (Tert. *Res.* 34,9), wohingegen Cyprian und Ps.-Cyprian ohne den Zusatz auskommen.

[59] Vgl. *Itala. Das Neue Testament in altlateinischer Überlieferung*. Nach den Handschriften hrsg. von Adolf Jülicher, durchgesehen und zum Druck besorgt von Walter Matzkow und Kurt Aland, IV: *Johannes-Evangelium* (Berlin 1963) 62.

1 *Cor.* 15,47–48: ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. οἷος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ἐπουράνιοι.

Tert.	Cypr.	*De centesima*
Carn. 8,5: Primus homo de terrae limo, secundus homo de caelo; *Res.* 49,2: Primus homo de terra, choicus, secundus homo de caelo; *Res.* 49,4: qualis ergo choicus, tales et choici, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes.	*Test.* 2,10: Primus homo de terrae limo, secundus homo de caelo, qualis ille de limo, et qui de limo, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes; *Zelo* 14: Primus homo de terrae limo, secundus homo de caelo, qualis ille e limo, tales et qui de limo, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes; *Test.* 3,11 = *Zelo* 14; *Hab. virg.* 23: Primus homo e terrae limo, secundus e caelo, qualis ille e limo, tales et qui de limo, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes.	*SPL* I, col. 55: Primus homo de terrae limo, secundus de caelo, qualis de limo, tales et qui de limo, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes.

In Tertullians Werken erscheinen (vom Beginn seiner montanistischen Periode an[60]) zwei unterschiedliche lateinische Versionen von 1 *Cor.* 15, 47 in den beiden Belegstellen *Carn.* 8,5 und *Res.* 49,2.4. Der Unterschied der beiden „Versionen" besteht in der Wiedergabe von χοϊκός.

In *Res.* 49,2.4, wo Tertullian den Text 1 *Cor.* 15,47 s. vollständig zitiert und ausführlich erklärt, wird das griechische Lehnwort *choicus* verwendet: „*Primus*", *inquit*, „*homo de terra, choicus*", *id est limacius, id est Adam*, „*secundus homo de caelo*", *id est sermo Dei, id est Christus* (*Res.* 49,2). Dieses Lehnwort nun findet sich in der altchristlichen lateinischen Literatur – Tertullian ausgenommen – nie in einem Bibelzitat und kommt überhaupt nur in der lateinischen Übersetzung von Iren. 1,5: (*Deus*) *fecit et hominem choicum*, und in der Exegese des Hieronymus vor: *Adv. Rufin.* 1,32: *perire choicum et nasci caelestem*; *In Eph.* 4,17, S. 622: *non choicorum et spiritualium natura varia, sed voluntas*; *Hom. Orig. in Luc.* 39, S. 365: *choici id est terreni.* Tertullian hingegen gebraucht das Lehnwort *choicus* zweimal beim Zitieren aus der Bibel[61] und einmal

[60] Vgl. Chr. Mohrmann, *Tertullianus. Apologeticum en andere geschriften uit Tertullianus' voor-Montanistischen tijd* (Utrecht-Brussel 1951) LVIII ff.

[61] Vgl. oben *Res.* 49,2, 49,4, und *Res.* 49,6: *Sicut portavimus imaginem choici, portemus etiam imaginem supercaelestis* (Zitat von 1 *Cor.* 15,49: καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσωμεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου). Cyprian schreibt hier zur Wiedergabe von χοϊκός stets *eius qui de limo est*: Cypr. *Test.* 2,10: *Quomodo portavimus imaginem eius qui de limo est, portemus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est*; *Test.* 3,11, *Hab. virg.* 23, *Zelo* 14 = *Test.* 2,10.

in einer Reminiszenz an eine Bibelstelle,[62] überdies recht häufig ausserhalb eines rein biblischen Kontextes: *An.* 40,3: *Adeo nulla proprietas hominis in choico, nec ita caro homo tamquam alia vis animae et alia persona, sed ...*; *Adv. Val.* 24,2: *figulat itaque hominem Demiurgus et de afflatu suo animat. Sic erit et choicus et animalis, ad imaginem et similitudinem factus, quadruplex res, ut imago quidem choicus deputetur*; *Adv. Val.* 24,3: *Habes duos interim. Carnalem superficiem postea aiunt choico supertextam, et hanc esse pelliceam tunicam obnoxiam sensui*; *Adv. Val.* 29,2: *Hos fontes quodammodo generis humani in totidem derivant argumenta naturae atque sententiae: choicum, saluti degeneratum, ad Cain redigunt, animale, mediae spei deliberatum, ad Abel componunt ... secundum choicum statum ex Cain et animalem ex Abel.* Wir folgern, dass bei Tertullian die Verwendung von *choicus* in Bibelzitaten wie ausserhalb des rein biblischen Kontextes ein individuell eigentümliches Element des Sprachgebrauchs dieses Autors ist und dass mit dem Zitat von 1 *Cor.* 15,47 s. in Tert. *Res.* 49,2. 4, wenigstens was *choicus* anbetrifft, Tertullians Unabhängigkeit von der damaligen *Vetus-Latina*-„Tradition" greifbar wird.

Wir wenden uns jetzt der zweiten Stelle zu. In *Carn.* 8,5 zitiert Tertullian nur 1 *Cor.* 15,47, wobei ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός an dieser Stelle im Wortlaut *de terrae limo* statt mit den Worten *de* (*e*) *terra choicus* erscheint (wie dies in *Res.* 49,2 geschieht). Auffallend ist nun, dass auch bei Cyprian stets *de* (*e*) *terrae limo* als die Übertragung von ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός in 1 *Cor.* 15,47 s. fungiert (s. oben) und dass diese Wiedergabe sogar in einer Reminiszenz an diese Bibelstelle wiederkehrt: ... *et apostolus primum hominem vocet de terrae limo, secundum vero de caelo* (Cypr. *Dom. orat.* 17). Χοϊκός wird in diesem Passus weiterhin immer mit *de* (*e*) *limo* wiedergegeben. Hiermit ergibt sich, dass die „Version" von 1 *Cor.* 15,47 s. – mit *de terrae limo* und *de* (*e*) *limo* als Wiedergabe von ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός bzw. χοικός – wohl die zeitgenössische *Vetus-Latina*-Tradition (der montanistischen Periode Tertullians und) Cyprians darstellte und dass der lateinische Text dieser Bibelstelle zu Cyprians Zeiten praktisch endgültig feststand.

Nun stimmt der Wortlaut des dem Korintherbrief entnommenen Zitats in Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* praktisch überein mit dem Wortlaut der gleichen Bibelstelle bei Cyprian; geringfügige Unterschiede liegen nur in der unterlassenen Wiederholung von *homo* nach *secundus* (bei

[62] z.B. *Res.* 49,10: *Nihil aliud intellegi mandat carnem et sanguinem quam supra dictam imaginem choici*, vgl. 1 *Cor.* 15,49 in Tert. *Res.* 49,6: Fussnote 61.

Ps.-Cyprian) und in der kürzeren Wiedergabe von ὁ χοϊκός mit *de limo*[63] (anstatt mit *ille de limo*) vor. Folglich darf wohl vermutet werden, dass Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* wahrscheinlicher in Cyprians Zeit oder später als in Tertullians Zeit oder gar früher anzusetzen ist.

Wir haben nun beobachtet, wie die altchristlichen lateinischen Schriftsteller den Bibeltext 1 *Cor.* 15,47 s. wiedergeben. Dabei hat sich uns ergeben, dass bis ungefähr 375 n. Chr. nur *de (e) terrae limo* und *de (e) limo* als Wiedergabe von ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός bzw. χοϊκός bekannt sind: Hil. *De trin.* 10,332 (PL 10, col. 356): *Primus homo de terrae limo, secundus homo de caelo*; Hil. *In Psalm.* 122,3: *Qualis de limo, tales et de limo, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes*; Zeno, *Tract.* 2,4,1:[64] *Primus homo e limo terrae, secundus e caelo* – cf. Zeno, *Tract.* 2,30,4: *Quemadmodum portavimus imaginem eius qui de limo est, portemus et eius imaginem, qui de caelo est* (1 *Cor.* 15,49). Seither, also seit etwa 375, gilt als die Wiedergabe von χοϊκός im genannten Bibeltext wohl ausnahmslos *terrenus*; von dieser zeitgenössischen Bibeltradition mit dem geänderten Wortlaut rührt nun höchstwahrscheinlich die *Vulgata* des Hieronymus her, der im Jahre 383 das Neue Testament und den Psalter zu revidieren begann.[65] Seit seiner Zeit und Tätigkeit lautet die Stelle ja fast unveränderlich: Ambr. *Exp. ev. Luc.* 5,31:[66] *Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo caelestis*; Filastrius, *Haeres.* 75,3 und 152,4:[67] *Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo caelestis*; Hier. *Esai.* 8,24,1/3: *Primus enim homo de terra terrenus, et secundus de caelo caelestis, qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, qualis supercaelestis, tales et supercaelestes*; Leo Magnus, *Tract.* 71,2: *Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de caelo caelestis, qualis terrenus, tales et terreni, et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes.* Indem wir annehmen, dass der neue Wortlaut der Bibelstelle durch Hieronymus seine endgültige Geltung bekam, kommen wir auf den *terminus ante quem* ca. 383 für die Abfassung des Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima.* Schwieriger erscheint uns der Ansatz eines

[63] Statt *de limo* bevorzugt D. de Bruyne die Lesart *ille e limo*, vgl. *SPL* I, Sp. 55 C.

[64] Vgl. *Zenonis Veronensis Tractatus*, ed. B. Löfstedt, Corpus Christianorum, series Latina XXII (Turnhout 1971) 7*: „Nach lebhafter Diskussion ist man sich jetzt darüber einig, die Entstehung der Predigten in die letzte Hälfte des 4. Jhs. zu verlegen."

[65] Vgl. *Geschichte der römischen Literatur bis zum Gesetzgebungswerk des Kaisers Justinian*, IV,1, von Martin Schanz, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft VIII,4,1 (München ²1959) 452.

[66] Dieses ambrosianische Werk wird in den Zeitraum 386/7 datiert, vgl. *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, IV,1, 337.

[67] Diese Schrift wird in den Zeitraum 385–391 datiert, vgl. *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, IV,1, 394.

terminus post quem. Wir hatten bereits festgestellt, dass Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* wohl nach Tertullian geschrieben sein muss. Für eine engere Eingrenzung des Zeitraums können wir vielleicht im folgenden Text einen konkreten Anhalt finden: *Abiciamus a nobis zeli et livoris stimulum, ut spiritum sanctum in nobis non solum hospitem, sed et rectorem copulemus* (*De centesima*, SPL I, col. 58). Da der Ausdruck *zelus et livor* erst in Cyprians Schrift *De zelo et livore* auftaucht und später kaum üblich ist, möchten wir annehmen, dass der soeben von uns zitierte Satz mit dem Ausdruck *zeli et livoris* auf eine Entlehnung aus Cyprians *De zelo et livore* zurückzuführen ist und dass die Entstehungszeit von Cyprians *De zelo et livore*, d.h. 251–257,[68] als *terminus post quem* für Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* betrachtet werden kann. – Zum Schluss erhebt sich die Frage, wie es zur Übertragung von ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός (1 *Cor.* 15,47) mit den Worten *de terrae limo* kommen konnte. Wir vermuten, dass diese Wiedergabe die Folge einer Kontamination bzw. einer Parallelisierung oder Gedankenverbindung mit der lateinischen Version von *Gen.* 2,7[69] ist, da die Genesis-Stelle sowohl in der *Vetus Latina*[70] wie in der *Vulgata* den Ausdruck *de limo terrae* enthält: *Formavit igitur Dominus Deus hominem de limo terrae* (*Vulg.-Gen.* 2,7).

III. Ps.-Cyprian, De montibus Sina et Sion

Eine andere Schrift, die Daniélou als Spezimen des vortertullianischen Christenlateins betrachtet, ist der pseudo-cyprianische Traktat *De montibus Sina et Sion*.[71] Für dieses Werk sind bisher Abfassungszeiten von ca. 200 bis nach Cyprian vorgeschlagen worden.[72] Daniélou ist nun der Meinung, dass der Wortschatz des Traktats einen archaischen Charakter habe; zum Nachweis führt Daniélou *contrarius*–„Widersacher, Teufel" und *credulus*–„gläubig" an: Diese im Traktat belegten Wortbedeutungen seien kennzeichnend für das altchristliche Latein im Anfangsstadium.[73]

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[68] Vgl. J. Quasten, *op. cit.*, II, 360.

[69] καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς.

[70] Vgl. B. Fischer, *Genesis. Vetus Latina*, 38–39: *et tunc finxit Deus hominem de limo terrae.*

[71] Edition: G. Hartel, *S. Thasci Caecili Cypriani opera omnia* (Wien 1871) III, 104–119.

[72] Vgl. J. Daniélou, *op. cit.*, 368.

[73] *Op. cit.*, 368f.: „Le vocabulaire a un caractère archaïque. Ainsi on trouve *contrarius* pour traduire ἀντικείμενος – l'adversaire, ce qui n'apparaît ni chez Tertullien ni chez Cyprien et par contre se trouve dans les traductions latines de l'*Épître de Clément* et de l'*Épître de Barnabé*, ainsi que dans l'*Adversus Iudaeos*. *Credulus* a le sens de croyant, qui sera évité à cause du sens péjoratif du mot."

Die Wortbedeutung *contrarius*–„Widersacher, Teufel" gilt freilich in der späteren altchristlichen lateinischen Literatur noch durchaus; wir beschränken uns auf wenige Beispiele: Bachiarius, *Repar. laps.* 20: *Satanas enim interpretatur contrarius*; Orig. *In Matth.* 12,21: *Satana autem dixit ei ... quod Hebraei interpretati sunt contrarius*; Rufin. *Orig. in Cant.* 4, 197A: *inimici veritatis fideique contrarii*; Cassiod. *Var.* 10,7,3: *ut probaretur contrarii animum non laesisse*; Hier. *In Eph.* 4,27, S. 629: (*diabolus*) *linguae Hebraea Satan appellatur, id est adversarius, sive contrarius.*[74] Auch die Wortbedeutung *credulus*–„gläubig" treffen wir in der späteren altchristlichen lateinischen Literatur häufig genug an, beispielsweise: Marius Vict. *In Eph.* 5,13, S. 1090B: *animi ... voluntas est commodota et credula*; Hil. *Hymn.* 1,35: *felix qui potuit fide res tantas penitus credulus assequi*; Zeno, *Tract.* 2,13,1: *creduli devotique*; Zeno, *Tract.* 2,17,2: *salutem civitati credulae praestaturus*; Paul. Nol. *Carm.* 10,304/5: *huius in adventum trepidis mihi credula fibris corda tremunt*; Paul. Nol. *Ep.* 50,12: *pestiferis disputationibus in corda male credula seminantes*; Prud. *Apoth.* 576: *quid renuis, quid inane caput, non credule, quassas?*; Prud. *Apoth.* 580: (*virgo*) *concepit credula Christum.*

Im übrigen argumentiert Daniélou mit dem Inhalt des Werks. Gewisse in dem Traktat ausgedrückte Gedanken, welche einen jüdischen oder jüdischrabbinischen Hintergrund voraussetzen, gelten ihm als Argument oder sogar als ein Beweis für die Richtigkeit seiner Hypothese, dass *De montibus* vortertullianisch sei. Der jüdische Hintergrund (und mithin nach Daniélou die sehr frühe Entstehung des Traktats) sei u.a. durch die manchmal weitläufig kommentierten Etymologien jüdischer Namen erwiesen. Wenn nun diese etymologischen Aussagen bei späteren Schriftstellern, etwa bei Augustin, wiederkehren, sollen sie nach Daniélou[75] als Zitate aus *De montibus* ihr Dasein verdanken. Daniélou erkennt immerhin an, dass die Frühdatierung nicht verbürgt ist, wenn der Sprachgebrauch einen jüdischen Autor verrät, der das Hebräische beherrscht und über sein Latein nicht mit gleicher Leichtigkeit verfügt: „Ce qui paraît caractériser le *De montibus* est d'abord qu'il est écrit par un juif connaissant l'hébreu et connaissant mal le latin. Mais ceci n'est pas

[74] Vgl. A. Blaise, *Le vocabulaire latin des principaux thèmes liturgiques*. Ouvrage revu par Dom A. Dumas O.S.B. (Turnhout 1966) 467 Fussn. 11: „(*adversarius*) usage fréquent chez les Pères (Tert.; Cypr.; Aug.; etc.); de même que *contrarius* qui, chez Hier. et les traductions d'Origène, s. Clément, traduit le mot *satan*." Vgl. noch G. J. M. Bartelink, Les dénominations du diable chez Grégoire de Tours, *Revue des études latines* 48 (1970) 411–432.

[75] Vgl. *op. cit.*, 369ff.

nécessairement une marque d'archaïsme."[76] Aber wenn sogar Daniélou meint, dass die Frühdatierung von *De montibus* durch das Faktum eines mit der lateinischen Sprache kaum vertrauten jüdischen Autors nicht gesichert werden könne, dürfen wir gewiss weitergehen und folgern, dass die im Traktat enthaltene jüdische Gedankenwelt des jüdischen Autors eben kein Beweis für den archaischen Ursprung des Traktats ist.

Ferner möchte Daniélou an mehreren Stellen des *De montibus* eine terminologische Abhängigkeit von der *lateinischen* Version des *Ps.-Barnabasbriefes* feststellen: „Nous avons vu que le *De montibus* citait le *Ps.* 1,3, avec la traduction *iuxta tractus aquarum*. Cette version est unique. Tertullien et Cyprien ont *exitus*. Le seul exemple que nous trouvions est précisément dans le Barnabé latin. La question se pose alors de l'usage de Barnabé latin par notre texte. Ce contact n'est pas le seul avec Barnabé ..."[77] Wir wenden ein, dass die Abfassungszeit der lateinischen Übersetzung des *Ps.-Barnabasbriefes* zufrühst gegen 200 n. Chr. anzusetzen ist.[78] Im Hinblick auf diese Datierung erscheint es uns kaum möglich, dass der Traktat *De montibus*, der terminologisch und inhaltlich von der lateinischen Übersetzung des *Ps.-Barnabasbriefes* abhängig sein soll, auch noch vor Tertullians Zeit entstanden sein könne. Zuguterletzt müssen wir auch der Suggestion[79] entgegenwirken, dass *iuxta tractus aquarum* in *De montibus* den üblichen Wortlaut von *Ps.* 1,3 darstelle: Der von Daniélou angedeutete Text lautet ja in der Edition von G. Hartel[80] (*De montibus* 9): *et erit velut lignum quod plantatum est secus decursus aquarum ...* (*Ps.* 1,3). Aus dem kritischen Apparat dieser Edition ergibt sich weiter, dass alle Handschriften den kritischen Text bezeugen, ausgenommen die schlechte[81] Hs. μ (= codex Monacensis 18203, saec. XV), welche die von Daniélou zitierte, auch im lateinischen *Ps.-Barnabasbriefe* belegte Lesart *iuxta tractus aquarum* bietet.

Nachdem wir uns mit Daniélous Hypothese auseinandergesetzt haben,

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[76] *Op.cit.*, 374.

[77] *Op.cit.*, 372f.

[78] Vgl. J. Quasten, *op.cit.*, I,91: „This work is also extant in a Latin translation dating back to the third century"; *Vetus Latina. Die Reste der altlateinischen Bibel.* 1/1. *Verzeichnis der Sigel für Kirchenschriftsteller*, 166: „Epistula Barnabae, Übersetzung, wohl vor Cyprian in Afrika entstanden. Cf. J. M. Heer, Die Versio Latina des Barnabasbriefes und ihr Verhältnis zur altlateinischen Bibel, Freiburg 1908."

[79] J. Daniélou, *op.cit.*, 372f.

[80] *Ed.cit.*, III: *Appendix*.

[81] Vgl. G. Hartel, *op.cit.*, III, XLVIff.

wollen wir zum Schluss auf *testamentum* „Neues/Altes Testament" in *De montibus* hinweisen. Wir haben bereits gesehen, dass *testamentum* „Altes/Neues Testament" erst in der *letzten* Arbeitsperiode Tertullians aufzukommen begann; und nur in dieser Bedeutung kommt das Wort in *De montibus* vor: *Quae in vetere testamento figuraliter scripta sunt, per novo testamento spiritaliter intellegenda sunt* ... (*De montibus* 1); *Ecce probavimus per omnium scripturarum deificarum fidem duo montes Sina in terra et Sion in caelo duorum testamentorum portare figuram, veteris Sina et novi Sion* ... (*De montibus* 11). Folglich meinen wir ausschliessen zu müssen, dass *De montibus* mit einem *terminus ante quem* in Bezug auf Tertullians Spätwerk datiert werden kann.

Wir fassen zusammen: Unser Thema war die Datierung der drei Traktate *De centesima sexagesima tricesima*, *De montibus Sina et Sion* und *Adversus Iudaeos*. Daniélou möchte dartun, dass die drei Traktate eine vortertullianische Abfassungszeit haben; er will diese Hypothese mit Argumenten des Wortlauts und zusätzlich des Inhalts stützen, wobei er ältere Arbeiten heranzieht. Wir überprüften die Argumentation und glauben festgestellt zu haben, dass sie nicht stichhaltig ist: Wortlaut und Gedankengut, die angeblich dem frühesten altchristlichen lateinischen Material eigen sind, gibt es auch noch späterhin. – Als positiven Ertrag unserer überprüfenden Arbeit bieten wir den Nachweis einiger Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse und zugleich einiger Datierungen an; thesenhaft zusammengefasst: 1. Ps.-Cypr. *Adversus Iudaeos* ist abhängig von Tertullians *Scorpiace* und *Adversus Iudaeos*, 2. Ps.-Cypr. *De centesima* ist zwischen 251/57 und ca. 380 zu datieren, 3. Ps.-Cypr. *De montibus* hat keine vortertullianische Abfassungszeit.

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REVIEWS

Francesco Trisoglio, *San Gregorio di Nazianzo in un quarantennio di studi (1925–1965)*, *Rivista Lasalliana*, anno XL, n. 1–4, 1973. Torino, Stamperia artistica nazionale, 1974. 462 S. L 15000.

Der Verfasser bietet sein Buch an als ein brauchbares Hilfsmittel für die Erforschung der Theologie des Gregor von Nazianz (S. 6). Tatsächlich findet man hier eine synthetische Darstellung aller Publikationen zu Gregor bis zum Jahre 1965. Der Verfasser hat sich offenbar die grösste Mühe gegeben wirklich alles zu berücksichtigen: auch Veröffentlichungen in polnischer, bulgarischer, rumänischer und türkischer Sprache sind verarbeitet worden. Wem die nötigen Sprachkenntnisse fehlen, und wem viele der angeführten Zeitschriften unzugänglich sind, der kann sich mittels der Studie Trisoglios breit orientieren. Trisoglio behandelt die Veröffentlichungen zur Biographie Gregors, zur handschriftlichen Überlieferung, zu den Editionen seiner Schriften und zu zentralen Themen seiner Theologie (z.B. Trinität, Christologie, Soteriologie, Gotteserkenntnis, Verhältnis zur griechischen Philosophie). In seiner Beurteilung der Veröffentlichungen ist er ziemlich zurückhaltend, aber das Ausmass mit dem er zitiert besagt doch vieles über den Wert, den er den betreffenden Publikationen beimisst.

Das Buch ist nicht nur ein ausgezeichnetes Hilfsmittel für die Erforschung der Theologie Gregors, sondern der gesamten kappadozischen Theologie, ja der griechischen Patristik im Allgemeinen. Hoffentlich wird der Verfasser, der über eine solche weite Kenntnis der Literatur zu diesem Thema verfügt, auch noch einmal eine Studie vorlegen in der er seine eigene Sicht auf Gregor von Nazianz bietet.

Oegstgeest, Remonstrantisches Pfarrhaus, Oranjelaan 11 — E. P. MEIJERING

Philostorgius, *Kirchengeschichte*. Mit dem Leben des Lucian von Antiochien und den Fragmenten eines arianischen Historiographen. Herausgegeben von Joseph Bidez. Zweite, überarbeitete Auflage besorgt von Friedhelm Winkelmann (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte). Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1972. CLXVIII, 393 S.

Es muss begrüsst werden, dass wir nunmehr über eine Neuauflage der bekannten im Jahre 1913 von Bidez besorgten Edition des Philostorgius verfügen. Winkelmann reproduziert den Text der Erstauflage, und fügt diesem Berichtigungen und Nachträge hinzu (SS. 340–363). Durch Sternchen am Rande verweist er im Text auf diese. Ferner wird der wichtige Aufsatz von Bidez in *Byzantion* 10 (1935) mit abgedruckt.

Bidez' Buch ist vor gut fünfzig Jahren von Kennern gerühmt worden. Deshalb kann der Rezensent sich darauf beschränken auf die vervollkommnete Neuerscheinung hinzuweisen.

Oegstgeest, Remonstrantisches Pfarrhaus, Oranjelaan 11 E. P. MEIJERING

Mélanges Christine Mohrmann. Nouveau recueil offert par ses anciens élèves. Utrecht-Anvers, Spectrum, 1973. Pp. X, 256. *f* 62.50.

Introduction (VII–VIII). Thèses de doctorat écrites sous la direction de Mademoiselle Mohrmann (IX–X).

J. Ysebaert, *Propitiation, Expiation and Redemption in Greek Biblical Terminology* (1–12). G.Q. Reijners, *Cross Symbolism in Hippolytus* (13–24). G.J.M. Bartelink, Φυλακτήριον–*phylacterium* (25–60). Vincenzo Loi, *Il libro quarto delle Divinae Institutiones fu da Lattanzio composto in Gallia?* (61–79). H.W. Hoppenbrouwers, *La technique de la traduction dans l'Antiquité d'après la première version latine de la Vita Antonii* (80–95). A. Roth, *Pascha und Hinübergang durch Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe (Augustinus, Brief 55 an Januarius)* (96–107). Á.P. Orbán, *Recherches sur les différences locales dans la langue des inscriptions latines de l'Antiquité chrétienne* (108–139). A. Bastiaensen, *Sur quelques oraisons du Missel Romain* (140–163). José Geraldes Freire, *Traductions latines des Apophthegmata Patrum* (164–171). J.W. Smit, *The Triumphant Horseman Christ* (172–190). Jean Deroy, *A l'entrade del tens clar – Veris ad imperia* (191–208). L.J. Engels, *De obitu Willelmi ducis Normannorum regisque Anglorum: Texte, modèles, valeur et origine* (209–255).

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EIN BILDHAFTER VERGLEICH BEI SENECA, THEMISTIOS, GREGOR VON NAZIANZ UND SEIN KYNISCH-STOISCHER HINTERGRUND

VON

MANFRED KERTSCH

Erasmus von Rotterdam erklärt Horaz, *Epist.* 1, 10,24 (*naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret*) mit Hilfe folgenden Bildes: „Ducta est metaphora a ramis, qui apposita furca torquentur alio quam natura posuerat: qua sublata rursum vergunt eodem quo prius." Dazu zitiert er u.a. noch Horaz, *Sat.* 2, 7,73–74: ... *tolle periclum: | iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis.*[1] Es geht hier um die Erfahrungstatsache, daß sich die Natur zwar äußerem Zwange fügt, aber bei seinem Wegfall wieder zu ihrem alten Zustand zurückkehrt.

Hier sollen uns einmal ausnahmsweise nicht die Originalstellen des Horaz interessieren, deren erstere – von Erasmus abgesehen – noch andere Deutungen gefunden hat,[2] sondern das zu ihrer Veranschaulichung vom

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[1] Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami *Opera omnia*, rec. Io. Clericus, tomus II complectens Adagia (Leiden 1703; Nachdr. Olms, Hildesheim 1961) col. 617 (*Adag.* 2, 7. 14); wird u.a. von S. Obbarius in seiner Horaz-Ausgabe (Leipzig 1843) fasc. V, 69 angeführt.

[2] S. schon Fr. E.Th. Schmid, *Des Q. Horatius Flaccus Episteln* (Halberstadt 1828) 1. Theil, 232, sowie H. Düntzer, *Kritik u. Erklärung der Episteln des Horaz* (Braunschweig 1843) 1. Th., 403–404; neuerdings A. La Penna, *Q. Orazio Flacco, Le opere (Antologia, introduzione e commento)*, I Classici della Nuova Italia 60 (Firenze 1969) 534; G. Funke, Art. ‚Gewohnheit', *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* III (Bonn 1958) 17f. (mit interessantem Einblick in die „Psychologie" der Stelle); K. Sallmann, Art. ‚Studien zum philosophischen Naturbegriff der Römer', ebd. VII (Bonn 1962) 175f. – Weiteres bei A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig 1890) 151 s.v. *furca*, 238f. s.v. *natura* (dazu die *Nachträge* v. R. Häussler [Darmstadt 1968] 166); zur Nachwirkung des Sprichwortes s. H. Walther (Hrsg.), *Proverbia sententiaeque Latinitatis medii aevi* (Göttingen 1963–1969) 2. Bd., Teil 3, Nr. 15938; U. Meisser, *Die Sprichwörtersammlung Sebastian Francks von 1541*, Amsterdamer Publikationen zur Sprache und Literatur 14 (Amsterdam 1974) 224 und 271. – Zu prüfen bleibt, ob – wie K. Deschner, *Das Kreuz mit der Kirche* (Düsseldorf/Wien 1974) 88, behauptet – P.N. Destouches das französische Pendant „Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop" tatsächlich gerade der Horaz-Stelle *Epist.* 1, 10,24 nachschreibt; vgl. dazu Y.P. de Dony, *Léxico del lenguaje figurado comparado* (Buenos Aires 1951) 297, Nr. 2820.

Humanisten herangezogene Bild. Anhand dieses Bildes soll aufgezeigt werden, daß es erstens keine Erfindung des Erasmus ist (was ja an sich denkbar wäre), sondern älterer Prägung ist, und zweitens ein in der Literatur der Diatribe geläufiges Exemplum gewesen sein muß. Im Anschluß daran mögen noch weitere Bilder und Wendungen, die in den gleichen Zusammenhang gehören, zur Sprache kommen.

Bei Seneca lesen wir in den *Quaest. natur.* 2,24,1–2 über die ‚Notwendigkeit', durch die einerseits der Blitz – entgegen der Natur des Feuers, das emporsteigt – nach unten geschleudert wird (*excutitur*), andererseits das an sich abwärts strebende Wasser wieder gewaltsam dorthin befördert wird, von wo es als Regen herabfällt; hierauf folgt der Vergleich: *Id⟨em⟩ his ignibus accidit quod arboribus quarum cacumina trahi possunt ita ut terram spectent, si tenera sunt, etiam ut attingant; sed cum permiseris, in locum suum exilient.*[3] Ohne Zweifel drücken diese Worte die gleiche Naturbeobachtung aus, wie sie uns im Zitat des Erasmus entgegentritt, mögen sie auch im Detail und im Wortlaut voneinander abweichen.

Nun würden diese Parallelen, stünden sie allein da, nicht mehr und nicht weniger bedeuten, als daß die Seneca-Stelle durch Erasmus' eigene Formulierung sozusagen eine Neuauflage erfahren hat. Indessen, auch der Kirchenvater Gregor von Nazianz bediente sich mehr als einmal unseres Bildes. Das haben schon die Mauriner und, lange vor ihnen, Eugubinus zu Gregors berühmter *oratio apologetica* (*Or.* 2), Kap. 15. bemerkt,[4] nicht ohne ihre Bewunderung für den schönen Vergleich auszudrücken. Entgangen ist ihnen freilich nicht nur eine weitere Parallele aus Gregors Gedichten, sondern die gemeinsame Quelle aller Stellen, worauf unten eingegangen wird.

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[3] Sénèque, *Questions Naturelles*, texte établi et traduit par P. Oltramare (Paris ²1961) I, 75. – Um es gleich vorwegzunehmen: Seneca trägt mit dieser Schilderung meteorologischer Vorgänge die Lehrmeinung der Stoiker vor; s. H. v. Arnim, *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* (Stuttgart 1964) II, 143, nr. 434 (πῦρ ἀνωφερές), womit man Nemesios, π. εἱμαρμένης, PG 40,744 A–B (mit ausdrücklicher Nennung des Chrysipp u.a.) vergleiche; zu derselben Sache bei Eusebius, *Laus Constantini* 11,13 (ed. I. A. Heikel, GCS I [Leipzig 1902] 228,2–3) s. W. Heinz, *Entstehung und Erscheinungsform der mythischen Religion nach Athanasios von Alexandrien* (Diss. Bonn 1964) 37.

[4] Erstere im Migne-Abdruck, PG 35,425 C–D, n. 49, letzterer in seiner Ausgabe: Gregorii Nazianzeni Theologi *Orationes tres* (Antwerpen 1573) 168, c. 32. In diesem Zusammenhang seien folgende Worte von M. Guignet, *Saint Grégoire de Nazianze et la rhétorique* (thèse Paris 1911) 169, angemerkt: „Les comparaisons rustiques sont peut-être celles où Grégoire a su le mieux garder son originalité ... Aussi les comparaisons qui en dérivent gardent-elles toutes, avec un air de fraîcheur et parfois de réalisme, la touche d'une émotion ressentie ..." Darauf folgt eine Paraphrase der von uns behandelten Gregor-Stellen *Or.* 2,15; 6,8; 23,1 ohne weiteren Kommentar.

An der genannten Stelle aus der 2. Rede mahnt Gregor die Männer in Führungsposition, ihre Untergebenen μὴ βίᾳ κατάρξειν, ἀλλὰ πειθοῖ προσάξεσθαι. Denn, „wenn etwas nicht freiwillig geschieht, ist es das Resultat der Gewalt, verdient nicht Lob und ist nicht dauerhaft."[5] Darauf wird das Verhalten der Pflanze zum Vergleich herangezogen:[6] φιλεῖ γὰρ τὸ βιασθέν, ὥσπερ φυτὸν βίᾳ χερσὶ μετασπώμενον, εἰς ἑαυτὸ πάλιν ἀφεθὲν ἀνατρέχειν, oder, in der entsprechenden lateinischen Übertragung des Rufin:[7] *solet enim quidquid violenter adtrahitur, sicut novellae arboris si quis vi cacumen inclinet, relaxatum rursum in id quod fuerat redire.*[8] Interessant daran ist der Aspekt des‚jungen Baumes' (*novellae*!), den Rufin zusätzlich in den Text hineingebracht hat; er stimmt zu Senecas Worten *si tenera sunt* (sc. *cacumina*) und könnte den Schluß nahelegen, Rufin habe sich an diese Worte erinnert und darnach den Gregortext erweitert bzw. verdeutlicht. Gleichwohl kann diese Erweiterung Rufin selbst zugewiesen werden.[9] In seiner ersten Friedensrede, *Or.* 6, 8,[10] verwendet Gregor wiederum das Bild von der Unbesiegbarkeit der Natur, dort wo er nach der Aussöhnung der kappadokischen Mönche und der

[5] In der Übersetzung von Ph. Haeuser, *Des hl. Bischofs Gregor von Nazianz Reden*, 1. Bd., BKV 59 (München 1928) 13; vgl. Joh. Chrysost. *De S. Babyla, c. Iulianum et gentiles* 3, PG 50, 537: οὐδὲ γὰρ θέμις Χριστιανοῖς ἀνάγκῃ καὶ βίᾳ καταστρέφειν τὴν πλάνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ προσηνείᾳ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐργάζεσθαι σωτηρίαν. Themistios, *Or.* 5 (εἰς Ἰοβιανόν), ed. Schenkl–Downey (Leipzig 1965) 98 sq.: οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι μὴ πάντα ἔνεστι τῷ βασιλεῖ βιάσασθαι τοὺς ὑπηκόους, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἃ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐκπέφευγε καὶ ἀπειλῆς ἐστι κρείττω καὶ ἐπιτάγματος, ὥσπερ ἥ τε ἄλλη ξύμπασα ἀρετὴ κ. μάλιστα ἡ περὶ τὸ θεῖον εὐλάβεια, καὶ ὅτι χρὴ προηγεῖσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τούτων ὅτῳ μέλλει / μὴ πεπλασμένως ὑπάρξειν ἀβίαστον τὴν ὁρμὴν τῆς ψυχῆς κ. αὐτοκρατῆ κ. ἑκούσιον πάνυ σοφῶς κατανοήσας, womit Platon, *Protag.* 327d, verglichen wird (p. 98).

[6] PG 35, 424C–425A.

[7] Tyrannii Rufini *Orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni novem interpretatio*, ed. A. Engelbrecht, CSEL 46, p. 18.

[8] Man vergleiche damit die Paraphrasen von F. X. Portmann, *Die göttliche Paidagogia bei Gregor von Nazianz*, Kirchengeschichtl. Quellen u. Studien 3 (St. Ottilien 1954) 25 und 129.

[9] Das ist wohl wahrscheinlicher und ähnlich gelagert wie die vom Gregor-Scholiasten Elias von Kreta (s. F. Lefherz, *Studien zu Gregor von Nazianz* [Diss. Bonn 1958] 140ff.; M. Geerard, *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, II [Turnhout 1974] 186, nr. 3028) stammende, in lateinischer Übersetzung (S. Patris nostri Gregorii Nazianzeni Theologi *Opera*, tom. II [Coloniae 1690] col. 32D) vorliegende Paraphrase unserer Stelle, wo – gleichfalls zur Verdeutlichung – der von Gregor als selbstverständlich weggelassene zweite Teil des Vergleiches hinzugefügt ist: ... *sic etiam quisquis per vim ad bonum translatus est, si vis remittatur, ad pristinos mores recidet.*

[10] PG 35, 732B.

Masse des Kirchenvolkes mit seinem Vater, Gregor dem Älteren,[11] über Gottes Wirken berichtet: „Durch Gegensätze wirktest du. Du trenntest uns, damit wir umso sehnsüchtiger einander aufsuchten."[12] Der folgende Vergleich mit der Pflanze lautet in Portmanns knapper und etwas zu freier Wiedergabe:[13] „Wie Pflanzen, mit Gewalt niedergetreten, ihrer ersten Natur folgend sich wieder erheben und dadurch zeigen, was ihnen eigentümlich ist, ..." Er ist, wie ersichtlich, um das hervorstechende Moment der ‚ersten Natur'[14] sowie um den Nachsatz „und dadurch zeigen ..." (im Original: καὶ δείκνυσι τὸ οἰκεῖον, βίᾳ μὲν ἀποκλινόμενα, οὐ βίᾳ δὲ ἀνορθούμενα) gegenüber *Or.* 2,15 erweitert.[15] In *Or.* 23,1,[16] der 3. Friedensrede, begegnet uns der Vergleich abermals; er deckt sich formal mit *Or.* 6,8 und steht inhaltlich in ganz ähnlichem Zusammenhang. Dazu gesellt sich, in dichterischer Gestalt, das gleiche Bild nochmals im Gedicht Nr. 12 der 1. Sektion von Gregors Gedichten,[17] v. 413–414: ὡς λοξός, οἶμαι, πτόρθος ἐκφυγὼν βίαν / χειρὸς κατευθύνουσαν εἰς ταὐτὸ τρέχει, womit Tollius[18] bezeichnenderweise keine andere als

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[11] Zu diesem M.-M. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie zu den Schriften Gregors von Nazianz*, Theophaneia 13 (Bonn 1960) 88–90.

[12] Übersetzung von Haeuser, a.a.O. 198. – Im übrigen haben wir es hier mit platonisch-aristotelischem Gedankengut zu tun: vgl. Aristot. *Nikom. Ethik* 8,10, 1159b12f.: ἐξ ἐναντίων δὲ μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον γίγνεσθαι φιλία ... (auch *Eudem. Ethik* 7,5, 1239b23) und dazu F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles Nikomachische Ethik*, Aristot. Werke in dt. Übersetzg. 6 (Darmstadt ²1960) A. 3 zu S. 182 (auf. S. 523) sowie R. A. Gauthier–J.Y. Jolif, *L'éthique à Nicomaque*, II (commentaire) 694f.

[13] A.a.O., 55.

[14] Der Ausdruck begegnet schon bei Platon, z.B. *Nom.* X, 886c (wozu s. D. Mannsperger, *Physis bei Platon* [Berlin 1969] 58) und wird sonst von Gregor in seiner Trinitätslehre verwendet (z.B. *Or.* 28,3, 7, 13, 14 u.ö., PG 36, 29A, 33C, 41C, 44C = J. Barbel, *Gregor von Nazianz, Die fünf theologischen Reden* [Düsseldorf 1963] 68, 76, 88, 92). Man würde hier eher den peripatetisch-stoischen Terminus τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον (s. F. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts*, Philologus, Suppl. 30,1 [1937] 47ff.) erwarten, woran ja bei Gregor tatsächlich das gleich nachfolgende οἰκεῖον erinnert; doch vgl. auch Eusebius, *Hist. eccles.* 8,9,2: εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἠφίεσαν τοὺς κλάδους φέρεσθαι φύσιν, mit Rufins Übersetzung in GCS 9/2, Eusebius 2. Bd., 2. T. (Leipzig 1908) 756/757, sowie ἕλκει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν κτλ. im Vergleich bei Themistios.

[15] Der Rufintext (a.a.O., p. 218) weicht im Wortlaut von *Or.* 2,15 weiter ab als die Stellen im Original, was zeigt, daß sich der Übersetzer der bereits einmal übersetzten Parellele nicht mehr entsann. Oder steckt eine stilistische Absicht Rufins dahinter: variatio?

[16] PG 35, 1152A.

[17] Den sog. *Poemata de seipso*, PG 37, 1196A = M. Pellegrino, *S. Gregorio Nazianzeno, Poesie scelte* (con testo, introduzione e note), Scrittori greci commentati per le scuole 98 (Torino 1939) 85.

[18] Bei Migne. ebd. – S. zu seiner i. J. 1690 erschienenen Ausgabe der Gedichte Gregors PG 35, 34ff.

die eingangs zitierte Horaz-Stelle *Epist.* 1, 10,24 vergleicht. Pellegrino[19] notiert, entsprechend der beschränkten Zielsetzung seiner Ausgabe, gar nichts zu den Versen, hilft aber mit kurzen einleitenden Bemerkungen zu einzelnen Gedichtsabschnitten wie diesem, den er mit ‚Ieri e oggi' überschrieb, dem Verständnis weiter: das Ganze hat ein ähnliches Anliegen Gregors zum Vorwurf, wie wir es aus seiner großen apologetischen Rede kennen, d.i. die Eignung und ernsthafte Vorbereitung zum Bischofsamt – Voraussetzungen, die Gregor so manchen Aspiranten dieser Würde entschieden abspricht. „Jüngst war einer," sagt er (v. 405–406), „noch auf Pferderennen versessen und schleuderte Staub gen Himmel (Θεῷ πέμπων κόνιν) wie ein anderer Gebete und fromme Gedanken" ..., „nun aber ist er ganz in Ordnung und auf nichts anderes als auf Anstand bedacht, bloß daß man, so geartet, heimlich wieder in den früheren Zustand verfällt" (v. 411–412), wozu Pellegrino das Sprichwort „Il lupo cambia il pelo ma non il vizio" anmerkt.[20] Der folgende Vergleich unterstreicht diesen Gedanken.

Die häufige Anwendung ein und desselben Bildes ist für Gregor von Nazianz, der sich überhaupt gern wiederholt,[21] nichts Ungewöhnliches.

Der gleiche Gedanke vom Freiheitsdrang all dessen, was mit Gewalt gebändigt wird, ist wie in *Or.* 2, 15 auch in *Or.* 12, 5,[22] freilich unter Verzicht auf das Bild aus der Pflanzenwelt, durch φιλεῖ[23] eingeleitet: ... φιλεῖ τὸ βίᾳ κρατούμενον ἐλευθεριάζειν ποτὲ καιροῦ λαβόμενον, und in der 31. Rede (der 5. theologischen), Kap. 25,[24] wird unser Bild zwar einerseits verkürzt, andrerseits aber um ein signifikantes Detail bereichert vorgeführt, wenn Gregor zur Begründung der beim Übergang vom Alten zum Neuen Testament nicht plötzlich, sondern schrittweise sich vollziehenden Veränderung gewohnter Verhältnisse und Gepflogenheiten

[19] A.a.O.

[20] Man vergleiche ähnliche Redensarten im Spanischen wie „El pelo muda la raposa, más el natural no despoja" bei Y. P. Dony, a.a.O. (s. A. 2). Im übrigen vgl. mit unserer Übersetzung W. Ackermann, *Die didaktische Poesie des Gregorius von Nazianz* (phil. Diss. Leipzig 1903) 96.

[21] Dazu s. etwa I. Sajdak, *De Gregorio Nazianzeno poetarum Christianorum fonte* (Krakau 1917) 34, n. 6 mit Hinweis auf Th. Sinko, *De tradit. oratt. Greg. Naz.* I (Krakau 1917) 52ff., 60ff.; ferner B. Wyß, Zu Gregor von Nazianz, in: *Phyllobolia f. P. von der Mühll* (Basel 1946) 166f.; H. M. Werhahn, *Gregorii Nazianzeni* Σύγκρισις βίων, Klassisch-Philolog. Studien 15 (Wiesbaden 1953) 7ff.; Portmann, a.a.O., 17 mit A. 1.

[22] PG 35, 849B.

[23] Vgl. *Or.* 4, 57, 580C: Φιλεῖ γὰρ τὰ γενναῖα φρονήματα πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ κρατοῦν αὐθαδιάζεθαι κτλ; Themistios, *Or.* 23 (Σοφιστής), ed. Schenkl etc., II, 84–85: ἀνάγκη μοι παρὰ φύσιν σμικρόν τι καὶ ἀπαυθαδίσασθαι.

[24] PG 36, 161A = J. Barbel (s. oben A. 14), 260.

(was er dann im einzelnen exemplifiziert) erklärt: ἵνα μὴ βιασθῶμεν, ἀλλὰ πεισθῶμεν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσιον οὐδὲ μόνιμον· ὥσπερ ἃ βίᾳ κατέχεται τῶν ῥευμάτων (vgl. Seneca![25]) ἢ τῶν φυτῶν. τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον μονιμώτερόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον.[26]

Ehe wir das hinter all diesen Äußerungen Gregors stehende Gedankengut in Augenschein nehmen, welches – wie die Übereinstimmung mit Seneca vermuten läßt – in der Profanliteratur popularphilosophischer Richtung wurzelt, ist die eingangs aufgeworfene Frage zu behandeln, von wem Erasmus diesen bildhaften Vergleich bezogen hat. Da neben Seneca und Gregor von Nazianz noch ein dritter zur Auswahl steht, der Philisoph und Redner Themistios nämlich, Vorbild Gregors und – wie unten gezeigt wird – die unbestreitbare Quelle für den Kirchenvater, nicht aber die des Erasmus, der diesen späten Vertreter der heidnischen Philosophie – soweit wir sehen – gar nicht kennt, wird wohl Seneca der Übermittler des Bildes für den Humanisten gewesen sein, wenn man v.a. folgendes bedenkt: Erasmus besorgte 1515 eine vollständige Ausgabe der Werke Senecas, die später in verbesserter Gestalt wieder aufgelegt wurde;[27] dazu kommt, daß er zeit seines Lebens eine ausgesprochene „Vorliebe für den römischen Philosophen"[28] hegte, die nicht zuletzt in zahlreichen Reminiszenzen aus dessen Schrifttum ihren Niederschlag gefunden hat.[29] Im Vergleich dazu nimmt sich die Bedeutung Gregors für ihn eher bescheiden aus, obschon er bei seinen weitreichenden literarischen Interessen sich natürlich auch mit ihm befaßt hat.[30] In diesem Zu-

[25] S. oben (mit A. 3); vgl. zum Bild Greg. v. Naz., *Or.* 26, 2, PG 35, 1229A: καθάπερ τι ῥεῦμα, πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἄναντες βιαζόμενον, εἰς δὲ τὸ πρανὲς ἐπειγόμενον.

[26] Vgl. dazu und zu *Or.* 12, 5 die Paraphrasen von Portmann, a.a.O., 85, 102, 140–141. – Hingewiesen seien hier noch auf die Verse 123–124 der *Poemata mor.*, PG 37, 925A: Δώσεις προδήλως ἐκβιάζων τὴν φύσιν, /καλοὺς μαθητὰς ἐκ κακῶν διδασκάλων.

[27] K. A. Blüher, *Seneca in Spanien, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Seneca-Rezeption in Spanien vom 13. bis 17. Jhdt.* (München 1969) 50, A. 31, und 453.

[28] So W. Trillitzsch, *Seneca im literarischen Urteil der Antike* (Amsterdam 1971) I, 223.

[29] Ein hervorstechendes Beispiel möge zur Demonstration genügen: In seinen *Parabolae sive Similia* (D. Erasmi Roterodami *Op. omn.* [Hildesheim 1961] tom. I, 592D) findet sich das Seneca-Zitat *Epist.* 50, 6: *Robora in rectum quamvis flexa revocabis; curvatas trabes calor explicat et aliter natae in id finguntur quod usus noster exigit.* Nur der Schluß deckt sich nicht mehr ganz mit dem Original: *quanto magis animus accipit formam flexibilis et omni humore obsequentior* statt: *quanto facilius animus accipit formam, flexibilis* etc.

[30] Wie sich anhand des Personenregisters der von W. Köhler in der Sammlung Dieterich (Bd. 2) besorgten Ausgabe von Erasmus' Briefen in deutscher Sprache (Wiesbaden 1947) eruieren läßt, übt der Humanist an Gregor verschiedentlich Kritik, so in

sammenhang bemerkenswert ist seine in der Migne-Ausgabe[31] abgedruckte Beurteilung Gregors, wo es heißt: „(Gregorius Nazianzenus) amat significantes argutias, quas eo difficilius est Latine reddere, quod pleraeque sunt in verbis sitae," und dann: „Me certe a vertendo Gregorio semper deterruit dictionis argutia et rerum sublimitas et allusiones subobscurae." Auf der anderen Seite äußert er sich über den Kirchenvater sehr positiv in einem Brief an Martin Lipsius[32] und empfiehlt ihn zur Lektüre. Nichtsdestoweniger sprechen die aus Erasmus' nachweisbarer Rezeption von Stellen aus Seneca, nicht aber aus Gregor, sich ergebenden Indizien a fortiori für Senecas Vermittlerrolle.

Dies bedeutet freilich nicht, daß Seneca auch als Urheber des in Rede stehenden Bildes anzusehen ist; er fußt selbst wieder auf einer älteren Vorlage, – womit wir beim Hauptpunkt unserer Untersuchung angelangt sind. Wie bereits oben erwähnt, hat nach Seneca noch ein dritter Autor unseren Vergleich, ein Zeitgenosse und Vorbild Gregors, Themistios. Bei ihm lesen wir in *Or.* 21 mit dem Titel Βασανιστὴς ἢ Φιλόσοφος (post H. Schenkl ed. G. Downey et A. F. Norman [Leipzig 1971] vol. II, p. 25–26) zunächst über des Dichters Theognis (1, 183 ff.) Verärgerung und Klage angesichts der Tatsache, daß wir zwar bei Tieren und Pflanzen gute Qualität nur dann erwarten, wenn schon im Samen die entsprechende Anlage dazu vorhanden ist, daß wir hingegen bei Menschen darauf nicht achten, sondern der Meinung sind, τὸν ἐκ μαγείρου τυχὸν ἴσως ἢ ἀρτοκόπου ... ἱκανῶς ἔχειν πρὸς / τὸ μεγαλεῖόν τε καὶ ὑψηλόνουν φιλοσοφίας (p. 26), ohne zu wissen, daß τὸ βάναυσον ἐκεῖνο καὶ δουλοπρεπὲς τοῦ σπέρματος πάντως δή τι προσομόργνυται τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ καθαρὸν οὐδὲν καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ὑπὲρ τὴν ῥίζαν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' ἕλκει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν καὶ ἐπιστρέφειν ἐπίσταται, worauf der Vergleich folgt: καθάπερ τῶν κλάδων τοὺς διαστρόφους φυέντας οὐκ ἄν ποτε εὐθεῖς μηχανήσαιο ταῖς χερσὶ μαλάττων τε καὶ ἐπικάμπτων, ἀλλ'

einem Brief an Reginald Pole (S. 518), wo er an Chrysostomus eine „gewisse Geschwätzigkeit", an Gregor von Nazianz seinen „etwas gesuchten Scharfsinn" auszusetzen hat; nur „bei Basilius stößt man sich an nichts". Oder in einem Brief an Jakob Sadolet (S. 524–527) läßt er Gregor zwar fast neben Basilius rangieren, kreidet ihm aber gleichzeitig zu starke Anlehnung an die Rhetorenschule des Isokrates an. Vgl. R. Newald, *Erasmus Roterodamus* (Darmstadt 1970) 321. Im übrigen s. über Erasmus' Verhältnis zu den kappadokischen Kirchenvätern auch W. Jaeger, *Das frühe Christentum und die griechische Bildung* (Berlin 1963) 76.

[31] PG 35, 309 und 310C; s. dazu Th. Špidlík, *Grégoire de Nazianze. Introduction à l'étude de sa doctrine spirituelle*, Orientalia Christiana Analecta 189 (Rom 1971) X und n. 8.

[32] Köhler, a.a.O., 189.

ἀνατρέχουσιν αὖθις ἐπὶ τὴν σκολιότητα τῆς γενέσεως. Es steht außer Zweifel, daß Themistios das Bild unmittelbar an Gregor weitervermittelt hat. Die Anklänge hier und auch sonst (s. Anm. 42) sind zu deutlich. Indessen müssen Themistios–Gregor einerseits, Seneca andererseits, unabhängig voneinander (von einer Kenntnis der lateinischen Sprache und dadurch ermöglichten Lektüre Senecas seitens des Themistios[33] und des Gregor[33a] ist nichts bekannt) auf eine ältere Quelle zurückgehen. Diese ist wohl nirgends eher zu suchen als in der sog. kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie, wenn man bedenkt, in wie hohem Grade Gregor derselben verhaftet ist.[34] So zeigt B. Wyss[35] anhand einiger Motive aus diesem „populären Ableger der Stoa"[36] auf, wie hier Horaz, Epiktet und Gregor aus ein und derselben Fundgrube schöpfen. Gregor teilte seine Vorliebe für die Stoa und ihre Gedankenwelt mit zahlreichen anderen Christen und hält damit nicht einmal hinter dem Berg.[37] Die bei den Schriftstellern der Popularphilosophie, so namentlich bei Seneca und auch bei Themistios, sehr beliebte Anwendung von Bildern, Gleichnissen, Sprichwörtern u. dgl. lag ganz im Sinne des Kirchenvaters.[38] Ist

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[33] S. dazu W. Stegemann, Art. ‚Themistios', *RE* 10. Halbbd. (Stuttgart 1934) Sp. 1646, Z. 49–50.

[33a] S. dazu B. Wyss, Gregor von Nazianz, Ein griechisch-christlicher Dichter des 4. Jahrhunderts, *Museum Helveticum* 6 (1949) 177 ff., Exkurs II (Horaz u. Gr. v. Naz.), 205 f.; Werhahn, *l.c.*, 91 und n. 20; J. Geffcken, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg 1909) 27. (Charakteristisch für die Einstellung der Griechen zum Erlernen des Lateinischen sind die Worte Gregors des Wundertäters in PG 10, 1065B: der Lehrer sollte ihn in dieser Sprache unterweisen οὐχ ὡς ἐπ' ἄκρον ἥξοντα, ὡς δὲ μὴ ἄπειρος εἴην πάντη καὶ τῆσδε τῆς φωνῆς. ἔτυχε δὲ νόμων οὐκ ἄπειρος ὤν, wozu s. H. Crouzel, *Grégoire le Thaumaturge, Remerciement à Origène* ..., SC Nr. 148 [Paris 1969] 15 und 118). – Nach G. M. Ross, Seneca's Philosophical Influence, in: C. D. N. Costa, *Seneca* (London 1974) 126, machen innere Gründe eine solche Beeinflussung unwahrscheinlich.

[34] Das ist schon seit langem nachgewiesen und mehrfach belegt worden: s. etwa J. Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa* (München 1933) 469 (mit Hinweis auf ältere Lit. in A. 133); zur Popularphilosophie überhaupt ebd., 38 und 50 ff. Vgl. auch W. Capelle–H. I. Marrou, Art. ‚Diatribe', *RAC* 3 (1957) 990–1009.

[35] A.a.O. (*Mus. Helv.*) 205 ff.; vgl. Werhahn, a.a.O., 19, n. 18.

[36] Stelzenberger, a.a.O., 53.

[37] Stelzenberger, a.a.O., 286; Werhahn, a.a.O., n. 9; Portmann, a.a.O., 53 A. 12; Barbel, a.a.O. (Gregors Verwendung stoischer Termini); R. R. Ruether, *Gregory of Nazianzus, Rhetor and Philosopher* (Oxford 1969) 80 (in seiner rhetorischen Dialektik befleißigt sich Gregor der kynisch-stoischen Methode), 173.

[38] Dazu: W. Trillitzsch, *Senecas Beweisführung*, Dt. Akad. der Wiss. zu Berlin, Schriften der Sektion f. Altertumswiss. 37 (Berlin 1962) 20 f; 36 ff.; 69 u.ö.; E. Bernert, Seneca und das Naturgefühl der Stoiker, *Gymnasium* 68 (1961) 122. Vgl. den entsprechenden Abschnitt ‚Imagery' bei Ruether, a.a.O., 86ff., bes. 98: „Nature imagery

aufgrund einzelner, oft nur geringfügiger Abweichungen innerhalb der Überlieferung des gleichen Clichés bei verschiedenen Autoren eine Abhängigkeit von einander auszuschalten, wird man an ein in den Philosophen- und Rhetorenschulen, wo die populäre Lebensweisheit propagiert wurde, so gebräuchliches Handbuch[39] als gemeinsame Quelle zu denken haben. Wenn man die sowohl an der Seneca-Stelle wie auch an den Gregor-Stellen stark hervortretende Betonung der ‚Willensfreiheit' in Betracht zieht, die ja ein besonders markantes gemeinsames Dogma der christlichen Lehre und des Stoizismus darstellt,[40] und dazu die Bedeutung des Panaitios in Rechnung stellt, der dies an sich aristotelische Element im Verein mit dem Gedanken, daß nur das beständig und vernünftig ist, was naturgemäß ist, dem Stoizismus zugeführt hat,[41] liegt es vielleicht nahe, dem Panaitios auch die Urheberschaft dieses und ähnlicher Bilder lehrhaften Charakters zuzuschreiben, die sich dann als Traditionsgut der Diatribe weiter verbreitet haben. Dabei ist interessant zu beobachten, daß die Stoiker auf dem Sektor dieser zwangsfreien, nur die Überredung duldenden Lebensweise gemäß dem jeweiligen Naturell sich in auffälliger Weise mit dem Standpunkt Epikurs treffen, der gesagt

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plays a very important part in Gregory's writings as a whole, and he was obviously a lover and keen observer of natural beauty." Zu Themistios vgl. etwa J. Scharold, Dio Chrysostomus und Themistius, in: *Progr. Königl. humanist. Gymnas. Burghausen* 1912, 10.

[39] Vgl. Werhahn, a.a.O., 102; Trillitzsch, a.a.O., 21.

[40] Portmann, a.a.O., 85, 102 u.ö. (wobei er betont, daß Gregor hinsichtlich der Willensfreiheit in seiner Erziehungslehre mit Origenes konform geht); M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (Göttingen [4]1970) 419 u.ö. (dazu den Erläuterungsband [4]1972, 201 f.), 426 f. (zu Origenes); I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie XIII (Berlin 1969) 151, 156, 162 ff.

[41] Dazu s. M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum*, Neue Wege zur Antike, II. Reihe: Interpretationen, 3 (Leipzig/Berlin 1934) 29, 112 f. (προαίρεσις = ‚spontanes Wählen'!); ders. auch: *Philosophie und Erlebnis in Senecas Dialogen*, Nachrichten v. der Akad. der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl., Jgg. 1941, Nr. 6, 91; Köster, in Kittel, *Theol. Wb. z. NT* 9 (Stuttgart 1973) 257 ff.; Hadot, a.a.O., 32 f., 153 f.; M. T. Griffin, *Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics* (Oxford 1976) 180 n. 1, 327 n. 2, 341 ff. – Zu der in unseren Zusammenhang gehörigen Metapher des ‚Richtscheits' (*regula*) in der Wendung *nostrae naturae regula*, die auf Panaitios zurückgeführt wird, s. K.-H, Rolke, *Die bildhaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios*. Spudasmata 32 (1975), 206. Das Bild findet sich später des öfteren bei Kirchenschriftstellern wie z.B. Rufin-Origenes, *In cant. canticorum* lib. II., v. 6, GCS 33, Origenes 8. Bd. (Leipzig 1925) 127, 18 ff. (vgl. ebd., lib. I, 112, 21 ff.), wozu inhaltlich Augustin, *Enarr. in ps.* 44, 17 (CChr. ser. lat. 38 [Turnhout 1956] 505, 20 ff.) zu stellen und letztlich Seneca, *Epist.* 71, 19–20, zu vergleichen ist (mit H. Oppel, KANΩN, Philologus Suppl. 30, 4 [1937] 90 f.). – Im übrigen blieb der von uns behandelte Vergleich mit der Pflanze bei Rolke unberücksichtigt.

hat: οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πειστέον.[42] Daraus resultiert ja auch die für beide philosophische Richtungen charakteristische Maxime: ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται,[43] mag auch hinsichtlich der Akzentsetzung bei dieser individuellen ‚Freiheit' zwischen beiden Schulen ein Unterschied bestehen.[44] Ganz in diesem Sinne liegt auch die Anschauung und Neigung Gregors, eines überhaupt mehr der beschaulichen als praktisch-tätigen Seite des Lebens zugewandten Menschen, wenn er z.B. in *Or.* 12,5, dem Drang der Zeit nachgebend, ganz dichterisch seine Bereitschaft zum Ausdruck bringt, vorderhand noch wie ein „Junges, das nicht untätig sich im Fluge in der Nähe des mächtigen, hochfliegenden Adlers aufhält",[45] seinem Vater in seiner Amtstätigkeit zur Seite zu stehen, gleich darauf aber betont: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο δώσω τῷ Πνεύματι τὴν ἐμὴν πτέρυγα φέρειν ᾗ βούλεται καὶ ὡς βούλεται ..., oder wenn er in *Or.* 10,1,[46] sich auf eine alte, zum Sprichwort gewordene Lebensweisheit stützend, erklärt: ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρκείτω ... ζῆν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι .... Mag auch Gregor auf der einen Seite bisweilen die Notwendigkeit des κοινωνικὸς βίος, des Lebens im Dienste einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft, hervorstreichen,[47] plädiert er auf der anderen Seite häufiger

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[42] K. Wotke, Epikurische Spruchsammlung, *Wiener Studien* 10 (1888) 193, Nr. 21; vgl. Schrenk, in Kittel, *Theol. Wb. z. NT* 1 (Stuttgart 1933 [1966]) 613, Z. 15; Hadot, a.a.O., 33, A. 136 zu Lukrez, III, 307ff.; ferner Themistios, der diese Maxime des öfteren, freilich stets variiert, zur Beherzigung empfiehlt, wie z.B. *Or.* 34 (Περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς), *l.c.*, II, 223–224: ... τὸ πειθοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ φόβῳ χρηστέον ἐπὶ τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, κτλ.; denn βουλομένων γάρ, οὐ φοβουμένων ἡγεῖται (*sc.* φιλάνθρωπος βασιλεύς), βασιλεία δὲ ἑκούσιόν τι καὶ οὐ βίαιον, (*l.c.*, I, 15), was mehr als deutlich an Greg. *Or.* 12,5, PG 35,849B (βουλομένων γάρ, οὐ τυραννουμένων τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον) anklingt und wohl Platon, *Politicus* 276e, als Vorlage hatte.

[43] Epiktet, *Diss.* 4,1; vgl. Cicero, *De off.* 1,20,70: *ut ... libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere ut velis*; dazu auch Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 9 (ed. L. Cohn–P. Wendland, VI [Berlin 1915] 17): ὥστ' ἐξουσίαν σχήσει πάντα δρᾶν καὶ ζῆν ὡς βούλεται, nebst weiteren Parallelen z. St.

[44] M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum*, 29, 46; Griffin, a.a.O., 329.

[45] Nach Haeuser, a.a.O., 268; vgl. M. Kertsch, Gregor von Nazianz' Stellung zu ‚Theoria' und ‚Praxis' aus der Sicht seiner Reden, *Byzantion* 44 (1974) 288.

[46] PG 35,828B; vgl. *Or.* 2,100,501B: ζῆν οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι σὺν ὀλίγῃ καὶ μικρᾷ τῇ μάζῃ κτλ., womit sich Gregor einerseits ganz im kynischen Fahrwasser eines Diogenes oder Kerkidas bewegt (s. J. Dziech, *De Gregorio Nazianzeno diatribae quae dicitur alumno lucubratio*, I [Poznan 1925] 104ff.), andrerseits mit einer echt christlichen Neuerung aufzuwarten scheint, wenn er die eine alte Spruchweisheit enthaltende Antithese ὦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ὡς θέλομεν, ἀλλ' ὡς δυνάμεθα (so bei Th. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, III [Leipzig 1888] 17f., Nr. 50, und J. M. Edmonds, *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, III B [Leiden 1961] 562, Nr. 50) auf den zweiten Teil reduziert, weil ja für den Christen von vornherein nur das Leben innerhalb der von Gott ihm zugedachten Möglichkeiten in Betracht kommt.

[47] Z.B. *Or.* 12,4, PG 35,848B: χρῆναι μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ

für die Unabhängigkeit von derlei Verpflichtungen, die er lieber anderen überläßt, und huldigt im ganzen – wie die Stoiker – der einer solchen Einstellung entspringenden Konsequenz, einem gewissen Kosmopolitismus.[48]

Wenn B. Wyß,[49] den Maurinern folgend, den oben behandelten Gregor-Stellen *Or.* 12, 5 und *Or.* 31, 25 das μὴ ἀναγκαστῶς, ἀλλὰ ἑκουσίως κατὰ θεόν des 1. Petrus-Briefes, 5, 2, als Ausgangspunkt zugrunde legt, ist dies insofern richtig, als hier eine Verschmelzung biblischen Gedankenguts mit stoischem vorliegt, wobei zu prüfen bleibt, ob und inwieweit der Verfasser jenes Briefes diesen Lehrsatz der Stoiker sich zunutze gemacht hat;[50] der Ätiologie dieser gegenseitigen Durchdringung an den erwähnten Stellen ist aber Wyß ebensowenig wie Portmann[51] auf den Grund gegangen, sonst wären ihm die Verbindungslinien zur Stoa aufgefallen. Ähnlich stellt sich uns auch die Problematik gewisser Äußerungen gleichen Vorwurfs beim hl. Athanasius, wie z.B. in seiner *Historia Arianorum* 67, 2:[52] θεοσεβείας μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μὴ ἀναγκάζειν, ἀλλὰ

τὸ τῶν ἄλλων, oder 25, 4, 1204B; zu dieser auch von den Stoikern wenigstens theoretisch betonten Notwendigkeit s. Pohlenz, a.a.O., 47; M. Spanneut, Art. ‚Epiktet', *RAC* 5, 611; Ruether, a.a.O., 10–11; Köster, a.a.O., 258; Griffin, a.a.O., 329.

[48] *Or.* 6, 6, 729A hören wir aus seinem Munde: πατρὶς καὶ ξένη τὸ ἴσον ἐμοί, oder 26, 14, PG 35, 1248A die rhetorische Frage, mit welcher er dem Vorwurf der Heimatflucht begegnet: ἔστι γάρ μοι πατρίς, ὦ οὗτοι, περιγραπτός, ᾧ πᾶσα πατρὶς καὶ οὐδεμία; Dazu s. Dziech, a.a.O., 72 n. 121; ferner Portmann, a.a.O., 8 f.; Stelzenberger, a.a.O., 64; G. Maurach, *Der Bau von Senecas epistulae morales* (Heidelberg 1970) 108.

[49] *Phyllobolia*, 165 und Fn. 1.

[50] Die bei J. Wettstein, *Novum Testamentum Graecum*, II (Amsterdam 1752; Nachdr. Graz 1962) 136 zur Parallele I Cor. 9, 16–17 vermerkten Stellen aus der Profanliteratur geben nicht viel her. Im übrigen vgl. Stelzenberger, a.a.O., 176, über das „Zusammenfließen ciceronianischer und paulinischer Gedanken bei Ambrosius".

[51] Er spricht in diesem Zusammenhang, S. 85, nur von Origenes.

[52] H. G. Opitz, *Athanasius' Werke* ..., II, 1 (Berlin u. Leipzig 1935) 219–220. Zur Sache s. H.-J. Sieben, Zur Entwicklung der Konzilsidee (bei Athanasius), *Theologie und Philosophie* 45 (1970) 370 A. 86. Vgl. auch das Zitat aus Chrysostomus, oben A. 5, und das bei Maximus Confessor (PG 91, 965B) und in den *Sacra Parallela* des Johannes von Damaskus (PG 95, 1285A) unter dem Namen des Klemens von Alexandrien stehende Fragment, das tatsächlich auf Johannes Chrysostomus (PG 48, 634) zurückgeht: Μάλιστα πάντων Χριστιανοῖς οὐκ ἐφίεται τὸ πρὸς βίαν ἐπανορθοῦν τὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων πταίσματα. Οὐ γὰρ τοὺς ἀνάγκῃ τῆς κακίας ἀπεχομένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς προαιρέσει στεφανοῖ ὁ Θεός. Dazu s. S. Haidacher, Chrysostomos-Fragment im Maximos-Florilegium und in den Sacra Parallela, *Byz. Zeitschr.* 16 (1907) 170 f. An der bezeichneten Stelle bezieht sich Chrysostomus übrigens auf 2 Cor. 1, 24 (οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως, ...), wozu er andernorts (PG 61, 418, in der 4. Homilie z. St.) bemerkt: Τὸν γὰρ μὴ βουλόμενον πιστεῦσαι τίς κύριος ἀναγκάσαι; Zu unserem Thema gehört übrigens auch die Feststellung des Dio Chrysostomus, *De regno or.* 3, 123 (I, 54 Arnim): τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀνάγκην, ἀλλὰ βούλησιν (vgl. desselben Vorstellung

πείθειν, ὥσπερ εἴπαμεν (vgl. ebd., 33 ff.).[53] καὶ γὰρ ὁ κύριος αὐτὸς οὐ βιαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ τῇ προαιρέσει διδοὺς ἔλεγε πᾶσι μέν· κτλ. Mag auch die Feststellung Stelzenbergers,[54] daß Athanasius die Verteidigung der Orthodoxie vom religiösen Standpunkt aus betreibe, während es besonders Gregor von Nyssa auf eine rationell-philosophische Widerlegung anlege, im Kern das Richtige treffen, ist es gewiß eine Verzeichnung des wahren Sachverhaltes, wenn P. Barth[55] apodiktisch behauptet: „Allen diesen (gemeint sind Basilius, Gregor von Nazianz, Gregor von Nyssa und ihr gemeinsamer Archeget Origenes) entgegengesetzt bestand gleichzeitig eine andere Richtung, die, alle philosophische Spekulation ablehnend, den Glauben nur auf die Offenbarung gründete, hauptsächlich vertreten durch Athanasius und Ambrosius."[56]

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von gerechter Behandlung eines Untergebenen, *ibid.* p. 32, c. 70: ἰσχύι μὲν καὶ θυμῷ καὶ βίᾳ μηδενὸς ἡττώμενον μηδὲ ὑπείκοντα, λογισμῷ δὲ καὶ φρονήσει ἑκόντα ὑποταττόμενον κτλ., u.a.m.). Es handelt sich also um einen echten Topos der Popularphilosophie. Über die ausführliche Behandlung des Themas ‚Gott zwingt niemand zum Glauben, sondern stellt ihn jedermann frei' bei Johannes Chrysostomus vgl. J. Gross, *Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas* (München/Basel 1960) 188.

[53] Opitz II, 1,201. Wegen ihrer Ähnlichkeit zu vergleichen sind die Worte des Flavius Iosephus in seiner *Vita* 113, wo er von seiner persönlichen Verhinderung der Beschneidung berichtet, die zwei vornehmen Männern aus der ostjordanischen Landschaft Trachonitis als Bedingung für ihren Verbleib bei den Juden gestellt wurde, wogegen Iosephus sich mit folgender Begründung wendet: ... φάσκων δεῖν ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ μετὰ βίας, ... (Fl. Iosephi *Opera*, ed. B. Niese, IV [Berlin ²1955] 340).

[54] A.a.O.,75.

[55] P. Barth, *Die Stoa*, Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie XVI (Stuttgart ⁵1941) 255.

[56] Dagegen sprechen schon, unbeschadet der Tatsache, daß Gregor v. Naz. in seiner Lobrede auf den hl. Athanasius, c. 6 (PG 35, 1088B), von einer nur kurzfristigen Beschäftigung des Gefeierten mit der profanen Allgemeinbildung redet (ὀλίγα τῶν ἐγκυκλίων φιλοσοφήσας: vgl. die Einführung von Christou zu Ἀθανασίου Ἀλεξανδρείας τοῦ Μεγάλου ἅπαντα τὰ ἔργα, 1 [Thessaloniki 1973] 12 = ΕΠΕ 6), Athanasius' leicht erkennbare Anleihen bei Platon zur Verteidigung seiner Trinitätslehre gegen die Arianer: s. etwa Christou's Artikel ‚Uncreated and Created, etc. in the Theology of Athanasius of Alexandria', *Augustinianum* 13 (1973) 399 ff., bes. 402; weitere Belege bei E. D. Moutsoulas–K. Papachristopoulou, Ὁ Μέγας Ἀθανάσιος (Athen 1974). Betreffs die Benützung und Verwertung der philosophischen Profanliteratur durch Athanasius ist die Feststellung von P. Ch. Demetropoulos, Ἡ ἀνθρωπολογία τοῦ Μεγάλου Ἀθανασίου (Athen 1954) 41 f., besonders aufschlußreich: Athanasius habe teils direkt aus den Schriften der alten Philosophen (Platon, Aristoteles u.a.) geschöpft, teils indirekt aus seinen alexandrinischen Vorgängern usf. (mit Belegen!), u. zw. zu dem Zweck, ἵνα ... καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πλευρᾶς τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς λογικῆς κατοχυρώσῃ τὴν πίστιν εἰς παραδεδεγμένας καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Γραφῆς ἐρειδομένας Χριστιανικὰς ἀληθείας, κτλ. Im übrigen sei an die oben A. 3 zitierte Diss. von Heinz erinnert. – Was Ambrosius betrifft, dem Barth, 263 und 325 (A. 12), im Hinblick auf *Off.* 1, 46,223 („daß man nichts gegen die Natur tun solle") den Gebrauch „äußerlich stoischer

Um zu unserem eigentlichen Thema, der jeder Gewaltanwendung widerstrebenden Natur, zurückzukehren, sei darauf hingewiesen, daß es neben dem bereits behandelten bildhaften Vergleich und einer noch zu behandelnden sprichwörtlichen Redensart etliche Formeln und Wendungen gibt, die dieselbe Sache zum Ausdruck bringen; sie mögen hier kurz gestreift werden: So lesen wir bei Seneca, *Epist.* 119,2: (*natura*) *contumax est, non potest vinci, suum poscit.* Man vgl. etwa Epiktet, *Diss.* 2,20,18: οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη. In *De tranquillitate animi* 6,4 prägt Seneca, vielleicht in Anlehnung an Cicero, *De off.* 1,31,110,[57] die klassische Wendung: *reluctante natura irritus labor est*, deren offensichtliche Nachbildung durch Cassiodor, *Var. lib.* 4,38[58] lautet: *Repugnante siquidem natura, quaelibet cedit industria.* Interessant ist das sogar konstruktionsmäßig mit Seneca vollkommen übereinstimmende griechische Pendant bei Johannes von Damaskus:[59] φύσεως ἀντιπραττούσης κενὰ τὰ πάντα. Ein gemeinsames stoisches Muster in dieser Fassung ist durchaus denkbar oder sogar wahrscheinlich, wenn auch vorsichtshalber nie die Möglichkeit des Gegenteils außer Acht gelassen werden darf; vgl. Stelzenbergers Einschränkungen:[60] „Die Berührungen sind oft nur formal, nicht real. Eine Gleichheit der Gedanken oder des Ausdruckes kann unbewußt sein und muß nicht notwendig eine Entlehnung oder bewußte Nachahmung sein."

Neben das oben in Anm. 29 zitierte, von Erasmus aus Seneca entnommene Bild vom Geradebiegen krummen Holzes ist ein aus derselben empirischen Erfahrung hervorgegangener Vergleich zu stellen, den Eras-

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Wendungen" zubilligt, ist E. Dassmann wohl recht zu geben, wenn er in *Die Frömmigkeit des Kirchenvaters Ambrosius von Mailand*, Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 29 (Münster 1965) 234f. z. St. bemerkt: „Ambrosius versucht zwar, diesen Satz aus der Hl. Schrift abzuleiten, doch ist es offensichtlich philosophisch-stoisches Erbe, das sich in ihm ausspricht" (mit Verweis auf Stelzenberger, 158 und 178 in A. 112).

[57] ... quia nihil decet ‚invita Minerva', ut aiunt (s. A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter* ..., 225 s.v., Nr. 4), *id est adversante et repugnante natura.* Vgl. Hadot, a.a.O., 153f. und A. 50.

[58] CChr 96,167.

[59] PG 96,397C; vgl. 400B. Angeblich ein Zitat aus Gregor Thaumaturgos, dessen Verifizierung allerdings nicht gelang; vgl. schon K. Holl, *Fragmente vornicänischer Kirchenväter aus den Sacra Parallela*, TU 20, 2 (1901) 159, Nr. 406 unter: ‚Nicht nachweisbare und zweifelhafte Citate'. Der Kontext der St. 400B ist mit Philo, *De sacrif. Abelis et Caini* 114 (u. 117; ed. Cohn, I [Berlin 1896] 248/249) zu identifizieren, vgl. bes. χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦσθαι φύσει mit der entsprechenden Wendung des Damaszeners.

[60] A.a.O., 27; vgl. auch 46, sowie M. Pohlenz, Philosophische Nachklänge in altchristlichen Predigten, *Zeitschr. f. wissenschaftl. Theologie* 48, N.F. 13 (1905) 79.

mus ebenfalls in seiner Parabelsammlung[61] aufführt, und der sich mit Stellen bei Basilius und Gregor deckt; er lautet: „Qui lignum ob imperitiam rectum facere nesciunt, distorquent in diversam partem: sic quidam fuga vitii in aliud vitium incidunt gravius." Damit vgl. v.a. Basilius in seinem an den Philosophen Maximus gerichteten Brief 9,[62] wo er an Dionysios von Alexandrien Kritik übt, weil er in der Bekämpfung der Irrlehre des Sabellios über das Ziel hinausgeschossen habe und ins andere Extrem geraten sei: εἴωθα γοῦν ἀπεικάζειν ἐγὼ φυτοκόμῳ νεαροῦ φυτοῦ διαστροφὴν ἀπευθύνοντι, εἶτα τῇ ἀμετρίᾳ τῆς ἀνθολκῆς διαμαρτόντι τοῦ μέσου καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀπαγαγόντι τὸ βλάστημα. Ferner, in ganz ähnlichem Zusammenhang, Gregor v. Naz., *Or.* 2, 36[63] sowie *Or.* 20, 5.[64] Stellt man einen Passus aus Aristoteles' Nikomachischer Ethik zur Seite, wo im 2. Buch, Kap. 9[65] geraten wird, „sich aus dem einen Extrem zum anderen zu zwingen",[66] um zur angestrebten ‚Mitte' zu finden, so sticht die auch hinsichtlich der Wortwahl erkennbare Ähnlichkeit mit der Basilius-Stelle sogleich ins Auge. Bei Aristoteles heißt es: εἰς τοὐναντίον δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. Die Abweichung voneinander erklärt sich aus den unterschiedlichen Intentionen der Verfasser und liegt im zusätzlichen Moment der ‚Unmäßigkeit' oder des ‚Übermaßes', auf das es hier Basilius, im Gegensatz zu Aristoteles, ankommt. Dagegen deckt sich eine weitere Stelle bei Gregor, die gewissermaßen aus den zwei uns geläufigen Bildern ‚kontaminiert' erscheint, inhaltlich ganz mit der des Aristoteles; es handelt sich um die Verse 119–122 des sog. *carmen in silentium ieiunii*.[66a] Dort geißelt Gregor die Unbändigkeit und Zügellosigkeit der Zunge, wenn er sagt, daß „das Wort, sobald es sich von der geschwätzigen Zunge löst (eigtl. ‚abspringt', ἀπορούσῃ, wie sich Gregor in der plastischen Sprache Homers ausdrückt), maßlos wütet und nicht mehr (zu seiner Ausgangsstelle) zurückkehrt". Darauf läßt er den Vergleich folgen: Ὡς

[61] A.a.O. (s. oben A. 29), 566C.

[62] Ed. Y. Courtonne, *Saint Basile, Lettres*, I (Paris 1957) 38 und n. 1 *ad loc.* (= PG 32, 269A). P. Calasanctius, *De beeldspraak bij den heiligen Basilius den Grote* (Nijmegen–Utrecht 1941) 116, erwähnt zwar und übersetzt die Stelle, verzichtet aber auf jeglichen Kommentar.

[63] PG 35, 444C. – Auf die Parallelität macht schon die Anm. 8 zur Basilius-Stelle im Migne-Text aufmerksam.

[64] PG 35, 1072A.

[65] 1109b, 1 ff.

[66] Nach F. Dirlmeiers Übersetzung der St. (s. oben A. 12), 43.

[66a] = *Carmen* XXXIV der *Poemata de seipso*, PG 37, 1315–1316.

δ' ὅτε τις λοξοῖο φυὴν πτόρθου παλάμῃσιν / ἧκα μετακλίνων ἔμπαλι γῦρον ἄγει, / αὐτὰρ ὅγ' ὥς μιν ἔλειπε, βίῃ χερὸς ὄρθιος ἔστη, / μηκέτ' ἐπὶ προτέρην κλινόμενος κακίην, so fand auch Gregor, wenn ihm wieder einmal das Wort durchzugehen schien (καὶ γάρ μοι βίος ἦεν, ὅτ' ἦν λόγος, gesteht er v. 125 ein[66b]), das beste Heilmittel im genauen Gegenteil, im Schweigen: ἔσχον ὅλον (*sc.* τὸν λόγον) ὑψινόῳ κραδίῃ, „compressi totum sermonem excelso pectore", heißt es v. 126, „auf daß die Zunge lerne zu unterscheiden, was zu sagen und was nicht zu sagen sei usw." Abgesehen von der Möglichkeit indirekter Übermittlung der Aristoteles-Stelle an die Kappadokier durch die vom Stagiriten stark beeinflußte Diatribe,[67] kann die Alternative der direkten Nachwirkung als durchaus möglich angenommen werden[68] und gewinnt vielleicht sogar an Wahrscheinlichkeit, wenn ein weiterer Beleg für das in Rede stehende Bild zum Vergleich herangezogen wird, u. zw. Plutarch, *De adulatore et amico*, c. 25 (66 C): ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀθεότητα καὶ πανουργίαν ἀβελτερίας ἀπολόγημα ποιοῦνται, καθάπερ ξύλον τὸ ἦθος ἐκ καμπῆς εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ κατορθοῦν διαστρέφοντες. Die Gegenüberstellung hinterläßt den Eindruck, als würden Aristoteles und Basilius hier einander näherkommen als Plutarch und der Kirchenvater; vor allem fehlt hier bei Plutarch das den anderen Autoren und Gregor, *Or.* 20, 5, gemeinsame, so gewichtige aristotelische Moment des μέσον oder der μεσότης, das namentlich bei Gregor eine so bedeutende Rolle

[66b] Vgl. *Or.* 7, 1, PG 35, 756A ex.; 43, 1, PG 36, 493A und dazu M. Kertsch, Begriffsgeschichtliches aus den Grabreden Gregors von Nazianz, *Jahrbuch der österr. Byzantinistik* 23 (1974) 20.

[67] Man bedenke nur mit Hadot, a.a.O., 147, „wieviel altakademisches und aristotelisches Gedankengut in der Stoa in systematisierter Form fortlebt". Als potentieller Vermittler solcher Gedanken kommt v.a. Themistios in Frage; vgl. z.B. seine nur arabisch überlieferte *Epistula de re publica gerenda*, ed. I. Shahid (in: Themistii *Orationes quae supersunt*, rec. Schenkl, opus consummaverunt G. Downey et A. F. Norman, III [Leipzig 1974] 87f.) in Norman's lateinischer Übersetzung: „nam quidvis ab eo quod sui simile est alitur atque augetur; per id autem, quod est contrarium sui, curatur atque in valetudinem redditur. frigore enim temperatur in mediocritatem nimia vis caloris, etc. omnia denique a contrario curantur atque reficiuntur." – Dabei könnte Aristoteles selbst wieder eine Anleihe beim Traditionsgut eines älteren Handbuchs gemacht haben: vgl. A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Hypomnemata 38 (Göttingen 1973) 251, A. 1.

[68] So hat E. Bignone, Nuove testimonianze e frammenti del „Protrettico" di Aristotele, *Riv. di filol. e d'istruz. class.* 64, N.S. 14 (1936) 225 sqq. Reminiszenzen aus dieser Schrift bei Greg. v. Naz. nachgewiesen; weitere diesbezügliche Lit. führt an und bespricht F. Trisoglio, San Gregorio di Nazianzo in un quarantennio di studi (1925–1965), *Riv. lasalliana* 40 (Torino 1973) 288–289.

spielt.[69] Daneben ist, wie erwähnt, ein gewisser Anklang zwischen Aristoteles und Basilius nicht zu verkennen, v. a. im Gebrach des Verbs ἀπάγειν, das angesichts der Möglichkeit einer größeren Auswahl ähnlicher Verba (z.B. ἀποκλίνειν) kaum zufällig bei beiden steht, während das mit διαστροφήν bei Basilius etwa vergleichbare plutarchische διαστρέφοντες nicht ins Gewicht fällt, weil es ja stehender Ausdruck unseres Bildes ist.[70] Allerdings trifft sich Plutarch mit Basilius wieder in dem Punkt, daß beide zusätzlich den Aspekt des ‚Zuviel' beim ‚Geraderichten' herausstellen, nur daß dies Plutarch mit ἀπειρίᾳ, Basilius hingegen mit ἀμετρίᾳ zum Ausdruck bringt.[71] Was die letzten Worte der aus Aristoteles zitierten Stelle anlangt, haben sie, wie Dirlmeier[72] vermerkt, Platon, *Protag.* 325 d 6–7: ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς zum Vorbild, wo von der Züchtigung unfolgsamer Kinder durch ihre Eltern die Rede ist. Der Ausgangspunkt dieser und ähnlicher Wendungen ist wohl ein Sprichwort, das meist in der Form σκαμβὸν ξύλον οὐδέποτ' ὀρθόν überliefert erscheint.[73] Ihm gilt der letzte Abschnitt unserer Untersuchung.

In den sog. *Menandri sententiae*[74] findet sich der Zweizeiler: Μηδέποτε πειρῶ σκαμβὸν ὀρθῶσαι κλάδον· / ἐκεῖ νένευκεν οὗ φύσις βιάζεται, oder auch, abgesehen von der Variante στρεβλὸν für σκαμβὸν,[75] in

[69] Zu Gregor s. D. G. Tsamis, Ἡ περὶ μεσότητος διδασκαλία Γρηγορίου τοῦ Θεολόγου, ΚΛΗΡΟΝΟΜΙΑ I, 2 (Thessaloniki 1969) 275 ff.; zu Aristoteles und Plutarch, welch letzterer anderswo sich sehr wohl auch mit der μεσότης-Lehre auseinandersetzt, s. D. Babut, *Plutarque et le stoicisme*, Publications de l'Université de Lyon (Paris 1969) 332 und n. 2, 524; ders., *Plutarque de la vertu éthique*, Bibliothèque de la faculté des lettres de Lyon XV (Paris 1969) 78.

[70] Vgl. die unten angeführte Platon-Stelle (und das Bild bei Themistios).

[71] Gleichwohl verwendet Plutarch im nachfolgenden Textabschnitt auch diesen Begriff, wenn er betont, daß es αἰσχρόν sei, παρρησίας ἀμετρίᾳ διαφθεῖραι τὸ φιλικὸν καὶ κηδεμονικόν. – Sonst hat M. Pohlenz die Benutzung anderer Plutarch-Stellen durch Basilius nachgewiesen in Philosoph. Nachklänge ..., 72 ff., bes. 94.

[72] A.a.O., 318 z. St.; vgl. Babut, a.a. Stellen.

[73] E. L. v. Leutsch und F. G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum*, II (Göttingen 1851; Nachdr. Hildesheim 1965) 208 (= Macarii centuria VII, 69); vgl. I, 284 zu Diogen. cent. VI, 92, sowie 324 zu Plutarch. cent. I, 18. – Ein lateinisches Äquivalent haben wir in dem *invenimus, qui curva corrigeret* bei Plin. *Epist.* 5, 9, 6, u.a. (A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter* ..., 103, Nr. 490 s.v. *curvus* 2). Sonst vgl. nǫch Diogenes Laërtios 7, 127 = Suidae *Lexicon* (ed. Adler) I, 346 Nr. 3830 = *SVF* (Arnim) III, 536, p. 143, sowie Musonius Rufus XIII B (ed. O. Hense, [Leipzig 1905] 70): ... πῶς ἀγαθὸς πονηρῷ ὁμονοήσειεν; οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον ἢ ὀρθῷ ξύλῳ στρεβλὸν συναρμόσειεν ἄν, ... nebst der Bemerkung des Herausgebers „imago *Stoicis usitata*".

[74] Ed. S. Jaekel (Leipzig 1964) 97 (= Comp. I, 213–214).

[75] *Ibid.* 116 (= Comp. III, 45–46).

anderer Formulierung: ... οὐκ ἦν ἐνεγκεῖν für ἐκεῖ νένευκεν.[76] F. G. Allison[77] übersetzt dies passend: „Never attempt to straighten out a twisted branch; you cannot achieve where nature suffers violence." Weniger geeignet dünkt uns J. M. Edmonds'[78] Wiedergabe des ἐνεγκεῖν durch „bear its fruit". Die sprichwörtliche Wendung hat noch in byzantinischer Zeit fortgelebt. So treffen wir sie, im Verein mit ähnlichen Aussprüchen, z.B. bei Symeon Metaphrastes in seiner *Vita S. Ioannis Chrysostomi*, c. 41, an:[79] ἀλλὰ σκαμβὸν ξύλον οὐδέποτ' ὀρθὸν οὐδὲ λεῖον ἂν θείης τὸν τραχὺν ἐχῖνον οὐδὲ βαδίζειν ὀρθὰ τὸν καρκῖνον παρασκευάσαις. Auch hier dient sie mit den anderen zur Veranschaulichung der Unveränderlichkeit der Naturanlage eines Menschen. Änlich Constantinus Acropolites *In S. Ioan. Damascenum*, c. 46.[80]

Die im Vorhergehenden dargestellten Bilder nebst dem zum Schluß behandelten Sprichwort wurzeln jedenfalls allesamt in der mit der Beschaffenheit und dem Verhalten des Holzes in der Natur gemachten Erfahrung, deren verschiedene Möglichkeiten je nach Bedarf verschiedenartig zum Ausdruck gebracht werden.

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[76] Unter Nr. 711 in Th. Kocks *CAF*, III, 203; vgl. dazu H. Blümner, *Über Gleichnis und Metapher in der attischen Komödie* (Leipzig 1891) 144 („das Grademachen krumm gewachsenen Holzes als Beispiel für nutzlose Bemühungen") und 244. – Mit der erstgenannten Fassung des Verses vgl. übrigens Greg. Naz. *Epist.* 178, 3 (ed. P. Gallay, *S. Grégoire de Nazianze, Lettres*, II [Paris 1967] 67): σέ φημι χρῆναι ... μηδὲ πρὸς ἄλλο τι μᾶλλον ὠθίζεσθαι τῶν οὐκ οἰκείων ἢ ταύτης (= φιλοσοφίας) περιέχεσθαι πρὸς ἣν νένευκας ...

[77] Menander, *The Principal Fragments*, The Loeb Class. Libr. (1951) 526.

[78] A.a.O. (s. oben A. 46), 829.

[79] PG 104, 1156B–C. Interessant ist die Variante bei Ps.-Plutarch, *De liberis educandis* 4, 2 (ed. H. Gärtner, I [Leipzig ²1974] 3): τάς γε μὴν καμπύλας τῶν ὑποκριτῶν βακτηρίας ἀπευθύνειν ἀμήχανον, wo gleichfalls noch weitere Bilder dies empirische Faktum unterstreichen.

[80] PG 140, 869A. – S. dazu auch G. H. Opsimathes, ΓΝΩΜΑΙ *sive Thesaurus sententiarum et apophthegmatum ex scriptoribus Graecis praecipue poetis* (Leipzig 1884) 278 u. 287; zum sprichwörtlichen Vergleich mit der Fortbewegungsart des Krebses (zuerst Aristoph. *Pax* 1049; vgl. Greg. v. Naz., PG 37, 925A) H. L. Davids, *De gnomologieën van Sint Gregorius van Nazianze* (Nijmegen–Utrecht 1940) 70.

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LA CRÉATION DE L'HOMME (Gn 1,26) CHEZ THÉOPHILE D'ANTIOCHE

PAR

NICOLE ZEEGERS-VANDER VORST

Théophile d'Antioche est, à notre connaissance, le premier auteur chrétien à présenter une exégèse sinon systématique, du moins suivie du récit biblique de la création. A ce titre, et aussi en raison de leur teneur, chacune de ses remarques mérite d'être analysée.

Son explication du pluriel «Faisons l'homme» (*Gn* 1,26) offre un intérêt tout particulier.

Après avoir affirmé que la collaboration personnelle de Dieu à la création de l'homme manifeste la dignité de celui-ci, Théophile écrit:

(...) Ἔτι μὴν καὶ ὡς βοηθείας χρῄζων ὁ θεὸς εὑρίσκεται λέγων· Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν· οὐκ ἄλλῳ δέ τινι εἴρηκεν Ποίησωμεν, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σοφίᾳ.[1]

(...) Bien plus, comme s'Il sollicitait un auxiliaire, on voit Dieu dire: *Faisons l'homme à l'image et à la ressemblance.* Mais ce n'est à personne d'autre qu'Il dit *Faisons*, sinon à son propre Logos et à sa propre Sophia.

Cette réflexion est présentée comme une réfutation des exégèses qui découvrent dans le *Faisons* un appel de Dieu à un ou plusieurs agents. Nous reviendrons sur ce point. Auparavant, nous voudrions préciser la portée de l'interprétation proposée par l'apologiste.

A priori, on pourrait imaginer que lorsqu'il fait intervenir le Logos et la Sophia en *Gn* 1,26, Théophile décèle dans ce *Faisons* une préfiguration de la Trinité: Dieu, Logos, Pneuma.[2] Certains commentateurs modernes

[1] *Autol.* 2,18,8–12. Les livres, chapitres et lignes (au sein des chapitres) sont cités d'après l'édition de G. Bardy, Sources chrétiennes, 20 (Paris 1948).

[2] Dieu parlant à son Verbe et son Esprit ou à son Verbe seulement, telle est l'interprétation du pluriel *Faisons* proposée par les Pères du IIIe au VIe siècle, et même plus tard. Cfr les dossiers constitués par J. Lebreton, *Histoire du dogme de la Trinité*, I, 8e éd. (Paris 1927) 553, n. 1 et H. Somers, The Riddle of a Plural (Gen., I, 26): Its History in Tradition, *Folia* 9 (1955) 77–101. – On complétera ces dossiers en signalant l'interprétation «trinitaire» des commentateurs syriaques: Narsai, *Homélies sur la*

l'ont cru[3] et, forts de cette conviction, n'ont pas hésité à qualifier Théophile de «prophète» de la Trinité.

En réalité, malgré sa constitution «triadique», le groupe Dieu, Logos, Sophia élaboré par l'apologiste n'est pas l'équivalent de la Trinité chrétienne. En effet, le troisième terme – la Sophia – n'y est pas identique au Pneuma.[4] A supposer même que Sophia et Pneuma soient interchangeables, le groupe Dieu, Logos, Sophia (= Pneuma) n'en serait pas pour autant trinitaire, car le Pneuma, dans les *Livres à Autolycus*, loin d'être la troisième personne de la Trinité, est de coloration beaucoup plus stoïcienne que biblique.[5]

Non trinitariste,[6] Théophile n'est pas davantage assimilable aux chrétiens qui comprennent le pluriel *Faisons* comme un appel de Dieu à son Logos – et à son Logos seulement.[7]

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création, I, 131, éd. Ph. Gignoux, PO 34,3–4 (1968) 535; Theodor Bar Kōnī, *Liber scholiorum*, II, éd. A. Scher, CSCO 55/syr 19 (1910) 53; Išo'dad de Merv, *Commentaire sur l'Ancien Testament*, I, *Genèse*, ad *Gn* I, 26, éd. J.-M. Vosté et C. Van den Eynde, CSCO 126/syr 67 (1950) 46 et 47 (texte) et 156/syr 75 (1955) 49 et 50 (trad.). Même interprétation trinitaire chez l'auteur syriaque anonyme édité par A. Levene, *The Early Syriac Fathers on Genesis, from a MS. on the Pentateuch in the Mingana Collection* (London 1951) 51, l. 26 ss (texte = fol. 9 b) et 86 (trad.). – Cfr T. Jansma, Investigations into the Early Syrian Fathers on Genesis, *Oudtestamentische Studien Leiden* 12 (1958) 69–181.

[3] R. McL. Wilson, The Early History of the Exegesis of Gen., I, 26, *Studia Patristica* 1, TU 63 (1957) 431–432 et 437 et G. T. Armstrong, *Die Genesis in der alten Kirche*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Hermeneutik, 4 (Tübingen 1962) 69–70; ce dernier toutefois fait remarquer (p. 70, n. 1) que Théophile n'identifie pas «directement» le Verbe et la Sagesse avec le Fils et l'Esprit. – Il semble que ces commentateurs aient interprété Théophile à la lumière d'Irénée, qui identifie explicitement le groupe Verbe-Sagesse avec le groupe Fils-Esprit. Cette interprétation est irrecevable, notamment pour des motifs d'ordre chronologique. Cfr N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Notes sur quelques aspects judaïsants du Logos chez Théophile d'Antioche, *Actes de la XIIe Conférence internationale d'Etudes classiques ‹Eirénè›*, Cluj 1972 (Bucarest 1975) 73 et n. 25–26.

[4] Sur la portée réelle des passages où Théophile établit un lien entre Sophia et Pneuma (*Autol.* 1,7,15–16 et 2,15,17–21), cfr N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Le Logos chez Théophile (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 72–73 et n. 20–23. – Ailleurs (*Autol.* 1,3,8–10 et 2,9,2–3), l'apologiste n'identifie nullement ces deux entités. Cfr G. Kretschmar, *Studien zur frühchristlichen Trinitätstheologie*, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 21 (Tübingen 1956) 32: „Für Theophilus sind Sophia und Pneuma nicht einfach Wechselbegriffe."

[5] A. Puech, *Les apologistes grecs de notre ère* (Paris 1912) 338, n. 2 et G. Kretschmar, *Studien*, 32. Ceci n'exclut nullement que le Pneuma chez Théophile présente certaines attaches bibliques: cfr R. M. Grant, Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus, *Harvard Theological Review* 40 (1947) 251–252.

[6] G. Kretschmar, *Studien* (cité ci-dessus, n. 4), 33 et 59–61.

[7] Cfr ci-dessus, n. 2. Parmi les auteurs antérieurs à Théophile, citons Barnabé, *Ep.* 5,5 et 6,12*a* et Justin, *Dial.* 62,1–2 (cfr ci-dessous, n. 24 et 25). Les chrétiens mis

L'intervention du groupe Logos–Sophia suggérée par Théophile pour expliquer le pluriel *Faisons* ne trouve donc aucun parallèle dans la littérature chrétienne. On s'interroge dès lors sur l'origine de cette conception.

Les tendances judaïsantes de l'apologiste, qui, récemment encore, ont été soulignées,[8] nous invitent à orienter notre enquête du côté de la littérature juive, en particulier des *midrashim*.

On pourrait songer tout d'abord à l'exégèse rabbinique proposée par R. Ammi et R. Assi, selon laquelle Dieu prit conseil de son propre cœur, tel un roi qui, avant de construire son palais, recourt aux conseils de son architecte.[9] Etant donné que le Logos dans les *Livres à Autolycus* est la propre pensée et l'intelligence de Dieu (2,22,16), son conseiller (2,22,15) et son artisan dans l'œuvre de la création (2,10,9), l'être avec qui Dieu converse continuellement (2,22,19–20), qui existe toujours «aux côtés de Dieu» (2,10,7), «en Dieu» (2,22,23), «dans les propres entrailles de Dieu» (2,10,7–8), «dans le cœur de Dieu» (2,22,14–15), l'exégèse des deux docteurs juifs ne manque pas d'analogie avec celle de Théophile (Dieu parle à son propre Logos ...). On notera toutefois que le Logos mis en scène par Théophile en *Gn* 1,26 est un Logos déjà proféré – en quelque sorte une personne distincte de Dieu –, alors que les docteurs juifs insistent sur l'intériorité du dialogue divin. On pourrait même dire qu'ils imaginent un monologue, si du moins on admet que «parler à son cœur» signifie «se parler à soi-même».[10]

Mais il est d'autres textes qui rappellent de beaucoup plus près l'exégèse de Théophile. On citera par exemple les *Pirkè* de R. Eliezer, où

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en scène dans les dialogues anti-juifs font état de la même interprétation: cfr ci-dessous, n. 27–29. De même encore Ephrem, *Comm. in Genesim*, ad *Gn* 1,26.

[8] A. Marmorstein, Jews and Judaism in the Earliest Apologies, *The Expositor*, VIIInd Ser., 17 (1919) 104–109; R. M. Grant, Theophilus (cité à la n. 5), 237–238 et The Problem of Theophilus, *Harvard Theological Review* 43 (1950) 188–196 (en particulier sur le judéo-christianisme de Théophile).

[9] R. Ammi et R. Jassi (IIIe s.), dans *Bereshit Rabba* (cité *BR*), VIII, 3, H. Freedman, I, p. 57; cfr R. Berekiah (IVe s.), dans *BR*, XXVII, 4, *ibid.*, I, p. 222.

[10] R. Berekiah, dans *BR*, VIII, 4, H. Freedman, I, p. 57; R. Hila (IVe s.?), dans *BR*, VIII, 8, fin, *ibid.*, I, p. 60 et R. Tifdai, au nom de R. Aḥa (IVe s.), dans *BR*, XIV, 2, *ibid.*, I, p. 112. Les interlocuteurs juifs mis en scène dans les dialogues anti-juifs (cfr ci-dessous, n. 27–29) interpréteront de même le *Faisons* comme un pluriel majestatif. – Les auteurs cités ici sont certes postérieurs à Théophile, mais leur explication du *Faisons* remonte au IIe siècle ou au delà: déjà Justin (*Dial.* 62,2) la cite en l'attribuant aux juifs et la réfute. – Admettrait-on avec M.-J. Lagrange, Hexaméron, Genèse I à II, 4, *Revue biblique* 5 (1896) 387 et J. Lebreton, *Trinité* (cité ci-dessus, n. 2), I,556, que

le *Faisons* est compris comme une conversation de Dieu avec sa Torah.[11] Si l'on fait jouer l'équivalence classique Torah = Sophia,[12] l'explication ainsi présentée est un décalque presque parfait de celle de Théophile.

De même, toujours à propos du pluriel *Faisons*, R. Hama b. R. Ḥanina affirme que la Torah est présente aux côtés de Dieu lors de la création de l'homme; s'il ne précise pas que Dieu s'adresse à sa Torah, il décrit cette dernière comme douée de parole; c'est elle, en effet, qui répond aux questions que lui posent les œuvres de chaque jour.[13]

Identiques sont les exégèses relatées dans certains ouvrages riches en spéculations judéo-chrétiennes. Ainsi le *Livre des Secrets d'Enoch* comprend *Gn* 1,26 comme un dialogue entre Dieu et sa Sagesse.[14] Les *Homélies clémentines* font état de la même interprétation lorsque, réfutant Simon le Mage qui introduit en *Gn* 1,26 une pluralité d'agents,[15] Pierre déclare: «Il est unique, Celui qui a dit à sa Sagesse *Faisons l'homme.*»[16] Enfin, dans le VIIe Livre des *Constitutions apostoliques* – ou plus précisément dans les chapitres 34–35, qui sont le remaniement chrétien d'une prière juive,[17] – on peut lire, insérée dans une louange au Dieu créateur paraphrasant le récit de la *Genèse*: «(...) l'être doué de raison, le citoyen de la

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le pluriel *Faisons* présuppose en Dieu une plénitude d'être telle qu'Il peut délibérer avec Lui-même comme plusieurs personnes délibèrent entre elles, on pourrait dans ce cas assimiler Théophile aux juifs qui retrouvent dans le *Faisons* un pluriel délibératif. Mais cette interprétation de *Gn* 1,26 – interprétation moderne – a-t-elle seulement effleuré l'apologiste? Rappelons que les chrétiens des premiers siècles (depuis Justin, *Dial.* 62,2) l'ont unanimement rejetée.

[11] *Pirkè de Rabbi Eliezer*, XI, cité par H. L. Strack–P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch*, III. Bd (1954) 479 (ad I *Co* 15,47) et W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (London 1962) 54. – Sous la forme dans laquelle ils nous ont été transmis, les *Pirkè* dateraient du VIIIe ou du IXe siècle, mais ils contiennent nombre de matériaux primitifs: cfr J. Bowker, *The Targums and Rabbinic Literature* (Cambridge 1969) 85.

[12] Par exemple, *BR*, I, 1 et I, 4, H. Freedman, I, p. 1 et 7.

[13] R. Hama b. R. Ḥanina (IIIe s.), dans *BR*, VIII, 2, H. Freedman, I, p. 55–56. – Sur la préexistence et le rôle créateur de la Torah, cfr N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Le Logos chez Théophile (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 75–76 et n. 33–42.

[14] II *Enoch* (Enoch slave) 30,8, éd. R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, II (1913) 448: «Le sixième jour, j'ai commandé à ma Sagesse de créer l'homme.» – Sur le judéo-christianisme et l'époque (fin du Ier s. ap. J.-C.) de l'Enoch slave, cfr J. Daniélou, *Théologie du judéo-christianisme* (Paris-Tournai 1957) 25–28. L'auteur de cet apocryphe serait, comme Théophile, originaire de Syrie (J. Daniélou, *ibid.*).

[15] *Hom. clem.* 16,11,2; cfr *Rec. clem.* 2,39,5–8.

[16] *Hom. clem.* 16,12,1. Théophile présente d'autres affinités avec les *Homélies clémentines*: cfr G. Kretschmar, *Studien*, 32, n. 2.

[17] G. Kretschmar, *Studien*, 37 et n. 3.

terre, c'est par un ordre donné à ta Sagesse que tu l'as préparé, lorsque tu as dit: ‹Faisons l'homme› (...).»[18]

Ces textes présentent une analogie très précise avec Théophile. C'est à peine si celui-ci leur donne un vernis chrétien lorsque, à cette Sophia avec laquelle Dieu dialogue, il juxtapose le Logos – un Logos qui, même s'il présente quelques affinités avec le Verbe johannique, accuse, lui aussi, de nombreuses attaches avec le judaïsme.[19]

Ce point vaut d'être souligné, d'autant plus que Théophile se montre ici plus judaïsant que les chrétiens qui déjà avant lui retrouvaient en *Gn* 1,26 un dialogue entre Dieu et son Logos. Certes, tout comme l'apologiste, ceux-ci s'inspirent de l'interprétation proposée par les docteurs juifs: «Dieu s'adresse à sa Sophia (ou à sa Torah).» Mais, alors qu'ils substituent le Logos à cette Sophia, Théophile maintient juxtaposées et distinctes ces deux entités. Loin de détrôner la Sophia, il se contente de lui adjoindre le Logos. Autrement dit, il prolonge la monade Sophia en une dyade Sophia–Logos.[20] Et par le maintien de cette Sophia en *Gn* 1,26 comme dans tout son commentaire de l'hexaméron,[21] il reste plus fidèle que ses contemporains chrétiens à ses sources juives.

Mais dans son exégèse de *Gn* 1,26, Théophile trahit d'autres affinités avec les doctrines juives, d'autant plus remarquables que les chrétiens de la même époque se situent en hostilité ouverte avec le judaïsme dans leur exégèse du même passage de la *Genèse*. En effet, s'ils appliquent au Logos – entendons au Verbe incarné – les attributs de la Sophia vétéro-testamentaire, c'est pour «prouver» l'éternité et la divinité du Christ et, dans le cadre de leur polémique anti-juive, le bien-fondé de leur religion et la caducité du judaïsme.[22] Parmi les nombreux textes de l'Ancien Testament qu'ils pouvaient transformer en témoignages christologiques, ils invoquent, véritable *leitmotiv* de leur polémique, l' 'Εν ἀρχῇ de *Gn* 1,1,

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[18] *Const. apost.* 7,34,6, éd. F.X.Funk, *Didascalia et Constitutiones apostolorum*, I (1905) 428,3–6; cp. 8,12,16, 500,22–24 (même contexte, même citation).

[19] Nous avons tenté de préciser quelques aspects de cette question dans notre article Le Logos chez Théophile, cité ci-dessus, n. 3.

[20] Son exégèse du *Faisons* est en quelque sorte «a forced interpretation» des auteurs midrashiques: A.Marmorstein, The Unity of God in Rabbinic Literature, *Hebrew Union College Annual* 1 (1924); réimprimé par J.Rabbinowitz et M.S.Lew = A.Marmorstein, *Studies in Jewish Theology* (Oxford 1950) 98.

[21] N. Zeegers–Vander Vorst, Le Logos chez Théophile (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 70–72 et n. 4–19 et 74–76, n. 31–42.

[22] Sur ces querelles et leur réciprocité, cfr M.Simon, *Verus Israël* (Paris 1948; réimpr. 1964) 175-176 et 189–196.

compris au sens de ἐν λόγῳ ou de *In Filio*,[23] et le Ποιήσωμεν de *Gn* 1,26, compris comme un appel de Dieu à son Verbe ou à son Fils. Outre Barnabé[24] et Justin,[25] on citera ici les chrétiens aux prises avec un interlocuteur juif dans les nombreux *Dialogues* qui virent le jour dès le milieu du IIe siècle:[26] *Dialogue d'Athanase et de Zacchée*,[27] *Dialogue de Timothée et d'Aquila*,[28] *Altercation entre Simon le juif et Théophile le chrétien*.[29]

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[23] N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, Le Logos chez Théophile, 80–82 en n. 72–82.

[24] Alors qu'en *Ep.* 6,12*a* Barnabé semble s'inspirer de *midrashim* dont l'interprétation est typologique, la polémique anti-juive apparaît nettement en 5,5, dont l'auteur emprunte les citations, et notamment *Gn* 1,26, à des recueils de *Testimonia* rédigés contre les juifs: cfr P. Prigent, *Les Testimonia dans le christianisme primitif. L'Epître de Barnabé*, I–XVI (Paris 1961) 159–160, 168 et 217–218. Comme Théophile, l'auteur de l'*Epître* aurait vécu en Syrie (P. Prigent, *ibid.*, 219). – Sur les témoignages christologiques cités dans l'*Epître*, cfr G. T. Armstrong, *Genesis* (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 15–16 et n. 1 (bibliographie).

[25] Les témoignages christologiques que Justin relève dans l'Ancien Testament ont été réunis par G. T. Armstrong, *Genesis* (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 28–40 et 48–51 (conclusion). – Sur le Christ, Sagesse de Dieu, cfr W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism* (cité ci-dessus, n. 11), 147–176. – Les affirmations des Pères apostoliques et apologistes sur la préexistence du Christ ont été étudiées par J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London 1958) 90–95 et 95–101. – Nous ne citons pas ici les Pères des siècles postérieurs, dont l'interprétation de *Gn* 1,26 prend place dans des querelles anti-ariennes et dont le but est de montrer l'égalité du Fils et du Père: cfr H. Somers (cité ci-dessus, n. 2), 72–73.

[26] Ces *Dialogues* sont postérieurs à Théophile, mais ont repris une polémique qui avait déjà cours avant Justin, probablement au milieu du IIe siècle: cfr les notes suivantes. – Sur les recueils de polémique anti-juive riches en «arguments christologiques», cfr P. Prigent, *Testimonia* (cité ci-dessus, n. 24), 16–28.

[27] *Dial. Ath. et Zacch.* 3–7, éd. F. C. Conybeare, *The Dialogues of Athanasius and Zacchaeus and of Timothy and Aquila*, Anecdota Oxoniensia, Classical Series, VIII (Oxford 1898) 3–5. Le *Dialogue* se situerait vers 300 (F. C. Conybeare, XXXIV), mais le document qui lui a servi de base remonterait à une période antérieure à Justin et pourrait être le *Dialogue* (perdu) *de Jason et Papiscus* (F. C. Conybeare, XXXV et XLV–LVII).

[28] *Dial. Tim. et Aq.*, éd. F. C. Conybeare (cité ci-dessus), 67–69. Le *Dialogue* serait contemporain de Cyrille d'Alexandrie, mais, comme le précédent, semble avoir puisé ses arguments dans le *Dialogue de Jason et Papiscus* (F. C. Conybeare, LI–LVII).

[29] *Alterc. Sim. et Theoph.* 8–9, éd. A. Harnack, *Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani nebst Untersuchungen über die antijüdische Polemik in der alten Kirche*, TU, I,3 (1883) 18–19. – Malgré sa date tardive (Ve s.), le *Dialogue* aurait utilisé, comme les deux précédents, une source ancienne. A. Harnack, *ibid.*, 96, 108–109 et 115–130, identifie cette source avec le *Dialogue de Jason et Papiscus*. Sur ce dernier *Dialogue*, cfr A. Harnack, *Die griechischen Apologeten des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, § 9, TU, I,2 (1882) 115–130. – A. Marmorstein, Juden und Judentum in der Altercatio Simonis Judaei et Theophili Christiani, *Theologisch Tijdschrift* 49 (1915) 360–383, a dressé l'inventaire des sources rabbiniques du *Dialogue* (sur *Gn* 1,26, cfr p. 368–369) pour en conclure (p. 382) que le document de base fut composé vers 130 ou même antérieurement.

Arguant du pluriel *Faisons* pour introduire le Christ dans la sphère divine dès avant la création du monde, les chrétiens se heurtent aux juifs qui, monothéistes intransigeants, refusent d'admettre l'éternité et la divinité du Christ.[30]

Théophile suit une démarche très différente. S'il admet la préexistence du Verbe en *Gn* 1,26, ce n'est pas pour assimiler ce Verbe au Christ[31] et montrer ainsi la supériorité du christianisme, mais pour redresser l'interprétation que les gnostiques, en y introduisant les anges, avaient donnée au verset.[32] Autrement dit, alors qu'un Justin, par exemple, saisit dans le pluriel *Faisons* l'occasion de prouver la préexistence du Verbe, Théophile est contrarié par ce pluriel et par l'exégèse à laquelle il donnait lieu. Il laisse percer cet embarras dans l'insistance qu'il met non seulement à limiter le nombre des interlocuteurs divins (« Dieu ne parle à personne ... »), mais encore à présenter ceux-ci comme intérieurs ou «propres» à Dieu (« Dieu ne parle qu'à son propre Logos et à sa propre Sophia»). Par là et contrairement aux chrétiens qui, pour avoir introduit en *Gn* 1,26, une

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[30] Dans le *Talmud* et les *midrashim*, les «hérétiques» jugés coupables d'introduire une pluralité en Dieu sont appelés *Minim*. Que les *Minim* désignent des chrétiens ou des judéo-chrétiens – question controversée – importe peu ici, dès l'instant où l'«hérésie» et donc les arguments pour la réfuter restent les mêmes: cfr A. Marmorstein, Unity (cité ci-dessus, n. 20), 93–105 et Juden (cité ci-dessus, n. 29), 368–369; G.F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era. The Age of Tannaim* (Cambridge 1950) I, 364–367 et M. Simon, *Verus Israël*, 214–238. – Sur l'opposition juive à la doctrine du Logos chrétien, cfr A. Marmorstein, Juden (cité ci-dessus, n. 29), 361–381 et K. Hruby, Exégèse rabbinique et exégèse patristique, *Revue des sciences religieuses* 47 (1973) 345–348.

[31] R.M. Grant, *The Letter and the Spirit* (London 1957) 80: "(Theophilus) does not find Christ in the Old Testament as freely as Justin found it." Même si le Logos proféré est, chez Théophile, plus qu'un simple attribut de Dieu (cfr n. 10, ci-dessus), il ne possède pas, semble-t-il, une vie hypostatique aussi nettement définie que chez les autres apologistes: V.A.S. Little, *The Christology of the Apologists* (London 1934) 200–201.

[32] Sur l'interprétation gnostique de *Gn* 1,26, cfr R. McL. Wilson, Gen., I,26 (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 428–431; G. Quispel, Der gnostische Anthropos und die jüdische Tradition, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 22 (1953) 198–199 et J. Jervell, *Imago Dei. Gen., 1,26f. im Spätjudentum, in die Gnosis und in den paulinischen Briefen*, Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten Testaments, 76, N.F. 58 (Göttingen 1960) 122–170. Philon de même accorde aux anges un rôle actif dans la création de l'homme: cfr C.H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (London 1935) 138–139 et 154–156; cfr G. Kretschmar, *Studien* (cité ci-dessus, n. 4), 43, n. 5, qui insiste sur l'indépendance de Théophile par rapport à Philon. En réalité, ce sont les gnostiques, semble-t-il, que l'apologiste réfute ici; les notes anti-marcionites fréquentes dans les *Livres à Autolycus* nous autoriseraient à le supposer: cfr R.M. Grant, The Problem of Theophilus (cité ci-dessus, n. 8), 192–193. – Irénée de même interprétera *Gn* 1,26 pour réfuter les gnostiques: G.T. Armstrong, *Genesis* (cité ci-dessus, n. 3), 67–70; cfr cependant *Dém.* 55.

entité rivale du Dieu unique, essuyèrent une critique très violente de la part des juifs, Théophile rejoint précisément ces mêmes juifs dans le souci qu'ils manifestent de préserver, malgré le pluriel, le monothéisme absolu.

De fait, malgré la variété des solutions qu'ils proposent au pluriel de *Gn* 1,26, les exégètes juifs sont tous guidés par le seul souci de maintenir le monothéisme. Soit qu'ils corrigent le *Faisons* en un singulier,[33] soit que, philologiquement plus honnêtes, ils le neutralisent en lui opposant des formes singulières découvertes dans les versets avoisinants,[34] soit enfin que, admettant la réalité d'un dialogue, ils imaginent Dieu conversant avec les œuvres du premier jour, c'est-à-dire le ciel et la terre,[35] avec les œuvres de chaque jour,[36] avec les âmes des justes[37] ou avec sa cour céleste composée des anges commis à son service,[38] dans tous les cas, ils font intervenir comme interlocuteurs de Dieu des êtres qui Lui sont manifestement subordonnés et donc incapables de ternir la foi monothéiste.

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[33] On trouvera dans le *Babli, Megillah*, 9 a–b la liste des formes plurielles (dont *Gn* 1,26) et des expressions anthropomorphiques que les LXX ont corrigées.

[34] Parmi les auteurs qui font état de cette argumentation, on nommera surtout R. Simlai (IIIe s.): cfr *BR*, VIII, 9, H. Freedman, I, p. 60; *Deut. R*, II, 13, *ibid.*, VII, p. 41–42 et le *Talmud de Jérusalem, Berakoth*, 9, 1. Mais déjà au IIe siècle, R. Simon b. Yoḥai (160 ap. J.-C.) et R. Nathan (même époque) avaient de la même manière refusé le pluriel. Sur l'ancienneté de cet argument, cfr A. Marmorstein, Unity (cité ci-dessus, n. 20), 95–97.

[35] R. Joshua b. Levi (vers 230 ap. J.-C.), dans *BR*, VIII, 3, H. Freedman, I, p. 56.

[36] R. Samuel b. Naḥman (début IVe s.), dans *BR*, VIII, 3, H. Freedman, I, p. 56. – Cette thèse implique que la nature entière a collaboré à la création de l'homme et que celui-ci présente des affinités avec tous les éléments. La même idée est développée par l'auteur syriaque anonyme édité par A. Levene (cité ci-dessus, n. 2), fol. 2 b–3 a, p. 64–65 (texte) et p. 74–75 (trad.). Dans son commentaire, p. 141, A. Levene se réfère explicitement à *BR*, VIII, 3 et à d'autres sources juives. Cp. A. Levene, Pentateuchal Exegesis in Early Syriac and Rabbinic Sources, *Studia patristica* I, TU 63 (1957) 484–491. – On rappellera que Justin, *Dial.* 62,2, signale et critique les exégètes qui supposent en *Gn* 1,26 un dialogue entre Dieu et les στοιχεῖα.

[37] R. Joshua de Siknin (IIIe s.) au nom de R. Levi, dans *BR*, VIII, 7, H. Freedman, I, p. 59. – Sur la valeur de ces différentes hypothèses, cfr J. Skinner, *Genesis*, The International Oxford Commentary, 2nd ed. (1930) 30–31. Avec la plupart des exégètes modernes, J. Skinner suggère (p. 46) de retrouver dans le pluriel *Faisons* la trace d'un polythéisme semblable à celui des cosmologies babyloniennes.

[38] R. Ḥanina (fin IIIe s.), dans *BR*, VIII, 4, H. Freedman, I, p. 57 et R. Aḥa (même époque), dans *BR*, XVII, 7, *ibid.*, I, p. 135; cfr *Lev. R*, XXIX, 1, *ibid.*, IV, p. 369. Même interprétation dans le *Targum du Pseudo-Jonathan*, ad *Gn* 1,26 et 11,7–8; à ce sujet, cfr le commentaire de J. Bowker (cité ci-dessus, n. 11), 184. – Sur le rôle des anges dans la création de l'homme (*Gn* 1,26), cfr L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, I (1909) 52–53 et V, 6e éd. (1947) 3–5 et 69–70. – Encore une fois, Justin, *Dial.* 62,3, énonce et critique cette thèse.

Même lorsqu'ils admettent que Dieu s'adresse à des anges, ils ravalent ceux-ci à un rang inférieur qui leur ôte toute possibilité de rivaliser avec Lui: les anges appartiennent à l'ordre créé[39] et loin d'y collaborer, ils se contentent d'assister à la création de l'homme; pire: ils se querellent sur l'opportunité du geste divin au point d'irriter le créateur[40] et de s'indigner contre Lui.[41] C'est dire assez que l'introduction des anges dans le récit de la création a pour but, tout en expliquant le pluriel *Faisons*, de sauvegarder le monothéisme que ce pluriel menace.

On note donc, dans le but que poursuivent Théophile et les docteurs juifs, une similitude frappante, qui semble bien résulter d'une influence juive sur l'apologiste.

Dira-t-on que ce souci commun de maintenir, malgré le pluriel de *Gn* 1,26, la notion d'un Dieu unique ne constitue qu'un indice bien maigre en faveur d'une relation de dépendance? Ce serait oublier que la préoccupation du monothéisme juif a marqué Théophile au point qu'on la retrouve en maints passages des *Livres à Autolycus*, alors qu'elle y était *a priori* peu prévisible, comme le décalque précis d'un commentaire juif. Tel est le cas, par exemple, du passage où l'apologiste affirme que si Dieu créa Ève à partir d'Adam, c'était pour ne poser qu'un seul acte créateur et éviter qu'on n'imagine ainsi l'intervention de deux dieux, l'un créant l'homme, l'autre la femme:[42] cette remarque se retrouve mot pour mot – la chose ne semble pas encore avoir été relevée – dans les Talmuds de Babylone[43] et de Jérusalem,[44] ce qui suppose évidemment une même tradition.

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[39] A. Marmorstein, Unity (cité ci-dessus, n. 20), 96–97. Sur les diverses opinions quant au jour où les anges furent créés, cfr L. Ginzberg, *Legends* (cité n. 38), I, 16–18 et V, 20–26 n. 59–71 et J. Bowker (cité n. 11), 108.

[40] Dieu brise leur volonté (R. Simon b. Pazzi, dans *BR*, VIII, 5, H. Freedman, I, p. 58) ou les place devant le fait accompli: «Quelle sera votre aide? L'homme a déjà été fait» (R. Huna, dans *BR*, VIII, 5, *ibid.*).

[41] Mettant en scène des anges indignés contre Dieu et jaloux de l'homme, les docteurs juifs associent *Gn* 1,26 et *Ps.* 8,5: «Qu'est-ce donc le mortel que Tu en prennes souci?»; ainsi R. Huna au nom de R. Aibu, dans *BR*, VIII, 6, H. Freedman, I, p. 58–59; cp. *Nombr. R*, XIX,3, *ibid.*, VI, p. 750; *Lament. R, Proem.*, XXV, *ibid.*, VII, p. 52; *Qo R*, VII, 23, § 1, *ibid.*, VIII, p. 203–204; *Midrash Tehillim* sur *Ps.*, 8,2, trad. W. G. Braude, I, p. 120; *Pesikta Rabbati*, 14, 9, trad. W. G. Braude, I, p. 272. – Sur l'opposition des anges à la création de l'homme, cfr L. Ginzberg, *Legends* (cité ci-dessus, n. 38), V, 69, n. 12. – D'autres soulignent l'ignorance des anges et leur incapacité à distinguer le Créateur et l'homme sorti de ses mains: R. Hoshaya, dans *BR*, VIII, 10, H. Freedman, I, p. 61; cp. *Qo R*, VI, 10, § 1, *ibid.*, VIII, p. 163.

[42] *Autol.* 2,28,10–14.

[43] *Babli, Sanhédrin*, IV, 5, 38 a.

[44] *Talmud de Jérusalem, Sanhédrin*, IV, 9 (11). A. Marmorstein, Unity (cité n. 20)

Ainsi, la polémique commune contre les interprétations polythéistes de *Gn* 1,26, l'exégèse monothéiste qui en découle et l'interprétation du *Faisons* comme un appel de Dieu à sa Sophia, prolongée par Théophile en une dyade Sophia–Logos, constituent autant d'indices qui autorisent à supposer que Théophile se situe ici en dépendance du judaïsme.

Volontairement limitées à quelques lignes des *Livres à Autolycus*, puissent ces remarques contribuer néanmoins à l'élaboration de ce que l'on pourrait appeler l'inventaire des notions et des commentaires que l'évêque d'Antioche puisa dans la tradition juive.

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signale, énoncés par des ***Minim***, des arguments du même genre et leur réfutation (avec référence à *Gn* 1,26), par Gamaliel II (110 ap. J.-C.). Nous avons ici encore la preuve que ces spéculations sur *Gn* 1,26 sont antérieures à Théophile. Cfr A. Marmorstein, Unity, 82–83 et 97–100 et M. Simon, *Verus Israël*, 234.

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LA FIN DES STROMATES ET LES HYPOTYPOSES DE CLÉMENT D'ALEXANDRIE

PAR

PIERRE NAUTIN

1. Les dernières pièces du Laurentianus

Les *Stromates* de Clément nous parviennent, comme on sait, par un seul manuscrit, le *Laurentianus V 3*, du XI^e^ siècle.[1] Il présente les *Stromates* I à VII dans un texte continu, puis on trouve, après le titre « Stromate VIII », Στρωματεὺς ὄγδοος, une série de morceaux disparates que l'on peut grouper en trois grandes sections:[2]

A. Une section de caractère philosophique qui peut se subdiviser ainsi:

a) un commentaire de la parole « Cherchez et vous trouverez » suivi de considérations philosophiques sur la « démonstration » (ἀπόδειξις): VIII, i,1,1 à v, 15,1;

b) une argumentation contre les sceptiques intitulée Πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνείους: v, 15,2 à viii, 24,9;

c) un long morceau qui traite des différentes sortes de causes: ix, 25,1 à 33,9.

B. Les *Excerpta e Theodoto*, dont le vrai titre est: Ἐκ τῶν Θεοδότου καὶ τῆς ἀνατολικῆς καλουμένης διδασκαλίας κατὰ τοὺς Οὐαλεντίνου χρόνους ἐπιτομαί, « Résumés des (enseignements) de Théodote et de la prétendue doctrine orientale à l'époque de Valentin ». La lecture de ce texte laisse voir qu'il est constitué par plusieurs fragments mis bout à bout et que ces fragments ne proviennent pas d'un ouvrage du valentinien Théodote, mais de l'ouvrage de quelqu'un qui exposait la doctrine de Théodote pour la réfuter; en effet, les thèses hérétiques sont souvent

[1] Le *Paris. Suppl. grec 250* du XVI^e^ siècle, qui comprend aussi les *Stromates*, n'est qu'une copie du *Laurentianus*; il en va de même, semble-t-il, de quelques manuscrits qui ne donnent que des extraits des *Stromates*; voir les prolégomènes de l'édition de Stählin, tome I (G.C.S., 12[2]), XXXIX–XLII et XLVII–XLVIII.

[2] Les références seront données d'après la numérotation adoptée par Stählin dans son édition; les *Stromates* I–VI sont au tome II (G.C.S., 15; une nouvelle édition revue par Früchtel et publiée en 1960 porte le n° 52), le *Stromate* VII et les pièces qui suivent sont au tome III (G.C.S. 17; nouvelle édition revue par Früchtel en 1970 sous le n° 17[2]),

exposées dans le style indirect: «Théodote dit», «les Valentiniens disent»;[3] d'autres fois elles sont exposées dans le style direct, mais la présence d'une incise: «dit Théodote», «dit-il», «disent-ils»,[4] ou d'un complément comme «selon Théodote», «comme dit Théodote», «comme ils disent»,[5] rappelle que l'auteur de l'ouvrage n'est pas valentinien lui-même; enfin plusieurs passages donnent des éléments de réfutation.[6]

C. Les *Eclogae propheticae*, intitulées Ἐκ τῶν προφητικῶν ἐκλογαί. Comme l'indique le mot ἐκλογαί, il s'agit encore «d'extraits», de «morceaux choisis». Ils sont tirés d'un ouvrage qui commentait l'Écriture ou tout au moins des passages de l'Écriture. Tout le début tourne autour des deux premiers versets de la *Genèse*, à propos desquels sont encore cités d'autres textes, notamment quelques versets de *Daniel* et d'*Osée* (ce qui explique le mot προφητικῶν dans le titre); les derniers fragments commentent des versets du *Psaume* 18.

Il n'y a pas à douter que tous ces fragments appartiennent à Clément, car on a découvert pour chaque section des passages parallèles dans le reste de son œuvre.

Les trois sections ont donc ceci de commun qu'elles sont formées de morceaux juxtaposés. Comment s'explique ce morcellement? La méthode la plus sûre pour le savoir n'est pas de laisser libre cours à l'imagination, mais de chercher s'il existe d'autres textes qui nous arrivent dans le même état et dont l'origine ne fait pas de doute. Or il en existe au moins un, découvert en 1946 dans les papyrus de Toura. C'est une collection d'extraits du *Contre Celse* d'Origène, de son *Commentaire de l'Epître aux*

[3] *Exc.* 2,1 Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου ... φασί; 6,1 οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου οὕτως ἐκδέχονται; 7,5 λέγουσι; 16,1 ἡ περιστερὰ ... ἣν οἱ μὲν τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμά φασιν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου τὸν διάκονον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἐνθυμήσεως; 21,1 φασὶν οἱ Οὐαλεντινιανοὶ ... λέγεσθαι; 22,5 λέγουσιν; 23,1 Τὸν παράκλητον οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου τὸν Ἰησοῦν λέγουσιν; 24,1 λέγουσιν οἱ Οὐαλεντινιανοὶ ὅτι ...; 25,2 ὡρίσαντο οἱ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου ...; 28,1 φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ Βασιλείδου ..., οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Οὐαλεντίνου; 32,1 ὅθεν ὁ Θεόδοτος τὸν Χριστὸν ... εἰκόνα τοῦ πληρώματος ἐκάλεσεν ...; 43,1 λέγουσιν οὖν ὅτι ...; 81,1 φασὶν ἅπτεσθαι ...

[4] φησὶν ὁ Θεόδοτος 30,1; φησίν 1,1; 2,1; 22,4; 25,2; 38,2; 41,1; 67,1; φασίν 22,4; 29,1; 32,1; 33,3; 35,4; 36,1; 41,2; 75,1; 78,1; 79.

[5] κατὰ τοὺς Οὐαλεντινιανούς 17,1 et 37; κατὰ Θεόδοτον 35,1; ὥς φησιν ὁ Θεόδοτος 12,7 et 26,1; ὥς φασιν 31,2; 33,4.

[6] Certains de ces passages sont signalés par l'emploi de la première personne ou par des reproches adressés aux hérétiques (1,3 φαμέν; 8,1 ἡμεῖς δὲ ... φαμέν; 17,3 ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ; 20 οὕτως ἐξακούομεν; 24,2 ἀγνοοῦσι δέ; 30,1 ἐκλαθόμενοι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ; 32 παράκουσμα τοῦ ἡμετέρου); d'autres se laissent reconnaître à leur contenu; voir l'introduction de F. Sagnard, *Clément d'Alexandrie, Extraits de Théodote*, Sources Chrét., 23 (Paris 1948) 8–9.

Romains et de son *Homélie sur la pythonisse d'Endor*. M. Scherer a prouvé que ce n'est pas la copie d'une collection faite antérieurement, mais que les extraits ont été faits par le copiste même qui a écrit le papyrus. Comme nous possédons d'autre part le texte continu de ces œuvres d'Origène, nous pouvons voir comment le copiste a procédé: les extraits, note M. Scherer, «sont de longueur très variable: un mot, quelques lignes ou plusieurs pages. Ils sont de plus en plus courts et précipités à mesure qu'on avance vers la fin du livre»; «ils prennent parfois l'allure de simples notes de lecture»; d'autres fois, pour abréger, le copiste remanie un peu la phrase.[7] Il en résulte un texte qui donne exactement la même impression de notes condensées et discontinues que les sections finales du *Laurentianus*. Il ne paraît pas douteux que l'état où nous trouvons ces dernières est pareillement le fait d'un copiste qui, voyant qu'il n'aurait pas assez de papyrus, de parchemin ou de temps pour transcrire le texte intégral de Clément, n'en a donné, comme il le dit dans les titres, que des «résumés» (ἐπιτομαί), des «extraits» (ἐκλογαί). Il est d'ailleurs significatif que ces extraits arrivent justement à la fin du manuscrit, là où un copiste pouvait se trouver dans la nécessité d'abréger.

Telle est l'explication la plus naturelle, si l'on se réfère à ce qui s'est passé pour les autres textes qui présentent le même caractère. Cependant c'est un explication différente qui est aujourd'hui communément admise. On suppose que nous n'avons pas là des extraits d'une ou de plusieurs œuvres de Clément faits par un copiste, mais des notes prises par Clément lui-même sous cette forme. Cette explication est présentée de deux façons: pour les uns, ce sont des matériaux qu'il a réunis en vue de travaux ultérieurs; pour les autres ce sont des notes de cours qu'il avait prises autrefois, quand il était le disciple de Pantène, et dont il s'est déjà servi pour écrire les *Stromates* I–VII. Examinons les arguments des uns et des autres.

2. S'AGIT-IL DE MATÉRIAUX POUR DES OUVRAGES ULTÉRIEURS?

La première explication a été lancée par un élève de Hermann Usener, Paulus Ruben, dans une thèse sur les *Excerpta e Theodoto* soutenue à Bonn et publiée à Leipzig en 1892;[8] elle a été reprise par Ioannes von

[7] J. Scherer, *Extraits des livres I et II du Contre Celse d'Origène d'après le papyrus n° 88747 du Musée du Caire*, Inst. fr. d'Archéol. Orient., Bibliothèque d'étude, XXVIII (Le Caire 1956) 26–29.

[8] P. Ruben, *Clementis Alexandrini excerpta ex Theodoto*, Diss. Bonn 1892 (Leipzig 1892) 32 pages.

Arnim dans une conférence donnée à l'Université de Rostock en 1894,[9] et le patronage de von Arnim entraîna l'adhésion de de Faye[9bis] et de Harnack dans la deuxième partie de sa *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur* (1904).[10]

Ruben, qui étudiait spécialement les *Excerpta*, fondait son opinion à la fois sur leur titre et sur leur texte: il faisait remarquer d'une part que le titre n'indique pas que ces extraits soient pris à une œuvre de Clément; d'autre part, il était porté à réduire au maximum la part de la réfutation dans les *Excerpta*, au point que ceux-ci lui paraissaient consacrés entièrement ou presque à l'exposé de l'hérésie.[11] Or il est invraisemblable, ajoutait von Arnim en explicitant ce qui était sous-jacent dans la pensée de Ruben, qu'un copiste résumant Clément n'ait pris que des passages hérétiques.[12] Ruben et von Arnim estimaient donc que nous n'avions pas à faire à des extraits d'un ouvrage de Clément, mais à des notes prises par Clément lui-même en vue des ouvrages qu'il projetait d'écrire; la mort aurait surpris Clément avant la rédaction de ces ouvrages et ses amis auraient publié ses notes.[13]

Pour apprécier cette thèse, il importe d'abord de dissiper une illusion. Il est exact qu'aujourd'hui on s'intéresse au moindre papier laissé par un écrivain ou un personnage célèbre, et qu'on publie volontiers ces témoins de sa vie intime ou de son mode de création littéraire. Mais l'antiquité n'avait pas encore le goût du document personnel quand celui-ci n'avait pas aussi un intérêt artistique. Les correspondances qui ont été publiées l'ont été pour leur valeur littéraire ou pour des raisons politiques, et le plus souvent par l'écrivain lui-même; mais on n'a pas d'exemple que les papiers d'un écrivain aient été publiés lorsqu'ils restaient à l'état de brouillon ou de notes personnelles. La réaction spontanée de ses amis était au contraire de faire disparaître tous les écrits qui n'avaient pas

[9] I. von Arnim, *De octavo Clementis Stromataeorum libro* (Diss. Rostock 1894) 16 pages.

[9bis] E. de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie. Études sur les rapports du christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe siècle* (Paris 1898) 312.

[10] A. von Harnack, *Gesch. d. altchrist. Lit.*, 2. Theil, *Die Chronologie*, 2. Bd. (Leipzig 1904) 18. Dans la première partie du même ouvrage, *Die Überlieferung und der Bestand* (Leipzig 1893) 315, Erwin Preuschen, qui a rédigé le chapitre sur Clément, admettait la thèse exposée par Th. Zahn dans ses *Forschungen zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons*, III. Theil, *Supplementum Clementinum* (Erlangen 1884) 104–130, selon laquelle les trois sections étaient des extraits du *Stromate* VIII.

[11] Ruben, *op. cit.*, XV–XVI.

[12] Arnim, *op. cit.*, 4.

[13] Arnim, *op. cit.*, 9.

reçu leur forme définitive et qui risquaient par là d'entacher la réputation du défunt. Il nous faudrait des raisons impérieuses pour croire que les papiers laissés par Clément ont bénéficié d'une exception. Avons-nous de telles raisons?

L'argument principal est celui que von Arnim exprimait sous cette forme: «Il n'est pas vraisemblable qu'un copiste résumant Clément n'ait pris que des passages hérétiques en laissant de côté les objections de Clément contre chacun d'eux.»[14] Cet argument n'est pas justifié pour deux raisons: (1) il n'est pas vrai que l'excerpteur n'ait retenu que des thèses hérétiques; la part de la réfutation est plus grande que ne le pensaient Ruben et von Arnim;[15] (2) et quand bien même les *Excerpta* ne contiendraient qu'un exposé de l'hérésie, il ne serait nullement invraisemblable de les attribuer à un copiste, car un copiste a pu s'intéresser spécialement à la documentation concernant les hérétiques. Il est même des hérésiologues de profession qui n'ont pas fait autre chose. Ainsi Josipe, dans son *Elenchos contre toutes les hérésies*, utilise l'*Adversus haereses* d'Irénée où il trouvait à la fois l'exposé et la réfutation des hérésies, et il n'en retient que les thèses hérétiques sans leur réfutation. De même, après qu'Hippolyte eut écrit son *Syntagma contre toutes les hérésies* dont chaque notice comprenait l'exposé d'une hérésie puis sa réfutation, il s'est trouvé deux abréviateurs, le Pseudo-Tertullien et Philastre de Brescia, pour ne retenir de cet ouvrage que l'exposé des hérésies.[16] Il n'est donc nullement invraisemblable qu'un copiste qui ne pouvait transcrire l'ouvrage intégral de Clément se soit intéressé tout particulièrement à l'exposé des doctrines de Théodote qui se trouvait dans cet ouvrage et qui n'avait son équivalent nulle part ailleurs.

Quant au titre, s'il est vrai qu'il ne dit pas que les *Excerpta* sont pris à un ouvrage de Clément, il ne dit pas non plus qu'ils sont pris à un ouvrage de Théodote. En fait il n'indique que leur contenu: ce sont des

[14] Arnim, *op. cit.*, 4: «Accedit quod probabile non est Clementis epitomatorem haeretica tantum excerpsisse, praeteriisse quae contra singula capita disputaverat Clemens.» C'est l'argument qui a convaincu Harnack, *Die Chronologie*, II, 18: «Wer hatte in der Folgezeit ein Interesse daran, nur das Heidnische und Häretische zu excerpieren, die Widerlegungen aber beiseite zu lassen?»

[15] C'est ce qui résulte de l'étude plus approfondie des *Excerpta* qu'ont faite depuis lors O. Dibelius, Studien zur Geschichte der Valentinianer, *Zeitschrift f. Neutestamentl. Wiss.* 9 (1908) 230–247, 329–340; R. P. Casey, *The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria* (Londres 1934), et F. Sagnard, *op. cit.*

[16] Voir mon *Hippolyte contre les hérésies (fragment). Etude et édition critique* (Paris 1949) 66–68.

«résumés des (enseignements) de Théodote et de la prétendue doctrine orientale à l'époque de Valentin».[17]

Nous n'avons donc pas les arguments décisifs que nous étions en droit d'attendre pour une thèse aussi étonnante. Puisqu'on nous parle de vraisemblance, il est certainement beaucoup plus vraisemblable d'admettre, d'après l'exemple du papyrus de Toura, que ces extraits ont été pris par un copiste dans l'œuvre de Clément que de supposer que les amis de Clément auraient accepté de publier ses brouillons.

3. S'AGIT-IL DE NOTES DE COURS?

L'explication qui suppose des notes de cours remonte à une thèse soutenue à Göttingen en 1910 par Wilhelm Ernst;[18] elle fut ensuite adoptée par P. Collomp et surtout par Wilhelm Bousset dans son ouvrage *Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* publié en 1915.

Ernst étudiait la section de caractère philosophique qui précède les *Excerpta e Theodoto* (*Str.* VIII, i, 1,1 à ix, 33,9). Il observa que plusieurs raisonnements contenus dans ces pages se retrouvent dans des *Stromates* antérieurs, mais il lui parut que leur forme originale était celle qu'ils ont au *Str.* VIII. Il admit donc que *Str.* VIII avait servi de source aux *Stromates* I–VII et il crut trouver dans un passage de *Str.* I la preuve que cette source (*Str.* VIII) était faite de notes prises jadis par Clément au temps où il était l'élève du didascalée d'Alexandrie.

La question est donc de savoir s'il est exact que dans les cas de parallélisme entre *Str.* VIII et *Str.* I–VII, nous devons considérer *Str.* VIII comme antérieur. Prenons le premier exemple qu'Ernst nous propose. Il s'agit du début du *Str.* VIII:

...[19] Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἱ παλαίτατοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν ἐφέροντο, ἢ πού γ' ἂν ἡμεῖς οἱ τῆς ὄντως ἀληθοῦς ἀντεχόμενοι φιλοσοφίας, οἷς ἄντικρυς ἡ γραφὴ εὑρέσεως χάριν ἐπὶ τὸ διερευνᾶσθαι τὸ ζητεῖν παρεγγυᾷ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεώτεροι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας κενῆς τε καὶ ἀτελοῦς ἐλεγκτικῶς

[17] ἐκ τῶν Θεοδότου καὶ τῆς ἀνατολικῆς καλουμένης διδασκαλίας ... ἐπιτομαί. Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 53, traduit à tort: «Extraits des *œuvres* de Théodote et de l'*école* dite orientale»; διδασκαλία, dans la deuxième partie du titre, signifie «*enseignement*», «*doctrine*», et non «*école*» (διδασκαλεῖον), et montre que le neutre τὰ Θεοδότου, «les choses de Théodote», dans le premier membre, doit s'entendre de son enseignement et non de ses œuvres,

[18] W. Ernst, *De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum libro VIII. qui fertur* (Göttingen 1910) 60 pages.

[19] De l'avis à peu près unanime, il nous manque le vrai début du *Stromate* VIII.

ἅμα καὶ ἐριστικῶς εἰς τὴν ἄχρηστον ἐξάγονται φλυαρίαν, ἔμπαλιν δὲ ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία τὴν πᾶσαν ἔριν ἐκβάλλουσα «ζητεῖτε» εἶπεν «καὶ εὑρήσετε, κρούετε καὶ ἀνοιγήσεται, αἰτεῖσθε καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν». Κρούει μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ζήτησιν ὁ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν λόγος τὴν θύραν τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον, διοιχθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἐμποδὼν κατὰ τὴν ἔρευναν ἐπιστημονικὴ ἐγγίνεται θεωρία. Τοῖς οὕτως, οἶμαι, κρούουσιν ἀνοίγνυται τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ τοῖς οὕτως αἰτοῦσιν τὰς πεύσεις κατὰ τὰς γραφὰς ἐφ' ὃ βαίνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται ἡ δόσις τῆς θεοδωρήτου γνώσεως καταληπτικῶς διὰ τῆς λογικῆς ὄντως ἐκλαμπούσης ζητήσεως. Οὐ γὰρ εὑρεῖν μὲν οἷόν τε, μὴ ζητῆσαι δέ· οὐδὲ ζητῆσαι μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ ἐρευνήσασθαι· οὐδὲ διερευνήσασθαι μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ διαπτύξαι καὶ ἀναπετάσαι δι' ἐρωτήσεως εἰς σαφήνειαν ἄγοντα τὸ ζητούμενον, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ πάσης ἐξετάσεως χωρήσαντα μὴ οὐχὶ λοιπὸν τὸ ἔπαθλον λαβεῖν, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ζητουμένου. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν εὑρεῖν τὸν ζητήσαντα, ζητῆσει δέ, εἰ οἰηθείη πρότερον μὴ εἰδέναι. Πόθῳ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἀγόμενος πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν τοῦ καλοῦ εὐγνωμόνως ζητεῖ, ἀφιλονικῶς, ἀφιλοδόξως ἐρωτώμενος καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, πρὸς δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπισκεπτόμενος τὰ λεγόμενα.

Les anciens philosophes n'étaient pas portés à douter et à faire des objections, et comment y serions-nous portés, nous qui adhérons à la philosophie réellement vraie et à qui l'Écriture recommande, pour nous amener à scruter, de «chercher» en vue de la découverte? Les philosophes grecs les plus récents, poussés par une ambition vaine et effrénée, sont entraînés à un bavardage inutile sous forme de réfutations et de contestations; la philosophie barbare, au contraire, rejetant toute contestation a dit: «*Cherchez et vous trouverez, frappez et il vous sera ouvert, demandez et il vous sera donné.*» Le raisonnement par question et réponse «frappe» donc dans la recherche à la porte de la vérité selon les apparences, puis une fois l'obstacle «ouvert» dans l'investigation, se produit la contemplation scientifique. C'est, je pense, à ceux qui «frappent» de cette manière, que l'objet de la recherche est «ouvert», et à ceux qui «demandent» de cette manière en interrogeant les Écritures sur la voie à suivre, que vient de Dieu le don divin de la Connaissance qui fait comprendre les choses par le moyen d'une recherche conforme à la Raison[20] et vraiment éclairante. Il n'est pas possible en effet de trouver et de ne pas chercher, ni de chercher et de ne pas scruter, ni de scruter et de ne pas décortiquer et dénuder par des questions l'objet de la recherche en l'amenant à la clarté, et il n'est certes pas possible, si l'on a saisi l'objet par un inventaire complet, de ne pas recevoir enfin la récompense qu'est la science de l'objet cherché. En revanche, il est possible de trouver si l'on cherche, et de chercher si l'on a pensé d'abord qu'on ne savait pas; à partir de là, conduit par le désir de trouver le bien, on cherche avec générosité en questionnant et en répondant sans désir de vaincre et sans vanité, mais en examinant pour elles-mêmes les paroles échangées.

[20] «Par une recherche λογικῆς», dans le sens plénier que cet adjectif a toujours chez Clément: conforme au λόγος humain et au λόγος divin, «rationnelle» et «spirituelle».

Ernst (p. 9–10) note que plusieurs expressions de ce passage se retrouvent au *Stromate* V:

V, i, 11,4

Mais il faut tendre la perspicacité de l'âme vers la découverte (πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν), supprimer les obstacles (τὰ ἐμπόδων διακαθαίρειν), extirper complètement le désir de vaincre, la jalousie et la contestation (τὴν ἔριν).

VIII, i, 1,1

L'Ecriture recommande, pour nous amener à scruter, de «chercher» en vue de la découverte (εὑρέσεως χάριν) ... 1,2 La philosophie barbare ... rejetant toute la contestation (τὴν πᾶσαν ἔριν) a dit: «Cherchez et vous trouverez»... 1,3 Une fois l'obstacle «ouvert» (διοιχθέντος δὲ τοῦ ἐμπόδων) dans l'investigation, se produit la contemplation scientifique.

V, i, 12,2

Ceux qui recherchent selon la vraie recherche ... seront remplis du don qui vient de Dieu, c'est-à-dire de la Connaissance (τῆς δόσεως τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τουτέστι τῆς γνώσεως).

VIII, i, 2,1

C'est, je pense, à ceux qui «frappent» de cette manière, que l'objet de la recherche est «ouvert», et à ceux qui «demandent» de cette manière en interrogeant les Ecritures sur la voie à suivre, que vient de Dieu le don divin de la Connaissance (ἡ δόσις τῆς θεοδωρήτου γνώσεως).

V, iii, 17,1

Qui a ignoré a «cherché», et ayant «cherché» il «trouve» le Maître, et l'ayant «trouvé» il a cru, et ayant cru il a espéré, et ayant aimé, il s'assimile par là même à l'être aimé en s'empressant d'être ce qu'il est arrivé à aimer. C'est une telle méthode que Socrate suggère à Alcibiade qui lui posait ces questions: «Ne penses-tu pas que je puisse savoir autrement quelque chose de la justice? – Oui, si tu trouves. – Mais ne crois-tu pas que je trouverai? – Certainement si tu cherches. – Alors ne penses-tu pas que je vais chercher? – Assurément si tu penses que tu ne sais pas (εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι)» (Platon, *Alcib.* I 109e).

VIII, i, 2,2

Il n'est pas possible de «trouver» et de ne pas «chercher», ni de «chercher» et de ne pas scruter, ni de scruter et de ne pas décortiquer et dénuder par des questions l'objet de la recherche en l'amenant à la clarté, et il n'est certes pas possible, si l'on a saisi l'objet par un inventaire complet, de ne pas recevoir enfin la récompense qu'est la science de l'objet cherché. En revanche, il est possible de trouver si l'on cherche et de chercher si l'on a pensé d'abord que l'on ne savait pas (εἰ οἰηθείη πρότερον μὴ εἰδέναι).

Ernst estime que ce dernier rapprochement est «d'une importance majeure», et c'est là qu'il trouve une première preuve que *Str.* VIII est antérieur à *Str.* V, car, dit-il, dans *Str.* VIII «la suite des mots est méthodique et conforme à un certain raisonnement dialectique, alors que dans *Str.* V la phrase présente une certaine couleur chrétienne qui manque ici. Lequel des deux textes est le modèle et lequel une imitation? La chose ne peut faire de doute: il est clair que Clément a transporté

cette phrase de *Str.* VIII à *Str.* V et l'a transformée en un raisonnement chrétien ».[21]

Une telle appréciation étonne. On pourrait d'abord opposer à Ernst que le passage du I^er^ *Alcibiade* est cité intégralement au *Str.* V et n'est rappelé que par allusion au *Str.* VIII, ce qui paraît bien montrer que *Str.* V est antérieur à *Str.* VIII. Mais surtout Ernst n'a pas analysé de près tout ce début de *Str.* VIII. Il aurait vu qu'il n'a pas toute la cohérence supposée et qu'il n'a pas moins de « couleur chrétienne » que *Str.* V. Qu'on relise le texte reproduit plus haut. Deux thèmes s'y entremêlent: un commentaire de la parole évangélique « Cherchez et vous trouverez » et des considerations sur les avantages du « raisonnement par questions et réponses » (l. 11 ὁ πρὸς ἐρώτησιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν λόγος – l. 27 ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος). Cette dualité vient de ce que Clément se sert, pour commenter la parole de l'Évangile, de réminiscences d'une source philosophique qui traitait de ce mode de raisonnement. On sait par exemple que Chrysippe avait écrit plusieurs traités sur ce sujet,[22] et Clément était grand lecteur de Chrysippe.[23] L'existence d'une source est en tout cas certaine, car l'adaptation se remarque en plusieurs endroits où elle n'est pas heureuse. Prenons cette phrase: « Une fois l'obstacle ‹ ouvert › dans l'investigation, se produit la contemplation scientifique »: l'expression « l'obstacle *ouvert* » (l. 12 διοιχθέντος τοῦ ἐμποδών) est insolite; cette bizzarerie est visiblement due à ce que Clément a voulu insérer de force le mot ‹ ouvrir › à cause du texte qu'il commentait: « Frappez et il vous sera ouvert. » Il est probable que l'expression employée par la source était plutôt τὰ ἐμποδὼν διακαθαίρειν, « *supprimer* l'obstacle », que Clément a retenue en *Str.* V, i, 11,4, et encore en VII, xv, 89,1 (διακαθάραντας τὰ ἐμποδών). Contrairement à ce que dit Ernst, ce n'est donc pas *Str.* VIII qui conserve ici l'expression originale, mais plus vraisemblablement *Str.* V et *Str.* VII.[24]

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[21] Ernst, *op. cit.*, 10: « Nam in libro VIII. continuatio verborum methodica et rationi dialecticae congrua est, cum in libro V. sententia colorem quendam christianum praebeat, quo ibi caret. Iam utrum exemplar fuerit, utrum imitatione effictum sit, dubium esse non potest. Clementem hanc sententiam e libro VIII. in libro V. transtulisse et in rationem christianam transformasse apparet. »

[22] Diogène Laërce, *Vit. philos.* 8, 7,13: περὶ ἐρωτήσεως β′, περὶ πεύσεως δ′, ἐπιτομὴ περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ πεύσεως α′, περὶ ἀποκρίσεως δ′, ἐπιτομὴ περὶ ἀποκρίσεως α′.

[23] Chrysippe est le philosophe que Clément cite le plus souvent, voir l'index de d'édition de Stählin (G.C.S. 39).

[24] Une autre bizzarerie est de dire que « le raisonnement par questions et réponses ‹ frappe › à la porte de la vérité selon les apparences »; Clément a voulu introduire le verbe « frapper » à cause du texte évangélique. Si une phrase analogue figurait dans

Prenons encore la phrase même sur laquelle Ernst s'appuyait: « Il n'est pas possible de ‹ trouver › et de ne pas ‹ chercher ›, ni de ‹ chercher › et de ne pas scruter, ni de scruter et de ne pas décortiquer et dénuder par des questions l'objet de la recherche en l'amenant à la clarté, et il n'est certes pas possible, si l'on a saisi l'objet par un inventaire complet, de ne pas recevoir enfin la récompense qu'est la science de l'objet cherché. » Elle n'est pas cohérente: La première proposition « il n'est pas possible de *trouver* et de ne pas *chercher* » esquisse un raisonnement qui remonte de la fin (*trouver*) au début (*chercher*), alors que les propositions suivantes nous conduisent du début (*chercher*) à la fin (*connaître*); en outre la proposition « il n'est pas possible de chercher et de ne pas scruter », οὐδὲ ζητῆσαι μέν, οὐχὶ δὲ ἐρευνήσασθαι, est une tautologie, les deux verbes ζητεῖν et ἐρευνᾶσθαι étant pratiquement synonymes. Mais supprimons ici encore les mots qui ont été suggérés par l'évangile (ζητεῖν et εὑρίσκειν), et la phrase se réduira à ceci: « Il n'est pas possible de scruter et de ne pas décortiquer et dénuder par des questions (δι' ἐρωτήσεως) l'objet de la recherche en l'amenant à la clarté, » affirmation maintenant cohérente et qui convenait bien à une source qui voulait montrer comment on est amené spontanément à employer le raisonnement par questions (ἐρώτησις) et réponses.

Tout se passe donc comme si Clément avait utilisé au *Str.* V et au *Str.* VIII des réminiscences d'une source philosophique en les adaptant chaque fois au sujet, en sorte que les expressions les plus fidèles à la source se trouvent tantôt au *Str.* V et tantôt au *Str.* VIII.

Les autres textes invoqués par Ernst ne sont pas plus probants. Ce chercheur n'était donc nullement fondé à prétendre que *Str.* VIII était antérieur à *Str.* I–VII, et il se trompait quand il croyait avoir trouvé dans une autre phrase de *Str.* I (i, 11,1) la preuve que Clément avait utilisé des notes de cours:

Ἤδη δὲ οὐ γραφὴ εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τετεχνασμένη ἥδε ἡ πραγματεία, ἀλλά μοι ὑπομνήματα εἰς γῆρας θησαυρίζεται, λήθης φάρμακον, εἴδωλον ἀτεχνῶς καὶ σκιογραφία τῶν ἐναργῶν καὶ ἐμψύχων ἐκείνων, ὧν κατηξιώθην ἐπακοῦσαι, λόγων τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν μακαρίων καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀξιολόγων.

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sa source, il est probable qu'elle disait simplement: « le raisonnement par questions et réponses scrute (ἐρευνᾶται) la vérité selon les apparences », pour signifier que dans une discussion on part des apparences, on pose des questions à leur sujet, et la vérité se dégage peu à peu.

> Cet ouvrage n'est pas un écrit composé dans les règles de l'art pour l'ostentation. Ce sont des notes, un trésor pour ma vieillesse, un remède contre l'oubli, reflet sans artifice et simple esquisse des paroles éclatantes et vivantes que j'ai été jugé digne d'entendre de la bouche d'hommes bienheureux et vraiment éminents.

Ernst (p. 56) comprend ὑπομνήματα (l. 2) comme désignant les «commentaires» faits par les maîtres de Clément. Il n'a pas vu que ce membre de phrase s'inspire de Platon, *Phèdre* 276a ὑπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος εἰς τὸ λήθης γῆρας, 274e μνήμην καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον,[25] et que dans la phrase de Clément ὑπομνήματα désigne en réalité l'ouvrage même que Clément est en train d'écrire.[26]

Trois ans plus tard, en 1913, dans un article de la *Revue de philologie*, P. Collomp relevait entre *Str.* VIII et *Str.* VII d'autres rapprochements qui lui faisaient penser à l'utilisation de part et d'autre d'une même source qui avait des affinités avec les Homélies pseudo-clémentines.[27] Mais Collomp n'a pas fait la preuve que cette source était mieux conservée en *Str.* VIII qu'en *Str.* VII. Au contraire, il reconnaissait expressément que c'est en *Str.* VII que se trouve le développement «le plus complet et le plus un» (p. 31).

Bousset, prenant la suite de Collomp, commença par étendre considérablement le domaine de la source à laquelle songeait ce dernier: il lui attribuait la plus grande partie des *Excerpta*, des *Eclogae* et encore des *Hypotyposes*; puis il précisait à l'aide de trois passages des *Eclogae* et du *Str.* I que cette source consistait en notes prises par Clément à l'époque où il fréquentait Pantène.[28]

Ce n'est pas le lieu de discuter la méthode employée par Bousset pour déterminer l'étendue de la source supposée. J. Munk en a déjà fait une critique pertinente.[29] Il nous suffira d'examiner les passages sur lesquels Bousset s'appuie pour attribuer à Clément l'utilisation de notes de cours prises à l'école de Pantène.

Dans *Eclogae* 56,2, à propos de *Ps.* 18,6 «Et dans le soleil il plaçait (ἔθετο) sa demeure (σκήνωμα)», on lit:

Ἔνιοι μὲν οὖν φασι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κυρίου ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ αὐτὸν ἀποτίθεσθαι, ὡς Ἑρμογένης, σῶμα δὲ λέγουσιν οἱ μὲν τὸ σκῆνος αὐτοῦ,

[25] Cf. W. Bousset, *Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom* (Göttingen 1915) 199–200.

[26] J. Munck, *Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria* (Stuttgart 1933) 179.

[27] P. Collomp, Une source de Clément d'Alexandrie et des Homélies Pseudo-Clémentines, *Rev. de philologie, de litt. et d'hist. anc.* 37 (1913) 19–46.

[28] Bousset, *op. cit.*, 155–271.

[29] C'est l'objet de l'ouvrage signalé à la précédente note 21.

οἱ δὲ τὴν τῶν πιστῶν ἐκκλησίαν, ὁ Πάνταινος δὲ[30] ἡμῶν ἔλεγεν ἀορίστως τὴν προφητείαν ἐκφέρειν τὰς λέξεις ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον καὶ τῷ ἐνεστῶτι ἀντὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος χρῆσθαι χρόνῳ καὶ πάλιν τῷ ἐνεστῶτι ἀντὶ τοῦ παρῳχηκότος, ὃ καὶ νῦν φαίνεται· τὸ γὰρ «ἔθετο» καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρῳχηκότος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου τάσσεται.

Certains disent comme Hermogène que le Seigneur a déposé son corps dans le soleil. Et ils entendent par corps, les uns son corps de chair, les autres l'Église des croyants. Mais notre Pantène disait que la prophétie s'exprime indistinctement en employant la plupart du temps le présent au lieu du futur ou d'autres fois le présent au lieu du passé, et c'est ce qui semble se réaliser aussi dans le cas présent, car le verbe «plaçait» s'applique à la fois au passé et à l'avenir ...

Comme Collomp attribuait ce passage à la source en question, Bousset voyait dans la mention de Pantène une preuve que cette source dérivait de l'enseignement de Pantène.[31] Mais Munck a répondu très justement que ce morceau n'attribue à Pantène qu'un principe général d'exégèse, à savoir que l'Écriture emploie le présent tantôt pour le passé, tantôt pour l'avenir; le texte distingue entre ce principe affirmé autrefois par Pantène (ἔλεγεν à l'imparfait) et l'application qui en est faite maintenant au verset commenté (ὃ καὶ νῦν φαίνεται au présent); on ne peut donc pas affirmer que le commentaire du verset soit l'œuvre de Pantène.[32] Observons au surplus que rien dans ce passage ne suggère l'utilisation de notes de cours; Clément se borne à rapporter un souvenir qu'il a conservé de son maître.

Sur le point précis de l'utilisation de notes de cours, Bousset recourt à deux passages du *Str.* I.

D'abord *Str.* I, i, 12,1:

Καὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀγαλλιάσονται, οὐχὶ τῇ ἐκφράσει ἡσθέντες λέγω τῇδε, μόνῃ δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὑποσημείωσιν τηρήσει. Ποθούσης γὰρ οἶμαι ψυχῆς τὴν μακαρίαν παράδοσιν ἀδιάδραστον φυλάττειν ἡ τοιάδε ὑποτύπωσις ...

Je sais bien qu'ils (*sc.* les maîtres dont Clément vient d'évoquer le souvenir) se réjouiront, non pas certes d'une joie esthétique devant mon style, mais de voir la fidélité de ces notes, car c'est le fait, je crois, d'une âme qui désire garder la bienheureuse tradition sans en rien laisser perdre que de rédiger semblable esquisse.

[30] Il n'y a pas à supposer l'omission accidentelle d'un substantif tel que διδάσκαλος devant ἡμῶν comme le fait Stählin sur le conseil de Wilamowitz-Mohlendorf. Cf. Tertullien, *Adv. Valent.* 4: *Proculus noster*; *De an.* 20,1: *Seneca saepe noster*; Jérôme, *Ep.* 36,16: *Victorinus noster.*

[31] Bousset, *op. cit.*, 190–192.

[32] Munck, *op. cit.*, 182–183. On remarquera aussi le καί devant νῦν, qui marque bien qu'il s'agit d'une addition faite actuellement à ce que disait autrefois Pantène.

Bousset (p. 200) fait remarquer que le mot ὑποσημείωσις est le terme technique pour désigner des notes prises sous la dictée de quelqu'un. Répondons que c'est en effet le sens premier du mot, mais que ce n'est pas le seul. ὑποσημείωσις peut signifier dans un sens large toutes sortes de notes,[33] et c'est le cas ici; d'après tout le contexte Clément ne veut pas dire qu'il se sert de notes prises autrefois, mais qu'il les rédige actuellement d'après ses souvenirs.

Mais c'est surtout en *Str.* I, i, 14,2–3 que Bousset croit lire l'aveu que Clément avait conservé des notes de cours; je cite le texte en le prenant un peu plus haut que Bousset pour qu'on ait le contexte antérieur:

Ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ οὐχ ὥστε ἑρμηνεῦσαι τὰ ἀπόρρητα ἱκανῶς, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, μόνον δὲ τὸ ὑπομνῆσαι, εἴτε ὁπότε ἐκλαθοίμεθα εἴτε ὅπως μηδ' ἐκλανθανώμεθα. Πολλὰ δὲ εὖ οἶδα παρερρύηκεν ἡμᾶς χρόνου μήκει ἀγράφως διαπεσόντα. Ὅθεν τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῆς μνήμης τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπικουφίζων, κεφαλαίων συστηματικὴν ἔκθεσιν μνήμης ὑπόμνημα σωτήριον πορίζων ἐμαυτῷ, ἀναγκαίως κέχρημαι τῇδε τῇ ὑποτυπώσει. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τινα μηδὲ ἀπομνημονευθέντα ἡμῖν (πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς μακαρίοις δύναμις ἦν ἀνδράσιν), ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἃ ἀνυποσημείωτα μεμενηκότα τῷ χρόνῳ νῦν ἀπέδρα, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἐσβέννυτο ἐν αὐτῇ μαραινόμενα τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἐπεὶ μὴ ῥᾴδιος ἡ τοιάδε διακονία τοῖς μὴ δεδοκιμασμένοις, ταῦτα δὲ ἀναζωπυρῶν ...

> Cet écrit ne promet pas d'expliquer complètement les choses indicibles, tant s'en faut; il veut seulement raviver les souvenirs, soit que nous les ayons oubliés, soit pour éviter que nous les oubliions. Bien des choses, je ne le sais que trop, nous ont échappé à la longue pour n'avoir pas été écrites. Aussi, pour soulager la faiblesse de ma mémoire, voulant me faire un exposé systématique de l'essentiel de mes souvenirs à titre d'aide-mémoire salutaire, j'ai adopté par nécessité le genre de l'esquisse. Il y a certaines choses dont je n'ai même pas gardé le souvenir – car ces hommes bienheureux étaient doués d'une puissance extraordinaire –; il y en a d'autres qui, non notées, sont demeurées pendant un temps et se sont maintenant enfuies; mais celles qui, restées dans mon esprit, étaient en train de s'y flétrir et de s'y éteindre – car ces choses sont d'un entretien difficile pour qui n'est pas passé maître –, je veux les vivifier par ces notes.[34]

Bousset met en relief les mots ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἃ ἀνυποσημείωτα μεμενηκότα τῷ χρόνῳ νῦν ἀπέδρα et raisonne ainsi: «Clément déclare expressément ici qu'il n'a pas noté certaines choses: cela suppose naturellement qu'il en avait noté d'autres quand il suivait les cours.»[35] Ce

[33] Le *Dictionnaire grec-français* de Bailly revu par Séchan et Chantraine donne comme sens: «note prise d'après une lecture ou des souvenirs.»

[34] Traduction Caster (Sources chrét., 30, 53) légèrement modifiée.

[35] Bousset, *op. cit.*, 201: «Hier sagt Clemens doch ausdrücklich, dass er einiges

raisonnement n'est pas juste. Clément dit bien que certaines choses sont sorties de sa mémoire parce qu'elles n'avaient pas été notées, mais il ne prétend pas que les autres l'avaient été davantage. Au contraire, il constate qu'elles sont en train de s'estomper, elles aussi, dans son esprit et c'est pour leur éviter le sort des premières qu'il veut les consigner. A l'inverse de ce que pensait Bousset, cette phrase me paraît la meilleure preuve que Clément n'avait pas gardé de notes de cours et qu'il n'avait jamais rédigé ses souvenirs avant d'écrire les *Stromates*.

Les historiens suivants ont généralement abandonné l'hypothèse de «notes de cours» pour revenir à celle de «notes de lecture» en vue de travaux ultérieurs.[36] Mais ils n'ont produit aucun argument nouveau. Simplement, parce que deux auteurs réputés comme von Arnim et Harnack admettaient que les dernières pièces du *Laurentianus* étaient des «notes de lecture», on a fini par croire que l'explication allait de soi. Mais je crois avoir montré plus haut que les arguments apportés par Ruben et repris par Arnim et Harnack étaient sans valeur, et que non seulement cette hypothèse ne dispose d'aucun argument positif, mais qu'elle tombe dans l'invraisemblance lorsqu'elle suppose que les amis de

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nicht aufgezeichnet habe, und das setzt natürlich voraus, dass er andres beim Lehrvortrag sich aufgezeichnet habe.»

[36] Munck, *op. cit.*, 180: «(Es ist) das Wahrscheinlichste, dass die beiden Stücke (sc. *Excerpta* et *Eclogae*) persönliche Aufzeichnungen des Klemens sind»; R. P. Casey, *op. cit.*, 4: «The material which follows under various titles is all of the nature of a notebook or scrapbook containing in part direct quotations from philosophical and gnostic works, in part Clement's summaries of his readings in them, in part independant attempts at exegesis, criticism or theological construction»; G. Lazzatti, *Introduzione allo studio di Clemente Alessandrino* (Milan 1938) 35: «note e impressioni di letture»; Cl. Mondésert, *Clément d'Alexandrie. Introduction à l'étude de sa pensée religieuse à partir de l'Écriture* (Paris 1944) à propos des *Excerpta*: «notes privées» (253), «simple cahier de notes rédigées *ad usum privatum*, contenant à la fois, et d'ailleurs pêle-mêle, des citations verbales d'œuvres lues ou étudiées, des résumés de doctrines, des allusions, des remarques, des réflexions, des jugements tout à fait personnels» (255); F. Sagnard, *op. cit.*, 7: «notes de carnet.» Quelques auteurs ont essayé un compromis entre les deux thèses. Ainsi Stählin dans une note de sa traduction (Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, 2. Reihe, Bd. 20 [1938] 114, n. 1): «Vorarbeiten des Clemens ..., die zum Teil schon in früheren Schriften benützt sind»; H. Chadwick, *Alexandrian Christianity* (Londres 1954) 17: «notes of a preparatory nature on which Clement draws in the first seven books»; J. Quasten, *Initiation aux Pères de l'Eglise*, II (Paris 1957) 22: «collection d'ébauches et d'études utilisées dans les autres sections de l'ouvrage»; A. Méhat, *Étude sur les Stromates de Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1966) 517: «notes non rédigées, non harmonisées comme dans le reste de l'ouvrage, et où l'on retrouve à l'état brut quelques-uns des matériaux qui sont entrés dans les autres livres», cf. p. 34: «dossiers constitués en vue d'ouvrages futurs.»

Clément, ou Clément lui-même, auraient consenti à publier de simples brouillons. Qu'on nous apporte donc d'autres exemples de cette pratique dans l'antiquité.

En revanche, ce qui est bien attesté à l'époque ancienne, notamment par le papyrus de Toura, c'est que parfois des copistes, renonçant à transcrire intégralement le texte de leur modèle, n'en ont reproduit que des extraits. Si nous cherchons une explication qui ne soit pas œuvre de pure imagination, mais qui repose sur des exemples précis fournis par l'histoire des textes, c'est celle-là et nulle autre que nous devons retenir.[37]

Il reste à identifier l'ouvrage ou les ouvrages de Clément d'où proviennent ces extraits. Puisqu'ils suivent les *Stromates* I à VII, vérifions d'abord s'ils constituent la continuation des *Stromates* et pour cela essayons de savoir ce que Clément projetait d'y traiter.

4. Le programme de Clément

Voici en quels termes, au début du *Str.* I (i, 15,2), Clément décrivait l'ouvrage qu'il commençait:[38]

(Mon livre)
(1) exposera les opinions des principales sectes[39] et leur opposera tout ce qu'il convient de dispenser avant la gnose de la contemplation épopticque,[40] qui croîtra en

[37] Zahn, *op. cit.*, 118, qui avait envisagé avant Ruben l'hypothèse de notes prises en vue de travaux ultérieurs, l'avait repoussée pour une autre raison: les morceaux en question, dit-il, sont faits de « phrases parfaitement tournées et de bon style », puis le fil du discours est coupé d'une manière brutale et l'on se trouve devant un autre morceau qui présente les mêmes qualités que le précédent; ce ne sont pas là les caractéristiques d'un brouillon, mais celles d'un texte travaillé dans lequel on a fait des coupures.

[38] (1) Τά τε παρὰ τῶν ἐπισήμων δογματιζόμενα αἱρέσεων παραθήσεται (*sc.* ἡ γραφή, cf. 15,1), καὶ τούτοις ἀντερεῖ πάνθ' ὅσα προοικονομηθῆναι καθήκει τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐποπτικὴν θεωρίαν γνώσεως, ἣ προβήσεται ἡμῖν κατὰ «τὸν εὐκλεῆ καὶ σεμνὸν τῆς παραδόσεως κανόνα» ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως προϊοῦσιν, (2) ⟨τὰ⟩ ἀναγκαίως ἔχοντα προδιαληφθῆναι τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας προπαρατιθεμένη καὶ τὰ ἐμποδὼν ἱστάμενα τῇ ἀκολουθίᾳ προαπολυομένη, ὡς ἑτοίμους ἔχειν τὰς ἀκοὰς πρὸς τὴν παραδοχὴν τῆς γνωστικῆς παραδόσεως προκεκαθαρμένης τῆς γῆς ἀπό τε τῶν ἀκανθῶν καὶ τῆς πόας ἁπάσης γεωργικῶς εἰς καταφύτευσιν ἀμπελῶνος.

[39] αἱρέσεις désigne à la fois les sectes philosophiques grecques et les hérésies.

[40] Je ne crois pas qu'on puisse traduire: « il leur opposera tout ce que doit dispenser une prudente pédagogie et qui fait partie de la gnose dans l'ordre de la contemplation épopticque », en considérant τῆς ... γνώσεως comme un génitif partitif complément de πανθ' ὅσα (Méhat, *op. cit.*, 148, qui propose d'ailleurs cette traduction « sans grande conviction », cf. 149, n. 2). Le nouvel exposé du plan qui sera donné au *Str.* IV montre très clairement que l'exposé et la réfutation des sectes philosophiques et hérétiques ne font pas partie de l'époptie gnostique mais la précèdent: l'exposé est mentionné d'abord (IV, i, 2,1 τὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν φυσιολογηθέντα τοῖς Ἕλλησι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις βαρ-

nous à mesure que nous avancerons selon «la glorieuse et auguste règle de la tradition»[41] en commençant par la genèse du monde,
(2) après avoir exposé préalablement ce qu'il faut nécessairement traiter avant la contemplation physique[42] et après avoir détruit les obstacles au bon déroulement de la pensée,[43] de façon à avoir les oreilles prêtes à recevoir la tradition gnostique une fois que la terre aura été nettoyée des ronces et de toute l'herbe, comme on le fait en agriculture pour planter une vigne.[44]

βάροις ... ἐξιστορητέον); ensuite seulement il est question de «gnose» et d'«époptie», lorsque, après la réfutation des philosophes grecs et des hérétiques, on passe à l'exposé de la vraie doctrine (IV, i, 3,1 τότε δὴ τὴν τῷ ὄντι γνωστικὴν φυσιολογίαν μέτιμεν, et 3,2 ἡ γοῦν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας γνωστικῆς παραδόσεως φυσιολογία, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐποπτεία ...). Il faut donc, dans notre passage du *Str.* I, considérer le génitif τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐποπτικὴν θεωρίαν γνώσεως comme régi par le préfixe προ- de προοικονομηθῆναι, et traduire: «et leur opposera tout ce qu'il convient de dispenser *avant* la gnose de la contemplation époptique.»

[41] Citation de Clément de Rome, I *Ep. ad Cor.* 7,2. Clément d'Alexandrie tient à souligner que la gnose dont il parle n'est pas celle des hérétiques: elle est conforme à la «règle de la tradition».

[42] φυσικὴ θεωρία est l'équivalent exact de φυσιολογία employé au *Str.* IV, i,2,1 à 3,2, où l'on voit que cette physique comprendra deux parties qui correspondent à celles qui viennent d'être indiquées: a) l'exposé et la réfutation des opinions des Grecs et des hérétiques «sur les principes» (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν φυσιολογηθέντα τοῖς τε Ἕλλησι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις βαρβάροις); b) la vraie physique gnostique (τὴν τῷ ὄντι γνωστικὴν φυσιολογίαν). – La traduction de notre passage proposée par A. Méhat, *op. cit.*, 148, fait de τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας un génitif partitif complément de τὰ ... ἔχοντα: «elle consignera de la contemplation physique ce qu'il est nécessaire de traiter auparavant.» Mais «ce qu'il est nécessaire de traiter *auparavant*», c'est-à-dire avant la contemplation physique, ne fait évidemment pas partie de celle-ci. Comme on le voit par la fin de la phrase parlant du jardinier qui arrache les ronces, Clément pense ici à l'éthique, laquelle ne fait pas partie de la physique mais, dans le système de Clément, la précède. Il faut donc très certainement rattacher τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας au préfixe προ- de προδιαληφθῆναι, et traduire: «tout ce qu'il est nécessaire de traiter *avant* la contemplation physique.» – Autre remarque: προπαρατιθεμένη est corrélatif de παραθήσεται au début du texte et doit avoir le même sujet (γραφή): Clément a d'abord indiqué l'*objet principal* (παραθήσεται) de son livre, qui consistera dans les deux parties de la physique, et il indique maintenant un *objet préliminaire* (προπαρατιθεμένη) qui est l'éthique.

[43] Les «obstacles au bon déroulement de la pensée» sont les vices et plus particulièrement ici l'esprit de chicane (cf. V,i,11,4 cité plus haut p. 275). Le membre de phrase précédent se rapportait à l'étude préalable (προπαρατιθεμένη) de l'éthique, et celui-ci se rapporte à l'effort préalable de purification (προαπολυομένη); ces deux préalables vont de pair: il faut à la fois étudier la morale et la pratiquer.

[44] Pour la comparaison de l'éducation avec la culture d'une plante, voir notamment Philon, *De agric.* 17–18. Le programme qu'Origène fera suivre à son élève commencera aussi par un entraînement à la vertu, destiné à préparer l'âme à recevoir la science; cf. (Ps.-) Grégoire, *Discours de remerciement* 7, 93–98; noter en particulier 96 «ronces (ἀκάνθας), chardons, herbes et plantes sauvages de toute espèce ... il coupait et arrachait tout». Les «ronces et chardons» de ce dernier passage sont empruntés à *Gen.* 3,18. Les «ronces» du passage de Clément font peut-être allusion au même verset, et la «vigne» à *Is.* 5,1–7, à propos de laquelle il est encore question de ronces (5,6).

Clément annonce ici:

(1) Un sujet principal qui comprendra deux parties: *a*) l'exposé et la réfutation des opinions des principales sectes (αἱρέσεων): *b*) «l'époptie» ou exposé de la vraie «gnose», «en commençant par la genèse du monde» (τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐποπτικὴν θεωρίαν γνώσεως ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως); ce sujet principal est appelé ensuite «*physique*» (φυσικὴ θεωρία).

(2) Un sujet préliminaire qui permettra de détruire les obstacles à la marche de la pensée, de nettoyer la terre de ses ronces et de son herbe, expressions qui font allusion à la purification morale qui précède l'acquisition de la science, c'est-à-dire à l'*éthique*.

Donc nous attendons dans l'ordre: en premier lieu une éthique, en second lieu une physique composée de deux parties.

Le *Stromate* II s'ouvre par un nouvel exposé du programme (II, i, 1,1 à 2,3):[45]

(1) C'est sans doute le moment de voir, puisque l'Ecriture traite les Grecs de «voleurs» de la philosophie barbare,[46] comment on prouvera brièvement

[45] (1) Ἐξῆς δ' ἂν εἴη διαλαβεῖν, ἐπεὶ «κλέπτας» τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας Ἕλληνας εἶναι προσεῖπεν ἡ γραφή, ὅπως τοῦτο δι' ὀλίγων δειχθήσεται. a) οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ παράδοξα τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἱστορουμένων ἀπομιμουμένους ἀναγράφειν αὐτοὺς παραστήσομεν, b) πρὸς δὲ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν δογμάτων σκευωρουμένους καὶ παραχαράσσοντας, προγενεστέρων οὐσῶν τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν γραφῶν, ὡς ἀπεδείξαμεν, διελέγξομεν ἔν τε τοῖς περὶ πίστεως περί τε σοφίας γνώσεώς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐλπίδος τε καὶ ἀγάπης περί τε μετανοίας καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ δὴ καὶ φόβου θεοῦ – σμῆνος ἀτεχνῶς τῶν ἀληθείας ἀρετῶν –· c) ὅσα τε ἀπαιτήσει ἡ κατὰ τὸν τόπον τὸν προκείμενον ὑποσημείωσις, περιληφθήσεται καὶ ὡς τὰ μάλιστα τὸ ἐπικεκρυμμένον τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας, τὸ συμβολικὸν τοῦτο καὶ αἰνιγματῶδες εἶδος, ἐζήλωσαν οἱ πραγματικῶς τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων φιλοσοφήσαντες, χρησιμώτατον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαιότατον τῇ γνώσει τῆς ἀληθείας ὑπάρχον. (2) Ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀκόλουθον οἶμαι ὑπὲρ ὧν κατατρέχουσιν ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ἀπολογήσασθαι ὀλίγαις συγχρωμένους γραφαῖς, εἴ πως ἠρέμα καὶ ὁ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπαΐων ἐπιστρέψαι δυνηθείη ἐξ ὧν ἐπίστευσεν εἰς ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν. (3) Διαδέξεται δὲ εἰκότως τοὺς γενναίους τῶν φιλοσόφων ἔλεγχος ἀγαπητικὸς τοῦ βίου τε αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς εὑρέσεως τῶν καινῶν δογμάτων, οὐκ ἀμυνομένων ἡμῶν τοὺς κατηγόρους – πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, τοὺς εὐλογεῖν μεμαθηκότας τοὺς καταρωμένους, κἂν βλασφήμους κενῶς καταφέρωσιν ἡμῶν λόγους –, ἀλλ' εἰς ἐπιστροφὴν τὴν ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, εἴ πως ἐπαισχυνθεῖεν οἱ πάνσοφοι δι' ἐλέγχου βαρβάρου σωφρονισθέντες, ὡς διιδεῖν ὀψὲ γοῦν δυνηθῆναι, ὁποῖα ἄρα εἴη τὰ μαθήματα, ἐφ' ἃ στέλλονται τὰς ἀποδημίας τὰς διαποντίους. Ὧν μὲν γὰρ δὴ κλέπται, καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδεικτέα περιαιρεθείσης αὐτοῖς τῆς φιλαυτίας, ἃ δὲ αὐτοὶ «διζησάμενοι ἑαυτοὺς» ἐξευρηκέναι φρυάττονται, τούτων ὁ ἔλεγχος· κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου καλουμένης παιδείας, εἰς ὅσα ἄχρηστος, περί τε ἀστρολογικῆς καὶ μαθηματικῆς καὶ μαγικῆς γοητείας τε ἐπιδραμητέον· αὐχοῦσι γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖσδε οἱ Πανέλληνες ὡς μεγίσταις ἐπιστήμαις. Traduction Mondésert (Sources chrét., 38) modifiée.

[46] La «philosophie barbare» désigne pour Clément l'enseignement de la Bible,

qu'ils le sont: a) non seulement nous établirons que c'est en imitant les faits merveilleux racontés chez nous qu'ils ont rédigé leur histoire, b) mais nous les convaincrons d'avoir mis en œuvre et falsifié les plus importantes de nos doctrines – car nos Écritures sont les plus anciennes comme nous l'avons démontré – en ce qui concerne la foi, la sagesse, la gnose et la science, l'espérance et la charité, la pénitence, l'ascèse et évidemment la crainte de Dieu, ce qui est bien «l'essaim»[47] des vertus de la Vérité; c) nous embrasserons tout ce que réclame l'exposé de ce sujet et nous verrons notamment comment ceux qui ont philosophé d'une manière terre-à-terre sur les paroles des Anciens[48] ont voulu rivaliser avec la manière voilée de la philosophie barbare, ce genre symbolique et énigmatique qui est très utile ou, pour mieux dire, tout à fait nécessaire à la connaissance de la vérité.

(2) Ensuite, je pense qu'il sera logique de nous défendre sur les points où les *Grecs* nous attaquent; nous le ferons en nous servant de quelques textes de l'Ecriture, pour le cas où insensiblement le *Juif* qui nous écouterait puisse lui aussi, à partir de ce qu'il croit, se convertir à Celui en qui il n'a pas cru.

(3) Et il sera normal de passer en revue la succession des *philosophes* de la race noble[49] en critiquant avec charité leur vie et les doctrines nouvelles qu'ils ont inventées, non pas pour nous venger de nos accusateurs, tant s'en faut, car nous avons appris à bénir ceux qui nous maudissent,[50] même s'ils n'ont aucune raison de tenir contre nous des propos diffamatoires, mais pour les convertir eux aussi, au cas où ces hommes tout sages, rendus plus perspicaces par la critique venue des Barbares,[51] seraient troublés et deviendraient ainsi capables de discerner, assez tard en vérité, de quelle nature sont les enseignements qu'ils vont chercher au-delà des mers. Car il faut évidemment prouver en quoi ce sont bien des «voleurs» pour les dépouiller de leur suffisance, et d'autre part, ce qu'ils se vantent d'avoir trouvé en

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auquel il ajoute celui du Nouveau Testament (cf. *Str.* VIII, i, 1,2: «La philosophie barbare dit: Cherchez et vous trouverez»). Sur l'histoire de cette expression voir J. H. Waszink, Some Observations on the Appreciation of the Philosophy of the Barbarians in Early Christian Litterature, *Mélanges Chr. Mohrmann* (Utrecht–Anvers 1963) 41–56.

[47] Platon, *Ménon* 72a.

[48] Plutôt que: «die wissenschaftlich hochstehenden Vertreter der alten Philosophie» (Stählin) ou «ceux qui ont en fait repris les thèses philosophiques des Anciens» (Mondésert). La phrase entière s'éclaire par *Str.* V, viii, 44–45, où Clément parle comme ici de «ceux qui ont voulu rivaliser avec le genre symbolique» (44,1 τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος ἐζήλωσαν): il cite comme exemple le pythagoricien Androcyde qui interprétait l'antique formule appelée *Ephesia grammata* en disant que le mot Αἴξ signifiait la terre, Τετράξ l'année, etc. (45,2). Clément pense que la Bible recèle un sens caché et que c'est ce qui a donné l'idée à ces philosophes de découvrir aussi un sens caché dans les textes païens antiques, mais le sens qu'ils y trouvent est terre-à-terre alors que celui de la Bible est sublime.

[49] Ironique (comme l'est généralement l'épithète γενναῖος chez Clément, cf. notamment *Str.* III, ii, 10,1, où il est appliqué aux hérétiques carpocratiens). Il s'agit ici des philosophes grecs, dits «de la race noble» par opposition à la «philosophie barbare» qu'ils méprisent.

[50] Cf. *Luc* 6, 28.

[51] Les «Barbares» sont ici les adeptes de la «philosophie barbare», c'est-à-dire ceux qui s'appuient sur la Bible, Juifs et Chrétiens; en l'occurrence, surtout les Chrétiens.

«s'interrogeant eux-mêmes»,[52] on en fera la critique. Accessoirement, il faudra aussi aborder la soi-disant éducation générale,[53] pour montrer combien elle est inutile, et les impostures de l'astrologie, des sciences occultes et de la magie, car les champions de l'hellénisme se vantent aussi de ces connaissances comme de sciences très hautes.

Clément ne mentionne pas ici l'époptie, mais seulement les sections qui la précèdent; elles sont au nombre de trois:

(1) *Le larcin des Grecs.* Clément annonce son intention d'établir que les Grecs ont plagié les Juifs sur trois points: *a*) les *récits de miracles*, *b*) la théorie des *vertus*, *c*) le *genre symbolique*. Telle était sans doute le plan de la source dont se sert ici Clément. Mais, en fait, Clément va modifier cet ordre: il traitera d'abord des *vertus* aux *Stromates* II à IV, puis du *genre symbolique* au *Stromate* V, enfin des *récits de miracles* en quelques pages du *Stromate* VI. Cette section sera donc consacrée en majeure partie aux vertus, c'est-à-dire à l'*éthique* et nous rejoignons ainsi ce qu'annonçait le *Stromate* I.

(2) Clément prévoit ensuite une *section apologétique* destinée à la fois aux Grecs et aux Juifs et qui consistera essentiellement à citer quelques textes de l'Ecriture. Cette section n'était pas annoncée dans le programme précédent.

(3) *La critique des sectes philosophiques.* Cela correspond à la première partie de la physique dans le plan annoncé au *Stromate* I («mon livre exposera les opinions des différentes sectes»). Clément ajoute ici qu'après avoir traité des philosophes, il examinera accessoirement les autres sciences dont les Grecs se vantent: les arts libéraux qui composent «l'éducation générale», puis l'astrologie, les sciences occultes et la magie. Il ne répète pas la suite du programme qui reste inchangée.

Au début du *Stromate* IV (i, 1,1 à 3,3) Clément fait un nouvel exposé, plus long et plus touffu, de ses projets:[54]

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[52] Cf. Héraclite, *fr.* 101 Diels.

[53] La restriction exprimée par καλουμένης porte sur παιδείας. Cette «éducation» générale tant prisée par les païens n'est qu'un semblant d'éducation. L'éducation véritable est celle dont le Verbe de Dieu est le pédagogue, c'est-à-dire celle qui est nourrie de l'Écriture.

[54] (1) Ἀκόλουθον δὴ οἶμαι a) περί τε μαρτυρίου διαλαβεῖν καὶ τίς ὁ τέλειος, οἷς ἐμπεριληφθήσεται κατὰ τὴν ἀπαίτησιν τῶν λεχθησομένων τὰ παρεπόμενα καὶ ὡς ὁμοίως [τε] φιλοσοφητέον δούλῳ τε καὶ ἐλευθέρῳ κἂν ἀνὴρ ᾖ γυνὴ τὸ γένος τυγχάνῃ· τά τε ἑξῆς περί τε πίστεως καὶ περὶ τοῦ ζητεῖν προσαποπληρώσαντες b) τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος παραθησόμεθα, ἵν' ὡς ἐν ἐπιδρομῇ τὸν ἠθικὸν συμπερανάμενοι λόγον κεφαλαιωδῶς παραστήσωμεν τὴν εἰς Ἕλληνας ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας διαδοθεῖσαν ὠφέλειαν. (2) Μεθ' ἣν ὑποτύπωσιν ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας

(1) Je pense qu'il est dans la ligne de notre sujet de traiter a) du *martyre* pour voir qui est l'homme parfait, et l'on prendra en même temps, comme l'exige l'exposé, les questions connexes, en montrant par exemple que chacun doit philosopher, qu'il soit esclave ou libre, homme ou femme; et quand nous en aurons terminé aussi avec les questions suivantes qui concernent la foi et la recherche[55] nous exposerons b) le *genre symbolique*; de la sorte, ayant achevé l'*éthique* comme en résumé, nous aurons montré dans les grandes lignes le profit que les Grecs ont retiré de la philosophie barbare.

(2) Après ce thème, viendra un exposé succinct de l'Ecriture *contre les Grecs et contre les Juifs*, et tout ce que nous n'avons pas réussi à faire tenir dans les *Stromates* précédents parce que nous avons dû nous plier à l'abondance de la matière, alors que nous projetions dans le prologue initial de tout achever en un seul livre.

(3) Ensuite, plus tard, quand sera achevé autant que nous le pourrons notre présent sujet, a) il faudra exposer la *physique* des principes qui a été élaborée par les Grecs et les autres Barbares[56] dont les opinions sont venues jusqu'à nous, et il faudra s'attaquer aux points essentiels des conceptions des *philosophes*; b) la suite normale après cette incursion dans la théologie[57] sera sans doute d'exposer ce qui

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καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς Ἰουδαίους κατ' ἐπιτομὴν τῶν γραφῶν ἔκθεσις παραδοθήσεται καὶ ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτου Στρωματεῦσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ προοιμίου εἰσβολὴν ἐν ἑνὶ προθεμένοις τελειώσειν ὑπομνήματι τῷ πλήθει τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαίως δουλεύσασι περιλαβεῖν οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. (3) Ἐπὶ τούτοις ὕστερον πληρωθείσης ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τῆς κατὰ τὰ προκείμενα ἡμῖν ὑποτυπώσεως a) τὰ περὶ ἀρχῶν φυσιολογηθέντα τοῖς τε Ἕλλησι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις βαρβάροις, ὅσων ἦκον εἰς ἡμᾶς αἱ δόξαι, ἐξιστορητέον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἐπινενοημένων ἐγχειρητέον· b) οἷς ἐπόμενον ἂν εἴη μετὰ τὴν ἐπιδρομὴν τῆς θεολογίας τὰ περὶ προφητείας παραδεδομένα διαλαβεῖν, ὡς καὶ τὰς γραφὰς αἷς πεπιστεύκαμεν κυρίας οὔσας ἐξ αὐθεντείας παντοκρατορικῆς ἐπιδείξαντας προϊέναι δι' αὐτῶν εἱρμῷ δύνασθαι ⟨καὶ⟩ ἁπάσαις ἐντεῦθεν ταῖς αἱρέσεσιν ἕνα δεικνύναι θεὸν καὶ κύριον παντοκράτορα τὸν διὰ νόμου καὶ προφητῶν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοῦ μακαρίου εὐαγγελίου γνησίως κεκηρυγμένον. Πολλαὶ δὲ ἡμᾶς αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἑτεροδόξους ἀντιρρήσεις ἐκδέχονται πειρωμένους τά τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν προκομιζόμενα ἐγγράφως διαλύεσθαι πείθειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἄκοντας, δι' αὐτῶν ἐλέγχοντας τῶν γραφῶν. (4) Τελειωθείσης τοίνυν τῆς προθέσεως ἡμῖν ἁπάσης ἐν οἷς, ἐὰν θελήσῃ τὸ πνεῦμα, ὑπομνήμασι πρὸς τὴν κατεπείγουσαν ἐξυπηρετοῦμεν χρείαν – πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ τῶν προλέγεσθαι ὀφειλομένων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνάγκη –, τότε δὴ τὴν τῷ ὄντι γνωστικὴν φυσιολογίαν μέτιμεν, τὰ μικρὰ πρὸ τῶν μεγάλων μυηθέντες μυστηρίων, ὡς μηδὲν ἐμποδὼν τῇ θείᾳ ὄντως ἱεροφαντίᾳ γίνεσθαι προκεκαθαρμένων καὶ προδιατετυπωμένων τῶν προϊστορηθῆναι καὶ προπαραδοθῆναι δεόντων. Ἡ γοῦν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας κανόνα γνωστικῆς παραδόσεως φυσιολογία, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐποπτεία, ἐκ τοῦ περὶ κοσμογονίας ἤρτηται λόγου, ἐνθένδε ἀναβαίνουσα ἐπὶ τὸ θεολογικὸν εἶδος. Ὅθεν εἰκότως τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς παραδόσεως ἀπὸ τῆς προφητευθείσης ποιησόμεθα γενέσεως, ἐν μέρει καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων παρατιθέμενοι καὶ ὡς οἷόν τε ἡμῖν διαλύεσθαι πειρώμενοι.

[55] Sujet traité au début du *Str.* V (i, 1,1 à 13,4).

[56] Les «autres Barbares», ainsi nommés par opposition aux Juifs et Chrétiens dont il était question plus haut (2), sont les hérétiques.

[57] L'«incursion dans la théologie» désigne le traité «sur les principes». Mais la théologie ne se réduit pas à cela; nous la trouvons encore nommée à propos de l'époptie (qui «part de la cosmologie et s'élève de là jusqu'au genre théologique»). La théologie recouvre donc les deux parties de la physique, mais s'épanouit surtout dans la seconde.

nous a été transmis au sujet de la prophétie, de manière qu'après avoir montré que les Écritures auxquelles nous croyons sont garanties par l'autorité du Tout-Puissant nous puissions avancer méthodiquement avec leur aide et faire voir, à partir d'elles, à toutes les hérésies qu'il y a un seul Dieu et Seigneur tout-puissant annoncé authentiquement par la Loi et les prophètes comme aussi par le bienheureux Évangile. Abondantes sont les discussions que nous devrons avoir avec les hérétiques pour essayer tout à la fois de détruire ce qu'ils ont publié dans des écrits et de les convaincre, fût-ce contre leur gré, en les confondant par les Écritures elles-mêmes.

(4) Quand nous aurons donc accompli tout notre projet dans les livres que l'Esprit voudra que nous consacrions à ce besoin urgent – car il est grandement nécessaire d'exposer ce qui doit être dit avant la vérité –, alors nous passerons à la *physique réellement gnostique*, puisque nous aurons été initiés aux petits mystères avant les grands de telle manière que rien ne fera plus obstacle à la vraie révélation des mystères divins, étant donné que les choses qui doivent être exposées et livrées au préalable l'auront été au cours d'une purification et d'une figuration préliminaires.[58] Toujours est-il que la physique de la tradition gnostique conforme à la règle de vérité, ou pour mieux dire l'*époptie*, part du traité de la cosmogonie et s'élève à partir de là jusqu'au genre théologique; c'est donc à bon droit que nous placerons au point de départ de l'enseignement transmis par nous la *Genèse* écrite par le prophète, en exposant aussi, à leur place, les doctrines des hétérodoxes et en essayant dans la mesure de nos moyens de les réfuter.

Nous retrouvons les trois mêmes sections préparatoires que dans le programme précédent mais suivies de l'«époptie» finale, et nous obtenons quelques précisions supplémentaires sur l'ensemble.

(1) *Le larcin des Grecs.* Clément cite à nouveau deux des trois domaines dans lesquels s'est produit ce larcin: *a*) la théorie des *vertus*, parmi lesquelles, on s'en souvient, Clément nommait la foi; celle-ci l'amènera à traiter aussi du martyre; *b*) le *genre symbolique*. Il n'est pas fait mention du troisième domaine (les récits de miracles), qui est accessoire pour Clément. Enfin la dernière phrase nous confirme que cette section correspond à l'*éthique*.

(2) *La section apologétique.* Clément nous disait au *Stromate* II qu'elle viserait à la fois les Grecs et les Juifs et consisterait à produire quelques textes de l'Écriture. Il la présente pareillement ici comme un «exposé succinct de l'Écriture contre les Grecs et contre les Juifs».

(3) *La critique des sectes.* Nous reconnaissons dans la troisième section la *première partie de la physique*, qui doit comporter l'exposé et la réfutation des opinions des sectes. Clément précise que ces dernières sont de deux sortes: *a*) il traitera d'abord des *philosophes* pour discuter ce

[58] Clément compare les deux parties de la physique aux deux étapes de l'initiation aux mystères d'Éleusis, la première partie correspondant aux «petits mystères» qui préparaient aux «grands».

qu'ils ont dit sur les principes; *b*) puis il passera aux *hérétiques*: à leur propos il commencera par traiter de la prophétie et de l'autorité de l'Écriture, après quoi il prouvera que l'Ancien Testament et le Nouveau annoncent un seul et même Dieu. Cette démonstration est dirigée au premier chef contre Marcion. Cependant Clément déclare expressément qu'il combattra «toutes les hérésies». Il prévoit même que ses discussions avec les hérétiques seront longues, parce qu'il projette, d'une part, d'examiner «ce qu'ils ont publié dans des écrits» et de le réfuter et, d'autre part, de leur opposer une démonstration de la vérité par l'Écriture.

(4) *L'époptie* ou *seconde partie de la physique* («la physique réellement gnostique»). Clément précise qu'elle commencera par un commentaire du récit de la *Genèse* sur la création. Il ajoute qu'il exposera aussi «à leur place, les doctrines des hétérodoxes» en essayant de les réfuter. Ces hérétiques ne sont plus ceux qui auront été réfutés dans la section précédente, mais ceux qui ont émis des opinions répréhensibles sur les premiers chapitres de la *Genèse*, tels Hermogène,[59] Tatien[60] et Jules Cassien.[61]

Au début du *Stromate* VI, Clément indique que nous sommes dans l'«éthique» et que pour l'achever il va consacrer «le VI^e^ et le VII^e^ Stromate» à démontrer que le vrai gnostique n'est pas athée (VI, i, 1,1): «alors», ajoute-t-il, «nos livres continuant dans le genre des Stromates,[62] il faudra résoudre les difficultés soulevées par les Grecs et les Barbares[63]

[59] Sur son interprétation de *Gen.* 1, 1–2, cf. Tertullien, *Adu. Hermogenem* 25, 2–3; 27,1; et mon étude: Genèse 1,1–2, de Justin à Origène, dans: *In principio. Interprétations des premiers versets de la Genèse* (ouvrage collectif du Centre d'études des religions du livre) [Paris 1973] 67–69. Hermogène était connu par le livre que Théophile d'Antioche avait écrit contre lui (Eusèbe, *Hist. eccl.* 4, 24).

[60] Tatien soutenait que *Gen.* 1, 3, «Que la lumière soit», n'était pas dit comme un ordre mais comme une prière, d'après Clément lui-même, *Eclogae* 38, 1.

[61] Jules Cassien, que Clément a commencé de critiquer au *Str.* III, xiii, 91,1s., pensait que les «tuniques de peau» qu'Adam et Ève ont reçues après leur désobéissance selon *Gen.* 3, 21, étaient un corps humain semblable au nôtre, et qu'ils n'avaient auparavant qu'un corps astral. Clément a déjà signalé cette thèse en *Str.* III, xiv, 95,2, en annonçant qu'il la réfutera plus loin: «Nous démontrerons que lui et ceux qui pensent comme lui à ce sujet sont dans l'erreur, quand nous entreprendrons *l'exégèse de la création de l'homme* une fois achevé ce qui doit être dit avant»: allusion à l'époptie qui serait le couronnement de son œuvre et comporterait un commentaire de la création du monde et de l'homme selon la Bible.

[62] Manière de dire que les livres dans lesquels il examinera cette question seront encore des *Stromates*.

[63] «Barbares» désigne comme plus haut (note 51) ceux qui s'appuient sur la Bible, mais ici ils excluent le Nouveau Testament: ce sont donc les Juifs.

au sujet de la venue du Seigneur» (1,4 τότε ἤδη, προϊόντων τῶν ὑπομνημάτων κατὰ τὸν τῶν Στρωματέων χαρακτῆρα, ἐπιλυτέον τά τε ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων τά τε ὑπὸ Βαρβάρων προσαπορούμενα ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας). Ceci fait allusion à la *section apologétique* déjà annoncée aux *Stromates* II et IV. Nous apprenons: (1) qu'elle concernera l'Incarnation; (2) qu'elle sera traitée dans les *Stromates* eux-mêmes, immédiatement après «le VI[e] et le VII[e]», donc qu'elle commencera au *Stromate* VIII.

Un peu avant la fin du *Stromate* VII, en *Str.* VII, xv, 89,1, Clément annonce ce qu'il fera après ce *Stromate*:[64]

> Et puisqu'il est logique que nous nous défendions contre les reproches qui nous sont adressés par les Grecs et les Juifs, et puisque dans certaines difficultés les hérétiques qui s'opposent à la vraie doctrine[65] leur viennent en aide comme dans ce qui a déjà été indiqué, il serait bien que nous supprimions d'abord cet obstacle de manière à être disponibles pour la solution des difficultés quand nous passerons au Stromate suivant.[66]

Toute la fin de ce *Stromate* VII traite en effet des hérétiques pour répondre à cette objection que les Juifs adressaient aux Chrétiens: comment pouvez-vous prétendre avoir la vérité quand vous êtes divisés en sectes qui s'en font toutes une idée différente? La phrase que nous venons de lire est simplement destinée à introduire ce sujet. Clément veut dire ceci: puisque le *Stromate* suivant doit répondre aux objections des Grecs et des Juifs et que les hérétiques leur fournissent un argument contre nous, parlons un peu de ces derniers et nous serons ainsi en meilleure condition pour résoudre les difficultés (ἀποριῶν) des Grecs et des Juifs. Ces ἀπορίαι sont les «προσαπορούμενα au sujet de la venue du Seigneur» dont il est question au début du *Stromate* VI, c'est-à-dire les difficultés auxquelles doit répondre la *section apologétique*. Clément nous confirme que cette section commencera au «Stromate suivant», *Stromate* VIII.

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[64] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἰουδαίων ἐπιφερόμενα ἡμῖν ἐγκλήματα ἀπολογήσασθαι, συνεπιλαμβάνονται δὲ ἔν τισι τῶν ἀποριῶν ὁμοίως τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ διδασκαλίαν αἱρέσεις, εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, πρότερον διακαθάραντας τὰ ἐμποδών, εὐτρεπεῖς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἀποριῶν λύσεις εἰς τὸν ἑξῆς προϊέναι Στρωματέα.

[65] αἱ περὶ τὴν ἀληθῆ [ἄλλην cod.] διδασκαλίαν αἱρέσεις pour spécifier qu'il s'agit des hérésies chrétiennes et non des sectes philosophiques qui portent aussi le nom de αἱρέσεις.

[66] A. Méhat donne deux traductions différentes: «le Stromate suivant» (169) est plus juste que «le reste du Stromate» (307).

Enfin, dans la dernière page du même *Stromate* VII, Clément nous avertit que l'éthique est achevée (VII, xviii, 110,4 τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ὑπογραφέντος). Doivent donc suivre d'après les renseignements glanés plus haut:

(1) la *section apologétique* contre les Grecs et les Juifs à propos de l'Incarnation, section dont il est prévu qu'elle commencera avec le *Stromate* VIII;

(2) *la première partie de la physique*, qui doit discuter: *a*) les opinions des *philosophes* sur les principes; *b*) les doctrines des *hérétiques*;

(3) la *seconde partie de la physique*, ou *époptie*, qui commencera par un commentaire des chapitres de la *Genèse* sur la création.

Clément a-t-il mené ce programme à son terme?

5. La réalisation effective du programme

Que le plan exposé dans les *Stromates* a été pleinement réalisé par Clément, nous en avons deux preuves.

A. *Les fragments conservés dans le Laurentianus.*

La première consiste dans l'exacte correspondance entre le programme prévu et les fragments qui se lisent dans le *Laurentianus* (*Str.* VIII, *Excerpta* et *Eclogae*):

(1) Clément prévoyait d'abord une *section apologétique* sur les ἀπορίαι, les προσαπορούμενα des Grecs et des Juifs (*Str.* IV, i, 1,3; VI, i, 1,4; VII, xv, 89,1). Le verbe ἀπορεῖν se retrouve précisément au début de *Str.* VIII (i, 1,1), où Clément explique que les anciens philosophes grecs n'avaient pas coutume de soulever des difficultés, mais que ce sont les philosophes récents qui ont introduit cet amour de la controverse. Le tout est dirigé contre les sophistes et les sceptiques (ceux-ci nommés dans le titre qui figure un peu plus loin: Πρὸς τοὺς Πυρρωνείους). A ces gens qui tergiversent toujours ou prétendent qu'on ne peut rien savoir Clément oppose la parole de l'Écriture: «Cherchez et vous trouverez» (*Mt* 7,7), et redit ce qu'il sait de la «démonstration». La correspondance verbale que je viens de signaler (ἀπορίαι / ἀπορεῖν) est un bon indice que nous sommes au début de la section apologétique prévue pour le *Stromate* VIII, mais nous n'en avons que les préliminaires; l'excerpteur a négligé la partie principale qui répondait par des textes de l'Ecriture à ces ἀπορίαι des Grecs et des Juifs sur l'Incarnation, parce qu'une telle démonstration était classique et se trouvait dans beaucoup d'autres livres, mais il a été intéressé par la réfutation préalable des sceptiques.

(2) Devait venir ensuite *une première partie de la physique* exposant et réfutant deux sortes de thèses:

a) les opinions des *philosophes* «sur les principes» (*Str.* IV, i, 2,1). Effectivement, *Str.* VIII, ix, 25,1 à 33,9 traite des différentes espèces de «causes» selon les philosophes grecs, la notion de «cause» étant étroitement liée à celle de «principe».

b) les doctrines des *hérétiques*; Clément annonçait en particulier son intention de critiquer longuement des écrits laissés par les hérétiques (*Str.* IV, i, 2,3). Cela correspond tout à fait aux *Excerpta ex Theodoto* discutant dans le détail un ouvrage valentinien.

(3) Enfin viendrait la *seconde partie de la physique* ou *époptie*, dont le début devait commenter le récit de la création dans la *Genèse* (*Str.* IV, 1, 3,1–2). C'est l'objet des *Eclogae*: les premiers fragments concernent les deux premiers versets de la *Genèse*, puis on trouve le troisième verset («Que la lumière soit») cité en 38, 1. Il y a plus: Clément annonçait dans son programme que cette section réfuterait «à leur place» certains hérétiques (*Str.* IV, i, 3,3), et le fait est que les *Eclogae* nomment pour les critiquer Tatien (38, 1) et Hermogène (56, 2).

Ainsi toutes les sections prévues au programme sont représentées dans les fragments et elles s'y trouvent dans l'ordre exact où elles étaient annoncées. Une concordance aussi frappante pourrait déjà suffire à nous convaincre que Clément a exécuté son plan jusqu'au bout.

B. *La référence du «Quis diues saluetur».*

L'autre preuve émane de Clément lui-même, qui écrit dans le *Quis diues saluetur* (26, 8):

Σημαινέτω μὲν οὖν τι καὶ ὑψηλότερον ἡ κάμηλος διὰ στενῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τεθλιμμένης φθάνουσα τὸν πλούσιον, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ θεολογίας ἐξηγήσει μυστήριον τοῦ σωτῆρος ὑπάρχει μαθεῖν.

> Le «chameau», qui passe avant le «riche» par la «voie étroite et malaisée» (cf. *Mt* 19, 24; 7,14) peut avoir une signification plus haute. C'est un symbole mystérieux du Sauveur comme on peut l'apprendre[67] dans l'exégèse sur les principes et sur la théologie.

Clément renvoie ici à des pages déjà écrites et non pas à un ouvrage

[67] La traduction: «comme il *est réservé* de l'apprendre» (Méhat, 161) est une tentative désespérée pour récuser ce témoignage que Clément à réalisé ses projets. On ne peut guère donner à ὑπάρχει un autre sens qu'à ἔστι ou πάρεστι dans des expressions semblables: «il est possible de le voir», «on peut l'apprendre», etc., qui sont fréquentes et à ma connaissance toujours employées pour renvoyer à des ouvrages existants. J'en glane quelques exemples chez Eusèbe: κατιδεῖν ἔστι (*Hist. eccl.* 4, 3,1); πάρεστι διαγνῶναι (6, 32,3); πάρεστιν ἀναλέξασθαι (3, 5,4; 6, 33,4).

futur, car il ne dit pas: «comme on *pourra* l'apprendre dans l'exégèse des principes et de la théologie», mais: «comme on *peut* l'apprendre», au présent (ὑπάρχει). Or, comme Zahn l'a reconnu,[68] le contenu de ces pages correspond à ce qu'annonçait le *Stromate* IV: περὶ ἀρχῶν renvoie à ce traité «des principes» qui était prévu pour la première partie de la physique (*Str.* IV, i, 2,1), et θεολογίας évoque soit le même traité «des principes», présenté par Clément comme une «incursion en théologie» (*ibid.* 2,2), soit l'époptie, «qui part de la cosmogonie et s'élève de là jusqu'au genre théologique» (*ibid.* 3,2).

Ces deux preuves conjuguées ne laissent, à mon avis, aucune place au doute: Clément a bel et bien exécuté tout son programme, et c'est de là que proviennent les fragments conservés dans le *Laurentianus*.

Mais il est impossible que toutes ces matières aient pu tenir en un seul *Stromate*. Comment penser que Clément qui a consacré sept *Stromates* à l'éthique aurait réussi à faire tenir en un seul: une apologétique contre les Grecs et contre les Juifs sur l'Incarnation, une réfutation des opinions des philosophes sur les principes et des doctrines des hérétiques, y compris la critique détaillée de l'ouvrage de Théodotion, enfin un exposé de la gnose orthodoxe commençant par un commentaire du récit de la création? Aussi Clément n'annonçait-il pour le *Stromate* VIII que la section apologétique (*Str.* VI, i, 1,4; VII, xv, 89,1). Restaient les deux parties de la physique. Faisaient-elles encore partie des Stromates ou constituaient-elles un nouvel ouvrage? C'est la question que nous devons maintenant examiner.

6. Les Hypotyposes, continuation des Stromates

Eusèbe mentionne un autre ouvrage de Clément, les *Hypotyposes*, qui ne nous est pas parvenu,[69] mais dont Photius nous a laissé la description suivante:[70]

[68] Zahn, *op. cit.*, 38–39. Zahn ne doutait pas d'après ce passage que Clément avait réalisé le projet décrit dans les *Stromates*.

[69] Eusèbe, *Hist. eccl.* 6, 13,2.

[70] *Bibl.* 109 (II 79 Henry) Αἱ μὲν οὖν Ὑποτυπώσεις διαλαμβάνουσι περὶ ῥητῶν τινῶν τῆς τε παλαιᾶς καὶ νέας γραφῆς, ὧν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ὡς δῆθεν ἐξήγησίν τε καὶ ἑρμηνείαν ποιεῖται. Καὶ ἔν τισι μὲν αὐτῶν ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν, ἔν τισι δὲ παντελῶς εἰς ἀσεβεῖς καὶ μυθώδεις λόγους ἐκφέρεται· ὕλην τε γὰρ ἄχρονον καὶ ἰδέας ὡς ἀπό τινων ῥητῶν εἰσαγομένας δοξάζει, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν εἰς κτίσμα κατάγει· ἔτι δὲ μετεμψυχώσεις καὶ πολλοὺς πρὸ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ κόσμους τερατεύεται· καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τὴν Εὔαν οὐχ ὡς ὁ ἐκκλησιαστικὸς λόγος βούλεται, ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ ἀθέως ἀποφαίνεται· μίγνυσθαί τε τοὺς ἀγγέλους γυναιξὶ καὶ παιδοποιεῖν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὀνειρο-

Les Hypotyposes traitent de certaines paroles de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament dont Clément donne brièvement ce qu'il croit être une explication exégétique. En certains endroits, il semble avoir un langage orthodoxe, mais en d'autres il se laisse complètement emporter à des discours impies et fabuleux. Il croit en effet á une matière éternelle et à des Idées, en fondant ces innovations sur des paroles de l'Écriture, et il rabaisse le Fils au rang d'une créature. De plus, il imagine des métempsychoses et plusieurs mondes avant Adam. Il affirme qu'Ève est sortie d'Adam non pas de la façon qu'enseigne la doctrine ecclésiastique mais d'une manière honteuse et indigne de Dieu. Il rêve que les anges ont commerce avec les femmes et leur font des enfants, et que le Verbe ne s'est incarné qu'en apparence. On le surprend à imaginer deux Logos du Père, dont l'inférieur seul serait apparu aux hommes, – ou plutôt celui-là même ne leur serait pas apparu –; il dit en effet: «Le Fils est appelé Verbe par homonymie avec le Verbe du Père, mais ce n'est pas ce dernier qui s'est fait chair. Ce n'est pas non plus le Verbe du Père qui a habité dans le cœur des hommes, mais une puissance de Dieu, une sorte d'effluve du Verbe lui-même, devenue intellect.» Tout cela, il s'efforce de l'établir par des paroles de l'Écriture, et il profère encore mille autres sottises et blasphèmes, soit lui-même soit quelqu'un d'autre caché sous son nom. Ces blasphèmes extravagants sont en huit livres. Il revient souvent sur les mêmes choses et produit les paroles (de l'Écriture[71]) de manière dispersée et brouillonne comme un homme stupide. Tout son but est de donner un semblant d'exégèse de la Genèse, de l'Exode, des Psaumes, et des Épitres du divin Paul, des Épitres catholiques, de l'Ecclésiaste. Il fut, comme il le dit lui-même, disciple de Pantène. Voilà pour les Hypotyposes.

Plusieurs historiens ont soupçonné que cet ouvrage de Clément était la suite des *Stromates*.[72] Mais les arguments invoqués n'ont pas tous la même valeur. Il faut d'abord en écarter un qui est mal fondé; nous en donnerons ensuite de meilleurs.

πολεῖ, καὶ μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ δόξαι· λόγους τε τοῦ πατρὸς δύο τερατολογῶν ἀπελέγχεται, ὧν τὸν ἥττονα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανῆναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον, φησὶ γὰρ· «Λέγεται μὲν καὶ ὁ υἱὸς λόγος, ὁμονύμως τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὗ νυν οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ σὰρξ γενόμενος· οὐδὲ μὴν ὁ πατρῷος λόγος, ἀλλὰ δύναμίς τις τοῦ θεοῦ οἷον ἀπόρροια τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ, νοὺς γενόμενος τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καρδίας διαπεφοίτηκε». Καὶ ταῦτα πάντα πειρᾶται ἀπὸ ῥητῶν τινῶν κατασκευάζειν τῆς γραφῆς, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μύρια φλυαρεῖ καὶ βλασφημεῖ, εἴτε αὐτός, εἴτε τις ἕτερος τὸ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον ὑποκριθείς. Ἐποιήθησαν δὲ αὐτῷ αἱ βλάσφημοι αὗται τερατολογίαι ἐν τόμοις ὀκτώ. Λέγει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις, καὶ σποράδην καὶ συγκεχυμένως ὥσπερ ἔμπληκτος παράγει τὰ ῥητά. Ὁ δὲ ὅλος σκοπὸς ὡσανεὶ ἑρμηνεῖαι τυγχάνουσι τῆς Γενέσεως, τῆς Ἐξόδου, τῶν Ψαλμῶν, τοῦ θείου Παύλου τῶν ἐπιστολῶν καὶ τῶν καθολικῶν καὶ τοῦ Ἐκκλησιαστοῦ· Μαθητὴς δέ, ὡς καὶ αὐτός φησι, γέγονε Πανταίνου· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν αἱ Ὑποτυπώσεις.

[71] ῥῆμα vient d'être employé plusieurs fois dans ce sens.

[72] Le premier fut Daniel Heinsius dans une note de son édition des œuvres de Clément parue en 1616 (note reproduite dans P.G. 9, 558, n. 76), mais il exprimait une conviction sans donner de raisons précises. En 1659, dans son édition de l'*Histoire ecclésiastique* d'Eusèbe, Henri de Valois signalait deux concordances frappantes, sur le Fils «créature» et sur Pantène, entre les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae* d'une part et la notice de Photius sur les *Hypotyposes* d'autre part (note sur *Hist. eccl.* 5, 11, réimprimée dans P.G. 20, 455, n. 73). La thèse de Heinsius fut ensuite reprise sur d'autres bases par Bunsen, voir la note suivante.

1. *Un argument mal fondé*

Dans la dernière phrase du *Stromate* VII, Clément indique qu'il va « traiter la suite à partir d'un autre début (VII, xviii, 111,4 τῶν ἑξῆς ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ποιησόμεθα τὸν λόγον); on a parfois compris que cet « autre début » était celui d'un nouvel ouvrage, les *Hypotyposes*.[73]

Mais cet argument rencontre une objection insurmontable: quelques pages plus haut dans le même *Stromate* VII, Clément a déclaré très explicitement son intention d'écrire « un Stromate suivant » (VII, xv, 89,1 εἰς τὸν ἑξῆς προϊέναι Στρωματέα). Peut-on supposer que Clément ait changé d'avis au cours de la rédaction du *Stromate* VII entre la phrase où il annonce le « Stromate suivant » et celle où il dit vouloir « traiter la suite à partir d'un autre début »? Je ne le pense pas pour deux raisons: (1) à moins de taxer Clément d'une incroyable légèreté, nous devons bien penser qu'en corrigeant le manuscrit du *Stromate* VII avant de le publier il aurait supprimé l'allusion au « Stromate suivant » si elle était devenue sans objet; (2) nous avons vu que les premiers fragments qui suivent le titre « Stromate VIII » concordent effectivement avec le sujet annoncé pour ce *Stromate*.

Il faut donc admettre que, lorsque Clément déclare: « Nous traiterons la suite à partir d'un autre début », cela ne signifie pas qu'il va commencer un nouvel ouvrage; mais il veut dire que, pour traiter la suite, c'est-à-dire répondre aux difficultés des Grecs et des Juifs sur l'Incarnation, il va commencer par d'autres préliminaires: ce qui correspond à la critique préalable des sophistes et des sceptiques que nous lisons au début du *Stromate* VIII. Il n'était pas inopportun, en effet, avant d'entamer une démonstration de la foi chrétienne, de réfuter les gens qui prétendaient qu'on ne devait croire à rien du tout, ou qui n'étaient animés que par l'amour de la controverse et non par un véritable désir de trouver la vérité.

2. *Des arguments meilleurs*

Nous reconnaissons donc que Clément a composé après le *Stromate* VII au moins un autre *Stromate* comprenant la section apologétique annon-

[73] C'était l'interprétation de Chr. Bunsen, *Analecta antenicena*, I (1854) 159; 167–200; en conséquence Bunsen attribuait aux *Hypotyposes* tous les fragments qui suivent le *Stromate* VII dans le *Laurentianus* (« Stromate VIII » en entier, *Excerpta* et *Eclogae*). A. Méhat, *op. cit.*, 522, se range à la même interprétation de la dernière phrase du *Stromate* VII et en conclut aussi que les *Hypotyposes* étaient la continuation des *Stromates*, mais il ne pense pas que les fragments qui suivent le *Stromate* VII appartenaient aux *Hypotyposes*; il y voit des notes que Clément aurait ajoutées aux *Stromates* comme un « couronnement provisoire ».

cée. La seule question qui puisse se poser est de savoir si, après cette section apologétique qui occupait le *Stromate* VIII et peut-être quelques autres *Stromates* encore, Clément n'aurait pas entrepris pour traiter de la «physique» un ouvrage nouveau qui serait les *Hypotyposes*. Trois sortes d'indices donnent à le penser:

A. On relève d'abord *des concordances typiques* entre la description des *Hypotyposes* par Photius et les extraits de la «physique» qui subsistent dans les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae*:

1) Photius affirme que les *Hypotyposes* réduisaient le Fils au rang d'une créature (εἰς κτίσμα κατάγει). Le fait est que dans les *Excerpta* le Fils est appelé «premier-créé» (πρωτόκτιστος).[74]

2) Photius rapporte en termes obscurs une théorie de la naissance d'Ève qu'il a lue dans les *Hypotyposes* et qui l'a scandalisé: Clément, dit-il, «affirme qu'Ève est sortie d'Adam, non pas de la manière qu'enseigne la doctrine ecclésiastique, mais d'une manière honteuse et indigne de Dieu». Cette phrase trouve son explication dans un autre passage des *Excerpta*: «L'élément mâle est resté en lui (*sc.* Adam), tandis que toute la semence féminine tirée de lui est devenue Eve.»[75] Ce texte qui présentait Ève comme issue d'une «semence» sortie d'Adam pendant son sommeil faisait penser à une éjaculation nocturne; d'où les termes indignés de Photius.

3) Les *Hypotyposes*, dit encore Photius, commentaient plusieurs livres de l'Écriture, parmi lesquels il nomme la *Genèse* et les *Psaumes*. Or nous trouvons précisément au début des *Eclogae* des extraits commentant les premiers versets de la *Genèse* et, à la fin, plusieurs versets des *Psaumes* 17 et 18 accompagnés de brèves explications.[76] Ajoutons que ces commentaires sont entremêlés d'autres citations de l'Écriture, ce qui correspond aussi à la description de Photius: «Il produit les paroles de l'Écriture de manière dispersée et brouillonne.»

4) Photius nous informe après Eusèbe[77] que Clément, dans les *Hypotyposes*, se présentait comme le disciple de Pantène. Cela aussi se vérifie dans les *Eclogae*: «Notre Pantène disait ...» (56,2 ὁ Πάνταινος δὲ ἡμῶν ἔλεγεν ...).

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[74] *Exc.* 20 Τὸ γὰρ «πρὸ ἑωσφόρου ἐγέννησά σε» (*Ps.* 109,3) οὕτως ἐξακούομεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρωτοκτίστου θεοῦ λόγου καὶ «πρὸ ἡλίου» καὶ σελήνης καὶ πρὸ πάσης κτίσεως «τὸ ὄνομά σου» (*Ps.* 71,17).

[75] *Exc.* 21,2 Οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ τὸ μὲν ἀρρενικὸν ἔμεινεν αὐτῷ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ θηλυκὸν σπέρμα ἀρθὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Εὔα γέγονεν. Cf. Bousset, *op. cit.*, 197.

[76] *Ecl.* 42–44; 51,1 à la fin.

[77] Eusèbe, *Hist. eccl.* 6,13,2.

5) On remarquera au surplus que les traits qui viennent d'être relevés dans les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae* s'y présentent dans l'ordre même où les donne la description de Photius.

B. C'est aussi ce que laissent entendre *quelques indications de Clément lui-même*:

1) Reportons-nous au début du *Stromate* IV. Clément avait donné au *Stromate* I un premier aperçu de ce qu'il comptait faire dans cet ouvrage: ce devait être essentiellement une «physique», après quelques préliminaires sur l'«éthique». Or au *Stromate* IV le voici qui annonce à nouveau son plan, parce qu'en progressant dans son travail la matière lui est apparue plus étendue et son plan primitif s'est modifié. J'ai déjà indiqué une innovation: Clément projette maintenant d'insérer entre l'éthique et la physique une section apologétique contre les Grecs et les Juifs. Mais je suis très frappé aussi par la manière dont il introduit ensuite la physique: 2,1 Ἐπὶ τούτοις ὕστερον ... Pourquoi se sert-il de deux expressions juxtaposées ἐπὶ τούτοις et ὕστερον? La première aurait suffi pour dire «ensuite». Je crois qu'il faut donner à ὕστερον son sens propre, «plus tard», et comprendre que Clément, voyant l'éthique s'étendre et les questions se multiplier, avait prévu dès ce moment-là de traiter la physique «plus tard», dans un autre ouvrage.

2) Prenons aussi le début du *Stromate* VI, où il indique ce qui lui reste à faire dans les *Stromates*: il ne mentionne plus que la section apologétique.

C. Enfin il n'est pas sans intérêt d'observer qu'Origène, sur qui l'œuvre de Clément a exercé une si profonde influence, a composé comme lui des *Stromates* et un traité «des principes» (début de la physique pour Clément) et que ce sont deux ouvrages distincts.

Tous ces indices se renforcent mutuellement et nous donnent des raisons suffisantes, à mon sens, de penser que Clément n'a pas exposé la physique dans les *Stromates* mais dans un autre ouvrage qui était les *Hypotyposes*. Dans ce cas, il convient de restituer aux *Hypotyposes* *Str.* VIII, ix, 25,1 à 33,9 traitant des «causes», les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae*. Nous avons alors la répartition suivante:

Ouvrages de Clément	Parties conservées dans le *Laurentianus*
STROMATES	
1) Éthique (*Stromates* I à VII)	*Str.* I–VII
2) Apologétique contre les Grecs et les Juifs (*Stromates* VIII à ?)	*Str.* VIII, i, 1,1 à viii, 24,6
HYPOTYPOSES	
1) Physique, première partie: critique des sectes:	
a) les philosophes: traité «des principes»	*Str.* VIII, ix, 25,1 à 33,9
b) les hérétiques	*Excerpta e Theodoto*
2) Physique, deuxième partie: «époptie» ou commentaire allégorique de passages de l'Écriture	*Eclogae propheticae*

On voit maintenant ce qu'est l'édition des *Stromates* dans le *Laurentianus*. Elle n'est pas la reproduction exacte de celle de Clément, mais l'œuvre d'un copiste qui avait à copier les *Stromates* avec leur suite, les *Hypotyposes*, et qui, manquant de papyrus, de temps ou de courage, n'a transcrit à partir du *Stromate* VIII que des extraits.

7. De quelques citations anciennes des «Eclogae»

Peut-être objectera-t-on que plusieurs auteurs ont cité des passages des *Eclogae* sous le nom de «Stromate VIII». Les chaînes nous ont conservé en effet un fragment d'Acace de Césarée citant *Ecl.* 17 (ὁ θεὸς – σώζει) en l'attribuant au *Stromate* VIII: καὶ ἐν τῷ η΄ δὲ Στρωματεῖ ἀθετεῖ τὴν περὶ τοῦ προεῖναι τὰς ψυχὰς δόξαν λέγων αὐταῖς λέξεσιν (suit la citation).[78] Le même passage, mais allant jusqu'au mot χάριτι, est encore donné par le florilège de Léonce et Jean sous le lemme: Κλήμεντος ἐκ τοῦ η΄ Στρώματος.[79] Enfin les *Sacra parallela* citent sous ce même lemme *Ecl.* 11 (φωβητέον – δι' ἃ ἡ νόσος) puis *Ecl.* 20 (ἀγάπη – σωτήριος).[80] Au vu de ces citations, Zahn estimait que les *Eclogae* devaient appartenir depuis l'origine au *Stromate* VIII, et qu'il en allait

[78] R. Devreesse, *Les anciens commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque et des Rois (fragments tirés des chaines)*, Studi e Testi 201 (Rome 1959) 114, sur *Gen.* 3, 21, lignes 12–17.

[79] Cf. Zahn, *op. cit.*, 29.

[80] K. Holl, *Fragmente vornicänischer Kirchenväter aus den Sacra Parallela*, Texte und Unters., 20, 2 (Leipzig 1899) 110.

naturellement de même des *Excerpta e Theodoto*, puisqu'ils sont compris entre le titre Στρωματεὺς ὄγδοος et les *Eclogae*.[81]

Mais c'est accorder à ces témoignages une portée qu'ils n'ont pas. Que prouvent-ils en effet? Ils prouvent qu'Acace de Césarée, Léonce et Jean, l'auteur des *Sacra parallela* dépendent d'un exemplaire des *Stromates* dans lequel les *Eclogae* et les *Excerpta* figuraient à la suite du titre «Stromate VIII» et paraissaient appartenir à ce *Stromate* comme c'est le cas dans le *Laurentianus*, mais ils ne prouvent pas du tout que cet exemplaire reflétait l'état primitif du texte. Deux considérations, nous l'avons vu, s'y opposent:

1) L'impossibilité de faire tenir tant de matières dans un seul *Stromate*. Nous y rencontrons successivement un développement sur la démonstration, un autre sur les causes, des extraits d'un exposé et d'une réfutation de Théodote et d'autres hérétiques, des extraits d'un commentaire de l'Écriture traitant spécialement de la création du monde. Voilà au moins quatre matières différentes. Aucun des autres *Stromates* n'est aussi dispersé dans son objet. Et si l'on tient compte que nous n'avons là que des extraits, on mesure des dimensions que devait avoir l'exposé intégral et l'invraisemblance qu'il y a à l'attribuer à un *Stromate* unique.

2) Rappelons-nous les déclarations de Clément. Il n'annonçait pour le *Stromate* VIII que la section apologétique contre les Grecs et les Juifs. On peut rattacher à cette section le début de *Str.* VIII, mais non le développement sur les causes, les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae* qui correspondent aux deux parties de la physique.

Je ne pense donc pas que ces citations comportent la conclusion que Zahn en a tirée, mais elles n'en n'offrent pas moins un très grand intérêt en nous apprenant que l'édition transmise dans le *Laurentianus* était déjà connue d'Acace de Césarée au IV^e^ siècle et en nous fournissant ainsi un jalon pour l'histoire des éditions antiques des *Stromates*.

8. Les éditions antiques des Stromates

Il convient désormais d'en distinguer trois:

1) Il y eut d'abord l'édition intégrale faite par Clément.

Une question se pose à son sujet: combien de *Stromates* comprenait-elle? Huit, répondront les bons élèves, puisqu'Eusèbe l'a dit.[82] Mais il faudrait être sûr qu'Eusèbe a bien connu l'édition intégrale. Nous venons

[81] Zahn, *op. cit.*, 119–121.
[82] Eusèbe, *Hist. eccl.* 6, 13,1.

de voir que l'évêque Acace de Césarée n'a eu en mains que l'édition abrégée qui nous arrive dans le *Laurentianus*. Or Acace était le successeur d'Eusèbe et se servait de la bibliothèque laissée par celui-ci. Il est donc très probable qu'Eusèbe ne disposait lui-même que de cet exemplaire abrégé. C'est une erreur de croire qu'il a connu tous les auteurs anciens dans des éditions conformes à l'original. Les copies qu'il possédait avait été déjà exposées aux vicissitudes ordinaires de la transmission des textes. Par exemple, son exemplaire du commentaire d'Origène sur *Osée* était mutilé du début et de la fin.[83] Il n'a pas eu non plus le grand commentaire d'Origène sur les *Psaumes* dans son intégralité; il y manquait plusieurs tomes, et l'un des tomes conservés n'avait que le début.[84] Ses copies étaient aussi déparées par des fautes.[85] Il n'est donc pas du tout assuré qu'il ait eu à sa disposition une édition complète des *Stromates*; nous avons lieu de craindre au contraire qu'il n'ait connu que le manuscrit consulté par son successeur Acace et qui était semblable au *Laurentianus*. Son témoignage sur le nombre des *Stromates* n'est donc pas décisif.

Clément, toujours prolixe, a-t-il réussi à condenser l'apologétique contre les Grecs et les Juifs en un seul *Stromate* ou a-t-il été amené à en écrire plusieurs? Nous n'avons pas le moyen de la savoir.[86]

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[83] Eusèbe avait reproduit dans la *Vie de Pamphile* le catalogue de la bibliothèque de ce dernier (*Hist. eccl.* 6,32,3), qu'il avait héritée et qui devint la bibliothèque épiscopale lorsque lui-même accéda à l'épiscopat. La partie de ce catalogue qui concerne Origène a été traduite en latin par Jérôme dans son *Ep.* 33,4, à Paula. Elle porte: *In Osee commentarium*, alors que pour tous les autres prophètes elle indique le nombre de tomes. Jérôme, qui a eu en main l'exemplaire de la bibliothèque de Césarée (*De uiris inl.* 75), nous fournit l'explication de cette singularité dans son propre commentaire d'Osée (*praef.*; P.L. 25,819AB): *Origenes ... de hoc propheta scripsit ... uolumen* ἀκέφαλον καὶ ἀτέλεστον, *quod et capite careat et fine*. La disparition des premières et des dernières pages du volume avait empêché l'auteur du catalogue de savoir si ce tome commentait tout Osée ou s'il était précédé ou suivi d'autres tomes.

[84] Le même catalogue énumère les tomes afférents à chaque psaume. Beaucoup de psaumes ne sont pas représentés, et on lit pour le *Ps.* 74: «In *principio* LXX^{mi}. II^{di}. librum I.»

[85] N'en citons qu'une, qui a eu une influence malheureuse sur la chronologie de l'*Histoire ecclésiastique*: la copie de la liste des évêques de Rome dont s'est servi Eusèbe donnait à Xyste 11 ans de règne (7,27,1) au lieu de 11 mois.

[86] Avons-nous une indication dans la dernière phrase du *Stromate* VII: Καὶ δὴ μετὰ τὸν ἕβδομον τοῦτον ἡμῖν Στρωματέα τῶν ἑξῆς ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ποιησόμεθα τὸν λόγον? Zahn, *op. cit.*, 107, n. 3, interprète τῶν ἑξῆς comme un masculin signifiant «les Stromates suivants». Cette traduction peut être exacte (cf. VII, xv, 89,1 τὸν ἑξῆς Στρωματέα), et dans ce cas nous aurions la preuve que Clément envisageait plusieurs *Stromates* pour la section apologétique. Mais il se peut aussi que τῶν ἑξῆς soit un neutre: «la suite». Cette solution parait même la plus probable dans la mesure ou l'expression ποιησόμεθα τὸν λόγον semble appeler un complément indiquant la

2) Vint ensuite l'édition qui nous est parvenue: un copiste y a transcrit les *Stromates* I à VII *in extenso*, puis des extraits des derniers *Stromates* et des *Hypotyposes*. Il ne fit pas un résumé proprement dit; il garda simplement quelques passages qui l'intéressaient spécialement. Il retint d'abord des développements dans lesquels il trouvait une information philosophique sur la démonstration et sur les causes. Puis il fit de copieux emprunts à ce que Clément disait de la doctrine de Théodote, car il y avait là une documentation plus riche que celle des hérésiologues. Ensuite son choix s'oriente dans deux directions: certaines exégèses de textes scripturaires lui ont plu, et il s'est attaché d'autre part à des morceaux d'intérêt documentaire: l'un rapportait une exégèse de Tatien (*Ecl.* 38,1), d'autres citaient une *Apocalypse de Pierre* (*Ecl.* 41,2; 48,1; 49,1) et une *Prédication de Pierre* (*Ecl.* 58) qui ne figuraient pas dans la Bible, un autre enfin nommait Pantène (*Ecl.* 56,2). Ce copiste travaillait au III^e^ siècle. Son exemplaire, ou une copie de celui-ci, est entré dans la bibliothèque de Césarée, où il a servi à l'évêque Acace et probablement déjà à Eusèbe, et il est l'ancêtre du *Laurentianus*.

3) Enfin nous connaissons par Photius une édition qui ne comprenait plus que les *Stromates* I à VII suivis du *Quis dives saluetur*.[87] Elle dérivait vraisemblablement d'une copie de l'édition précédente dans laquelle on avait supprimé le « Stromate VIII » (y compris les *Excerpta* et les *Eclogae*) soit à cause de son caractère morcelé soit encore parce que le copiste s'est aperçu que ce « Stromate VIII » était composé en grande partie de passages qui se lisaient d'autre part dans les *Hypotyposes*.[88]

Pour conclure, je résumerai les points principaux de cette étude en quatre propositions dont je tiens les trois premières pour certaines et la quatrième pour extrêmement probable:

1. Les textes qui suivent le *Stromate* VII dans le *Laurentianus* ne sont ni des brouillons ou notes de lecture publiés par Clément ou par ses légataires, ni des notes de cours qu'il aurait prises à l'école de Pantène

matière qui sera traitée plutôt que le titre des livres. Nous restons donc dans l'incertitude.

[87] Photius, *Bibl.* 111.

[88] Peut-être y eut-il d'autres manuscrits grecs ou syriaques qui s'arrêtaient à *Str.* VIII, 16, si l'on prend à la lettre le Cod. Mus. Brit. Add. 14533, f. 137 a, qui cite ce passage en syriaque avec le lemme: « De Clément l'auteur des Stromates. *Fin du livre VIII* » (Zahn, *op. cit.*, 28; 116). Mais ces derniers mots peuvent avoir été provoqués simplement par la présence, quelques lignes plus loin, d'une rubrique qui laissait croire que le *Stromate* VIII s'arrêtait là (éd. Stählin, III, 90,7).

et dont il se serait déjà servi dans les *Stromates* précédents, mais des fragments qu'un copiste a extraits de l'œuvre de Clément.

2. Ces extraits proviennent de la suite des *Stromates* telle que Clément l'a annoncée à plusieurs reprises.

3. Cette suite des *Stromates* comprenait: 1° un huitième *Stromate* – et peut-être d'autres encore – consacré à l'apologétique contre les Grecs et les Juifs (d'où vient *Str.* VIII, i, 1,1 à viii, 24,6); 2° d'autres tomes contenant la « physique » (d'où viennent *Str.* VIII, ix, 25,1 à 33,9, les *Excerpta e Theodoto* et les *Eclogae propheticae*).

4. Plusieurs indices tendent à prouver que ces autres tomes contenant la « physique » étaient ceux des *Hypotyposes*.

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THE ORIGIN OF FALSEHOOD

SOME COMMENTS ON THE INTRODUCTORY PASSAGE OF THE TREATISE "ON THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD" ATTRIBUTED TO ATHENAGORAS

BY

J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

The author, whose identity may be left undiscussed here[1], begins his treatment of the problem of the resurrection with a speculation on the origin of falsehood. The text runs as follows:

Παντὶ δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἀληθείας ἐχομένῳ παραφύεταί τι ψεῦδος· παραφύεται δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ὑποκειμένης τινὸς ἀρχῆς κατὰ φύσιν ὁρμώμενον ἢ τῆς κατ' αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον αἰτίας, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ἔκθεσμον σποράν ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς ἀληθείας τετιμηκότων σπουδαζόμενον. 2. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν εὑρεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν πάλαι ταῖς περὶ τούτων φροντίσιν ἐσχολακότων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων πρός τε τοὺς ἑαυτῶν πρεσβυτέρους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοχρόνους γενομένης διαφορᾶς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν ἐν μέσῳ στρεφομένων ταραχῆς. οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀληθῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατέλιπον ἀσυκοφάντητον, οὐ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ τὴν γνῶσιν, οὐ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, οὐ τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς καθ' εἱρμὸν ἑπόμενα καὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν ὑπογράφοντα λόγον· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν πάντῃ καὶ καθάπαξ ἀπογινώσκουσιν τὴν περὶ τούτων ἀλήθειαν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς διαστρέφουσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν ἀπορεῖν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν (c. 1,1–2).

The structure of this introductory speculation is clear enough. The author asserts that *some falsehood* grows up alongside every true doctrine. He then indicates the *source* of this growth and shows how the history of human thinking *illustrates* this theory.

The way, however, in which the author elaborates his ideas deserves some closer examination. Only then one detects the background of thinking which lies behind this, at first sight, rather common speculation.

In the opening sentence the words τῆς ἐν τούτοις ἀληθείας ἐχομένῳ

[1] See R.M. Grant, Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras, *Harvard Theological Review* 47 (1954) 121–9.

draw the attention of the reader. The author speaks of every doctrine or word (argument) "that sticks to the truth therein". Is this just a somewhat affected expression for "every true doctrine"? One should, however, realize that the formula "a doctrine sticking to the truth" evokes a special idea of 'the truth'. Here truth is not the accordance between reality and verbal expression, but it indicates 'the true reality'. A true doctrine is a doctrine that sticks to that reality.

But, one may ask, how then can we explain ἐν τούτοις? This pronoun must refer to δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ, i.e. to the verbal expression of the truth. This difficulty has been solved by some authors through an emendation of the text; they read ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. There is, however, no need for any emendation. Every doctrine that sticks to the truth, sticks only to a part of the truth, namely to the part *expressed in that doctrine*, and this is exactly what ἐν τούτοις means.

Παραφύεταί τι ψεῦδος – Falsehood grows alongside (παρα-) every true doctrine. The image here is that of the weed growing in a field, and growing there unduly.

Παραφύεται δὲ οὐκ ... – Of course the question arises where the weed comes from. The author gives first a negative answer, which is not easy to understand. Literally he says: "it does not grow naturally (κατὰ φύσιν ὁρμώμενον) from an underlying source nor from the (τῆς) cause that is in the essence of everything"; and then he adds "but it is the result of the endeavour (σπουδαζόμενον) of those who have valued the sowing of spurious seed to destroy the truth". This positive answer reminds one of *Mt.* 13,24 ff., esp. 27–28 "Lord, did you not sow good seed in your field? Where does the weed then come from? He answered: an enemy has done this."

But how can we understand the negative answer? This becomes clear, if one elaborates the image used by the author. One may ask: what place has the truth in this image? The answer is: truth is the field itself with the good seed in it. This field, this seed do not bring forth falsehood, but only true doctrines, true words. Now one understands the negative answer: 'falsehood does not originate from *some underlying source* (in other words, there is no *seed* in the field that makes it grow naturally), nor is there anything *in the essence of everything* (i.e., in the ground itself) that causes falsehood.'

The Codex Parisinus Gr. 451 (written in 914) presents in the margin of the text a resumé of the successive chapters by Arethas. That of the present paragraph runs as follows:

Ὅτι παντὶ δόγματι καὶ λόγῳ ἀληθείας ἐχομένῳ παρυφίσταταί τι ψεῦδος, οὐκ ἐκ φυσικῆς αἰτίας ὁρμώμενον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀθέσμου τῆς ἀληθείας διαφθορᾶς τῶν τὸ ψεῦδος τετιμηκότων ἐκ κακοσχόλων καὶ συκοφαντεῖν ἅπαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ θεῖον ἐσπουδακότων.[2]

Arethas expresses the theory without making use of the image of the field and the weed. Falsehood does not originate "from any physical cause", he says, but from the lawless deeds of those who intend to destroy the truth.

This explanation of falsehood reminds one of the famous theory concerning the origin of *evil*, according to which evil has no real existence because it does not originate from a physical cause but from the will of the wrong-doer.

τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν εὑρεῖν ... – This paragraph serves to illustrate the author's thesis concerning the origin of falsehood. He says: "This may be gathered first from those who long ago concerned themselves with reflections on these matters and the discord which arose between them and their predecessors and contemporaries, but also and by no means least of all, from the confusion which characterizes the discussion of matters currently debated" (tr. Schoedel[3]). One wonders *how* this διαφορά or ταραχή is an argument in favour of the author's thesis. This must become clear from what follows: "For such men have left no truth free from misrepresentation." However, even after this explanation one might ask: where does the force of this argument lie? It says that "such men" behaved like συκόφανται towards every truth. This argument only holds if that 'truth' is a given reality, which can be 'mishandled'.

Thinking over the argument of the author we have found here indeed the idea which is behind it, namely the conviction that 'the truth' was given to man at the beginning. One finds the same idea in an early Christian author, almost contemporary with the supposed writer of the present treatise, *viz.*, in Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho*. He speaks of the only true philosophy, sent down to men in early times, of which the different philosophic schools are aberrations (*Dial.* 2,1).[4] This philosophy, which is 'the truth', was sent to Moses and the prophets. And Christianity, being the fulfilment of the prophecies, is now the only true philosophy.

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[2] O. von Gebhardt, *Der Arethascodex Paris. Gr.* 451, T.U. I,3 (Leipzig 1883) 186.

[3] Athenagoras, *Legatio* and *De Resurrectione*, edited and translated by W.R. Schoedel, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford 1972).

[4] Cf. my *An Early Christian Philosopher. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, Chapters one to nine* (Leiden 1971).

Only against the background of this basic idea the argument under discussion is valid. It says: "Such men have left no truth free from misrepresentation, not the nature of God, not his knowledge, not his activity, nor all that logically flows from these and traces the outlines of our religious teaching" (cf. tr. Schoedel). The last observation[5] points out that, according to the author, the outlines of Christian doctrine have already been sketched by the truth as it was given in the beginning (cf. the theory of Justin mentioned above).

Finally, the author describes the different attitudes of those who do not accept that truth. "Some of them simply reject it,[6] others distort it after the model of their own thinking, others exercise themselves in doubting even what is obvious." Thus some falsehood grows up alongside every true doctrine, as the initial sentence said.

The above observations may show again how commentaries on the early Christian writers are badly needed. Only a commentary supplies the ingredient for a clear understanding and an exact rendering.

Leiden, Haarlemmerstraat 106

[5] Schoedel translates "and *follows the lines* of our religious teaching", which seems to be incorrect.

[6] Schoedel: "Some of them simply despair of knowing the truth concerning these things." This is rather the attitude of the third group.

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NOTE SUR UN LIEU DE CASSIODORE FAISANT ALLUSION AUX SEPT LIVRES D'AMBROISE SUR LES PATRIARCHES

PAR

E. LUCCHESI

Dans un passage du *De institutione divinarum litterarum*, Cassiodore attribue à saint Ambroise sept livres «sur les Patriarches»: *Item sanctus Ambrosius de Patriarchis septem libros edidit, qui multa loca Veteris Testamenti factis quaestionibus suaviter enodavit.*[1]

Un autre passage plus loin, dans le même ouvrage de Cassiodore, vient ensuite préciser qu'Ambroise parle d'Isaac au troisième livre «des Patriarches»: *Unde etiam et sanctus Ambrosius in libro tertio Patriarcharum, ubi de persona Isaac loquitur, multa salubriter luculenterque disseruit.*[2]

Il s'agit maintenant de concilier ces données de Cassiodore avec la tradition manuscrite d'Ambroise.

Puisque donc le *De Isaac* réclame pour lui la troisième place, il s'ensuit logiquement que le *De Noe* et le *De Abraham* doivent occuper respectivement les deux premières. Les deux livres dont est divisé le *De Abraham* semblent ainsi n'avoir été comptés que pour un seul. En effet, outre qu'on voit mal pourquoi le *De Noe* n'aurait pas été assimilé aux traités concernant les Patriarches, ce commentaire, plus que les autres, paraît fort bien répondre au genre littéraire «Questions et Réponses», sur lequel insiste précisément Cassiodore, même si Ambroise semble avoir oublié Noé, lorsqu'au début du *De Ioseph*, en retraçant les grandes figures patriarcales antérieures, il mentionne uniquement Abraham, Isaac et Jacob.[3]

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[1] 1 (PL 70, 1111 B).

[2] 5 (PL 70, 1117 B).

[3] *Sanctorum uita ceteris norma uiuendi est, ideoque digestam plenius accipimus seriem scripturarum, ut dum Abraham, Isaac et Iacob ceterosque iustos legendo cognoscimus ...* (éd. Schenkl, CSEL 32/2, 73,1–3: *ceterosque* espacé par nous). Par contre, le *De Abraham* 1,1,1 se rattache visiblement au *De Noe*, qui ouvre cette série d'exégèses, tout en en annonçant implicitement d'autres: *Abraham libri huius titulus est, quoniam per ordinem huius quoque patriarchae gesta considerare animum subiit* (CSEL 32/1, 501,1–2, espacé par nous). Cf. *De Abraham* 2,1,1: *Unde non absurdum reor referre ad altiora sensum et per historiam diuersarum personarum uirtutis formae quendam processum explicare ...* (Schenkl, CSEL 32/1, 564, 11–13). Le *diuersarum personarum* fait certainement allusion aux histoires des Patriarches qu'Ambroise a l'intention de présenter à son public. Ceci implique que l'évêque milanais prévoyait un cycle complet d'exégèses concernant les Patriarches.

Schenkl, qui dédouble le *De Abraham* et le *De Iacob* divisés chacun en deux livres, non seulement il élimine le *De Noe* et le *De fuga*, mais il est aussi obligé, pour atteindre le chiffre sept, de compter ensemble le *De Isaac* et le *De bono mortis*, d'une part, et le *De Ioseph* et le *De Patriarchis* ou *De benedictionibus Patriarcharum*, de l'autre.[4]

Si nous intégrons le *De Noe* au corpus de Cassiodore, à juste titre croyons-nous, nous sommes entièrement d'accord avec la position de Schenkl, pour voir dans le *De Isaac* et le *De bono mortis*, un seul traité exégétique primitif en deux livres. Rien que la conclusion du premier et l'entrée en matière du second suffiraient à le prouver.[5] Du reste, le thème du *De bono mortis*, tel que ce titre le laisse clairement entendre, ne se comprend que comme deuxième «volet» de celui, plus général, du *De Isaac*, c'est-à-dire l'élévation de l'âme (le titre complet étant en effet *De Isaac vel anima*), dont la mort corporelle est l'ultime délivrance; ce en quoi Schenkl a raison de ne point les séparer.

Mais nous contestons le fait que le *De Ioseph* et le *De Patriarchis* aient pu former à l'origine un ouvrage commun. Les «Bénédictions des Patriarches» ont fait l'objet, avant même Ambroise, de traités distincts, comme l'atteste l'œuvre homonyme d'Hippolyte qui n'irait pas sans points de rencontre avec notre texte.

Enfin, l'exclusion du *De fuga* de cet ensemble de commentaires ambrosiens nous semble également erronée. Car le *De fuga* n'est pas un écrit tardif, ainsi qu'on s'accordait à le considérer depuis Buecheler.[6] Ce livre est en revanche à dater des années 385 à 387, au plus tard, comme l'a bien montré Szabó,[7] et non pas vers le fin de la vie d'Ambroise, comme le fait encore Dassmann, en s'appuyant sur des critères internes.[8] N'oublions pas d'ailleurs que les manuscrits ambrosiens du Moyen âge rangent aussi

[4] CSEL 32/1, *Praef.*, IIII–V.

[5] La formule *superiore libro* du début, 1,1 du *De bono mortis* (CSEL 32/1, 703,1) n'est pas sans rappeler celle, identique, du deuxième livre du *De Iacob*, 1,1 (CSEL 32/2, 31,9).

[6] Voir F. Buecheler, Coniectanea, *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* N.F. 43 (1888) 293–4, d'où dépandent plus au moins les recherches ultérieures de datation: cf. M. Ihm, *Studia Ambrosiana* (Leipzig 1889) 17–9; Schenkl, CSEL 32/2, *Praef.*, XII; et J.-R. Palanque, *Saint Ambroise et l'Empire romain* (Paris 1933) Appendice III, 549–50.

[7] C'est ce qu'il appelle les années de «transition», caractérisées par l'influence nouvelle d'Origène et du néo-platonisme, par rapport à la Ie période, marquée par l'utilisation servile de Philon, et à la IIe période (387–397), celle des écrits christocentriques et de la théologie «pastorale»: voir F. Szabó, *Le Christ créateur chez saint Ambroise* (Roma 1968) 19–23.

[8] Voir E. Dassmann, *Die Frömmigkeit des Kirchenvaters Ambrosius von Mailand* (Münster i.W. 1965) 46, n. 217.

le *De fuga* après le *De bono mortis*, place qui semble nettement mieux lui convenir.

Cependant, nous nous séparons de Szabó pour ce qui est du problème des sources. Nous avons déjà démontré ailleurs comment la dépendance immédiate de Philon doit normalement s'arrêter, dans le cycle ambrosien des Patriarches, au *De Noe* et au deuxième livre du *De Abraham*, alors que les commentaires suivants, jusqu'au *De fuga* inclus, auraient comme source directe Origène. Les séquelles de «philonismes» d'usage moins systématique, qui s'observeront encore par la suite, et les traces de néo-platonisme, qui seront de plus en plus perceptibles, passeraient elles aussi par Origène. De celui-ci, nous pensions même pouvoir identifier l'ouvrage, maintenant perdu, qui aurait servi à Ambroise pour l'élaboration de ses propres traités ou sermons scripturaires, à savoir les *Homiliae mysticae* connues grâce au catalogue des écrits origéniens dans la célèbre *Lettre à Paula* de Jérôme.[9]

Cette unicité de source nous fournit alors une preuve supplémentaire, pour réinsérer le *De fuga* dans l'ordre chronologique qui est bien celui suggéré par les manuscrits médiévaux et, probablement aussi, celui visé par Cassiodore, dont nous connaîtrions indirectement l'intention sous-jacente à son renseignement.

Pour récapituler, le *De Noe*, le *De Abraham* en deux livres, le *De Isaac* (doublé du *De bono mortis*), auquel revient justement la troisième place, le *De fuga*, à situer en quatrième position, le *De Iacob* en deux livres, le *De Ioseph* et, pour terminer, le *De Patriarchis*, à classer séparément, formeraient donc la liste des sept livres d'Ambroise «sur les Patriarches» de la notice de Cassiodore, qui doit vraisemblablement refléter une tradition plus ancienne, voire celle remontant jusqu'à l'auteur.

À supposer même que le groupement dont témoigne Cassiodore soit purement arbitraire,[10] l'étude approfondie des sources ayant trait aux travaux exégétiques d'Ambroise confirme que tels sont les livres que doit regrouper tout classement qui se veut tant soit peu fondé.

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[9] Voir notre étude monographique, *L'Usage de Philon dans l'œuvre exégétique de saint Ambroise* (à paraître aux éditions E.J. Brill, Leyde): l'argumentation centrale de cette thèse se trouve exposée aux chapitres III–V. À notre avis, non le *De fuga*, mais le *De Abraham* constituerait l'élément de charnière entre les écrits «philoniens» et les écrits «origéniens», du fait que le second livre est un vrai plagiat des *Quaestiones in Genesim* de Philon, tandis que le premier serait une «Überarbeitung» d'une ou de plusieurs homélies «mystiques» d'Origène, et donc en réalité postérieur dans le temps.

[10] Telle est l'opinion de Palanque qui nie toute liaison intrinsèque entre ces divers commentaires bibliques (*op. cit.*, Appendice II, 442–3).

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COLUMBANUS AND GILDAS

BY

MICHAEL WINTERBOTTOM

A high authority, Ludwig Bieler, has rightly remarked that the letters and sermons of Columbanus alike show a rhetoric 'elaborate in form but simple and direct in concept – a rhetoric which is the heritage of the great preachers of Christian antiquity and of post-Roman Gaul'.[1] Columbanus is no stranger to anaphora and other forms of repetition (*rogat itaque rex rogatque regina, rogant te toti, ut, quam celerrime possit fieri, fiant omnia unum, fiat ut patriae pax, pax fiat mox fidei, ut toti deinceps grex unus Christi fiat*);[2] to balance and antithesis (*coram Deo et angelis non confundar; laus est pro Deo coram hominibus confundi. si exaudiar, commune lucrum erit; si despiciar, mea merces erit*);[3] to accumulation with assonance (*qui potestatem habes omnia ordinandi, bellum instituendi, duces excitandi, arma corripi iubendi, aciem construendi, tubas undique sonandi, certamen demum, te in fronte gradiente, ineundi*);[4] to sustained metaphor,[5] to vivid

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[1] In *Sancti Columbani Opera* ed. G.S.M. Walker (Dublin 1970) lxxxi. I have learned nothing from A. Quacquarelli, La prosa d'arte di S. Colombano, *Vet. Christ.* 3 (1966) 5–24.

[2] *Ep.* 5,17. I restrict my examples to this letter, which is my primary concern here. References to the letter are henceforth given only by Walker's section number. Cf. also 2 (anaphora of *quis*, with increasing sentence length), 3 (anaphora of *nullus*), 6 (anaphora of *hic*), 8 (*nescio quae corda, quae aures, qui sensus* ...), 12 (repeated *pro* and *post*).

[3] 3. Cf. e.g. 2 *quid enim tacebit peregrinus Christianus, quod iam diu declamat vicinus Arrianus?*; 5 *tua vigilantia multorum erit salus, sicut e contrario tua securitas multorum erit vastatio*; 12 *ita ut libertas veritati ubique ab omnibus detur, et aditus errori ab omnibus similiter abnegetur.*

[4] 7. Cf. 4 *conserva fidem apostolicam, confirma testimonio, robora scripto, muni synodo.*

[5] 3 (sea); 4 (sheep); 7 (war). It is perhaps worth noting that Columbanus' image of his 'fragile boat' (8: see also below, n. 16) is unduly abbreviated by Walker's punctuation and translation. The shape is: *sed quia fragilis ingenii cymba non tam in altum ... ducta est quam adhuc in uno haereat loco (non enim charta totum comprehendere potest quod animus ... epistolae angustiis concludere voluit), dum* [codd.: *tum* Walker] *a rege rogor ut ... suggeram ... negotium doloris (dolor namque suus est schisma ...; fertur enim*

proverbs,[6] to word-play.[7] All this is only surprising because of its date. What would be commonplace in Caesarius in the early sixth century may seem a miracle in Columbanus in the early seventh. *Amor autem pacis evangelicae totum me dicere cogit, ut vobis sit stupor ambobus* (11) – and that may be true of the style too.

If it was a miracle, it was a miracle wrought in Ireland, home of an unforced rhetoric and of grammatical correctness[8] when standards were beginning to slip on the continent. But what of the other side of Columbanus' style, the occasional descent into bombast, obscurity and arcane vocabulary? Should we lay stress on the heritage of fifth-century Gaul, of Sidonius Apollinaris and Paulinus of Nola, or on something in Columbanus' Irish past? Or should we speculate, as another high authority, Professor Mohrmann, has done,[9] that these influences are ultimately the same thing, that Gaul originally supplied the mannerism that Ireland fostered? I should hesitate to answer the question generally. In this article, however, I hope to show from Columbanus' fifth letter that he was thoroughly familiar with a British writer, Gildas, and that his style as well as his thought at times carries Gildas' imprint.

We know that Columbanus was acquainted with the writings of Gildas. He names him in successive sections (6–7) of the first letter, alluding first to a passage of the *De excidio*, then to a letter to Finnian of which we know a fragment. If Columbanus draws on the *De excidio* in the fifth letter, it is primarily because of a similarity in content. Gildas had analysed the history of Britain up to his own time (c. 550) to demonstrate that sin brings inevitable punishment by foreign invasion, and proceeded to lambast the secular and religious authorities of his day for their part in the decline in morals. For Gildas, as for Sallust and Orosius, peace and

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dixisse, si certum sciret, et ipse crederet), redeamus ad librum, quem iuxta ripam dimisimus. That is, I do not wish to get stuck on a subsidiary point, and, as the king has asked me to put a particular case, I shall return to it. The *librum* is nothing to do with the Edict of Justinian, as Walker would have it, but Columbanus' own letter, which he compares to a boat which he has left near the shore instead of sailing it out into the open sea.

[6] 3 *sub prunas, ut dicitur, faciem ponam*; cf. perhaps 9 *non enim ignem flare potest os farina ... plenum.*

[7] 5 (Vigilius, *speculator*).

[8] In this letter one is offended only, perhaps, by *alternantem convertibulum* (presumably neuter) in 4; but I doubt if the noun is correctly transmitted. Among Irish products of comparable quality, I think e.g. of the *de duodecim abusivis saeculi.*

[9] The earliest continental Irish Latin, *Vig. Christ.* 16 (1962) 216–33.

prosperity only brought a breakdown in standards, marked in his own day by civil war and neglect of justice and the class structure.[10] Columbanus too is concerned with discord. Urged on by the Lombard king Agilulf, he calls on the Pope, Boniface IV, to bring an end to the schism caused by the 'Three Chapters' controversy, a schism that cut off the Lombard churches from the mother church of Rome.[11] It is a measure of Gildas' influence that Columbanus sees the ultimate cause of this split, not very convincingly, in prosperity: *multi per prosperitatem infelicissimae abundantiae decepti sunt* (5), and regards it as God's punishment for earlier vices: *in hoc spiritali bello victi sumus etiam Christiani, vitiis primum carnalibus ac pomposa conversatione, deinde fidei vacillantis tepore, qua infirmata inimicis nostris dum non sensimus circumdati sumus triplicibus, qui dati sunt nobis ad vindictam nostrae luxuriosae securitatis. omnium enim malorum causa est caeca prosperitatis securitas* (7).[12]

Along with this similarity of diagnosis go resemblances of detail. Much of the letter, which, though long, has few dominant themes, is devoted to a defence of Columbanus' action in writing at all. It may seem presumptuous for an Irishman to address a pope; but the times demand that he should speak out.[13] Gildas had started with an elaborate preface, explaining his own decision to publish his book. He began: *in hac epistola quicquid deflendo potius quam declamando, vili licet stilo, tamen benigno, fuero prosecutus, ne quis me affectu cunctos spernentis omnibusve melioris, quippe qui commune bonorum dispendium malorumque cumulum lacrimosis querelis defleam, sed condolentis patriae incommoditatibus miseriisque eius ac remediis condelectantis edicturum putet. quia non tam fortissimorum militum enuntiare trucis belli pericula mihi statutum est quam desidiosorum, silui, fateor, cum inmenso cordis dolore, ut mihi renum scrutator testis est dominus, spatio bilustri temporis vel eo amplius praetereuntis, imperitia sic ut et nunc una cum vilibus me meritis inhibentibus ne qualemcumque admoni-*

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[10] See my article The preface of Gildas' *De Excidio*, forthcoming in the *Transactions of the Cymmrodorion Society*.

[11] See Walker, xxix–xxxi; J. Rivière, Saint Colomban et le jugement du pape hérétique, *Rev. des sciences rél.* 3 (1923) 277–82.

[12] The idea of *securitas* is vital to the letter. It afflicted everyone (8), and Columbanus hints it may afflict Boniface (4–5). He, who has the *cura* of so many (4), must show *cura* '*ut non perdatis vestram dignitatem*' (11).

[13] 2 *respondeo non esse praesumptionem ubi constat esse necessitatem*; the ideas are combined in 3 *necessariae insinuationem praesumptionis meae*. Cf. also 14 *ubi necessitas cogat* (= *Ep.*1,2); 16 *necessitate magis quam cenodoxia scribere coactus sum*. Gildas was *coactus* too – *seu cogitatuum rationibus vel fratrum religiosis precibus* (1).

tiunculam scriberem. Columbanus uses some of these ideas at different places in his letter. *Quid enim tacebit peregrinus Christianus, quod iam diu declamat*[14] *vicinus Arrianus?* (2). Columbanus, then, will not be silent any more than Gildas had been. And his letter, however it may sound to us, is not designed as an echo of the 'declamation' of the Arians. It, like Gildas' letter, will be 'tearful'[15] – *dolendum enim ac deflendum est si in sede apostolica fides catholica non tenetur* (9), dealing in lament rather than words – *lacrimis in his opus est magis quam verbis* (12). That, after all, is more appropriate for someone who affects to doubt his right to speak at all: Columbanus (2), like Gildas (36), regards himself as *vilissimae qualitatis*, and he, like Gildas, can only launch a fragile bark on to the stormy waves.[16] All the same, however feeble they may be, their job is to 'announce their sins to the house of Jacob, their wickedness to the house of Israel' (Is. 58,1; Gildas 36), or at least to encourage another to do so (Columbanus 5). Only in this way can the Lord's army, *in campo potius torpentis quam pugnantis* (Columbanus 7: cf. Gildas 1 *non tam fortissimorum militum ... quam desidiosorum*, with 6 and 19) be mobilised. Only in this way can there be some remedy for *hunc inolitorum scelerum funem per tot annorum spatia ininterrupte lateque protractum* (Gildas 1; cf. Columbanus 9 *ne ... hoc fune erroris longissimo liget latro antiquus homines*).[17]

In view of these resemblances we may be emboldened to see Gildas behind three further passages of Columbanus' letter. At 4 he compares the Christians of Italy with sheep troubled by wolves: *populus ... tamquam grex pavidus turbatur et inde non cito securus est quia tantos Italia lupos habuit, quorum catuli vix toti possunt elidi, dum nimirum inter antra tanti*

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[14] Here of loud noise (~ *tacebit*). For the sense in Gildas, see my *art.cit.* (above, n.10), n.17.

[15] Cf. also Gildas 37 *tam flebilis haec querulaque malorum aevi huius historia*. But it was also outspoken (26 *si qua liberius ... immo lugubrius ... non tam disceptavero quam deflevero*), again like Columbanus' (6 *mordacius*; 11 *libertas paternae consuetudinis*; 14 *mihi nimis iniurioso asperoque cuidam loquaci* – cf. Gildas 37 *loquaci tantum temeritate*).

[16] Gildas 106 *quid ... in despecta ingenii nostri cymbula fluctuabimur*, with Columbanus 8 *fragilis ingenii cymba*. But Columbanus' wording recalls rather Cassian, *Coll.* praef. (C.S.E.L. 13,4,2), or even Jerome, *Ep.* 14,10 *inter cavas spumeis fluctibus cautes fragilis in altum cumba processit* (also echoed at Columbanus 3 *cautis spumosis concavae vorticibus*?). For the τόπος see J.W. Smit, *Studies on the Language and Style of Columba the Younger (Columbanus)* [Amsterdam 1971] 172–89, and my own article Variations on a nautical theme, forthcoming in *Hermathena*.

[17] For the merging of *funes peccatorum* (Ps. 118,61) with *qui ligant peccata tamquam funem longum* (Ital. Is. 5,18) see *T.L.L.* s.v. *funis* col. 1597,9 seq. Here again Columbanus is not thinking only of Gildas' wording.

enutriti sunt. The idea is commonplace enough, but its elaboration may remind us of Gildas' enthusiasm for wild-beast analogies.[18] At 14, J.W. Smit has ingeniously explained *quique oliginosis †celotes† palearibus* as an allusion to 'the traditional symbol of pride in Early Christian literature, the bull'.[19] To his parallels from Jerome we may add, from Gildas' invective against Maglocunus, *illis quibus praecipitanter involvi solent pingues tauri moduli tui retibus* (34; cf. also 66 *pinguedinis gratia taurorum more raucos*). And in 8 *acsi quidam campi bellici roscidus cadaverum ac madidus post pugnam contemplator* it may not be fanciful to hear a distant echo of some scenes of carnage in Gildas.[20]

Along with the content goes some of the style. In a number of chapters, Columbanus' brisk polemical rhetoric is tinged with a new colouring. I think particularly of the introductory words (1), where Columbanus modestly confronts Boniface;[21] a passage on the dangers facing Italy (3); a paean on the greatness of Rome, spiritual even more than temporal (11); a defence of Columbanus against critics who (at least amongst other things) object to his uncouth style (14); and a further passage of modesty in 16, looking back to the start. At these heightened points in the letter, though not quite only there, Columbanus employs a technique of word-order that, in view of his general use of Gildas, it is reasonable to suppose that he borrowed from the *De excidio*. François Kerlouégan has discussed and classified this phenomenon, and given instances from Columbanus;[22] from our letter note 14 *rex gentilis peregrinum scribere Longobardus Scotum hebetem rogat*, 17 *quam alacer annos supervenit pater post multos*, and also 1 *pulcherrimo omnium totius Europae ecclesiarum capiti*.[23] Again, though not only in the 'Gildan' passages, we find an abundance of alliteration

[18] See e.g. 16; 23 *Saxones ... quasi in caulas lupi ... intromitterentur ... tum erumpens grex catulorum de cubili leaenae barbarae*; and the discussion in R.W. Hanning, *The Vision of History in Early Britain* (Columbia U.P. 1966) 52 (also my The preface ..., n. 13).

[19] *Op. cit.* (n. 16), 139–40.

[20] 24 *cadaverum frusta, crustis ac si gelantibus purpurei cruoris tecta*; 28 *ita ut sacrificii caelestis sedem purpurea ac si coagulati cruoris pallia attingerent*.

[21] Cf. a similar passage in *Ep.* 1,1. Heightened passages of the kind I discuss are found occasionally elsewhere in Columbanus, especially in the first letter.

[22] Une mode stylistique dans la prose latine des pays celtiques, *Ét. Celt.* 13 (1972) 275–97, modified in my own article A Celtic hyperbaton?, forthcoming in the *Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies*.

[23] *quam alacer* ... is Kerlouégan's class IIC. *rex gentilis* ... shows a comparable clustering of adjectives, while *pulcherrimo* ..., though strictly (in Kerlouégan's language) a 'disjonction simple', shows an unusually complex interlacing of genitives.

that may look to Gildas as much as to continental rhetoric.[24] Thus 1 *papae praedulci, praecelso praesuli, pastorum pastori*; 10 *quo utrique culpabiles celerius concordate*; 11 *ille enim certus regni caelorum clavicularius est*; 13 *ideo cito, carissimi, concordate et convenite in unum et nolite contendere pro antiquis litibus.*

The heightened passages are notable for two further peculiarities: their sentence structure and their vocabulary.

Columbanus ordinarily writes periods (when he does so at all) of moderate length and tight construction. Thus (9):

Ne igitur hoc fune erroris longissimo liget latro antiquus homines,
CAUSA SCHISMATIS INCIDATUR, quaeso, confestim a te
cultello quodammodo S. Petri,
id est vera in synodo fidei confessione
et hereticorum omnium abominatione ac
anathematizatione,
ut mundes cathedram Petri ab omni errore, *si* quis est, ut aiunt, intromissus,
si non,
puritas agnoscatur ab omnibus.

In the heightened passages he moves a stage further. In 3, the sustained image of the sea is still well organised, though its members are interlaced in a complex manner. In 14, though *sed* (line 30) answers irregularly to *quamvis* (line 26), the structure remains clear. But both in 16 and, especially, in 11,[25] Columbanus seems to make a conscious effort to match the shapeless grandeur of Gildas' most characteristic constructions.[26]

It is, again, in these passages that Columbanus shows off such arcane

[24] In Gildas note e.g. 19 *magis vultus pilis quam corporum pudenda pudendisque proxima vestibus tegentes*, 65 *crebro veracium volatu volitent conviciorum cautes*. For the continent cf. e.g. Cic. *Cat.*3,29 *ut in perpetua pace esse possitis providebo, Quirites*; Apul. *Apol.*97 *quod tamen testamentum Rufinus neque comparari neque perfici passus est pudore perditae hereditatis, quam ⟨praemium⟩ paucorum mensium quibus socer Pontiani fuit magno quidem pretio noctium computarat*; Cyprian, *De cath.eccl.unit.*11 *hos eosdem denuo Dominus designat et denotat, dicens ...*; Rufinus, *Hist.eccl.*11,34 *ad meliora migravit cum piissimis principibus percepturus praemia meritorum.*

[25] The period is longer than Walker allows. Its shape is: *Quamquam enim ... urbis ... nomen ... longe lateque vulgatum est, ex eo tamen tempore quo Dei filius homo esse dignatus est ac ... per mare gentium equitans turbavit aquas et ... multiplicavit quadrigas, ⟨et⟩* [addidi] *supremus ipse auriga ... ad nos usque pervenit, ex tunc vos magni estis ... Ex tunc* picks up *ex eo tempore.*

[26] I think e.g. of Gildas 8, to be instructively contrasted with its source in Rufinus, *Hist.eccl.*2,2–3.

vocabulary as he allows himself. Kerlouégan has discussed[27] with proper caution the words employed by Gildas. He finds that the *De excidio* does not, with the possible exception of *Tithica*, use 'Hisperic' words; on the contrary, its use of foreign, especially Greek words, and glossary words, is hardly different from that of the fifth-century Gallic prose on which Gildas will ultimately have modelled himself. I suggest that it is in Columbanus that we see the first step of a series of steps that were to develop the vocabulary of Gildas into the bizarrerie of the *Hisperica Famina*: a step originating, no doubt, in Columbanus' native country. There is, as it happens, little precise overlap with the *Famina*. But *Ausonicum decus* (11) for Rome and the strange *dodrans* (also 11) are properly Hisperic; and some other words, taken with more or less originality from the Greek, have the same ring.[28]

Columbanus' letter looks forward stylistically as well as back. The rambling periods of Gildas, themselves without proper earlier precedent, were to find little other response in seventh-century Irish writers,[29] and the English Aldhelm, perhaps under continental influence, made his vast sentences masterpieces of construction. But Columbanus shows us bizarre word-order en route from Gildas to Adamnan and Aldhelm; his fondness for alliteration of *p*, having left a trace at the end of Cummian's letter to Seghene, reaches the realm of parody at the start of Aldhelm's epistle to Eahfrith;[30] and his occasional extravagance of vocabulary prepares us for the dottiness of the *Famina*. In these fields a lead given by Gildas on the basis of continental influence was taken up and exaggerated by the Irish.

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[27] In Le latin du De Excidio Britanniae de Gildas, in: *Christianity in Britain 300–700*, ed. M.W. Barley and R.P.C. Hanson (Leicester 1968), at pp.164–8, concluding that Gildas knew Hisperic Latin only in its 'gestation'. I see the picture a little differently. For Gildas and the *Famina*, see also M.W. Herren, *The Hisperica Famina: I The A-Text* (Toronto 1974), 22–3.

[28] Thus 14 *copes*, *epicroca* (see Smit, 136–7: I suspect that e.g. *bona* has fallen out in this sentence of 14: cf. also Gildas 35 *amoena quaeque inperagrata putans*), 11 *euriporum* (cf. *Ep.*1,5), 1 *micrologus* (cf. *Ep.*1,2), 11 *rheuma* (cf. *Famina* C80?), 3 *proretis* (*Lorica* 21). *Ausonicus* (Herren, 129) seems a form unique to Columbanus and the *Famina*. For *dodrans*, see Herren, 180 (his Anglo-Saxon explanation is doubtful in view of Columbanus' use of the word).

[29] The preface to Muirchú's life of Patrick (Rolls Series 89.ii.269) is not unlike Gildas in manner, but the content points rather to Cassian (see my Variations ...). Inefficiency in handling long sentences perhaps here leads by accident to a result that Gildas, as I should think, consciously sought.

[30] P.L.87,978B *cum plebis praecidite prioris praeputiis*; Aldhelm p.488,4 Ehwald (fifteen *p*'s in the first sixteen words!).

In Columbanus' fifth letter, alongside his use of the content of the *De excidio*, we can see these insular elements tempering the vigorous rhetoric that, equally, he had learned back in his homeland.

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REVIEW

E. P. Meijering, *God Being History. Studies in Patristic Philosophy.* Amsterdam-Oxford, North-Holland Publishing Company – New York, American Elsevier Publishing Company, Inc., 1975. X, 185 pp. *f* 60.—/ $ 23.25.

This book contains the photographic reproduction of eleven papers, to which a conclusive chapter has been added with the title "What could be the Relevance?" We first mention the titles of these papers, adding the page-numbers in the present volume. Three of them have been published in vol. 28 (1974) of this periodical, *viz.*, "God Cosmos History. Christian and Neo-Platonic Views on Divine Revelation" (52–80), "HN ΠΟΤΕ ΟΤΕ ΟΥΚ HN Ο ΥΙΟΣ. A Discussion on Time and Eternity" (81–88), and "Wie platonisierten Christen? Zur Grenzziehung zwischen Platonismus, kirchlichem Credo und patristischer Theologie" (133–146). The titles of the remaining eight are: "Zehn Jahre Forschung zum Thema Platonismus und Kirchenväter" (from: *Theologische Rundschau*, N.F. 36 [1971]: 1–18); "Irenaeus' Relation to Philosophy in the Light of his Concept of Free Will" (from: *Romanitas et Christianitas. Studia J. H. Waszink oblata* [Amsterdam 1973]: 19–30); "Some Observations on Irenaeus' Polemics against the Gnostics" (from: *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 27 [1973]: 31–38); "Die 'physische Erlösung' in der Theologie des Irenäus" (from: *Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis* 53 [1973]: 39–51); "Athanasius on the Father as the Origin of the Son" (from: *id.* 55 [1974]: 89–102); "The Doctrine of the Will and of the Trinity in the Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus" (from: *Nederl. Theol. Tijdschr.* 27 [1973]: 103–113); "Cyril of Alexandria on the Platonists and the Trinity" (from: *id.* 28 [1974]: 114–127); "Some Reflections on Cyril of Alexandria's Rejection of Anthropomorphism" (from: *id.* 28 [1974]: 128–132).

The final chapter has as its subject the relevance for the present times of the doctrines and theories of ancient theologians examined in these eleven papers. The chapter is opened by an introduction (147–149) concerning the different duties of the historian of theology and the

systematician, both of whom should have done "to a limited degree (and undoubtedly as amateurs) work in each other's field". The reviewer would like to add here from his own experience the observation that this requirement is particularly appropriate to a description of Tertullian's activity, who nowadays is more and more regarded as an author whose work can be explained for the full hundred percent from external facts, amongst which the continuous influence and practising of the main rules of Roman rhetorics is by far the most important factor. It is true that this importance is very great, and we must be thankful to Mr. R. D. Sider to have analysed it so well (*Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian*, Oxford 1971), but on the other hand we must never forget that all the polemic firework is eventually based on the very solid, and fairly limited, foundation of Tertullian's Christian faith which has a remarkably strong structure.

In accordance with the major problems discussed in the eleven papers mentioned above the author chooses for this final systematic reflection the notion of unchangeability in God and man, and the notion of divine revelation in history. The discussion is both exact and sagacious, and well worth reading for all types of patristic scholars. Particularly interesting is the critical description of the treatment of the notion of the unchangeability of God in the theology of Karl Barth and some of his modern critical followers of whom Berkhof should be mentioned in the first place. No less important – of easier access to scholars who are more historically or philologically trained – is the question of the relevance of the ancient doctrines concerning the divine reality in history, where Barth and Berkhof are joined by Troeltsch and Tillich as the major figures. Occasionally the reviewer (who must add at once that he is a classical philologist and not an expert at all) wonders about the absence of certain names: in his opinion, some quite important observations can be found in the work of von Campenhausen, and at all events some major Catholic theologians should have entered the scene.

One short observation: When speaking about the fairly small differences between Jewish theology of Late Antiquity and the contemporaneous forms of Platonism concerning their treatment of the subject of God's unchangeability, the author observes (150): "the great Jewish thinker Philo did not differ from the Platonists in this respect." But Philo cannot be characterized as "a Jewish thinker" as such: the two greatest specialists, Theiler and Wolfson, have qualified him as one of the most important adherents of Middle Platonism. At all events Philo is to be treated as a

special case and cannot be regarded as just representing a certain group of thinkers.

Finally, the reviewer would like to tease the author a little on account of his characterization of H. J. Adriaanse's thesis (148 not 2) as a "very learned and therefore extremely difficult thesis". His experience is that frequently very learned books, from the times of Scaliger and Grotius to those of Courcelle and Hadot, are considerably easier to read than those written by less learned authors.

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COMMUNICATION

CONFERENCE ON ST. PATRICK

A Conference on St. Patrick for scholars and research workers is being planned for August 22nd–25th, 1977, in the rooms of the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin. Every side of this potentially rich field will be included; historical, archaeological, hagiographical, philological, and literary, the tradition about Patrick, the nature of his Latin, the effects of his work, as well as his career and background. Prof. Daniel Binchy, D.Litt. has consented to be President. Prof. R.P.C. Hanson, D.D., M.R.I.A. (The University, Manchester, England) will be Secretary. It is to be desired that the approximate number of those who hope to attend should be known as soon as possible. Those in U.S.A. or Canada who are interested should communicate with Prof. J.F. Kelly, John Carroll University, University Heights, Cleveland, Ohio; others with Prof. Hanson. Those who come from outside will be accommodated.